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Abstract 
Title: Surviving Dispossession: Burmese Migrants in Thailand’s Border Economic Zones 
Adam Saltsman 
Chair: Professor Stephen Pfohl 
 This dissertation explores the intersection of gender, violence, and dispossession among 
Burmese migrants living in precarious circumstances in Thailand, close to the border with 
Myanmar. In this space, particularly in the town of Mae Sot and surrounding areas, migrants are 
targets of multiple overlapping technologies of governance, including the Thai state, 
multinational garment export processing facilities, plantation-style agricultural firms, 
international humanitarian NGOs, and transnational social and political networks. Through a 
multi-modal qualitative approach relying on collaborative action research and key informant 
interviews, I consider how this complex web of discursive and relational power simultaneously 
renders migrants invisible subjects of global supply chains and yet hyper-visible targets of 
humanitarian assistance and intervention. Invisible because actors associated with state or market 
forces performatively enforce upon migrant bodies the violent notion that they are deportable, 
reiterating the boundaries of sovereignty at each encounter. And visible because as migrants 
struggle to make ends meet working long hours for illegally low wages, NGOs spotlight their 
social problems and offer solutions that promote individual biowelfare but not wider 
transformative change. Despite what appear to be opposing forces, both forms of power 
contribute to the production of gendered border subjects that are healthy workers; ethical and 
self-reliant yet docile. 
 Migrants interpret and negotiate these overlapping systems, exerting agency as they rely 
on their own social and political networks to establish mechanisms of order that are shaped by 
but not necessarily subordinate to the disciplinary regimes of factories and farms, the juridical 
frameworks of the state, or the biopolitical gaze of NGOs. This dissertation finds that within 
these mechanisms, gender becomes a key discursive metaphor both to make sense of the 
widespread violence of displacement and to maintain collective order. Migrants’ own gendered 
performances of discipline are themselves a product of border precarity and forge pathways of 
limited agency through which migrants seek to navigate the everyday conditions of that 
precarity. 
 Throughout, this dissertation reflexively examines its own collaborative action research 
approach as well as humanitarian intervention on the border to identify ways that both are 
complicit in gendered border subjectivation. Gender in this analysis manifests itself as a set of 
discursive resources that NGO staff and migrants make use of as they seek to effect change—
albeit in ways that tend to leave unchallenged the larger structural conditions of violence and 
neoliberal sovereignty that undergird and require the formation of a docile and disposable border 
population. Thus, in one sense, this dissertation is about how migrants survive in a violent 
context of dispossession, but it is also just as much about the generative qualities of violent life, 
the spaces in which agency challenges precarity, and the ways in which performatively 
reproduced gendered hierarchies are at the center of both precarity and resistance.  
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Chapter 1—Introduction 
 
 
1. The Intervention 
 
Our truck drives past sites that have become familiar markers of Mae Sot’s 
energetic center, this diverse town on the Thailand-Myanmar border: first the gate to the 
Buddhist monastery behind the main road where I see dogs asleep in the shade of the 
temple; then, amidst two-storey shops, a row of sagging wooden houses whose sloped 
roof-lines succumb to gravity; remnants of the old face of the town. Turning right, we 
pop out of an alley onto a hectic road in the Muslim quarter of downtown where the 
smells of sawdust from lumber yards stacked with milled teak mix with the sweetness of 
frying roti, motorbike and truck exhaust, and curries with rice noodles hawked from 
sidewalk stalls—scents devoid to us today as we sit in our air-conditioned truck insulated 
from the sounds, smells, and textures we pass. This way of seeing the town from behind 
the glass of the window makes me feel like a voyeur, turning the place and its people into 
objects for consumption and “enjoyment” (Benjamin 1998: 95). When we finally weave 
our way toward the edge of town, we emerge from the tightly packed and blocky concrete 
buildings of Mae Sot to roadside dirt lots zoned for construction, intermittent high-walled 
and windowless garment factories, open fields with goats eating grass and litter, and 
finally to our destination as we turn off the paved road onto a bumpy ridged track worn 
into existence by repeated use.   
We arrive just outside the periphery of Mae Sot, pulling up in our Toyota Hilux 
bearing a USAID logo in front of the cluster of corrugated zinc and woven thatch houses 
where nearly 100 Burmese families live behind a set of oxen stables. This is the 
neighborhood known as Khok Kwai in Thai and Kyuwe Kyan in Burmese, which 
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translates in both languages to “buffalo enclosure.” Despite being less than a five-minute 
drive from the heart of Mae Sot, Kyuwe Kyan could not be more outside the urban space, 
and hidden from the view of most residents. There is no road access, and, abutting rice 
fields, Kyuwe Kyan floods severely every rainy season; all houses are on stilts and the 
water rises from the ground to just below the floor. There are pieces of board serving as 
partial plank walkways, and residents who can afford them wear rubber boots to wade up 
to the main road. Dengue fever is a major problem here.   
Rather than seeing this settlement as a contrast to the industrial border town of 
Mae Sot, it should be considered a product of the town’s—and the country’s—reliance on 
low wage and informal migrant labor.  Mae Sot is illustrative of its place as a middle 
class town in Thailand, but it is riddled with informal settlements; houses made from 
found materials crowded into the lots of individual landowners or next to factories, 
usually behind walls or out of view from the main road. They are, in this sense, invisible 
slums maintained at low cost to supply the adjacent Thai households with domestic 
workers and factories with wage laborers. In this way, places like Kyuwe Kyan are both 
inside and outside the urban space of Mae Sot. They are “Third World” spaces 
constructed in a state attempting to achieve “First World” economic status (Arnold and 
Pickles 2011). There is something ad hoc in their informality, as if they sprung up 
spontaneously in otherwise empty locales. And yet, everything about these habitations is 
deliberate: they are often in enclosed spaces, their boundaries are the boundaries of the 
landlord or factory property, they are built or allowed to be built by landlords who 
cleared and leveled their land, and in many cases these settlements developed over time; 
Kyuwe Kyan, for example, has grown slowly over a twenty-year period.   
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Now, during the dry season, as we get out of the sterile environment of the truck, 
we are hit by all the senses against which we had been shielded: in the foreground is the 
cooked chemical smell of a slow-burning trash heap—two children are stoking the 
flames, sending up a pall of engulfing yellow smoke; behind them the heat muffles the 
sounds of the settlement, giving it an empty, faraway feeling.  
Arriving in Kyuwe Kyan, we are stepping into “the field” where we will 
“mobilize the community” to take action on a village cleanup campaign migrants decided 
on during a “community health consultation” with the NGO the previous month. I am 
along for a ride as an observer with this NGO’s health team, which aims to improve 
access to basic healthcare for dozens of migrant settlements like Kyuwe Kyan along the 
border; many on the outskirts of Mae Sot, near factories, behind warehouses, adjacent to 
fields, and others in rural areas in districts to the north and south. Working on my PhD 
research, I want to know more about this place, about how it and its inhabitants were both 
part of Mae Sot and also the signification of “other” space. Though our arrival lays bare 
my privilege and that of the NGO to conduct these visits and observations—to move 
about freely, to enter the settlement—I am interested in the ambivalence and discomfort 
of these moments or the lack thereof. We unload the supplies from the bed of the truck 
and carry everything to the side of one of Kyuwe Kyan’s houses where a “community 
health volunteer” lives and where this NGO organizes its activities. Unsure of what to do, 
I watch as the staff and the volunteer put up a plastic banner with USAID’s logo and the 
message “From the American People” in large print across the wall of the house. They 
open boxes and remove tins of cookies, twenty-liter trash bags, baskets, gloves, and face 
masks, which they array on a table we brought. Soon residents gather and a representative 
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from Mae Sot General Hospital begins an animated lecture in Thai about the importance 
of maintaining a clean neighborhood, which the community health volunteer translates 
into Burmese. There are about thirty people sitting or standing nearby, listening to this 
presentation; others peer through the open windows of their houses or continue with their 
household work, seemingly oblivious. Then residents and NGO staff take gloves, bags, 
and baskets and set off through the settlement collecting bits of garbage lining the 
pathways and stacked up under houses. The trash heap smolders in the near distance. 
After about an hour we load the filled bags and baskets onto our truck and drive off, 
stopping at the dump to unload the garbage and then we head back to the office. The 
community mobilization is finished for today.   
Activities like the one described here raise a number of important questions that 
are at the center of this dissertation. For example, what do “community” and 
“mobilization” mean in this place that is, in so many ways, a site constructed out of 
dispossession, built to be a non-space? Settlements like Kyuwe Kyan and their residents 
are invisible in Mae Sot as a result of poverty, undocumented migrant status, informal 
sector livelihoods, and socially constructed gender, race, and religious identities. Wages 
for migrants are a fraction of the national minimum, the cost and effort of becoming 
registered—and thus, semi-legal—is prohibitive, and migrants work long hours on jobs 
considered dirty, dangerous, and degrading (Campbell 2013; Pearson and Kusakabe 
2012a). Outside of the workplace, they face restricted movement, have a hard time 
accessing healthcare and the justice system, and are subject to deportation or abusive 
treatment by authorities if caught outside one’s place of work (Pearson and Kusakabe 
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2013; Person et al. 2006). On top of this, they must contend with the widespread notion 
that such conditions are acceptable or appropriate for them. 
However, for the same reasons that Kyuwe Kyan residents are invisible to many 
in Mae Sot, they are hyper-visible to NGOs working in this town as the targets of 
biopolitical intervention that aim to empower them, especially women, as healthy, safe, 
and responsible individuals. These apparent contradictions reflect, in fact, a point of 
intersection between the destruction wrought by flows of global capitalism, the legacy of 
colonial hierarchies, the practice of sovereignty, and the world of humanitarian affairs.  
As such, it is important to interrogate the relationship between the types of projects 
described here, implemented by some NGOs, and the relations of production on the 
border that have shaped the town into a variegated pattern of visible homes and invisible 
slums. This means looking at how all the enclosures, settlements, and labor camps that 
are home to thousands of Burmese migrants signify the multiplication of borders that 
produce and simultaneously erase difference, rearrange and fracture sovereignty, and 
impose hierarchies which place greater value on some lives than others, and that affix 
people to place and to labor in the most intimate ways.  
This also means that it is crucial to ask how, amidst all of this, life in precarious 
spaces of dispossession goes on as subjectivities shift and migrants confront, interpret, 
and engage with these various imbricated sets of power relations. Illegality, the 
enforcement of unjust policies, exploitation, racialized and gendered discourse about 
migrants, disregard, restricted rights, and a slew of other practices and ideas all constitute 
a kind of violence that, when imposed on the migrant population’s everyday lives, 
becomes a rendering force that reproduces status iteratively and performatively. The 
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differences of class, race, and gender that these encounters enforce are integral to 
defining the nature of dispossession and the relations of production. It is unequivocally 
the case that the special economic zone of Mae Sot is profitable because of the near-free 
laborers on whose backs it is built, a condition that exists by its rationalization as 
acceptable.1 The gendered violence of constructing and maintaining an idea of a class of 
“disposable Third World women” to serve as flexible workers in outsourced care and 
domestic work, piece-rate sewing or weaving, and other forms of supply-chain 
production are instrumental aspects of labor’s intensification, diversification, and 
heterogenization in a post-Fordist era (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 88; Wright 2006).   
Moreover, flexible labor and the maintenance of precarious households are bound 
together with gendered definitions of work and the unequal burdens of social 
reproduction in a way that locates the contradictions of dispossession and capital 
accumulation in the home and family. While both men and women struggle in such 
contexts, on top of their role as flexible workers women often bear the extra burden of 
household maintenance and care imposed by patriarchal power structures (Hochschild 
and Machung 2012; Hochschild 1989; Kusakabe and Pearson 2010). At the same time, 
scholars find that these contexts often lead to crises of masculinity when it becomes 
impossible to live up to gendered standards related to the support of one’s family, and 
when both men and women are subject to disempowering regimes of discipline in 
worksites and at the hands of authorities (Sinatti 2014; Walter et al. 2004). As the strain 
                                                
1 As I note later in the dissertation, despite the prominence of the garment industry in Mae Sot, employers 
often complain of labor shortages as migrants often move from the border area to more central parts of 
Thailand where wages are higher and conditions are better. This has engendered severe efforts on the part 
of Thai security officials to prevent migrants from leaving the border area. This suggests that the garment 
sector’s profitability hinges not only on low wages, but also on the willingness of local authorities to 
sometimes break the very laws they are mandated to uphold in order to restrict migrants’ mobility.  
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of precarious labor confronts such structures, families often become the site of violence 
and conflict, which, in its own way, furthers certain notions of gender identity and 
disregards or subverts others (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Messner 1994; Kabachnik et al. 
2013). It is in this way that dispossession relates to a process of identity materialization 
and de-materialization through the multiple overlapping layers of difference imposed on 
migrants (Butler and Athanasiou 2013). 
This dissertation is concerned with these processes of subject-formation as it 
looks at how precarity is reproduced and how social actors negotiate the overlapping 
forces of dispossession, political exclusion, humanitarian intervention, and capital 
accumulation. Concerned with the productive power of gender and violence in such 
contexts, I ask in particular how migrants’ discourse linked to displacement, violence, 
and the resolution of interpersonal conflict on the border leads to the production of 
gendered political subjectivities and particular social forms that do not always conform to 
dominant power structures. This is to focus outside the workplace, in migrant labor 
camps, informal settlements, and urban neighborhoods where migrants must navigate the 
myriad forms of violence outlined above, violence that is produced and reproduced in the 
assertion of dominant meanings of dispossession, exile, and flexible labor. It is also to 
look reflexively at how, as a researcher and as somebody affiliated with humanitarian 
NGOs, my work, and the work of my colleagues is implicated in all this. I struggle with 
my goal of acting in solidarity with participants and the reality of producing and 
reproducing certain gendered and racialized knowledges of research participants/service 
users and their social problems. I interrogate this contradiction to enrich and deepen this 
dissertation’s analysis. 
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Basing my question on the idea of gender and dispossession as productive forces 
reflects a phenomenological and constructivist notion that people employ certain 
knowledges that have become available to them through their experiences or the 
inheritance of the collective experience of those by whom they are influenced (Scheutz 
1953). Also key here is Butler’s (1988) concept of performativity, which argues that 
identities and perceptions of reality are reproduced through the iterative repetition of 
discourse, practice, and affect.  Implied in both ideas is the complexity of relations in 
which assemblages of domination and resistance are never fixed but are contingent and 
always in flux. Thus, in one sense, this dissertation is about how a sample of people who 
have been uprooted from their homes in Myanmar develop ways to survive the hostile 
conditions of the Thailand-Myanmar border that are outside but linked to the normative 
juridical and social-political structures of power. Yet it is also just as much about the 
generative qualities of violent and precarious life, the spaces in which agency challenges 
precarity, and the ways in which performatively reproduced gendered hierarchies are at 
the center of both precarity and resistance. This is to suggest that dispossession does not 
always necessarily lead to more dispossession, but can and does lead to something 
alternative, and possibly resistive in a way that offers a “future that is…not the invention 
of…empires, hegemonic or subaltern” (Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006: 209).    
2. Borders, production, and gendered subjectivation 
 
 In addressing this set of questions, this dissertation makes contributions to the 
study of displacement and scholarship on the intersection and interconnectivity of 
capitalism and gendered subjectivities. This approach brings together work that tends to 
focus on structural and systemic forces linked to space and capital on the one hand, and 
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the practice and discourse of individual interaction and knowledge construction, on the 
other. Helping to tie these elements together is this dissertation’s methodology. Guided 
by the principles of Participatory Action Research, I reflexively put the social forces of 
the Thailand-Myanmar border into conversation with dynamics of knowledge 
construction that resonate between multiple situated representations of the local and 
global.   
2.1 Governance and spaces of capital accumulation in a context of displacement 
Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) assertion that space and power relations are mutually 
constitutive provides an important link in this study between work on the uneven 
geographical development of capitalism (Harvey 2006; Smith 2008) and the production 
and reproduction of particular relational assemblages and technologies of governance in 
certain locales and not others. This relates to Aihwa Ong’s (2000, 2006) concepts of 
graduated sovereignty and graduated citizenship; terms that describe shifts in the 
relationship between states, territory, governance, and subjects in ways that correspond to 
the global market dynamics of advanced capitalism. That is, as part of a neoliberal trend 
characterized by financialization and capital mobility, privatization, the imposition of 
economic rationality in everyday life, and the dwindling of the public sector, certain 
spaces and certain groups of people are exposed to regimes of discipline that reflect a 
grouping of state and supra-state market forces. As Ong (2006) points out, these regimes 
are gendered and racialized in that they assert ideas about ethnicity, femininity, and 
masculinity within the scope of production. In fact, notions about gender in terms of 
production are part of what determines the nature of reterritorialization and variegated 
categories of belonging. Spatialized power relations of capitalism and Foucault’s (2008) 
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notion of biopolitics come together to form particular regimes of discipline to manage the 
care and productivity of workers and their families. While graduated sovereignty and 
biopolitics are symptoms of advanced capitalism that arise heterogeneously in many 
forms throughout the world—from the elite spaces of technological expertise to labor-
intensive export processing zones—I focus in particular on the types of gendered 
governance found in sites rendered productive through acts of destruction and 
dispossession (Harvey 2003; Banerjee-Guha 2010). Such locales represent the sites for 
the production and distortion of social and political borders.   
This dissertation builds off of and departs from this set of concepts in that I look 
at graduated sovereignties and citizenship as not only relating to arrangements between 
the state and the market, but as contingent with the personal and collective agency of 
migrants as well as the racialized conceptions linked to the idea of the nation. I show 
how, historically, the political, and geographical formation of the Thailand-Myanmar 
border area constitutes a space that is integral to the imaginary of both countries, but 
whose perennially peripheral status also renders it a zone of exception in many ways 
where the law is applied differently. I show how the contemporary practices on the 
border linked to governance and production stem from these spatial arrangements but 
also further shape this space as one of violence and precarity for Burmese migrant 
workers there. In addition to, and interconnected with, the force relations of production 
and state-making, my research also points to the importance of social, political, and 
religious networks for migrants that extend across official boundaries. In the borderlands, 
migrant workers are not only subjects of market-oriented discipline by state security 
officials or factory managers. The extent to which Mae Sot and surrounding areas are 
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spaces of exception and exclusion allows for a proliferation of multiple overlapping and 
fragmented forms of sovereignty. These correspond to networks of power rooted in local 
communities, migrants’ semi-autonomous places of origin, and global circuits of 
discourse. Like the dynamics of production on the border, these non-market and non-state 
order-making systems advance their own gendered and racialized ideas that interact in 
their own ways with the demands of production and social reproduction. Thus, this 
dissertation argues that migrant agency and the kinds of social capital which derive from 
mobility are just as important to consider as the dynamics of market-oriented discipline 
when analyzing subjectivation in borderland special economic zones.  
2.2 Discourses of dispossession and gendered subjectivities 
 This dissertation also builds on scholarship concerned with how social actors 
make meaning of conflict and violence, and what this says about the experiences of 
dispossession, migration, and precarity. I approach this line of inquiry both theoretically 
and methodologically. In terms of the latter, having collected and analyzed data through a 
collaborative action research project with Burmese migrant rights’ activists in Mae Sot, I 
look at the overlapping mechanisms of knowledge production about gendered migrant 
identities in our assessment, the discourse of the activists involved, and my own 
assumptions. This method pushed me to both think with and about co-researchers and 
participants as well as about my own role in this study in an attempt to interrogate the 
role of scholarship on dispossession in migrants’ efforts to survive and negotiate a 
precarious environment (e.g., Jacobsen and Landau 2003). What this means is multiple 
levels of analysis: co-researchers and I looked at and discussed data as we collected it; I 
facilitated an interpretive focus group discussion with co-researchers and other activists 
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on the border; and finally, I stepped outside of the collaborative process to apply my own 
constructivist analysis of both the data we collected together as well as the first two 
analytical layers in order to tease forth a sense of how our joint project generated 
discourse in its own right. By looking at multiple layers of meaning making, I suggest 
that it is possible to focus on the interstices between the individual and collective 
construction of knowledge. 
Conceptually, this work aspires to Mignolo’s (2000) notion of “critical border 
thinking” in its analysis of how migrants negotiate their experience with dispossession in 
ways that appropriate and redefine local and transnational marginalizing discourses. I 
locate this act of negotiation within migrants’ narratives about displacement, order-
making, violence (both structural and interpersonal), and the resolution of social conflict. 
Within discussions about such experiences and practices, I find the performative 
reproduction of gendered subjectivities and the use of particular gendered tropes to make 
sense of everyday life and the challenges of dispossession. This perspective builds on the 
writings of Judith Butler (1990) on the production of the gendered subject and her work 
with Athena Athanasiou (2013), which explores how precarity and dispossession are 
conditions reproduced iteratively through discourse and practice.  
When I write subjectivities, I am referring to interactions between power and the 
self. This ascribes to a relational notion of power that infuses everyday life in a way that 
affixes the self and gives it definition as an individual with particular attributes vis-à-vis 
others, discourse, the state, and the market (Foucault 1982). Subjectivity is a fluid 
concept that engages with, constitutes, and is constituted by discursive constructs that 
appear to be static, such that one emerges as a woman or a man in ways that give 
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meaning to sex and femininity and masculinity; or one emerges as a migrant in ways that 
frame certain types of violent experiences as a natural part of what it means to be on the 
move. To Butler, who infuses psychoanalytics with a relational conception of power, 
subjectivation is a paradoxical and ambivalent process. The subject is iteratively 
produced from amidst a diverse field of possibilities in ways that are mediated by 
expectations rooted in social relations and discourse. This means that the characteristics 
that define individuals are not inherent, but arise through struggle and the assertion of 
certain qualities, truths, identities, and the subordination of others. Subjectivation, then, is 
just as much about foreclosure as it is about agency, and both occur in conflict 
simultaneously and performatively through repetitious acts of definition and self-
definition (Butler 1997). Subordination is a form of power that presses onto a subject in 
the process of its forming, meaning that, as Butler (1997: 198) puts it, “The power 
imposed upon one is the power that animates one's emergence.” To her, “there appears to 
be no escaping this ambivalence.” To the extent that all individuals embody this conflict, 
the study of how issues like violence, migration, borders, and labor intersect with gender 
on the level of subjectivity is to engage in an analysis of how the particular power 
relations bound up in these processes and concepts push individuals and collectivities to 
consider themselves and struggle with diverse notions of how to live life (Anderson et al. 
2009; Das 2008; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Ong and Peletz 1995). Importantly, Butler 
and Athanasiou look to these moments of ambivalence in the performative reproduction 
of the subject when it becomes possible to subvert and oppose the relations of domination 
in ways that do not privilege narrow interpretations of identity. In this context, these 
moments of diverting the discursive power of precarious production and biopolitical 
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governance constitute the kinds of semi-purposeful resistive subaltern acts described by 
de Certeau (1984) when he refers to “tactics.” 
 While this dissertation builds on these ideas, it complicates them by asking how 
the production of alternative subjectivities on the border for Burmese migrants can lead 
to modes of social organization that are outside the dominant market-state regimes of 
discipline but that nevertheless constrain migrant identities in gendered ways. That is, 
even as some migrants in this context organize to oppose their precarity and to restore 
and rethread some of the social fabric torn through displacement, their discourse may 
reify in its own way gender and gendered ideas of migration and survival in exile.  
Similarly, I point to an ambivalent role for humanitarian intervention on the border, 
asking whether international and grassroots NGOs engage with local and transnational 
movements for political transformation; reproduce discourses of biopolitical self-
regulation; challenge dominant notions of femininity, masculinity, and sexuality; or all of 
the above. I ask what ideas about migrants, gender, and culture underlie these 
interventions and how migrants interpret and make use of these notions in their self-
conception and everyday struggles to make order and get by.  
 As this brief description shows, my work contributes to multiple fields within the 
discipline of sociology, including the study of capitalism, development, gender and 
sexuality, and inequality and mobility. It also brings new perspectives to scholarship on 
the performative dynamics of social space, processes that transform the abstractions of 
global space into a phenomenology of lived place. Indeed, bringing these fields of study 
into conversation with one another is one of the strengths of this work. Outside of 
sociology, this dissertation brings new perspectives to scholars exploring the experiences 
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of displacement and to those interested in how dispossession, the law, and transnational 
struggles for rights intersect to limit or enable subaltern social movements. 
 
3. Locating the study of migration, supply chains, and gender production on the 
Thailand-Myanmar border 
 
 This dissertation focuses on the town of Mae Sot and the agricultural district to 
the south, Phob Phra, making comparisons between migrants’ experiences in urban and 
rural settings. As the next chapter explains in more detail, the town of Mae Sot, in the 
district of the same name, lies about four kilometers from the Thailand-Myanmar 
boundary and is the largest city in Tak Province as well as on the border (see Map 1).    
 
While much research has been done on 
migration and labor issues in Mae Sot 
(see for example, Arnold and Hewison 
2006; Aung 2010; Campbell 2013; 
Pearson and Kusakabe 2012; Pollock and 
Aung 2010; Saltsman 2014), few studies 
mention Phob Phra, despite the fact that 
this district is an example of Thailand’s 
industrialized agricultural sector, a source 
of highland products as well as cut flowers. Mae Sot’s status as a zone plugged into 
regional and global production circuits makes it an attractive site for research on the 
dynamics of capital accumulation and flexible labor, but no studies have compared the 
extent to which the power relations and disciplinary regimes associated with the export 
processing industry there are unique to this zone of multinational investment and activity, 
Map 1: Mae Sot and Phob Phra Districts, Tak Province 
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and what their relations are with nearby areas “outside” transnational production 
networks. Though the difference in experiences migrants have in rural and urban areas 
along the border does not constitute the main argument of the dissertation, the 
comparison helps to situate the findings in broader discussions about the political 
economy of borderlands. 
To place this dissertation’s focus into perspective, scholarship as well as policy 
tends to analytically divide the population of Burmese displaced in Thailand into two 
categories: refugees or displaced persons (primarily residents of nine camps along the 
Thai side of the border) and people on the move for primarily economic reasons who live 
in Thailand’s rural and urban areas (Brees 2009; Grundy-Warr and Wong 2002; Saltsman 
2014). The category of refugee typically corresponds to rural upland populations of 
southeastern Myanmar displaced by conflict as well as those fleeing state persecution, 
often from more urban areas (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009; Lang 2002). The category of 
economic migrant refers to those Burmese people who have moved to Thailand over the 
last thirty years in search of opportunity (Rabibhadana and Hayami 2013). Based on the 
lived experiences of all those leaving Myanmar, the distinction between refugee and 
migrant is essentially a construct in that economic reasons cannot be unlinked from the 
broader effects of militarism and war (Caouette and Pack 2002; Green et al. 2008). 
Nevertheless, the ideal type categories are important to enumerate here as they play a role 
in the discourse about migration on the border.2   
                                                
2 Making comparisons between migrants and camp-based refugees has become increasingly prevalent 
in literature on forced migration, as scholars articulate the importance of urban spaces in terms of 
protection, economic opportunity, access to social networks, and new ways of articulating the 
relationship between forced migrants, the state, the host population, and the growing numbers of urban 
poor (Jacobsen 2006; Agier 2002; Malkki 1995).   
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This dissertation is also deliberate about centering the border as a place of study, 
albeit one that is not isolated, but linked in and connected to territories, populations, and 
relations of power at disparate points around the globe. Borders between visibility and 
invisibility, exclusion and inclusion, and disposability and valued life are to be found not 
only on the physical boundaries of states, but in every corner of their territories in the 
form of affect, discourse, and interaction (Agamben 1998; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). 
Nevertheless, while the significance of some geographic boundaries is downplayed 
(states within the EU, for example), others reflect the gathering point of many of today’s 
figurative borders. These constitute manifestations of states’ policies and attitudes 
regarding the edges of their bounded and imagined communities (Anderson 1991). They 
are places of beginning and ending; where nations cease to be nations or are called into 
being (Thongchai 2003). As a result, the borderlands are where a plethora of border-
related subjectivities and practices coalesce and confront one another. They are the 
territories to which states and private firms look to tuck “third world” production sites out 
of view; where refugee camps are built alongside “off-the-grid” labor camps and 
factories. They are the spaces in which multiple identities—racial, class, 
gender/sexuality, national, and ethnic—are made and contested (Balibar 2002). Because 
it is here that migrants’ daily discrete crossings back and forth between countries 
destabilize notions of state boundaries as the parameters of “national/regional culture,” 
these are also the loci where security forces gather to articulate and defend these ideas.   
On top of all this, borderlands are significant because they are spaces that are at 
once liminal and generative of subjectivities that challenge dominant or normative 
notions of identity and belonging (Lamont and Melnár 2002; Téllez 2008). The 
 18 
“creolization” or mestiza identities of borderlands suggests an assertion of identity from 
the cracks of state and imperial homogenization, an exertion of the double-consciousness 
that arises from subjectivation in the imbricated space between subjugated and dominant 
histories (Anzaldua 1987). The goal then is not to write about practices on the border but 
to “think from the borders themselves” to rewrite “geographic frontiers, imperial/colonial 
subjectivities and territorial epistemologies” (Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006: 214). 
Discourse and practice related to inclusion, exclusion, recognition, and dispossession on 
borders make visible broader practices related to how states, markets, individuals, and 
collectivities are engaged in an ongoing process of determining hierarchies of 
subjecthood. The sites where this research was conducted, introduced below, represent 
these sorts of locales where multiple borders meet, overlap, and confront one another. 
While the following chapters contain further details that convey some idea about 
migrants’ experiences in these sites, I briefly mention some basic points here.   
 
 
Map 2: Mae Sot research sites 
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3.1 Htone Taung (Map 2) 
Situated behind Mae Sot General Hospital, this dense urban neighborhood 
consists of several blocks, some of which are further divided into communities, like Ya 
Mar Kin, Medina, and Wat Luang, colloquial names that mostly refer to landmarks such 
as factories, temples, and mosques. There is a great diversity of housing in this section, 
including two-storey concrete structures and single-floor row-houses with small and long 
apartments divided into two or three rooms. There are also clusters of houses made from 
found materials, thatch, zinc and/or bamboo. The streets are narrow here and alternate 
from organized blocks to winding alleys. Despite being made up of many blocks and 
despite the fact that there are no walls or gates closing off the neighborhood, there are 
only three roads to get into or out of Htone Taung. In this sense, the place feels bounded 
with a distinct inside and outside. The back of the community abuts rice paddy and forms 
part of the outer edge of Mae Sot town. The fact that one can step out from the last alley 
of Htone Taung into fields is a reminder that this 
neighborhood is on the periphery, though the heart of 
the place feels urban, albeit separated from the 
downtown area by the hospital and the layout of 
roads.     
NGOs in Mae Sot estimate that approximately 2,500-3,000 Burmese people live 
here, though one group asserts the figure is closer to 4,000. An unknown number of these 
migrants are without legal status in Thailand. The most populous site in this study, Htone 
Taung, is also the most diverse with many different ethnic and religious groups from 
Myanmar living there. In some areas, particularly the more upscale, the Burmese 
Photo 1: Houses in Htone Taung 
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population shares space with Thai residents. The smaller community within this 
neighborhood known as Medina is primarily Muslim and, as chapter five shows, with a 
mosque and an imam, is connected to the Muslim council of Mae Sot, a Thai 
organization. There are also several migrant learning centers and grassroots 
organizations, including Social Action for Women, one organization involved in this 
study. Together, these institutions give the neighborhood a feeling of vibrancy as an 
organized but varied set of spaces and peoples. That said, the many lines of difference 
here serve as a reminder that assigning the term “community” to Htone Taung is an 
arbitrary endeavor that is ignorant at best and risks subjugating certain voices. This is not 
one single group of people, but many crammed together. Keeping this in mind, I do not 
consider the place to be an analytical unit by itself. Rather I rely on findings from Htone 
Taung as part of an urban sample, together with Kyuwe Kyan.  
3.2 Kyuwe Kyan (Map 2) 
 Kwye Kyan, already introduced at the start of this chapter, is a group of 
approximately eighty-six houses behind a buffalo stable situated on the southeastern edge 
of Mae Sot (the number of houses fluctuates 
slightly) (see Map 2 shown above). In front of 
the neighborhood are private homes and 
factories divided by streets and alleys that 
eventually lead to the heart of the city. One of 
these houses is a large two-storey villa 
belonging to a junior police officer. Its high-
walled perimeter, which blocks both the officer’s family from seeing Kwye Kyan and the 
Photo 2: Police officers home near 
Kyuwe Kyan 
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latter’s residents from accessing the property, is symbolic of Mae Sot’s relationship with 
this informal settlement.  
Everything about this site defines it as peripheral in relation to the space and 
people of Mae Sot. Geographically, two sides of the settlement border wetlands, rice 
paddies, and cornfields, which extend to outlying villages and eventually the highway. In 
appearance, Kwye Kyan contrasts the concrete 
organized structures of Mae Sot with less 
permanent construction. Unlike Htone Taung, 
which is tapped into Mae Sot’s power and water 
grid, Kyuwe Kyan has no running water and 
gets its electricity from a spliced wire hooked up 
to the landlord’s house nearby. While Htone 
Taung reflects a more recognized segment of Mae Sot’s Burmese population—with many 
working in factories—Kyuwe Kyan residents tend to work in those sectors which are 
invisible to most of the town; livelihood practices linked to waste picking and sorting. On 
an additional level, residents of Kyuwe Kyan, who are generally darker and poorer than 
other residents of Mae Sot, including the Burmese population, are subject to the place’s 
racialized hierarchies that render them alien among a broader population of alien others.   
All these factors render Kwye Kyan an undesirable place, a slum on the edge of 
town to be regarded suspiciously by those who are aware of it. Though the owner of the 
property on which Kyuwe Kyan sits is a middle class Thai man who raises and sells 
buffalo and has been renting out the space to these Burmese Muslim migrants for more 
than fifteen years, authorities look to the place and its estimated 400 mostly 
Photo 3: Kyuwe Kyan in the background 
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undocumented residents as prone to crime and drug addiction. They are a minority within 
Mae Sot’s minority, a factor that, as subsequent chapters show, manifests itself in 
particular types of discourses, interventions, and discipline.  
3.3 Pyaung Gyi Win and Rim Nam (Map 3) 
Not far from the Mae Sot-Phob Phra highway, close to the forty-two kilometer 
marker, one finds this collection of labor camps adjacent to one another. One site is a 
compound with high walls and dozens of migrant households set apart from the 
landlord’s house. The place next to it consists of rows of thatch, corrugated zinc, and 
bamboo huts on land cut out of a cornfield, giving the impression of a temporary labor 
camp, one that exists today and can be erased tomorrow. Indeed, a fire swept through this 
part of the settlement in 2012, burning down an NGO’s health post and several houses.   
 
 
 
 
 
These sites go by different names; different organizations refer to the whole area as 
KM42 (such as the International Rescue Committee, which only works in the compound) 
while others call the labor camp in the cornfields KM44 and refer to the compound as 
Pyaung Gyi Win. The latter literally means “baldie’s land” in Burmese, an example of a 
widespread trend among workers to give nicknames to worksites like farms and factories. 
Part of the reason for the difference in names is that the owner of Pyaung Gyi Win lives 
in the village that corresponds to KM42 while the labor camp adjacent to the compound 
Photo 4: Pyaung Gyi Win (left) & Rim Nam (right) 
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has an owner that lives in KM44 village. Nearby these labor camps are Hmong and Meo 
households, ethnic minority groups in Thailand that moved into this particular area in the 
last thirty years from other highland parts of the country.  
Though these settlements are close to the highway, they feel isolated because they 
are on employers’ properties and are not part of any town or village. That is, when a 
migrant needs to go to a market or some other facility, such as a school or health clinic, 
she or he must first traverse others’ land and must then walk at least two or three 
kilometers on a dirt road to the highway. There is limited sanitation and no running water 
here. In the labor camp in the cornfields, there is limited electricity. Only a few houses 
have small wires that lead off from the farm through their roofs. In front of each house is 
a small wooden frame where residents can garden or hang their laundry. Despite the 
Map 3: Phop Phra research sites 
 24 
temporary appearance, a Burmese community leader living in the KM44 labor camp 
reports that he is familiar with migrants who have lived on or around that land for more 
than twenty years, since the early to mid-1990s. Between the two sites of Pyaung Gyi 
Win and KM44’s labor camp, “Rim Nam,” it is believed that there are approximately 
1,000 Burmese migrant workers, though there is no precise number.  The International 
Rescue Committee counts only 272 in the Pyaung Gyi Win compound while a 
community leader from the KM44 labor camp (Rim Nam) estimates that there are 1,000-
1,500 in his area as well as migrant housing on the other side of the road. There are 
religious and ethnic differences in these sites, with many residents identifying as 
Christian or Buddhist, though, as noted elsewhere, this study did not inquire about 
participants’ religious and ethnic identities in order to ensure a more comfortable 
interview setting.  
3.4 Kilometer 48 (Romklao Sahamit) (Map 3) 
Colloquially, residents refer to this village as KM48 or even just 48, which 
translates to See-Sib Bet in Thai or Leh Sey Shit in Burmese. However, the official Thai 
name of KM48, Romklao Sahamit, which translates to “under the protection of the king,” 
communicates something of this place’s involvement in the Thai government’s efforts to 
secure the borderlands in the late 20th century. I outline this history in the next chapter, 
but it is worth noting here that the diverse population of this village stems from 
Thailand’s anti-communist counter-insurgency campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
former head of the village, until his death, had been a militia commander with one of 
Thailand’s paramilitary groups. In this sense, KM48 represents the many layers of social 
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dislocation and violence that gives Phob Phra the topographical and demographic 
contours it has today.  
KM48, as the name suggests, is forty-eight kilometers from Mae Sot. It is also 
only six kilometers from the border with Myanmar. However, there is no official border 
crossing here; the international boundary is the Moei River and is minimally enforced in 
Phob Phra. KM48 is a hub for all the agriculture along a fifteen-kilometer stretch of the 
highway. It is larger and has a more centralized character than most of the other villages 
along the road with actual blocks divided by fifteen different soi, or alleys, the smaller of 
which are dirt, and the larger of which are paved. The village extends behind a large 
wooden arch with the official Thai name written in gold-painted letters. Leading into the 
community from here, along the main stretch of road, there is a small market, a few 
restaurants, and rows of shops selling farm equipment. Farmers and workers from a 
number of villages on a back road off the highway come to KM48 regularly for gas or to 
make purchases. This includes people from Pyaung Gyi Win / Rim Nam which is only 
six kilometers away. 
Divided as it is into blocks, KM48 does not have the same feel as Pyaung Gyi 
Win / Rim Nam just down the road. It is less isolated and more crowded with a number 
of different enclosures and a high diversity of ethnic groups and languages spoken here, 
part of the place’s history. The majority of residents in KM48 are immigrants who have 
permanent status as ethnic minorities in Thailand. Migrants typically live with owners in 
their enclosures, sometimes working for those landlords as farmhands or domestic 
workers, or they just rent the space from these landlords and travel to nearby farms to do 
agricultural work. As a result of this layout, one cannot talk about a single community of 
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migrant workers. Migrants’ situations vary greatly depending on their relationship with 
their landlord or employer, the size of their compound, the number of workers living 
together, and the housing conditions in enclosures.   
Population estimates vary depending on the part of the village to which 
participants are referring, though NGOs and local government guess that there are around 
1,500 to 2,000 Burmese people in the KM48 area. Other participants referred to the 
specific population of Burmese in the lane or alley on which they live. For example, 
participants identified seventy Burmese houses on lane four, in different properties, fifty 
houses on lane five, forty houses on lane six, and eleven houses on lane seven.   
Between February 2013 and February 2014, co-researchers and I visited these 
sites in Phob Phra and Mae Sot numerous times. Though some researchers were quite 
familiar with residents in certain communities because of activities run by their NGOs, 
we were all constantly negotiating different levels of outsider and insider status, a topic I 
pick up in chapter three. Nevertheless, the data we collected for our assessment—and for 
this dissertation—was to design specific service and advocacy activities and, even as this 
dissertation is finished and I am no longer on the border, the activists that were involved 
in this study continue to maintain relationships and connections in the places where we 
conducted our research. 
 
4. Questioning the boundaries of the “field” 
 Writing about migrant communities comes with enormous risks of essentializing 
and fetishizing both people and landscape in a way that reproduces hierarchies of 
difference. To write “from the borders” as Mignolo and Tslostanova (2006) direct is to 
engage in a form of methodological and analytical praxis; to move iteratively between 
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reflexive interrogation and dialogic analysis in a way that de-centers reifying conceptual 
frameworks (Cornwall and Molyneux 2006). Though this dissertation is not an 
ethnography, I was in many ways a participant observer. Always negotiating my place in 
an activist-scholar spectrum, I conducted the research for this study while affiliated with 
various organizations. To carry out the collaborative assessment that makes up a 
significant portion of this dissertation’s data, I worked with six local NGOs (five of 
which are unregistered, and thus officially illegal in Thailand) and two international 
NGOs; one of the latter funded the project and provided logistical support. Earlier, I was 
a consultant with an international human rights NGO doing research on Thailand’s 
refugee policy, and at another point I volunteered with a local unregistered Burmese 
community organization to help them secure funding for their projects. Not only did these 
experiences pull me in various directions according to the agendas of the groups with 
whom I worked, but they created opportunities to explore the ways that power and 
privilege intersected in various venues to reproduce dialectics between different forms of 
knowledge.   
 Though my language abilities (English and Thai but not Burmese), my 
nationality, and appearance (white, North American male), and many other aspects of my 
background—including class and professional/academic experience—render me an 
outsider in the communities of Mae Sot (Burmese, Thai, and others), this is also a town in 
which I have spent more than two years on and off during a period of more than half a 
decade. This means I have established friendly and professional relationships within 
multiple communities, including Burmese activists, Thai activists, Thai NGO staff, Thai 
academics, and foreign aid workers. It also means that I was attempting to work in 
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solidarity with migrant rights groups (in the way that I could without Burmese language 
abilities). These factors, together with the collaborative nature of the study did not, of 
course, make me an insider, but instead revealed the extent to which even supposed 
“insiders” were “outsiders,” a comment on the many lines of division piercing this town 
and its population. In addition, my work there meant that I was somebody embedded in 
local power relations, albeit with a critical perspective. I do not write this as evidence of 
“access” to participant communities. Rather, if anything, I am implicated in the very 
processes that I analyze and critique in this dissertation. The discourse I examine in the 
following chapters includes that which I myself helped produce and circulate, only 
sometimes wittingly. This is what I mean by participant observer. However, instead of 
seeing this as a limitation, I read in my position the inevitable partiality that any study 
brings. And I have used this reflexivity to broaden my scholarly lens to include in the 
analysis my work, the work of my colleagues, and the transnational and institutional 
knowledges we both represent and with which we grapple. As well, being a participant 
observer means that the questions guiding this dissertation come not only from the 
dozens of hours of taped interviews, but also from hundreds of informal conversations, 
shared moments of solidarity, and observations made over an extended period.    
 
5. Dissertation outline 
 
 To address this dissertation’s questions and weave together the various conceptual 
threads discussed above, each chapter deals with a different aspect of how practice and 
discourse in this context link to the process of subjectivation. I move in the next chapter 
towards a discussion of space, its construction, and its capacity to generate particular 
social relations. Chapter two focuses on the development of the border space through the 
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discussion of three significant historical epochs: prior to the colonial era, the period of 
modernity and colonial rule, and the late twentieth century’s transition to globalized 
neoliberal capitalism. Each of these moments contributed to the construction of racialized 
and gendered notions of geographic difference that today designates the borderlands as 
marginal, wild, and lawless; and its “non-Thai” inhabitants as outsiders. The role of the 
borderlands as a place of exile, refuge, social dislocation, and smuggling/trafficking 
stems from this discursive and material construction and also fuels the iterative 
reproduction of power structures that influence the lives of migrants living and working 
there. 
Thus, rather than outlining a detailed history of the region, the chapter is more 
concerned with looking at the production and reproduction of discourse that labels the 
border as a space that is simultaneously outside the imagined community of Thailand and 
in need of control. During the years prior to colonialism, the production of difference 
adhered to geographic and topographic distinctions between lowland polities and 
highland peoples. This was a categorization that hardened into binaries during the 
colonial era when the British (in what was then Burma) and the monarchy and 
principalities of Siam asserted ideas of nation founded on territory and racial difference. 
Simultaneously, the border at this time was constructed as a frontier space rich with 
resources to be claimed and exploited by imperial or state powers. This duality—physical 
territory to be controlled and a peripheral, alien, population within national boundaries—
not only defined the nation and national identity but instilled in people and places the 
makings of borders between inclusion and exclusion. Subsequent eras in both Myanmar 
and Thailand involving insurgency and counter insurgency, smuggling, displacement (of 
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people into and within Thailand), social dislocation, and development all reproduced this 
contradictory relationship in their own way, and often in subtly gendered terms. This 
includes the Cold War and anti-colonial struggles in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, 
which sent initial waves of refugees into Thailand in the 1970s and 1980s. More recently, 
market and government reforms as well as economic crisis further transformed the border 
area, capitalizing on the history of marginality, alienation, and gendered narratives of 
management, profitability, and resource extraction. Moving through history in this way, I 
show that the violence of the border, migrants’ responses, and the gendered political 
subjectivities which emerge in this space are related to not only the more recent dynamics 
of advanced capitalism, but also to the role of the borderlands in the national imaginaries 
of Thailand and Myanmar.   
 In chapter three, I outline and interrogate the dissertation’s methodology by 
looking at the issue of representation and voice in the research process and tying this into 
a broader conversation about conceiving of gender violence and community in contexts 
of displacement. I start by presenting a conceptual framework of power, knowledge, and 
Participatory Action Research that forms the foundation of this dissertation’s methods. 
This includes looking at the difference between experiential local and expert institutional 
knowledges, and the types of power relations that lead to their circulation, reproduction, 
or supression (Smith 1990). An important concept for this dissertation that I introduce 
here is the Foucauldian notion that identities and knowledges are embedded in power 
relations to the extent that some ideas are privileged as normal and valid, emerging as 
dominant, whereas others are considered biased, emotional, invalid, and are thus regarded 
as inferior. I emphasize, though, the haunting nature of those submerged knowledges or 
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voices; they take on what Gordon (2008) calls a “ghostly nature,” exerting an influence 
from a place of invisibility.   
 I also provide a detailed description of the specific methods relied on in this 
study, which include a collaborative action research project employing qualitative data 
collection strategies and a multi-layered analysis, as mentioned above. The design of the 
methods strove to privilege ideas that arose from a forum of knowledge production in 
which Burmese migrant rights activists and I engaged with one another’s interpretations 
of gender violence and humanitarian intervention on the border. However, I point out that 
within this research approach there emerged important lines of difference and hierarchy 
worth examining for what they say about the interplay between local/experiential and 
expert knowledges and how this affects the lives of those migrant workers our 
collaborative action research project aimed to support. 
 Chapter four takes these subtle discursive expressions of power and places them 
on a continuum with some of the more material constraints placed on migrants’ lives that 
one finds on the border. I rely on concepts of structural violence and precarity, which 
help frame the uncertainty, insecurity, discrimination, and exploitative conditions of 
migrants’ lives on the Thailand-Myanmar border. I show that these less visible forms of 
violence are part of what makes the migrant population flexible and deportable in the 
eyes of many, and also forms an important context for any analysis of more conspicuous 
forms of violence among individuals and collectivities.  
 Having laid out these ideas, I look at the development of migrant policy in 
Thailand and the ways that this supports the establishment of a population of registered 
but illegal migrant workers (and a larger group of migrants who are altogether 
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undocumented); a set of laws and policies built to protect a notion of Thai-ness, attract 
foreign direct investment, and keep Thailand competitive in an economic era of mobile 
capital. Beyond these institutional mechanisms, though, I show that what places the 
greatest constraints on the migrant population is the symbolic and invisible violence of 
these policies. By this I mean the ideas about worth and humanity conveyed by a lack of 
rights, and the ways that the meaning of these policies enters into the interactions among 
migrants, authorities, employers, and other actors. These interactions inscribe the 
violence of precarious status onto the bodies of migrants in gendered ways and erect 
barriers that narrow the set of choices they have for determining how to survive and make 
ends meet. It is in this way that the precarity of the border plays a role in migrants’ 
gendered subjectivation. As Farmer (2004) reminds us, the most nefarious side of this 
structural violence is its power of erasure, to naturalize and render the subordinate status 
of illegal others seemingly inevitable.   
 In chapter five, I begin to consider some of the ways that migrants on the 
Thailand-Myanmar border respond to the subaltern status imposed on them through a 
variety of mechanisms that support a parallel set of social structures. I note that these 
informal institutions are built on migrant social and political networks that extend across 
boundaries, multiplying the borders of migrants’ lives, and offering subjectivities that are 
linked to the dominant power relations of state and market, but not bound by these 
dynamics. I look in particular at the informal systems migrants encounter and on which 
they rely to make order, keep peace, and resolve interpersonal conflicts, especially those 
related to intimate partner violence. In a place where both state and market practices are, 
in many ways, built on certain notions of gender, looking at intimate partner conflicts and 
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their resolution reveals important areas to see both how borderland precarity produces 
gender and how gender as a concept is embedded in migrants’ tactics for negotiating that 
precarity. 
 I devote the first half of the chapter to an analysis of the networks and informal 
systems used to solve disputes in both rural and urban parts of the border. I consider the 
ways these networks are rooted in the border’s history, as noted in chapter two, but how 
they also interact with the demands of flexible labor routines, and navigate the constraints 
imposed via the systems and institutions of enforced deportability. I also look at how 
these technologies of governance, together with the living and working conditions 
migrants face, result in certain forms of self-regulation and discipline in ways that reflect 
a neoliberal withdrawal of the state. However, while it is the case that this is coupled with 
an augmented role for private firms in the management of workers’ lives, this chapter 
suggests that sources of ordering are more diverse, stemming from multiple locations, 
including those developed out of migrants’ own social and political networks that are 
informed by but not yoked to the relations of production.  
In the second part of the chapter, I look to the discursive and gendered overtones 
of these alternative modes of governance. By analyzing the narratives of mediators and 
leaders who come from migrant communities, I consider the importance of gendered 
ethical and religious tropes. These authorities rely on such discourse to make order, but at 
the same time, their language serves to make meaning of the experience of displacement 
and to provide some indication as to how they think migrants need to act in order to 
survive such difficult conditions. These moral threads tie people together in a context 
where power relations seem intent on tearing them apart, but at the same time, they have 
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important implications for how they reproduce certain gendered hierarchies.   
 Continuing the thread of looking at gender as communicative and productive, 
chapter six focuses on participants’ and co-researcher’s narratives related to violence 
(especially gender violence) and its resolution. I locate this analysis within the literature 
on the mutually constitutive roles of gender and capital, a body of work that regards 
gender as performative and productive of social and power relations in global supply 
chains (see for example, Salzinger 2003; Wright 2006). This chapter’s approach, 
however, is to look at social relations outside the workplace as reflective of migrants’ 
struggle with precarious conditions and their reliance on complex networks for social 
support. By looking at discourse around gender violence in the community and home as 
well as the resolution of such conflicts, I am centering this chapter on the pressures 
migrants encounter at the intersection of the demands for social reproduction, the 
insecurity of work in this setting, and the ways these affect notions of masculinity and 
femininity.  
 Within participants’ narratives, I find that gender is both produced as well as 
productive. That is, participants’ discourse reinforces certain identities at the same time 
that those ideas serve as metonyms that help make sense of the challenges of 
dispossession. Central to migrants’ narratives was the theme of violence, and in this 
chapter, I explore the ways that the communicativity of this violence is part of an iterative 
discursive and affective process that has a disciplinary role in migrants’ lives in ways that 
buttress the demands of production networks, but that claim ownership over individual 
choice. Some migrants also rely on gendered explanations to reconcile with the violence 
around them. In the final part of the chapter, I focus in particular on the role of migrants’ 
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narrative and collective memories about gender and sexual violence in Myanmar. 
Participants’ experiences with stories of gender and sexual aggression before they left for 
Thailand were formative in their thinking about social problems in the present on the 
border and the best way to deal with them. In this sense, the spatio-temporal shifts caused 
by displacement stretch migrants’ conception of life in the host country and ways of 
negotiating precarity to include memories and encounters from both their place of origin 
and host country. I underscore that in these processes of navigating the constraints of life 
in Thailand, the trend of relying on conservative notions of home and culture may prove 
useful in fostering a certain solidarity, but at the same time it reifies a narrow view of 
gender identities that exclude the lived reality of many men and women. Perhaps most 
subtle here is the interplay between this way of coping with dispossession and the 
reproduction of the precarious conditions of labor. In this sense, gender as trope becomes 
a mechanism for the displacement of the injustices migrants face from the relations of 
capital to their own bodies and families.    
 However, migrants must also contend with the gendered narratives of 
humanitarian interventions that seek to protect their biowelfare. In chapter seven, I turn 
toward the question of how discourses within these interventions linked to women’s 
rights circulate in migrant communities, and what this means for the possibility of 
political change. Situating the global movements related to gender justice and the 
practices of the humanitarian industry within the context of capital accumulation, I reveal 
the tendencies for such forms of intervention to reproduce the neoliberal emphasis on 
individualized biowelfare, self-care, and self-regulation—all forms of Foucault’s 
biopower (2008) and what Merton (1957) might refer to as “latent functions.” Key in 
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global discourses about women’s rights are racialized overtones about “Third World 
Women” that invoke neocolonial hierarchies. I consider these issues by analyzing local 
activists’ “theories of change”; that is, their notions about what is needed to achieve a 
level of gender justice for Burmese women on the border and elsewhere, including 
Myanmar. My particular interest is in interpreting that which is not said explicitly in 
these theories, which rather linearly move from oppression to liberation.    
With an approach of interpreting between the lines, one of the goals in this 
chapter is to trace what Avery Gordon (2008) calls the “seething” presence of race and 
gender differences as a resonating force between discourse framed as global and sites 
considered “local.” I question whether these discursive threads constitute sources of 
stigma for the targets of aid, the migrant participants in this study, in a way that 
demonstrates colonialism’s transnational linkages of race, class, and gender inscribed in 
individual minds and bodies. In addition to considering how activists relate to and 
interpret these global discourses as they formulate platforms for change, this chapter also 
puts local activists’ ideas into conversation with the perceptions of migrants in the four 
sites where data were collected. This enables an analysis of how ideas move among the 
global arenas of language, the local interlocutors—or “vernacularizers” as Merry (2006) 
puts it—and the migrants whose lives these interventions aim to improve. In the last part 
of the chapter, to comment on the variance between discourse and practice, I contrast the 
activities of womens’ rights and humanitarian/service NGOs on the border with the 
informal tactics on which migrants rely as they maintain peace and strive for a form of 
gender justice on their own. 
 In the concluding chapter, I bring together the various arguments raised 
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throughout the dissertation to discuss implications on three levels. First, and most 
importantly, I write what the findings discussed here might suggest for the lives of the 
study’s participants, both co-researchers and migrants in the four sites. I ask what 
gendered subjectivities on the border have to say about people’s future, their choices, and 
the possibilities for broader transformation in the conditions of displacement and the 
relations of production. Second, I consider what this study’s findings reveal about state 
practices in Myanmar and Thailand at a time of great change. I highlight what the politics 
of the border could mean for Myanmar as it struggles with questions of political reform 
and opens its markets to the demands of global capitalism. The focus in this dissertation 
on subjectivation brings nuance to a discussion about how women’s rights campaigns on 
the border relate to those in Myanmar. I also look at what border politics mean for 
Thailand as a society and for the region of Southeast Asia as 2015 marks the formal start 
of a regional economic body: the ASEAN Economic Community, a concept that hinges 
on the perpetuation of flexible labor. Finally, I consider the implications of my findings 
for further research on borders and in contexts of dispossession. As well, I show that 
while findings reaffirm the importance of thinking with and not only about participants in 
such settings, it is just as important to analyze the nuanced challenges of engaging in such 
work. With such a reflexive approach, I deepen understanding of how the practice of 
research is part of the nuanced dialectic over knowledge and identity for those navigating 
displacement. 
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Chapter 2—Boundary as Other: the construction of the Thailand-Myanmar 
borderlands in historical perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
  
Lying in a broad river valley between two ridges, the densely populated and 
smoky border city of Mae Sot resembles an urban island surrounded on all sides by fields 
and separated from lowland Thailand and Myanmar by the Tenasserim Hills and the Shan 
Highlands. This juxtaposition of forest against town is one of the border area’s many 
contrasts. The place is at once bucolic and industrial as it is simultaneously remote and 
plugged in to global production networks. It is also as much Burmese as it is Thai; the 
border is both a site of refuge for Burmese migrants fleeing their country and a space 
defined by the exploitation and lack of rights those migrants face. These contrasts relate 
in many ways to how the border zone fits within the contemporary dynamic of 
capitalism. Spaces considered peripheral in the “Global South” are frequently 
reterritorialized and developed as labor-intensive low-wage sites of production in global 
supply chains. However, in the case of Mae Sot, such contrasts are only a current 
iteration of two recurring contradictions that have played out for centuries on the 
Thailand-Myanmar border. First: the tension between a statist belief that the borderlands 
are in need of inclusion in order to be better controlled and the imperative to exclude 
them on some level so that they will remain peripheral. And second: contrasting with 
state desires for control is the reality of the semi-autonomous social systems of the people 
living there.  
As scholars have suggested, the contradiction between the desire to control and 
the perceived need to exclude is foundational to the discursive construction of a border 
between Thailand and Myanmar; in terms of both the rationale for the boundary and the 
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meaning ascribed to the line dividing the two states (Pinkaew 2003a; Toyota 2007; 
Thongchai 1994). And yet, in the space carved out between inclusion and exclusion, one 
finds a persistent autonomy among those inhabiting the Thailand-Myanmar frontier. 
Following from this, I ask in this chapter what role repetitive acts of discursive 
construction play in the social forms and power relations that one finds on the border 
today and that are central to the focus of this dissertation. With this question, I use this 
chapter to ground this dissertation’s arguments in a phenomenological and constructivist 
interpretation of space, especially border spaces. Though gender is not this chapter’s 
main focus, I show how the structural violence, the modes of social organization, the 
gendered discourses and practices, and the emergent political subjectivities of migrants 
analyzed in subsequent chapters are related not only to the flows of capitalism but also to 
the very meaning and maintenance of the Thailand-Myanmar border. As such, I suggest 
that the social dynamics examined in this dissertation cannot be unyoked from broader 
considerations of national and regional identities.  
I begin this chapter with an explication of my theoretical position vis-à-vis space 
and borders. The notion that a discursive contradiction repeated iteratively in different 
forms can have a defining role in constructing and reaffirming a state boundary, which is 
itself not fixed but consists of multiple fragmented lines of differentiation, is founded on 
certain assumptions that require a bit of explanation. In this next section, I briefly bring 
together political, economic and post-structural notions of socially constructed spaces 
with postcolonial interpretations of borders and their emergence at a particular 
intersection between modernity and the rise of empires and nation-states. This includes 
the idea that discourse can constitute space and influence its physical appearance, which 
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in turn can lead to certain social relations and power arrangements (see for example, 
Lefebvre 1991). I consider also the relevance of Thongchai’s (1994) concept of geo-
body, i.e., the linking of territory and national consciousness to an analysis of how power, 
identity, and conflict overlap in peripheral spaces. A third important angle builds on the 
work of scholars who point to borders as sites of transformation in the reconfiguration of 
sovereignty, territory, and gendered subjectivities which is endemic in contemporary 
advanced capitalism (Mezzadra and Nielson 2013; Ong 2006). Together these various 
ideas form the basis for my approach to the Thailand-Myanmar border zone.  
In the third, fourth, and fifth sections of this chapter, I look historically at the 
long-standing tension involved in the dominant discourse about the Thai-Myanmar 
frontier as a space that must be both incorporated into and repelled from the space of the 
state. I show that this discourse was evident during the pre-colonial period and fully 
emerged as a component of British colonialism in Burma and the Siamese project of 
defining and claiming power over its territory. I highlight how in the post-colonial Cold 
War period, this discursive contradiction continued to dominate perceptions of the border 
and the various peoples living in highland areas, and led to military conflict and 
campaigns to reshape the borderlands. The sixth part of the chapter looks at the post-Cold 
War era of economic liberalization in which the border has served as a locus for capital 
investment and as a hub for low-wage production. Throughout the chapter, I consider 
what this discursive tension has meant for the people inhabiting the Thailand-Myanmar 
borderscape who find themselves pushed and pulled by contradictory power relations, 
including in ways that have gendered implications, and who, nevertheless, reveal cracks 
in dominant discourse through their everyday lived experiences.   
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2. Borders as constructed and constructing 
 
 The arguments of this dissertation are based on the assertion that the border zone 
in which Burmese migrants are living and working is, in certain ways, a socially 
constructed space that plays an active role in shaping the social and power relations there. 
It is a collection of locales in which unique forms of social organization and political 
subjectivities are produced as a result of multiple overlapping forms of power and 
struggle. From this perspective, borders are heterogeneous spaces where “several 
functions of demarcation and territorialization—between distinct social exchanges or 
flows, between distinct rights, and so forth—are always fulfilled simultaneously” 
(Balibar 2002: 79). They divide between belonging and not belonging, exception and 
norm, and legality and illegality (Rajaram and Gruny-Warr 2007).1 
I point to three key perspectives that are relevant to this discussion: the view of 
space as simultaneously absolute/material and relational/representational, the significance 
of national and colonial discourses for the designation and construction of 
border/peripheral space, and the linkages which place border spaces in global supply 
chains. The second and third perspectives stem from the first. 
2.1 Borders as material, borders as relational 
 
Borders must be thought of both in terms of their physicality—that is, as 
                                                
1 This is not to say that I consider borders as impermeable lines, an assertion that much scholarship and any 
observation of practices at borders has shown to be false. This is a point that has been so well established 
across social science disciplines that I do not take it up in this dissertation. Rather I start from the position 
that state borders are spatial constructs that span lines dividing nations as well as sites for state expressions 
of sovereignty. It is easier in some cases and more difficult in others for people and goods to cross 
boundaries; certainly some borders are built up specifically to prevent uncontrolled crossing (such as the 
wall dividing the US and Mexico in some parts of the border or the wall Israel has erected in the West 
Bank),while other border spaces show no marking whatsoever that there is a division between one place 
and another. However, instead of approaching such practices within a dualistic lens 
(permeable/impermeable), my concern in this dissertation lies with the way borders are conceived, 
perceived, and lived as Lefebvre (1991) puts it. 
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boundary lines on maps, as rivers, mountain ranges, and immigration checkpoints (to 
name a few examples)—and as places that are constructs of discourse which locate power 
and meaning at these sites of entry and exit, inclusion and exclusion. The objects and 
spaces that physically make up borders reflect what Harvey (1973) calls “absolute space” 
and what Lefebvre (1991) refers to as “material space,” which is “mapped (balisé), 
modified, transformed by the networks, circuits, and flows that are established within it—
roads, canals, railroads, commercial and financial circuits, motorways and air routes, 
etc.” (Lefebvre 2003: 84).2 Such spatiality is essential for border thinking because it 
relates to the physical structuring of borders and the material manifestation of perceptions 
of those borders.3 It does not only refer to state-controlled spaces or locales which lie on 
the geographical boundary line. Rather, material border spaces are components that 
signify borders for all those who encounter them (Lafazani 2013; Mountz 2010).  Thus, 
absolute border spaces might include a river that an individual needs to cross in order to 
enter a new country, a safe house, a checkpoint, the backroom of a police station where 
officers exact bribes or negotiate migrants’ rights, the gate of a camp which 
communicates to a refugee that she or he has arrived in a space of exceptional legality, or 
a welfare office in an urban center where caseworkers exercise discretion upon migrants 
in a way that reminds them that they do not belong. As well, border spaces are those 
                                                
2 Another translation of balisé is “marked.” 
3 Harvey (2006) is careful not to equate his tripartite framework for theorizing space with that of Lefebvre.  
Thus, while I write of absolute and material space as similar here, it is important to also recognize the 
nuanced difference. To Harvey, absolute space means not only the physical objects of geography (such as 
walls, roads, and bridges), but also geographical representations, such as maps. For Lefebvre, the concept 
of material space includes virtual manifestations of experienced space such as the circulation of capital and 
commodities. Harvey also draws similarities between his notion of relative space and relational space on 
the one hand and Lefebvre’s concepts of “representations of space”and “spaces of representation”on the 
other, but points out that these are better thought of as different axes on a matrix as opposed to translations 
of the same ideas (2006: 134-135). 
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where economic arrangements manifest themselves in material terms that suggest 
periphery, as a political economic concept: labor camps that are “off the grid,” squatter 
settlements housing non-citizens or citizens deemed unworthy of basic rights to housing 
and sanitation, or a home set up with sewing machines operating informally as a factory 
that pays migrants a quarter of the minimum wage.   
These examples suggest that the materiality of borders intersects with a more 
relational or representational view of space in that different absolute spaces have different 
meanings for various actors. As Balibar (2002) notes, this renders borders polysemic; 
individuals perceive, articulate, and experience border spaces through emotions, lived 
encounters, and images. Such relations give meaning to borders and reaffirm their 
existence. Space, writes Lefebvre (1991: 342), is thus both abstract and concrete:  
Abstract inasmuch as it has no existence save by virtue of the exchangeability of 
all its component parts, and concrete inasmuch as it is socially real and as such 
localized. This is a space, therefore, that is homogenous yet at the same time 
broken up into fragments.  
 
Space “enters social relations at all levels,” including the physical, semiotic, abstract, 
interactive, and affective (Gottdiener 1993: 131). Borders as abstract space are 
constructed as they are interpreted and enacted. They are internalized as invisible borders 
at the same time a variety of actors performatively inscribe them, at times violently, upon 
migrant bodies (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007). Discourse about difference and 
belonging construct borders and render material spaces into border spaces that are 
capable of exclusion or affixing statuses of legibility/illegibility and visibility/ invisibility 
to different groups of people (Tangseefa 2007). Space, borders, and hierarchies are all 
aspects of knowledge construction and the assertion of certain discourses over others.   
However, as Foucault (1977) would suggest, within the span of relational forces 
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that constitutes space, one must conceive of every iterative reproduction of dominant 
discourses as an opportunity for divergence, resistance, and conflict. To concentrate on 
“border struggles,” then, is to focus on the space (both relational and material) between 
seemingly binary notions of “inside” and “outside” or “inclusion” and “exclusion” which 
are never stable and are always conflicted (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). It is to follow 
Mohanty (2003: 2) who calls for analysis of “the fault lines, conflicts, differences, fear, 
and containment that borders represent.” Thus, just as discourse may relationally define a 
space in gendered terms, studying the interstices may reveal moments where social actors 
resist such constructs or offer their own interpretations of how gender and space interact. 
 Viewing space as both material and relational is key to this dissertation’s 
argument in the sense that I view the Thailand-Myanmar border zone as a series of 
tangible places constructed and constantly reproduced as a result of multiple discourses 
and power relations. The relational and the material converge here in that while tangible 
locales on the border are built physically (e.g., out of bricks and mortar), certain 
perceptions of the frontier zone and the people living there are just as much part of these 
locales’ construction. My analysis of migrants’ social relations stems from the view that 
particular discourses infuse the material forms which constitute this border with specific 
knowledges and exert an influence on migrants who internalize, are shaped by, and 
struggle with these bordered hierarchies. In some cases, this cyclical relationship between 
space, discourse, action, and conflict can lead to alternative spaces and knowledges that 
migrants develop and that are central to their survival and wellbeing in that context of 
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displacement.4 In order to situate this dialectical notion of space, I turn now to another 
angle for theorizing borders that conceives of them as constructed via the discourses of 
modernity and colonialism and as intimately connected to conceptions of national and 
ethnic identities.  
 
2.2 Borders as interstices in the national imagination 
 
 With this constructivist view of space, it is important to highlight here the way 
that borders link to the discourses of nationhood, national communities, and national 
identity.5 Borders not only play a central role in the imagining of national spaces as an 
outline of territory. They are implicated in the very construction and reproduction of the 
concept of a national space, or what Thongchai (1994) termed a geo-body. This refers to 
a spatialized national consciousness in which the map, as “new geographical knowledge, 
was the force [for] conceiving, projecting, and creating the new entity” of the nation 
(Thongchai 1994: 129). The connection between borders and the geo-body relates to the 
development of state boundaries as we know them today during the period of nation and 
empire-building beginning in the 19th century.6 The idea of the nation as a discrete 
                                                
4 These alternative spaces and knowledges, to the extent they push back on the dominant power relations 
which exert pressure on migrants to fit within categories of subjects that are exploitable, can be conceived 
of as a form of resistance. However, I stop short of referring to these types of processes and shifts as such 
in favor of other terms like struggle and conflict. This is because I hesitate to frame as resistance those 
actions which merely strike subjects as survival or “getting by,”that is, which subjects do not consciously 
frame as resistance. To label migrants’tactics which transform or appropriate dominant or exploitative 
relations and knowledges for their own uses and purposes but which they do not consider resistant would 
be, I think, to impose categories onto these migrants and deny them their agency to conceive of resistance 
in their own terms.   
5 While scholarship in the last two decades has debated the continued relevance of the nation-state as an 
analytical category, I am concerned here less with the state’s integrity (or lack thereof) and more with the 
uses of an idea of the nation as a tool for articulating identity-based hierarchies.   
6 While the colonial period in Latin America began significantly earlier than this, I refer here specifically to 
the era of empire and nation building associated with the age of modernity when countries like Germany 
and Italy established themselves as nations and France as the Third Republic. This was the formative age of 
colonialism in Africa and Asia. Though the British colonized India starting in the 17 th century, it was only 
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community of citizens and the colony as divided by distinct racial groups developed 
together with the principle of fixed boundaries separating one nation/colony space from 
another (Anderson 1991).  Indeed, in his seminal work on nationalism, Benedict 
Anderson (1991) points to the census and the map as two mechanisms which worked in 
tandem as a sort of “demographic triangulation” to render known the peoples and places 
of a nation-space.   
 I highlight this conceptual link of maps, concrete borders, and identity because of 
the role it played and continues to play in creating ethnicity, ethnic and racial hierarchies, 
and—more broadly—a determination of inclusion and exclusion on a national scale. 
Boundaries, as the point of differentiation between inside and outside, facilitate the 
visualization of a national community in contrast to those external to that space.  This 
spatial-conceptual demarcation turns “territory into tradition” and the “people into one,” 
writes Bhabha (1990: 300).   
Nowhere is this more evident than on borders, where the erasure and construction 
of ethnicity and group identity is active and ongoing (Balibar 2002). These are thus sites 
of constant struggle for the establishment of what Anderson (1991) famously calls 
“imagined communities” and Kapferer (1988: 97) refers to as the fetishization of culture, 
that is, the supersession of discourses of homogeneity over difference within the national 
community. The taxonomy of different peoples within a national space has been part of 
the establishment of the geo-body, and this process was essential for the construction of 
certain hierarchies and dichotomies between cultures-as-races, distinguishing primitive 
from civilized and rendering a “them” legible and knowable in order to more clearly 
                                                                                                                                            
during the age of nation building in the 19th century that control of the sub-continent by the East India 
Company ceded to the British government. 
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define an “us.” As Stoler (2002) writes, discourses of gender and sexuality were also 
intimately connected to conceptions of race in the service of constructing the social 
boundaries of colonialism. The same is true for post-colonial nationalisms in which 
behaviors and sexual practices considered masculine, feminine, and hetero-normative 
have been part of the conditions of racial membership, which divided up national spaces 
(Harriden 2012; Ong 1995a; Suriya and Pattana 2014).7 As Thongchai (2000: 41) 
explains, the hierarchical domain of colonies and nations in Asia adhered to a sort of 
“ethno-geography,” with distinct peoples mapped out as part of various landscapes. On 
these maps, border areas were peripheral both geographically and culturally since they 
were inhabited by groups identified as ethnic minorities, the “outsiders” to be compared 
to the nation’s community in racial as well as gendered terms. Ludden (2011) notes that 
such divisions, rooted in the processes of empire, continued to intersect post-colonial 
nation-states as useful hierarchies separating elites from subalterns. In this sense, it 
remains that border spaces relationally embody a notion of exclusion or exception in a 
way that helps define the included, i.e., the norm (see for example, Agamben 2005).  
Referring to the link between mapping, territory, and culture, Homi Bhabha 
(1990: 295) writes, “The recurrent metaphor of landscape as the inscape of national 
identity emphasizes the quality of light, the question of social visibility, the power of the 
eye to naturalize the rhetoric of national affiliation and its forms of collective 
expression.” This excerpt raises important points about the visual and conceptual shaping 
                                                
7 Ong (1995b) cautions that nationalism not only be thought of as a masculine endeavor that suppresses 
women’s agency, even if this is often the case, because this view glosses over the unique ways in which the 
relationship among gender, space, and social institutions shifts during nationalist and post-colonial 
struggles as women articulate belonging and political autonomy in their own terms, even, at times in 
seemingly “traditional”or conservative ways. 
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of national spaces and peoples and the solidification of these into always already 
constituted frameworks through their repetitious discursive presentation. That is, colonial 
social-spatial conceptions were often represented as fixed and permanent in a way that 
reaffirmed the European ontology of modernity, which placed the world and its peoples 
onto racialized and evolutionary hierarchical scales (see for example, Edwards 2007). 
Through ethno-geography, the “inscape” of national identity becomes naturalized by the 
recurrent discourse of identity building.8 These efforts rendered a diversity of peoples 
into more organized categories and groups and affixed these categories to the natural 
development of the place.  
The establishment of borders as a product of national/colonial negotiations did 
not, however, neatly adhere to the spaces of the groups living along what became a 
boundary line. As the materialization of a relational space conceived in capitals, they cut 
across and divided groups of people who, in many case, considered themselves more of a 
distinct and separate unit less affiliated with far away capitals (Horstmann 2014; 
McKinnon and Michaud 2000; Scott 2009). Thus, the drawing of borders and the 
affirmation of nation-state territory also signified a need to exert more complete control 
of those on the edge who were “outsiders” but within the national geo-body (Scott 1998; 
Thongchai 2000a). It is here, along the borders within the tension between relational and 
material space that the primary contradiction I mentioned at the start of this chapter plays 
out: the need to incorporate and manage peripheral spaces and peoples lies in tension 
                                                
8 For example, as part of this process and in an effort to justify colonial endeavors, it was not uncommon in 
the 19th century for British and French scholarship to historicize their spatial claims in Asia and elsewhere 
(Anderson 1991; Edwards 2007). Anderson (1991: 174-175) writes of “historical maps”used as a sort of 
“political-biographical narrative”to demonstrate the “antiquity of specific, tightly bounded territorial units” 
that coincided with colonial borders.   
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with the place of these “others” as peripheral in the national imagination.  
Borders, therefore, can be conceived of as sites for the performance of the 
expression of a “national culture” and people in contrast to the narratives, identities, and 
histories of “others” in the borderscape. And yet, at the same time, it is in the border 
space where one finds an alternative reality of subaltern lived experiences that contradict 
popular notions of peoples and places. This is true not only for contemporary geographic 
boundaries, but also for myriad invisible borders that cut across states and which 
constitute vestiges of colonial racial and ethnic hierarchies that are reproduced on the 
national scale (Ludden 2011). It is with this in mind that I quote Tsing’s (1994: 279) 
definition of margins as a way of explaining the relations of border spaces: 
Margins [are] conceptual sites from which to explore the imaginative quality and 
the specificity of local/global cultural formation. Margins here are not 
geographical, descriptive locations. . . . Instead, I use the term to indicate an 
analytic placement that makes evident both the constraining, oppressive quality of 
cultural exclusion, and the creative potential of rearticulating, enlivening, and 
rearranging the very social categories that peripherize a group's existence. 
 
As Thongchai (2003) writes, “A history of the margins of a nation is, therefore, a history 
of the locations—geographically, temporally, culturally—where it stops being a nation, 
or being this or that nation” (p. 12).  It is by focusing at the interstices between insider 
and outsider, inclusion and exclusion, normative and exceptional, that we can see 
alternative histories and identities that were and are actively submerged as part of the 
project of building and maintaining the nation and its hierarchies (Mignolo 2000; 
Thongchai 2003). Placing the focus along state boundaries in Southeast Asia, one can see 
that space is actually fractured into multiple sovereignties which are constantly contested 
through the everyday lived experience of the people there (Soe Lin Aung 2014; 
Horstmann 2002; Ludden 2011; Rajah 1990). Thus, studying social practices in these 
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locales affords an analysis of how nation-states reproduce hierarchies and how various 
subaltern actors contest these lines of division.   
 
2.3 Borders as plugged in and peripheral 
 
 Keeping in mind the tensions and hierarchies that pull at border spaces, I turn now 
to the increasing role of these peripheral sites in global production networks. The place of 
border zones in contemporary capitalism as gendered sites is a global phenomenon that 
stems from the most basic tenets of the relationship between capitalism and space; that is, 
the way that the “geographical configuration of the landscape contribute[s] to the survival 
of capitalism” (Smith 2008: 4). What Smith refers to here is the spatial relations of 
uneven geographical development which builds on the Marxian concepts of how space 
shifts as a result of several of capitalism’s fundamental principles, including capital 
accumulation, market exchange and competition, physical infrastructure development to 
enable production and consumption, and the production of scale. There is a socio-
ecological component as well in the sense that social relations and the perception and 
relationship between humans and nature are bound up in the uneven geographical 
development of space (Smith 2008; Harvey 2006). Economically, the concept pertains to 
the duality of capitalism’s constant need for growth and expansion, converting assets into 
capital, and the tendency for capital to centralize. This duality, writes Smith, is one of the 
fundamental contradictions within the capitalist system in that an increasing number of 
spaces are brought into the fold of a capitalist mode of production at the same time 
capital is concentrated in fewer locations.  
Fueling this expansion is the pressure to avoid crises of over-accumulation, which 
results in the dumping of surpluses, devaluation, and the reinvestment of capital in new 
51 
locales or existing sites of production through acts of dispossession (Harvey 2006). 
Accumulation by dispossession, as David Harvey terms this practice, is one of the key 
forms of spatial reconfiguration resulting from the exigencies of capitalism (see also 
Banerjee-Guha 2010). Harvey (2003: 145-146) lists some of the ongoing forms of 
dispossession: 
Displacement of peasant populations and the formation of a landless proletariat as 
accelerated in countries such as Mexico and India in the last three decades, many 
formerly common property resources, such as water, have been privatized (often 
at World Bank insistence) and brought within the capitalist logic of accumulation, 
alternative forms of production and consumption have been suppressed. 
Nationalized industries have been privatized. Family farming has been taken over 
by agribusiness. 
  
 In this, Harvey describes three significant effects capital accumulation has on space. 
First, as populations leave their homes and move elsewhere, there is an emptying of 
locales where people used to live and a building-up of homes and infrastructure wherever 
they go, whether it is to an urban area in the form of suburbs or slums, or to camps for 
migrants and/or refugees. Second, public spaces become private through the 
commodification of certain natural resources that were formally public or unregulated. 
Third, a geographical landscape consisting of small farming properties increasingly shifts 
to a landscape of industrial agriculture, manufacturing, or development.  
 The devaluation of surpluses and subsequent reinvestment gives capital a certain 
mobility that, on the ground, can wreak havoc as sites of production are de-industrialized 
and other locales that can enhance competitive value (because of lower transportation 
costs, more advanced technological capacity, or the possibility of lower wages) enter the 
supply chain in their stead. It is possible for such changes in production networks, what 
Harvey (2006) terms a “spatial fix,” to manifest themselves on grand scales in the form of 
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regional developments that transgress state boundaries to connect centers of capital in 
diverse locales via lines of transport and low-cost zones of production along these routes. 
When this happens, the building up of the infrastructure for such projects bypasses 
certain places (including many that used to be significant sites of production) and 
reconfigures others.   
 In recent decades, as part of the neoliberal turn in politics and the global 
economy, reterritorialization and the establishment of special zones of production have 
become a dominant manifestation for capital accumulation through certain kinds of 
regional and global developments (Arnold 2012). This practice is another form of 
accumulation by dispossession in that it reflects the repurposing of active economic 
spaces into new arrangements, often through the displacement of the institutions and 
individuals that were previously functional in that locale (Banerjee-Guha 2008). These 
zones are often established in sites where capital can draw on an ample supply of labor. 
While special economic zones differ in terms of the labor-power on which they rely 
(technological SEZs versus garment manufacturing SEZs, for example), it is common for 
zones to be populated by migrants traveling internally from rural to urban areas or 
migrants moving from low-wage or less secure countries. For this reason SEZs are often 
located outside major urban areas or along borders. A number of scholars have shown 
that SEZs on borders (often called cross-border economic zones, or CBEZ) are able to be 
competitive in part because of their distance and isolation from economic centers, their 
lack of regulation, and their exploitative treatment of workers (Arnold 2012; Campbell 
2013; Arnold and Pickles 2011). 
The establishment of special economic zones (and their various incarnations) 
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reflects changes in the relationships among state governments, market forces, and 
territory, including in gendered terms (Arnold 2010; Ong 2006). Such zones are what 
Banerjee-Guha (2008) calls “economic enclaves,” that is, spaces with different 
governance and regulation structures where investment and infrastructure accumulate in 
ways that are effectively isolated from the economic landscape outside of these spaces 
because the zones are more tapped in to global supply chains than domestic markets. In 
her seminal piece, Aihwa Ong (2000) uses the term “graduated sovereignty” to describe 
the state’s role in setting territories aside for development as exceptional spaces that will 
link strategically with global supply and production chains. In certain arenas, such as in 
Malaysia and Singapore, states designate these special economic zones as locales in 
which production firms assume some of the responsibilities of governing, such as 
surveillance, regulation, and control, that “set the terms and are constitutive of a domain 
of social existence” (Ong 2000: 56; see also Foucault 1991 and Sparke et al. 2004).   
These spatial shifts influence the links among states, territory, and gender vis-a-
vis global capital. In an age of hypermasculine capitalism characterized by mobility, high 
risk, competition, and aggression (both of the social actors who make capital move, and 
the discourse around flows of capital), the dominance of global financial investment 
firms based in the “Global North” over governments of the “South,” resulting in an 
occupation and accumulation of “virgin territory,” evokes a hierarchial relationship 
among territories, institutions, and social actors that adheres to economic tropes with 
gendered overtones (De Goede 2004; Griffin 2012; Ling 2004). Such a dynamic is part of 
how global economic forces and state redistributive policies play a major role in the 
production of space and the social relations and modes of organization within that space.   
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Large-scale spatial practices which give rise to special economic zones, including 
those on borders, are not only gendered, but influence gendered subjectivities in various 
ways, including how women and men relate to one another, think of themselves, navigate 
moral and civic structures, and participate (and are expected to participate) in local and 
global economies as well as in the social fabric and care structures of communities  
(Mills 2003; Tsing 2005). This is part of the way that global capital has transformed 
gendered spaces, insinuating itself into households and the practices of social 
reproduction, rendering both into forms of surplus labor (Bryan et al. 2009; Nagar et al. 
2002; Pollard 2012).   
However, within the spatial relations of social reproduction, as “capital produces 
landscapes in its quest for survival…workers seek to produce space in particular ways as 
part of a strategy to secure their own social and biological reproduction on a daily and/or 
generational basis” (Heynen et al. 2011: 241). Practically speaking, this refers to all the 
ways that workers formally and informally build up infrastructure to support their 
survival, including accommodation, healthcare, family space, childcare, and educational 
facilities/services. It also pertains to the re-appropriation of space for worker recreation, 
mobilization, and solidarity building as well as transportation networks and systems to 
enhance the connectivity of individuals and families across long distances. Crucially, 
these sites are never solely produced by and for the perpetuation of capital. While the 
landscapes workers construct sometimes support the goals of capitalism, sometimes they 
constitute or support resistance (Boyer 2006; Kurtz 2003). That these unanticipated 
consequences in the reproduction of labor-power are openings for struggle, change, and 
the assertion of alternative spaces and space-relations is a key theme in this dissertation. 
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The three concepts of space highlighted in these pages—space as 
material/relational; space and the imagining of nations, empires, and culture; and space 
and capital—are, of course, deeply interrelated. The legacies and continued prominence 
of various hierarchies manifest themselves in the economic practices that reconfigure 
spatial relations. Spaces considered peripheral are more easily subsumed into new sites 
for production. Special zones for production relying on different regimes of regulation, 
governance, gender relations, and wage scales are likely to profit from employing those 
who might already be considered as “others” who do not have the full entitlements of 
citizens. Along borders, discourses about the nation and national identity seem to become 
all the more important the more spaces are designated as sites in global supply chains. 
Concerns over national security and the perception of change to the national 
consciousness fixate public attention onto borders in terms of their permeability and the 
threat of the people living in these peripheral areas.  
 All of these intersections in spatial consciousness and spatial relations are relevant 
for the development of the Thailand-Myanmar borderlands. While it is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to convey a full account of this area’s history, I share several 
snapshots from three centuries in order to convey the intersecting and contingent spatial 
processes that render the borderlands a place where migrants find themselves 
simultaneously incorporated into economic practices and the national imagination and 
forcefully kept on the margins. I show also how the border’s particular historical 
development represents an agglomeration of time-space moments in which various 
histories, discourses, and relations of power are in a state of constant struggle.       
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3. From forests to towns and periphery to the center 
 
Prior to the colonial era, the hierarchies and boundaries that currently divide the 
territory and people of Southeast Asia did not exist as such. That said, the topography of 
the region, which divides mainland Southeast Asia into broad lowlands and the highlands 
of a vast massif, did facilitate the construction of particular categories of difference, 
which had a lasting effect. The political, economic, and social relationships between the 
people living in the highlands and those in the lowlands of Southeast Asia fostered 
notions among the latter of a frontier space that delineated between concepts of center 
and periphery. As this suggests, the production of social and political differences and the 
production of a concept of a frontier between civilizations were interconnected, giving 
rise to binary analytical categories in which the spatial and the social were linked. I focus 
in this section on the association between the material and relational concepts of frontier, 
lowland, and highland in this region. I look at the construction of these binary categories 
and their contrast to the actual patterns of settlement and social structures in this region 
prior to colonialism. I show that while the work of social-spatial differentiation before the 
colonial period lacked the rigidity of subsequent eras, it nevertheless laid a foundation for 
more recent conceptions of hierarchy and space which embody the contradictions on 
which this chapter focuses.9   
Before the current 1,300-mile boundary divided the territories of Thailand and Myanmar, 
                                                
9 It is important to note here that known histories of the region are unfortunately imbalanced in the sense 
that there is far more material to work with from the perspective of lowland polities who kept written 
records and wrote their own historical accounts. As Renard (2003: 3) writes about the Karen, one of the 
dominant agglomerations of highland peoples in western Thailand/southeastern Myanmar, “With neither a 
written record nor a continuous tradition of oral history, historians seeking to record the past of such 
‘Karen’peoples…have little on which to rely.” Keeping this in mind, I regard the descriptions of highland 
groups as perceptions as opposed to facts. 
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the mountains of the Dawna Range, Shan Highlands, and the Tenasserim Hills running 
longitudinally formed a natural barrier between the lowland Irrawaddy River basin of 
Myanmar and the Chao Phraya River basin of Thailand (see Map 4 below; Gupta 2005). 
Summarizing Leach, James Scott (1998: 185) explains that pre-modern Burma could be 
thought of in terms of “horizontal 
slices through the topography” in 
which different peoples and social 
systems existed at different 
altitudes based on the ecology, the 
terrain, and isolation from lowland 
centers of power. The highlands 
were home to a variety of peoples 
with multiple different languages 
and customs who, by and large, 
considered themselves 
autonomous from each other as 
well as from lowland civilizations. 
Anthropologist Charles Keyes 
(1979) explains that highland and 
lowland groups “lived in 
symbiotic relationship,” with the former “having wet-rice cultivation as its economic 
base” and the latter “having upland swidden cultivation as its main system of production” 
(pp. 29-30). Scott (2009: 106) describes reciprocal economic relationships dating back at 
Map 4: Thailand-Myanmar borderlands 
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least as far as the ninth century, with upland groups procuring and trading commodities 
considered luxury items for lowland polities, including “rare and/or aromatic 
wood…medicinals…and latexes…from forest trees as well as rare hornbill feathers, 
edible birds’ nests, honey, beeswax, tea, tobacco, opium, and pepper.” “Hill people” also 
depended on lowland traders for staples like “salt, dried fish, and ironware” and later 
“ceramics, pottery…porcelain, manufactured cloth, thread and needles, wire, steel 
implements and weapons, blankets, matches, and kerosene” to name a few items (Scott 
2009: 107).   
Despite the presentation of highland versus lowland peoples as distinct, the 
populations of these two altitudinal categories “have no intrinsic permanence,” as Leach 
(1960: 62) put it. First, while the Southeast Asian massif does constitute a large 
landmass, it is also the case that mountains and valleys are interspersed, especially in 
foothills or high altitude plateaus. Once outside the broad flatlands of the central river 
basin—and once down from the core of the massif—mountains bisect hundreds of 
smaller alluvial rice plains, leading to a checkered pattern of social, political, and 
economic practice. Second, it was not uncommon for inhabitants of highland areas to 
relocate to lower locales or to cities, engaging in wet-rice farming and integrating into the 
social systems of the valleys. Inversely, Scott (2009) describes the upland spaces of 
Southeast Asia as sites of refuge for people seeking to leave the influence of lowland 
states/polities for a variety of reasons. As a result, both highlands and lowlands 
developed as utterly heterogeneous (Thongchai 2000). 
But while the peoples of the highlands and lowlands were somewhat flexible in 
their settlement patterns, these two categories referred to different political systems with 
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the latter developing as more centralized polities and the former as semi-autonomous 
communities. Keyes (1979: 29-30) refers to a difference between “quasi-feudal polities” 
in the lowland areas and upland peoples “having no stable political organization that 
brought together more than a few villages.”  However, anything but stable, the lowland 
kingdoms of Burma (including Ava, Toungoo, and Shan kingdoms) and of Siam 
(including Lanna and Ayutthya) were, as Thongchai writes, “arch-rivals since the 
sixteenth century” (1994: 62) and in a more or less constant state of warfare.     
As a result, as power and control frequently shifted in the lowlands, the highlands 
emerged as a frontier to these polities, a kind of buffer zone. In that power and 
sovereignty in this region were determined less by mapped and bounded territories and 
more by tributary semi-feudal networks of allegiance, there was no clear edge to these 
fractured lowland states. Indeed, Anderson (1972) uses the word “potency” to describe 
masculine power in Java as a drawing or consumption of powerful people and objects 
towards one’s center increasing one’s power and thereby decreasing others’. Kingdoms 
of Lanna, Ayutthya, the Shan, the Burmese, and even the Chinese in Yunnan competed 
for the affiliation of highland towns, who, in turn, often hedged their bets by paying 
tribute to multiple kingdoms simultaneously (Thongchai 1994). Highlands were strategic 
in that armies and traders relied on key mountain passes to move from one lowland state 
to another (interestingly, one of the key military and trade routes between Burma and 
Siam passed close to Mae Sot).10 In addition, towns in the frontier space were drawn into 
                                                
10 Today, highway 105, which runs from the city of Tak west through Mae Sot to the border and then 
north, goes through the Mae Lamao pass. This pass, along with multiple other routes across the mountains, 
was instrumental in both trade and military campaigns at least since the 14th century when Tak was the 
westernmost corner of the Sukhothai principality (Pitch 2007). Pitch (2007: 376) notes that Tak (and 
subsequently Mae Lamao and a priori the area where Mae Sot is today) was “part of the trade route from 
 
60 
the conflict, “to cultivate food for the troops while they were at the same time the targets 
of destruction from the other to prevent them from supplying the enemy” (Thongchai 
1994: 62). Siam’s chronicles and the oral traditions of highland groups describe perennial 
attacks back and forth, “the prizes of which were prisoners-of-war” who were assimilated 
into the victors’ towns (Renard 2000: 66).   
 The frontier/buffer role of the highlands during the centuries leading up to the 
colonial era defines this region as an in-between space, important strategically and 
economically, but neither fully Burmese nor Thai. This perception of the highlands as 
external resonates with the development of a cosmographic interpretation of space in 
Siam (Thongchai 1994). Bangkok conceived of itself as center and of all those spaces at 
the edge of its control as periphery. While the shifting pattern of allegiances mentioned 
above suggests that there was no clear or permanent boundary between center and 
periphery, these two categories nevertheless emerged as distinct from one another in a 
conceptual and social-spatial sense. Indeed, in Siam, a dominant system for classification 
consisted of dividing people into an inclusive “Tai” and an “other,” “kha,” which 
corresponded roughly to the spatial categories of muang (town) and pa (forest) (Turton 
2000). First, in terms of the pair of spatial references, muang and pa, it is important to 
note the variety of interpretations attached to each. Muang refers not only to town; it has 
also been used to refer to a settled community, a city, or a country. It is, as Thongchai 
(1994: 49) writes, “an occupied area under the exercise of the governing power but 
                                                                                                                                            
Sukhothai westward to Burma, both Pegu and Martaban and the religious (Buddhist) route to Sri Lanka.”.  
Situated at the confluence of two rivers, Tak also connected the lowland Bangkok-based kingdom to the 
powerful Lanna kingdom in the north (at the heart of which is where Chiang Mai lies today). During the 
great Burma-Thailand wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, it was through the Mae Lamao pass that the 
Burmese army entered Thailand to launch devastating attacks. 
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without specification of size, degree or kind of power, or administrative structure.”  
While this definition of muang connotes a sense of space inside the kingdom, pa, on the 
other hand, can suggest the opposite. It means not only forest, but wild and/or savage and 
suggests a space external to the muang (Turton 2000).  
Second, Tai largely refers to the category of lowland populations, “a reference to 
a level of civilization and participation as a full member of a kingdom” while 
“kha…refers to those who were on the outside of this” (Renard 2000: 66). But kha means 
more than “outsiders” or “non-Tai;” according to Turton, it refers to “a generic social 
status of servant, slave, etc.” (2000: 6). Renard (2003: 1-2) refers to kha as those 
considered “forest-dwelling” peoples “living beyond the pale of the Tai.”  Elsewhere, 
Renard (2000) explains that Siam used the term kha to classify a broad range of groups 
into a few different ethnicities, including the Karen, Kachin, and Khamu—all names that 
Pinkaew (2003a) says are derogatory because of the meaning of kha and different from 
the names these groups gave to themselves, which usually translate to “human beings.” 
Turton (2000) reminds readers, however, that the terms kha, pa, Tai, and muang should 
not be used as analogous binaries (such as kha : Tai as pa :  muang) because this glosses 
over their complexity and various changes in meaning over time.  
Importantly, no scholar regards kha and Tai as entirely dichotomous. Rather, they 
are categories that relate to the ever-changing ethno-geography of Siam’s kingdom of 
tributary towns and principalities. Moreover, kha should not be thought of as entirely 
external to Siamese civilization. Siamese perceived some kha as closer to the muang than 
other, wilder kha who remained in more isolated forests/mountainous areas (pa). And, as 
Tapp (2000) explains, center (muang) and periphery (pa) together make up the state in 
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the sense that the center desires the population and the resources of the 
highlands/mountain/forest/periphery. A common northern Thai (Yuan) saying was “kep 
phak sai sa, kep kha sai muang,” which means “gather vegetables (and/to) put into 
basket(s), gather kha (and/to) put into muang” (Turton 2000: 16).11 While Turton 
explains that a common way to interpret this over the centuries was in terms of warfare 
between towns and the forcible relocation of populations from one to the other, the 
meaning of the saying has, no doubt, developed to connote something of the relationship 
between the perceived notions of center and periphery. It is suggestive of an 
understanding of the periphery as an untamed region with autonomous “others” that the 
state needs to bring into the fold of their influence.   
Despite the interconnection and even flexibility between Tai, kha, pa, and muang 
in a social-spatial sense, Keyes reminds us to consider such distinctions as technologies 
of power exercised by lowland kingdoms to impose analytical categories of identity onto 
diverse groups (Keyes 2002: 100). In this sense, even before the colonial era’s notorious 
racial and ethnic hierarchization of Southeast Asia and its peoples, socio-spatial 
distinctions differentiated the mountainous area between Thailand and Myanmar and its 
inhabitants in ways that portrayed them simultaneously as peripheral and inferior, and yet 
subsumed. In the next section, I look at how this system of classifying spaces and peoples 
developed into more rigid hierarchies as a product of colonialism and the movement of 
Siam and Burma from tributary kingdoms to bounded territories with 
administrative/bureaucratic systems of rule.   
                                                
11 Grabowsky (2001) notes that this saying has been translated in multiple ways, including “Put vegetables 
into baskets, put people into towns,”a version that does not connote ethnic difference and domination.  
Nevertheless, through archival research he asserts that the phrase was in reference to the relationship 
between outsiders (kha) and centers of power and the control of manpower.  
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4. Producing a boundary, imagining the Thai geo-body 
 
 While the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries represented an era of 
conflict, fragmentation, and the classification of center and periphery in Siam and Burma, 
it was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that colonialism precipitated the 
demarcation of a clear boundary and fixed categories of ethnicity. In this section, I 
highlight the resonating technologies of power that led to the reconfiguration of the 
frontier landscape and the articulation of racial/ethnic hierarchy in spatial terms. I show 
that these processes were directly related to the construction of what Thongchai (1994) 
refers to as the geo-body; that is, a spatial-social conception of national identity. 
 The Burmese colonial period (1824-1948) resulted in the establishment of clear 
boundary lines marking the territory of Siam for two significant reasons. First, the unique 
natural environment of the mountainous areas on the peripheries between the Thai and 
Burmese states drew international attention to seemingly endless hills of teak and other 
hardwood. Second, with the British occupying Burma and Malaya to Siam’s south, and 
the French in Indochina to the north and east, the West effectively imposed their 
conception of boundaries and territory onto Siam, a process of state and colony-making 
that scholars argue promulgated gendered metaphors of masculine European states 
dominating hyper-feminine Asian territories (see for example, Sinha 1995). While Siam 
was never colonized by a Western power, the British and French each claimed large 
chunks of territory to secure natural resources; the British incorporating the Shan 
highlands into their empire, and the French asserting control over what is now Laos 
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(Renard 2000; Saratsawadi 1996).12 The British were eager from the beginning of their 
reign in Burma to demarcate the exact border between Burma and Siam, and from the 
inception of talks, the question was always an economic one. While both Siam and 
Burma had relied for centuries on timber, neither logged on an industrial scale, and as a 
result the dense jungle of the frontier maintained a reputation as “untamed” or “wild”—
pa, as mentioned in the previous section.  In order to transform the space from jungle to 
colonial property in the form of an organized, domesticated forest that could service the 
empire’s timber industry, the British argued that it was necessary to settle on a border. 
Thongchai notes that disputes between the British and Siam over claims to parts of the 
forest were what eventually “brought about the first formal Siam-British India treaty 
signed in January 1874 at Calcutta to mark the boundary between Lanna and Tenasserim 
Province” (1994: 73). The two powers continued to demarcate the rest of the border over 
subsequent decades.   
 And in terms of constructing bounded political spaces, with two imperial powers 
bearing down on it, grabbing hundreds of thousands of square miles of land, Siam was 
forced to revise its pre-colonial understanding of state space and frontiers. Earlier spatial 
conceptions of Siam adhered less to mapped territory and more to a combination of 
                                                
12 Siam was able to avoid colonization in part by acting as a buffer between the French and British empires, 
but also by negotiating the loss of vast tracts of land. This was the case not only regarding the Shan 
Highlands, and Laos, but also much of the land that is currently Cambodia today, over which Siam had 
been claiming suzerainty for some years. In addition, Siam was able to avoid colonialism because it 
effectively yoked its economy to the colonial exploits of surrounding empires, especially the British. The 
Bowring Treaty of 1855, signed under military threat by the British, liberalized Thailand’s economy up to 
British exploitation. The treaty gave British extraterritorial status in Siam, preferential treatment when it 
came to exports, and proscribed many of the duties and tariffs on goods. Ultimately, the British came to 
control much of Thailand’s rice trade (Raquiza 2012). Pasuk and Baker (2008) use the term “colonial”to 
describe Thailand’s economy during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries while Glassman (2010: 
66) refers to Thailand during this time as “an ensemble of institutions that serves to facilitate accumulation 
by the most internationalized investors, regardless of their ‘nationality’.”.   
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sacred topographies and quasi-feudal tributary networks connecting to centers of power 
in Bangkok and Chiang Mai (Thongchai 1994). While there had been certain landmarks 
that served to divide Siam from its neighbors, such as rivers and mountain passes, the 
British demanded a far more detailed and rigid articulation of space. The persistence of 
the British to establish a clear boundary between Burma and Siam took decades in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, but finally in the 1870s and 1880s led to the 
drawing of a series of lines along rivers and mountains, a process that was more or less 
complete by the 1890s.   
At the same time that Siam worked to demarcate its national boundary, the 
government also enacted a series of political changes to reconceptualize its national space 
in light of imperial advances. This was also in response to Bangkok’s desire to 
consolidate its management over territory and people (as opposed to the diffuse system of 
allegiances to local lords and tributes from lords to the monarchy). Many of these 
changes took place during the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), the monarch 
credited with “modernizing” the country. First and foremost, this involved centralization 
on multiple levels and the replacement of the quasi-feudal tributary system with the 
division of the territory into mapped units and the advent of a nation-wide tax system to 
generate revenue (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). These changes, which coincided with 
the establishment of a Ministry of Interior, replaced the ubiquitous and predominant 
muang with the “region (monthon), province (changwat), district (amphoe), subdistrict 
(tambon), and village (moo ban)” (Bunnag 1977; Pitch 2007).13 And, importantly, Siam 
began using the term prathet (nation) to define itself (Thongchai 1994). This spatial-
                                                
13 The spatial administrative unit for the region (monthon) was eliminated in 1932, leaving the province as 
the primary unit for dividing territory in Siam/Thailand. 
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administrative system made it theoretically possible for the first time for every subject-
citizen of this nation to be accounted for and registered down to the household level. 
Bangkok also established Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, Education, Public Works, 
Defense and others during this period. In 1896, the government created the Royal Forest 
Department to manage the teak trade flowing out and through Siam’s territory (Renard 
2000). This department was involved in a series of laws that declared as government 
property all uninhabited land in Siam (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). In 1910, the 
Modern Land Act nationalized Siam’s forests, signaling the importance of the logging 
industry as a source of revenue for the country (Pitch 2007). A Royal Survey Department, 
founded in 1885, worked together with a newly centralized army to document the spaces 
and boundaries of Siam’s newly arranged national territory (Vandergeest and Peluso 
1995).14 
The effect of these reforms was a new way of exerting control over the conception 
of national territory by rendering people and spaces known, legible, and counted. In 
practice, this process manifested itself through two technologies of power: the physical 
exertion of control over all parts of Siam with an emphasis on border spaces through the 
building up of infrastructure, and the production and circulation of discourse about the 
various subjects living within Siam’s national territory.   
In terms of the first mechanism, at the end of the nineteenth century, Siam 
recruited thousands to join military and police forces. By the end of the first decade of the 
twentieth century, more than 8,000 police were based in 345 stations throughout the 
country (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 400). In addition, Mae Sot and surrounding areas 
                                                
14 The Royal Survey Department was subsequent to the Anglo-Siamese Border Commission which was 
initiated in 1866 after much pressure from the British to delineate the Thai-Myanmar boundary. 
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along the western frontier developed as more permanent border fixtures during the 
colonial period, transitioning from ad hoc trade-route establishments imposed upon local 
pre-existing communities to symbols of the Thai state; part of the government’s strategy 
to manage and populate the lands near the boundary line. One commander: 
Ordered local authorities to set up new villages right along the borders with a 
number of guardhouses, fortifications, and households in each place…He called 
for a meeting of local chiefs along the frontiers. There they signed a declaration of 
loyalty to the king of Siam and took an oath of allegiance (Thongchai 1994: 72-
73).  
 
In border areas, it was particularly important for Siam to remind its subjects who had not 
considered themselves particularly attached to the Thai state of their affiliation. Suddenly 
people who had belonged to no nation or to multiple nations now technically belonged to 
only one and were officially prohibited from maintaining the kind of flexibility in 
movement that had defined much of their social organization. “The prohibition,” writes 
Thongchai (1994: 78): 
Caused confusion among the local people, who were used to traveling across the 
boundary without permission in the case of friendly borders.  Local people were 
accustomed to visiting their relatives on both sides of the border; some even 
migrated from one side to the other from time to time.  This has been true for all 
borders from the Pakchan River to northernmost Lanna.  
 
Greater interest in developing the border area in response to British colonialism and 
advancements in the frontier space motivated Siam to appoint representatives of highland 
kha communities, such as the Karen, as heads of towns and principalities. The Thai state 
placated such groups, eager for them to remain in Siam and for their allegiance to reflect 
the boundary lines drawn on official maps (Jorgensen 1979; Pinkaew 2003a).   
 This enabled Siam to both consolidate power in border spaces and to capitalize on 
the lucrative teak trade in this area. The conflation of state power, resource extraction, 
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and profit resulted in particular assemblages of state power and infrastructural 
developments along the border. For example, in one historical account of the area where 
Mae Sot lies today, the newly appointed governor of the area only made an appearance 
“during the dry season to oversee the logging activities which only took place during that 
time of year” (Pitch 2007: 391). And as Mae Sot emerged as a border post along a well-
trodden trade route between Burma and Siam (halfway between Yangon and Bangkok), it 
grew as an international hub, albeit one tucked remotely in the mountainous jungle of the 
frontier. From an early twentieth century account, Chinese caravans passed through en 
route from Yunnan to Burma; Indian lenders managed currency exchange (the British-
Indian rupee was the dominant currency in the town); the dominant population was 
Burman and Shan (not Thai); and the head of the police department was, according to 
records, Danish (Lajonquiere 2001).  
 The second key technology for exerting social and political control over the 
nation of Siam during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries lies in the efforts 
made by the government to “know” and classify the diverse groups of people living 
within Thai territory. Pinkaew (2003a) points out that this effort was also a part of a 
broader project to construct “the new Thai national identity.” She continues, “As pa 
(forest), the non-Tai entity, has been gradually incorporated into a new spatial 
organization…the uncivilized khon pa (wild people), the non-Thai ethnic category, has 
become a salient object of interrogation”  (p. 26-27). As part of this project, then, one 
finds a proliferation of Thai ethnographies at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of 
the twentieth century, creating and shaping ethnicity through the process of making 
people legible, a process that was echoed in neighboring colonial territories as well 
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(Edwards 2007; Thongchai 2000a). Underlying this ethno-geographic project was, 
according to scholars, Thai interest in defining themselves as superior to other ethnic 
groups and thus civilized (siwilai) alongside the other modern nations exerting their 
imperial authority in the region (Thongchai 2000b).   
The work of classifying what Thongchai (2000a: 41) refers to as the “others 
within,” the chao pa/khon pa (forest/wild people)—which later developed into the 
contemporary term still in use chao khao (translated as hill tribe)—ascribed to European 
constructions of racial/ethnic hierarchies, the colonial discourse of civilized and primitive 
peoples, and spatial conceptions of center and periphery (see also Renard 2006). Another 
category was the chao bannok (country-side people), which referred to the melting pot of 
peoples living in lowland rural areas under the sovereignty of the Thai state. This 
suggests that the early ethnographic discourse, produced for both government 
documentation purposes as well as public consumption, affixed linear notions of 
racial/ethnic and social hierarchies to a geographic grid in which one gets more civilized 
the closer one gets to Bangkok. Thongchai (2000a: 46) provides one example of an 1886 
ethnographic publication, “On the varieties of the forest people in the north,” which listed 
multiple ethnic groups including the Karen, Hmong, Lahu, Khamu, among others, 
according to their place on a spectrum from primitive to civilized. While the language of 
the text is blatantly racist, these early Thai ethnographies placed the many groups in a 
category of khon daem (original people) to reflect evolutionarily on the living origins of 
the Thai nation. In this sense, the peoples inhabiting the borderlands are both included 
within the Thai national consciousness and, at the same time, kept at a distance as they 
serve as contrast to highlight the modernity of Siam, and Bangkok in particular. Over 
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time, these lines of difference only hardened as the construction of Thai national identity 
articulated in racial and cultural terms produced growing nationalism in the early decades 
of the twentieth century (Renard 2006).15   
 As this section shows, the development of the Thai nation—referred to as Siam 
until 1941—during the age of modernity and imperialism involved multiple constructions 
that reconfigured the border space in significant ways. Prior to the colonial era, the 
mountains between Burma and Siam had been the permeable and dynamic peripheral 
space outside but still tangentially incorporated into multiple polities. The region’s 
inhabitants as well were classified as outsiders though not in modernity’s inflexible 
racialized way; they moved in and out of social-spatial categories. Officially, the colonial 
period ended the relative autonomy of those living on the edges of the state. At the same 
time the state built up the border as a site to emphasize Thai sovereignty, official and 
public discourse placed highland populations within the interest of national security and 
on an evolutionary scale to help define Thai identity.  
 Nevertheless, while the historical developments covered thus far in this section 
highlight the spatial-social construction of the border and its people from the perspective 
of the Thai state, the lived reality of border populations suggests an alternative set of 
histories. Scott (2009: 217) writes that the themes of “equality, autonomy, and mobility” 
arise repeatedly in the “positional self-understanding of hill peoples” whose material 
lives in the highlands were structured around maintaining freedom and independence. 
                                                
15 Laws like the 1913 Thai Nationality Act aimed to eradicate heterogeneity, particularly in terms of the 
many thousands of Chinese migrants who had moved to Siam in the early part of that century (Pinkaew 
2003b). Renard (2006) describes the strong link between this Thai sense of nationalism and European 
notions of race and hierarchy, possibly a result of the impression late 19th and early 20th century Europe 
made on Thai royalty. 
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Citing as an example the shifting settlements of Karen groups in the Thailand-Myanmar 
border space, which frustrated state efforts to manage these populations, Scott 
emphasizes the extent to which “the utter plasticity of social structure among the more 
democratic, stateless, hill peoples can hardly be exaggerated.” This, he writes, was a 
“polymorphism…suited to the purpose of evading incorporation in state structures. Such 
hill societies rarely challenge the state itself, but neither do they allow the state an easy 
point of entry or leverage” (Scott 2009: 219).  This suggests that despite a building up of 
the border and the state’s assumption of control, people and communities remained quite 
autonomous and still managed to move back and forth across what was still mostly an 
unmarked boundary. What Scott does not mention here is that aside from efforts to evade 
state efforts to control and manage, since before the twentieth century some of the 
highland populations had also begun their own nationalist movements for self-
determination, which developed into full-fledged separatist governments, as the next 
section discusses (Christie 2000). 
 Thus, the work of nation building in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
solidified the contradictory position of the border and its people. The space and its people 
as pa and khon pa/chao pa/chao khao served as a social and geographic marker to 
indicate the center and its identity. In this sense the periphery was simultaneously 
incorporated into the national consciousness and yet excluded. And yet, at the same time, 
this discourse belies the lived experience of the borderlands, where populations could 
capitalize on the designation of the frontier as isolated and remote to assert their 
autonomy in terms of their material life and social organization. As I move to the next 
section, I show how the tension between inclusion and exclusion and control and 
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autonomy continued its iterative repetition during the Cold War period in which the 
border and territory on both the Burmese and Thai sides emerged as contested, highly 
securitized sites of social dislocation and relocation.  
 
5. Border as a site of refuge, border as a site of dispossession   
 
 Keeping one’s focus on the border zone between Thailand and Myanmar during 
the second half of the twentieth century, one finds a space that continues to be both of 
great importance to the two states as well as a site of struggle, exclusion, and autonomy.  
During this period, both Thailand and Myanmar (still Burma until 1989) increasingly 
regarded the border through the lens of national security, expending great effort and 
resources to pacify the space. On the Burmese side, this involved decades of active 
warfare as the government sought to crush rebellion waged by Karen and other ethnic 
groups struggling militarily for independence and autonomy. In Thailand, highland 
groups faced further exclusion and prejudice as a result of nationalism. By the middle of 
the twentieth century, the government perceived the autonomy of the highlands—
particularly along border areas—as threatening. This sentiment grew in the post-World 
War Two era as Thailand dealt with political change and upheaval, in part related to the 
broader geopolitical shifts taking place in the region. These factors reconfigured the 
gendered nature of the border from the feminized space of imperial conquest to one of 
conservation threatened by masculine warfare, development, and eventually global 
capital. 
I divide this section into three parts, the first focusing on armed conflict in Burma 
and the mass displacement of Karen and other ethnic groups along the border. In the 
second part, I look at how Thailand’s campaign against a communist insurgency in the 
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highlands/border areas reshaped the borderscape in Mae Sot and Phob Phra. In the third 
sub-section, I consider the particular role that Mae Sot played during this tumultuous 
time; its historic place along trade routes positioning the town to become a hub for a 
black market smuggling, refuge, and resistance. I attempt to approach these topics with 
the specific perspective of the border and its physical and discursive construction during 
this era.  
 
5.1 Myanmar, civil war, and displacement 
 
 With approximately forty percent of the country constituting highland spaces with 
populations that had maintained a state of semi-autonomy under British colonialism, 
Burma was born as a nation in 1948 with only partial control over its territory (Smith 
1991). Though this is somewhat of an oversimplification, the struggles that took place in 
the borderlands during the subsequent sixty years can be characterized as conflict 
between the government’s effort to claim sovereignty over these mountainous territories 
and the nationalist movements for independence and/or autonomy of more than a dozen 
ethnic groups.16 The state of Burma has been in constant civil war since months after the 
country’s independence from England when ethno-nationalist groups took up arms for 
self-determination and a powerful communist movement erupted in revolt. A succession 
of failed negotiations over the status of highland quasi-states in the new nation, on top of 
racial and historical political tensions from the colonial era between the majority Burman 
and dozens of minority groups, sparked insurgencies that spread throughout the entire 
                                                
16 The highlands of Myanmar did become the battleground for multiple struggles that were separate from, 
but interconnected with, the campaigns for self-determination of ethnic groups. This includes the conflict 
waged by the Communist Party of Burma and student activists turned militants after the 1988 suppression 
of student activist movements in Rangoon/Yangon.   
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country. In addition, the new government of independent Burma was unable to pacify the 
Communist Party of Burma or its more militant “Red Flag” faction, both of which had 
emerged before the Second World War as a widespread nationalist movement (Charney 
2009). However, rather than a single unified revolt, ethno-nationalist groups and the 
communists waged their own struggles, forging certain alliances with some groups and 
fighting others (South 2008).  
As conflict dragged on for decades, the government of Burma (which changed 
from a civilian government to military and nominally socialist dictatorship in 1962 as a 
result of a coup)17 and its military, known as the Tatmadaw, deployed a “scorched earth” 
strategy to suppress and control contested territory.18 This emerged as a total war against 
the highlands, the armies operating there, and their civilian populations who the 
government regarded as supporting the rebellion. Starting in the mid-1960s and 
continuing for the next fifty years, Tatmadaw waged what it referred to as the Four Cuts 
campaign (Phyet Ley Phyet) to combat the insurgencies by severing the latter’s support 
structure.19 That is: 
To cut food supply to the insurgents; to cut protection money from villagers to the 
insurgents; to cut contacts (intelligence) between people and the insurgents; and 
to make the people “cut off the insurgents’ head” (meaning, involving the people 
in fighting, particularly the encirclement of insurgents) (Maung Aung Myo 2009: 
26). 
 
                                                
17 In 1962, General Ne Win staged a coup, overthrowing Burma’s civilian government, imposing martial 
law (which would last for the next twelve years) and initiating the “Burmese Way to Socialism,”his 
program to consolidate total control over the country’s resources, territory, and economy. This coup 
ushered in an era of military dominance in Burma that has continued in different iterations through the 
present time.  
18 One of the first targets of this campaign in the 1950s was actually a non-highland space, the Irrawaddy 
Delta, where Karen insurgents had gained control at the outset of the conflict. 
19 Smith (1991: 259) points out that this was not a particularly innovative strategy, but rather was adapted 
from British counter-insurgency work in Malaysia and the subsequent “strategic hamlet”program of the 
United States in Vietnam (see also Thompson 1966).  
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The tactic, which has become notorious for extreme human rights abuses, 
effectively reconfigured the Burmese social-spatial conception of the border area. The 
Tatmadaw color-coded the country into white, brown, and black areas. White areas were 
those totally under their control; brown represented disputed territory, where government 
forces and insurgents each held territory or where territory regularly changed hands; and 
black referred to areas completely under the authority of insurgents. The Four Cuts 
campaign aimed to expand the white area by both winning the “hearts and minds” of the 
people and by relocating highland communities to “strategic villages” away from areas 
the Tatmadaw designated as combat zones and toward military bases or areas more 
firmly under the latter’s control. Smith (1991: 259) writes: 
Any villager who remained, they were warned, would be treated as an insurgent 
and ran the risk of being shot on sight.  After the first visit, troops returned 
periodically to confiscate food, destroy crops and paddy and, villagers often 
alleged, shoot anyone suspected of supporting the insurgents. It was, they claim, a 
calculated policy of terror to force them to move.  
 
In this sense, the Burmese state’s strategy was to not only gain control of territory 
and people, but to eliminate whole populations they saw as threatening either through 
direct attacks or by causing their displacement (Lang 2002). Through brutal tactics, the 
military moved whole villages, often from hills where they had farmed for generations, 
into the plains or valleys where the Burmese government could more easily control 
them.20  
The Border Consortium (2012) claims that since 1996, when it started counting, 
                                                
20 The Tatmadaw laid landmines in the middle of emptied villages and in surrounding rice paddies; 
murdered hundreds of villagers who were reluctant to leave or who returned from relocation villages to 
harvest their crops; tortured villagers under the guise of interrogating them; and raped and pressed villagers 
into forced labor as part of its eradication campaign (International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law 
School 2014; Karen Women Organization 2007; Karen Human Rights Group 2009).   
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the Burmese government has destroyed approximately 3,700 villages. Humanitarian 
organizations and ethno-nationalist groups working in southeastern Myanmar and on the 
western border of Thailand documented more than 500,000 internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) (the number includes those displaced since 1996 when they began to collect data). 
The Border Consortium, formerly the Thai-Burma Border Consortium, divided this 
number into three main categories of IDPs: those in hiding in “militarily contested areas, 
which are generally located in remote and mountainous forests and fields” (TBBC 2007: 
26); those forced into government “relocation sites;” and those displaced in “ethnic 
ceasefire areas,” the latter a broader category for multiple forms of displacement, 
including IDP camps (p. 29). Figure 1 displays figures for internal displacement in 
southeastern Myanmar in 2007 and in 2012. 
 
 
 
In addition to violence and displacement, civil war has proliferated the many articulations 
of nationalism and fragmented sovereignties that have multiplied and shifted over time 
and in relation to local, regional, and global politics. Movements for self-determination 
among ethno-nationalist groups have developed over the years into militarized political, 
social, and economic structures. In southeastern Myanmar, armed groups like the Karen 
National Union, the Karenni National People’s Party, and the New Mon State Party have 
From The Border Consortium 
(2012) 
Figure 1: Displacement in southeast Myanmar 2003-2012 
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built up complex political and social systems, which include departments for relief and 
development, health, and education, all of which depend heavily on support from 
international donors as part of a humanitarian intervention (Jolliffe 2014; South 2011).   
Beyond these more prominent groups, there are a growing number of breakaway 
factions that exert control over people and territory and that sometimes fight alongside 
the Burmese government. For those living under insurgent control or in mixed-control 
areas, life is extremely complicated as people are “under the authority of multiple ‘states’ 
or ‘state-like’ authorities that extract from citizens, both mediate and cause conflict, and 
provide some services for residents and commercial interests” (Callahan 2007: xiii). 
Ashley South (2008: 36) refers to the rise of multiple splinter insurgent groups and the 
social structures which result as a system of “neopatrimonialism” where “authority [is] 
concentrated in the hands of strongmen (or warlords).”  Jolliffe (2014) characterizes this 
as a patron-client system of loyalty, power, hierarchy, and legitimation. 
Amidst the diversity of different authorities, the economic landscape of the 
Burmese borderlands has developed during this time as a web of interconnected networks 
engaged in the production and trafficking of drugs as well as struggles over the control of 
natural resources, especially logging and mining concessions (Lintner 1999). With the 
Tatmadaw and their various proxy forces also heavily involved in these practices, power 
and legitimation in the Burmese highlands is increasingly based on access to and control 
over modes of black market production and transport. During the 1990s, economic 
exploits increasingly defined the terms of the civil war with growing numbers of Thai and 
Chinese investments in hydropower and resource extraction projects in conflict areas 
(South 2011). In more recent years as the Burmese government has signed ceasefires with 
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a number of ethnic armed organizations, the once illicit networks for logging and mining 
remain intact and are rebranded as liberalization as they attract the interest of multi-
million dollar foreign direct investment from firms no longer restricted by sanctions 
(Fujimatsu and Moodie 2015). The end to sanctions against Myanmar (gradually between 
2012 and 2014), which succeeded political change and ceasefires, allowed for what was 
illegal trafficking to continue unabated, but as an increasingly legitimate practice. In this 
sense, even as conflict and militarization are ongoing and even as this continues to define 
the nature of economic practice in the Burmese borderlands, changes in the social-spatial 
arrangements of the frontier render the space and its inhabitants at once marginal and 
central, resistant, and subjugated.21  
  
5.2 Development, displacement, and relocation in Thailand 
 
 On the other side of the border, the Thai state also increasingly approached its 
borderlands from a national security perspective.22  Embracing a nationalistic notion of 
state boundaries which conflated territory and ethnic/racial identity, Thais saw those they 
identified as non-Tai peoples of the highlands as not only peripheral and less civilized but 
progressively as alien and non-citizen.23 Like Myanmar, though not on the same scale, in 
Thailand the tension between the autonomous lives of highland groups and the 
government’s desire to manage them resulted in open conflict and forceful attempts at 
                                                
21 South (2008) notes, “On a number of occasions, KNLA units were deployed to ‘protect’areas of forest 
from government-oriented and rogue logging companies, in order that these trees could be logged by 
companies allied with powerful Karen commanders and their families”(pg. 74). In a footnote, South 
provides an example of one unit who laid landmines to protect a logging tract, resulting in the death and 
injury of local villagers (cf. 24, p. 237). 
22 Though not discussed in depth here, this included the eastern border with Cambodia in the 1980s where 
a highly visible population of 300,000 refugees fleeing the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese occupation had 
gathered in a series of camps.    
23 This was the case even with the Thai Nationality Act of 1913. This was because all those within Thai 
territory had access to citizenship though it was considered in terms of lineage from Thai parents. 
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relocation and containment. During the post-World War Two era, the threat posed by 
ethnic minority “others” became part of Thailand’s larger geopolitical Cold War struggle 
against what the government perceived to be an international communist movement 
within its borders. The government, concerned that communist China was secretly 
funding Hmong and rural Thai peasants, viewed highland peoples as either for or against 
the communist threat, an assessment that included views on which groups were most 
willing to integrate in Thai society.24 As I show in this sub-section, acts of resistance and 
government counter-insurgency tactics—both through military force and development-
focused interventions—contributed to shaping the borderscape as it exists today.  
The government’s security perspective toward its “peripheral” spaces in the 
highlands as well as the arid northeast (Isan) derived in part from the growing 
polarization of these regions from Bangkok during the first half of the twentieth century. 
A dominant narrative emerged in Thailand that chao khao (literally hill tribes) were 
unwilling to assimilate and integrate (Pinkaew 2003a). In addition, the twentieth century 
saw an in-migration of newer groups of people such as the Hmong, Burmese Karen, 
Akha, and Kuomintang Chinese (anti-Maoist followers of Chiang Kai-shek) from China 
and Burma to Thailand’s north and western frontier. This coincided with a drastic rise in 
opium cultivation in the highlands, most heavily in the far north “Golden Triangle” 
region bordering Burma and Laos (Culas 2000; Lintner 1999). Lumping groups 
                                                
24 While scholarship at the time sometimes considered the conflict in Thailand as yet another Cold War 
proxy conflict between the US and its capitalist allies and China, the reality is that insurgency in Thailand 
was more local. Moreover, the suspicion of Hmong villagers as especially linked to China reflects a 
racialized assumption of a threatening “other”based on the Hmong’s origins in China. Thailand viewed 
other groups, particularly the Karen National Union, the Shan United Army, and the Kuomintang, as allied 
with their struggle against insurgency and communism and, with the help of the CIA provided substantial 
funds in their efforts to fight communist insurgents in Burma and Thailand. To enlist Thailand in its 
regional campaigns for influence, the US gave Thailand approximately US $650 million between 1950 and 
1975, for primarily counter-insurgency activities, including those for development (Kislenko 2004).   
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autochthonous to the highlands with these newer migrants, the Thai state viewed most 
upland populations as illegal, their perceived lack of assimilation as a sign of disloyalty; 
their perceived involvement in swidden agriculture and opium cultivation as unlawful 
(Pinkaew 2003a; Renard 2000). As Pinkaew (2003a: 32) writes, “migratory behaviour, 
opium growing, and shifting cultivation were marked as the three most dangerous threats 
posed by ‘hill tribes’—all needing to be urgently controlled and suppressed in order to 
maintain the security of the entire nation.”   
These concerns about highland populations converged with Bangkok’s anxiety 
that growing numbers of rural peasants in many parts of the country, including the south 
and northeast, were joining the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) out of discontent 
with the government (Bowie 1997).25 Though highland-dwelling groups were not 
particularly affiliated with the communist movement at first, their status as dangerous 
outsiders made it easy for the government and the public to see them as part of the armed 
insurgency, particularly the Hmong, who historically were the most isolated and 
independent of the highland communities (Tapp 1989).   
Importantly, however, the Thai government made exceptions for those highland 
communities who joined them in the fight against communists. This included the forces 
of the Karen National Union who often crossed into Thailand and were ardently anti-
communist (Lintner 1999). This was also the case with Kuomintang Chinese soldiers and 
Shan militants whose expansive opium production and trade networks the government 
agreed to ignore because they battled communists in Thailand and in Burma (Cooper 
1979; Lintner 1999). This reflects an important contradiction in the development of the 
                                                
25 Though starting in the “peripheral”areas of Thailand and based there, by the 1970s the Thai government 
classified a majority of its provinces as “infiltrated”with the insurgency. 
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borderlands during this Cold War period of heightened security. During this time, the 
Karen, Shan, and Kuomintang armed groups thrived in an autonomy that confounded 
Thailand’s official perception of the border as space in need of regulation and control. 
They crossed back and forth over the boundary, launching attacks from Thailand into 
Burma, and they earned immense profits from the management and taxation of a multi-
billion dollar black market in timber, gems, opium, and everyday goods passing through 
their territory. This was just the sort of behavior the Thais had expressed as anathema, a 
rationale for critiques of and attacks against other highland communities the government 
perceived to be linked to communists. From this perspective it becomes possible to see 
how official consideration of the border and attitudes toward highland peoples were, at 
this time, related to the influence of broader geopolitical concerns. 
The Thai government’s view of upland autonomy through the lens of anti-
communist struggle helps explain their militarized response to certain ethnic minority 
expressions of autonomy in the border region in the 1960s and 70s. For example, even 
though various highland communities had violently protested perceived government 
intrusions in the past, the Thai labeled the “Red Meo revolt” (Meo being another term for 
Hmong) what started as a series of land quarrels in Chiang Rai and Nan Provinces 
between Hmong residents and local Thai authorities in late 1967 (Cooper 1979; Renard 
2000). Fearing that Hmong unrest was an act inspired by the communists, the Thai army 
responded to small-scale attacks with artillery and airstrikes, destroying villages and 
displacing many hundreds (Marks 1994). Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the Thai 
government waged war on their own highlands in an attempt to stamp out rebellion at the 
same time their repressive tactics motivated increasing numbers of peasants, students, 
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and ethnic minority groups to join the insurgency.26 Journalists covering the conflict in 
the mid-1970s analogized what they saw to what was taking place in Vietnam: napalm 
dropped indiscriminately in forest areas and “wanton killing and damage inflicted on the 
rural people in the remote areas where the heaviest fighting takes place” (Economic & 
Political Weekly 1976: 1,823).27 Also documented was the relocation of whole villages 
from highlands to the lowlands; in some cases, people ended up in government-built 
“new villages” because they fled fighting, while in other cases, the Thai security forces 
had razed their homes and brought them down to the lowlands where they could not aid 
rebels (Abrams 1970; Thomson 1968). Hearn (1974) suggests that about 100 villages 
were destroyed during the late 1960s and early 1970s when the government’s counter-
insurgency tactics most severely targeted highland-dwelling Hmong people. Tapp (1989) 
asserts that while Hmong communities were not particularly affiliated with the 
communist insurgency prior to these events, such government reprisals drove them to 
join the CPT. Pinkaew (1996) echoes this perspective, noting that Karen living in western 
Thailand joined the CPT only after seemingly random attacks on their villages by the 
Thai military in the 1960s and 1970s.   
Simultaneous to the tactic of military might, the Thai government also engaged in 
a substantial campaign to “develop” highland areas and extend the “border of Thainess,” 
as Thongchai (1994) puts it. This was part of what has been referred to as a CPM (Civil-
                                                
26 Also fueling rebellion was the police and paramilitary crackdown on student protesters at Thammasat 
University on October 6, 1976 and the subsequent coup and takeover by the military. Though the military 
asserted the need for them to be in power to combat the widespread communist insurgency, their takeover 
appeared only to galvanize widespread support for the uprising. 
27 It is important to note that these tactics were not entirely disconnected from the conflicts taking place in 
nearby countries. Not only did the US fund Thailand’s counter-insurgency efforts, but Thailand was 
involved (alongside the US) in funding anti-Soviet factions among the Cambodian refugees who fought 
against the Vietnamese who were, at the time, occupying Cambodia.  
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Police-Military) approach, which was heavily sponsored by the United States (Marks 
2007). Government programs served the dual purpose of gaining the support of highland 
communities and increasing the government’s access to such areas in order to better 
suppress insurgents and diminish the opium trade. This included the establishment of a 
number of paramilitary forces, such as the Border Patrol Police, the Volunteer Defense 
Corps, the Village Scouts, and the Rangers, all of whom had different roles ranging from 
armed patrol missions, to development projects, to the mobilization of the rural 
population under the banner of nationalism (Ball and Mathieson 2007; Bowie 1997; Lobe 
and Morell 1978). A Hill Tribe Division of the Public Welfare Department of the 
Ministry of Interior began work in the late 1950s and early 1960s to engage in 
“resettlement and development” of ethnic minorities, a policy that continued into the 
1980s (McNabb 1983). The US Agency for International Development (USAID) poured 
tens of millions of dollars into “Accelerated Rural Development” programs which sought 
to improve the production capacity of rural communities, build roads connecting rural to 
urban areas, better extend government authority into the village level, “promote the 
growth of democracy,” and provide vocational training (Vichit 1966).   
Thus, parallel to and intersecting with the state of active warfare in the highlands 
were government efforts with substantial international financial support to build schools, 
roads, bridges, health centers, and government buildings; spread the education of the Thai 
language, school curriculum, and love of the monarchy; fund cash crop alternatives to the 
production of opium; and train and support village-level counter-insurgency efforts 
(Bowie 1997; Keyes 1995; Tapp 1989). However, scholars argue that these were “of 
secondary importance,” in that “Many of the development projects, such as the 
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construction of rural roads built in security-sensitive areas were primarily intended to 
serve the needs of the police and military in combating the insurgents” (Thomas 1986: 
20). Either way, a significant result was to diminish the relative isolation of highland 
communities in multiple ways. 
A third component to the government’s reterritorialization of the borderlands 
involved its forest and land policy during this time, which, together with “resettlement 
and development” and a military presence, reconfigured the system of landholding in this 
territory and furthered a discourse of ethnic minorities as unlawfully living in spaces that 
needed to be regulated. Under the Reservation and Protection of Forests Act of 1938, 
which prohibited grazing animals or clearing land in reserved spaces, in the 1950s and 
1960s, the Thai government began designating large swaths of territory as protected 
areas, even when sections of these areas were in use or inhabited (Vandergeest and 
Peluso 1995). Through this process, over forty percent of Thailand was considered 
“protected” by 1985 (ibid). Other initiatives took place in the second half of the twentieth 
century to mark certain areas as national parks and protected watersheds. At the same 
time, in the 1950s, the government instituted reforms to the landholding system such that 
property owners had to register their land (within 180 days) or it would be considered 
uninhabited and thus the state’s (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995).28 The policy was based 
on fixed property lines, which did not support the shifting-agriculture of many highland 
communities.   
While many of those who did not register their land were those in more remote 
areas living off of swidden farming, because of lax enforcement, many living in upland 
                                                
28 The policy of declaring unregistered land unoccupied extended from 1954 until 1971 when it was 
abolished in recognition of the many thousands of settlers who had moved into protected areas unlawfully.   
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areas, including protected territory, continued their livelihoods without change. 
Nevertheless, two consequences of these laws and policies were to consider certain 
people and their livelihoods illegal and the issuance of a series of plans to remove the 
millions of people living in reserves, watersheds, and national parks. Tapp (1989) and 
Walker and Farrelly (2008) describe limited and isolated incidents of displacement and 
relocation of ethnic minorities from protected areas from the mid-1970s through the 
1980s, totaling 5-6,000 people who ended up in lowland settlements. More than the act of 
forced relocation though, forest and land policies during this time contributed to the 
alienation and exclusion of highland peoples.  
During and after the insurgency in northern and western Thailand, the military 
and the government used internationally funded development projects to encourage the 
population of forested territory in border areas by lowland farmers to expand alternative 
cash-crop production (Hirsch 2009; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). The government 
encouraged such groups to settle in the highlands as a security measure; new roads and 
other infrastructure in previously semi-autonomous areas established new villages loyal 
to the government and disrupted the support networks of insurgents and other 
communities who had been living more or less independently. Hirsch (2009: 125) 
describes this as a kind of “frontier-taming” and a continuation of the “state’s civilizing 
mission” of its territory’s outer reaches, but notes that the settling of the highlands also 
had to do with “global market demand for commercial rice and other crops.” Settlers and 
investors often followed directly in the footsteps of the logging industry which cleared 
vast swaths of public territory, enabling the establishment of high value agribusiness on 
the border, such as sugar, pineapples, cut flowers, and even prawn farms (Hirsch 1992). 
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Border development, then, had less to do with protecting forested land or empowering 
and incorporating local communities, and more to do with reconfiguring space to be more 
economically useful.  
While most of the government initiatives during the Cold War did not result in the 
forced displacement of large numbers of highland peoples or other rural landholders, they 
changed the relationship between the conception of forest space, national territory, and 
what type of people and practices were entitled to property. On the one hand, 
development, land, and forest programs furthered the late nineteenth/early twentieth 
century goals of constructing the Thai geo-body and a unified concept of a “Thai nation” 
by pushing language and identity into areas in the name of national security (Baker and 
Pasuk 2005). On the other hand, discourse, policies, and practice during this period 
drastically changed the economic topography of the border. Hirsch (2009) aptly describes 
the growth of cash-crop industrial agriculture in border areas as a process of 
accumulation by dispossession. Instead of semi-autonomous villages practicing 
swidden/shifting agriculture in a small-scale, cyclical fashion, the newer settlements used 
this land to create labor intensive contract farming, often on an industrial scale, a shift 
that created significant demand for seasonal, low-wage migrant labor. Groups like the 
Hmong that had farmed cyclically, became more sedentary in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
wealthy Thai investors bought up land that had been lying fallow to start industrial farms, 
drastically increasing land prices (Hirsch 1992).   
In this sense, the Cold War era constituted another iteration in Thailand’s struggle 
to control and manage its frontiers; not only western and northern as highlighted in this 
section, but eastern as well where 300,000 Cambodian refugees lived in camps. While, by 
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the end of this period, Thailand had succeeded in gaining control over its borders in ways 
that it had not been able to during previous eras, the state had also both further excluded 
its highland communities and laid the groundwork to transform the space into a site of 
labor-intensive production (Cambodian refugees had also mostly repatriated or been 
resettled). As Anna Tsing (2005: 28) writes, these interconnected contradictions were a 
common theme throughout the region during this period, where due to: 
Cold War militarization of the Third World and the growing power of corporate 
transnationalism,…resource frontiers grew up where entrepreneurs and armies 
were able to disengage nature from local ecologies and livelihoods, “freeing up” 
natural resources that bureaucrats and generals could offer as corporate raw 
material.  
 
And yet, underlying all these Thai government efforts to “tame” the frontier is the reality 
that a number of groups, such as Burmese Karen and Shan separatist movements, who 
took up the anti-communist struggle, exerted their own, heavily organized, cross-border 
sovereignty in ways that directly contradicted the notion of the Thai geo-body.    
 
5.3 Mae Sot and Phob Phra as a site of refuge, reterritorialization, and black market 
trade 
 
 While previous eras marked Mae Sot on the map as a stop between Rangoon, 
Bangkok, and Chiang Mai, the political and economic-spatial changes during the Cold 
War era reconfigured Mae Sot and the surrounding border districts of Tak province from 
a remote border trade post into a site of refuge, exile, resistance, conflict, and 
industrialization. Many of the events described above—including insurgency and 
counter-insurgency, development and the expansion of “Thai-ness,” and deforestation 
and new settlements—took place near Mae Sot as well, and are directly related to the 
establishment of the sites where research was conducted for this study and to the social 
practices discussed in subsequent chapters.   
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 In terms of conflict, development, and social dislocation on the Thai side of the 
border, the mountainous districts of Tak province were sites of intense struggle. 
Umphang emerged as a communist stronghold in the 1970s because the area was heavily 
forested, remote, and largely controlled by the Karen and not by the state government, 
making it an ideal place for dissidents and students-turned-insurgents to hide (Pinkaew 
2003; Pitch 2007). To suppress rebellious Karen and Hmong villages in this area, the 
government initiated infrastructure and social relocation projects aimed at pacifying the 
people. This included the construction of a road in 1973, and the establishment of several 
towns and settlements with schools and police stations over the following years, 
including the two Phob Phra sites where research was conducted for this dissertation. The 
road, the only one from Mae Sot to Umphang, is an extraordinarily winding 125-mile 
route through the Dawna Mountains, next to the border with Myanmar, that passed 
through dozens of highland villages considered insurrectionary when it was built (see Rt. 
1090 on Map 3, chapter 1). The road was built one stone at a time in the face of frequent 
attacks from insurgents. Using one ethnic minority group to pacify or displace others, the 
Thai army requested support from the anti-communist Karen National Liberation Army 
(the armed branch of the KNU), who controlled the territory on the Myanmar side of the 
border, to help guard the road-builders and to patrol the surrounding hills (Pitch 2007; 
[field notes, February 15, 2014]). The army also sent in a paramilitary group known as 
krathing daeng (red gaurs) made up of highland migrants from Burma (including Akha, 
Lahu, Lisu, and Yao peoples) and Kuomintang soldiers from China to guard the civilian 
road crews (Schmid and Jongman 2005).   
To express gratitude for the frontline fighting of the Karen and the krathing 
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daeng, King Bumiphol of Thailand granted them the right to settle in the area close to the 
48 kilometer marker and, according to one veteran still living in the area, “cultivate all 
the land we could see” [field notes, 20 February 2014]. Today, there are a number of 
Karen villages in this part of Phob Phra who remain closely affiliated with the KNU 
across the border.29 For the krathing daeng, the area they settled became an official 
village in 1977 and the Thai government named this nationalist, anti-communist 
settlement Romklao Sahamit, which translates to “Under the protection of the King;” a 
pocket of loyal subjects implanted on the land that used to belong to rebellious Hmong 
opium farmers.30 A government school with the same name was also established along 
with other village-level institutions, such as pro-government village chiefs. Additional 
Romklao Sahamit villages and schools were established along the border, including one 
about fifty kilometers further south on the same road.31 
 With the construction of the road, the establishment of outpost towns, and the 
                                                
29 The presence of Karen villages that claim loyalty to the KNU in this area corresponds to my discussion 
of Karen-based networks of power in chapter five. 
30 The use of the monarchy in the naming of this village is significant and reflects the military and the 
government’s use of the king to construct a sense of unity in a fractured country. The king of Thailand has, 
himself, played a major role in this project. Though the country is a constitutional monarchy with a strong 
parliamentary system and everyday executive power lies in the hands of a prime minister, the king and the 
military maintain an extremely close relationship such that the agendas of the military and the monarch are 
often conflated.    
31 Entering the latter village from the highway, one passes under a large wooden gate with the name carved 
in a style mimicking Chinese letters, homage to the Kuomintang soldiers who helped establish the place. In 
this village, Chinese script can be found on the doorframes of many houses, but today the descendents of 
Kuomintang fighters say they are ethnic Haw instead of Chinese because this enabled them to register for 
Thai ethnic minority IDs. According to older residents, the first village chief was the Kuomintang 
commander who declared that the village was only for those ethnic groups who had fought together against 
the communists; no Hmong or Thai people were allowed to settle there; residents affirm that this was the 
case until he passed away. Residents say that over the years the Thai government reneged on their promise 
of land to the anti-communist veterans and began relocating other groups to neighboring areas as part of a 
subsequent era of social landscaping called Ruam Thai Pattana (develop Thailand together). To clear a 
national park south of Umphang district in the 1980s, the Thai government moved thousands of Hmong to 
the hills near Romklao Sahamit; only a string of villages along the highway in Phob Phra are now not 
Hmong dominated [field notes, 20 February 2014].  
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ongoing control of certain areas by the KNU, Phob Phra developed as a site for both 
Karen resistance and intensive resource extraction. Once trees were cleared, capital-
intensive agribusiness moved into this fertile highland territory. Now, all along the two-
lane highway, one finds massive plantations with thousands of acres of roses, corn, 
cabbage, palm sugar, and other crops.  These are interspersed with smaller Hmong and 
Karen farming communities. 
 
 Not only Phob Phra, but Mae Sot and districts to the north were also KNU 
strongholds during this time. As noted in the section above, the Thai government gave 
them tacit permission to operate autonomously on this part of the border in exchange for 
their fight against communism. As the Burmese army gained more territory in the 
southeast of Burma pushing the Karen further east and over the border, Mae Sot 
increasingly became a hub for KNU activity where one could find the homes of 
government-in-exile officials and generals (Lang 2002; South 2008). Mae Sot also 
attracted many thousands fleeing the Burmese governments’ crackdown against students 
and democracy activists in 1988 and 1989 and during the post-1990 election repression 
Photo 5: Gate to Romklao 
Sahamit village (KM48). 
The gate was made to look 
Chinese because of the 
many former Kuomintang 
soldiers involved in the 
militia that fought for the 
Thai government against 
the communist insurgency 
during the construction of 
the road to Umphang. 
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(Fink 2009). They too relied on Mae Sot as a safe corridor beyond the range of the 
Tatmadaw from which they could engage in advocacy and regroup, many joining the 
armed struggles of different ethno-nationalist insurgents, and others staying to start Mae 
Sot’s budding unregistered civil society industry. By the end of the twentieth century, 
Mae Sot was a prime headquarters for forces opposed to the Myanmar government, and 
central in their narrative of resistance.   
Related to this is the presence of refugee camps along the border in five different 
provinces. Ashley South argues that the refugee camps which opened in the mid-1980s 
along the Thai side of the border swelled in the 1990s with former soldiers, families of 
combatants, and the civilian branches of the exiled Karen, Mon, and Karenni political 
bodies (2008; 2011). As of October 2014, there were 74,000 registered refugees living in 
the camps, though as a result of a long-stalled registration process, the unregistered 
number in the camps brings the total over 110,000 (TBC 2014). Over 90,000 Burmese 
refugees have left the camps to resettle in third countries since 2005 (UNHCR 2014). The 
largest refugee camp, Mae La, which hosts more than 40,000 people, is just thirty-five 
miles north of Mae Sot and another camp, Umpiem Mae which holds 15,000 refugees, is 
only fifty-five miles to the south in Phob Phra district. Additional camps extend to the 
south and north of Mae Sot, and the town is the primary junction for residents’ movement 
between camps and urban spaces (Mae Sot, Bangkok, and elsewhere) and from one camp 
to another. There are also thousands of Shan refugees in Thailand, most of whom work as 
migrants or who attempt to blend in with the Thai population. The influx of displaced 
Burmese in the mid-1980s and 1990s came just as Thailand and the international 
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community were resolving the decade-long Cambodian refugee crisis.32 Fatigued from 
the latter, the Burmese on the border initially received little attention, which Bowles 
(1998) argues facilitated self-sufficiency and autonomy among the displaced Burmese 
who moved back and forth across the border depending on conditions in Myanmar. 
In addition to their pervasive social and political networks extending across the 
border, until the end of the twentieth century, the KNU also controlled an incredibly 
lucrative black market trade that passed through Mae Sot for goods to get into 
Burma/Myanmar (Horstmann 2011). As part of Burma’s “socialist” program—initiated 
in 1962 after the military coup—the government shut down nearly all of its official 
border trade. Mae Sot and the Burmese town of Myawaddy (four km away, see Map 5) 
across the border emerged as the primary gateway for a variety of illicit essential goods 
into socialist Burma (Pitch 2007; Mya Maung 1991).  
  
 
                                                
32 The attention the Cambodian crisis received from the international community contrasted heavily with 
the Burmese influx. While the former received significant international support immediately and fit in the 
broader Cold War narrative of refugees from Soviet-backed Vietnamese aggression, Thailand sought to 
deal quietly with the growing population of Burmese refugees along the border (Robinson 1998). This is 
likely another reason the western border was a space of autonomy and factionalization in the way it was.  
Map 5: Myawaddy, Mae Sot & border crossings 
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Mya Maung (1991) asserts that during these years of economic failure and 
insularity in Burma/Myanmar, it was the black market that sustained much of the 
population.  There was no more vibrant trade route for the black market than that between 
Myanmar and Thailand, and in particular: 
the largest trade points were border market centers in Mae Sot, Phob Phra, Mae 
Ramat, and Tha Song Yang district…The most active illegal border trade between 
Burma and Thailand was conducted along the Thai river of Moei involving more 
than fifty different Thai market centers or custom outposts…There were five 
different outposts in the township of Mae Sot alone…The Thai exports from Mae 
Sot were mostly basic necessities needed by a Burmese family (Mya Maung 
1991: 210).   
 
For example, one report from the late 1980s observed nearly three-dozen trucks heading 
from Thailand through Mae Sot into Myanmar daily through just one crossing, with an 
estimated average value of 200,000 baht [~ US$8,000] per truck (Khin Maung Nyunt 
1988: 98). Going the opposite direction, from Myanmar into Thailand along the same 
routes were precious and semi-precious stones and hardwood (Mya Maung 1991; Felbab-
Brown 2013). See Table 1 for a list of commonly traded items in the early 1980s.  
 
Burma !  Thailand Thailand !  Burma 
Fish, food, other Auto parts and bicycles 
Opium and drugs Pastes/sauces/food products 
Gems Textiles 
Timber/wood Chemicals/plastics 
Livestock Pharmaceutical 
Minerals Electric appliances 
In addition, scholars, NGOs, and UN 
agencies have identified Mae Sot and the 
trade routes as hubs for human trafficking, as well as trafficking in arms, counterfeit and 
Table 1: 1980s Burma-Thailand trade  
Adapted from Takamuri and Mouri 1984, p. 134 
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contraband goods, and drugs (Chouvy 2013; Feingold 2013; Capie 2013; Lintner 2013). 
For many years in the 1960s and 1970s, a large informal border market existed in the 
open near Mae Sot where Burmese forces could not easily access it, a testament to the 
lack of control either Myanmar or Thailand could exert on the town or the trade. The 
scale of the black market trade in the 1960s and 1970s prompted the migration to Mae 
Sot of traders and smugglers. 
Despite officially being on Thai soil, the social fabric and economic terrain of 
Mae Sot and Phob Phra constitutes a microcosm of the many contradictions intersecting 
in the Thai-Myanmar border space. With major geopolitical transitions taking place in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s—the end of the Cold War, Burmese “socialism,” and 
Thailand’s communist insurgency—the border gradually ceased to be a site of political 
struggle and emerged as a space illuminated by regional governments as a symbol of 
Southeast Asia’s new economic cooperation.33 This signified the shift Thailand’s then-
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan called for in turning “battlefields into market 
places” in the late 1980s (Battersby 1999). As the next section demonstrates, this change, 
which emphasized the economic power of the Thailand-Myanmar borderlands as a 
distinct region within Southeast Asia, was entirely contingent on the influx of more than 
two million migrants from Myanmar, fleeing both the broader effects of civil war and 
economic destitution.   
 
6. Crisis and the movement of capital: Mae Sot as a special economic zone  
 
 With the borderlands constituted and reconstituted as a peripheral space of 
                                                
33 As Thailand grew significantly closer to the government of Myanmar, these geopolitical changes also 
signaled the termination of the partnership between Thai security forces and the KNU who had lost much 
of their control over the Burmese side of the border (Smith 2007).  
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“otherness” and as a result of the physical, political, and demographic changes wrought 
on this landscape, the Thailand-Myanmar frontier has come to reflect an ideal locale for a 
particular form of capital accumulation that advances gendered and racialized 
assumptions about the people there. As I show in this section, in order to remain 
competitive amidst the broader regional and global turn toward neoliberal market 
reforms, Thailand capitalized on the unique social, economic, and political dynamic of 
the border space to establish a special economic zone around Mae Sot. The modes of 
production and gendered social organization one finds in this zone today derive in many 
ways from the discursive contradictions that define Mae Sot and the Thailand-Myanmar 
borderlands as a space set apart. They also reflect the spatial relations of uneven 
geographic development.  
Since the early 1990s, the tension between the border’s designation as external 
and semi-autonomous and the desire for the Thai state to incorporate, regulate, and make 
this space useful has manifested itself in Mae Sot’s growth as a hub for capital and 
migration.  In terms of capital, Pitch (2007: 417) notes that “it was the armed ethnic war 
[in Myanmar] that has structured the economy of the area,” in the sense that the KNU and 
later the breakaway faction Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) controlled most 
of the lucrative Thailand-Myanmar trade along Thailand’s western border via a series of 
informal crossing points. Mae Sot’s reputation as the port for an immense black market 
trade between Myanmar and Thailand drew in brokers from throughout Thailand in the 
1980s and multi-national capital investment in the 1990s when relations between the two 
countries improved (Pitch 2007). By the mid 2000s, goods passing through Mae Sot 
represented fourteen percent of Myanmar’s official border trade, which accounted, in 
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2007, for about thirteen percent of all of Myanmar’s imports and exports (Kudo 2013).34 
As of 2007, official statistics showed that US $360 million of trade passed through Mae 
Sot annually (imports and exports), while unofficial estimates are closer to $1.5 billion 
(Silp 2007).35 During the 1990s, improved relations between Thailand and Myanmar also 
led to a series of new economic initiatives centered around this vibrant cross-border trade, 
including Thai investments in Burmese contract farming and logging initiatives, 
hydropower, and mining—only some of which was legal (see for example, Felbab-Brown 
2013).36  A major source of investment was also a budding garment industry in Mae Sot, 
tailored according to gendered assumptions to capitalize on the thousands of Burmese 
women entering Thailand through this town. Firms relocated to the border in order to 
undercut organized Thai labor in the country’s central provinces as well (Maneepong 
2006; Piya 2007). 
Along with the thousands of mostly Karen and Shan refugees displaced from 
southeastern Myanmar since the 1980s, and the urban activists fleeing persecution in 
Yangon, Thailand has become a destination for some two to three million Burmese men 
and women uprooted as a result of fifty years of disastrous economic practices under two 
different dictatorships (Martin 2007; Matthews 2006). Burmese households throughout 
Myanmar have struggled against double-digit inflation, unreliable market prices, regional 
                                                
34 In the late 1990s, the primary imports from Burma to Thailand were wood and gems and as one of the 
more developed border towns, much of this traffic—which is semi-legal or completely illegal—passed 
through Mae Sot (Maneepong and Wu 2004). 
35 Kudo (2013: 190) compared Burmese and Thai statistics from FY 2006 and found significant 
discrepancies regarding the value of imports and exports between Mae Sot and Myawaddy. According to 
Myanmar there were US $61 million in exports to Mae Sot and US $95.1 million in imports from that port. 
However, according to Thailand, the former was only US $34.2 million and the latter was US $289 million.  
The enormous discrepancy may be indicative of the double flow of legal and illegal goods and a lack of 
agreement between the two countries about which goods show up in official records and which do not. 
36 This coincided with the formal renewal of official border trade between Myawaddy in Myanmar and 
Mae Sot in Thailand in 1998 (see Lintner 2013).  
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economic downturns, and arbitrary taxation on the local level (MAP 2010; Myat Thein 
2004; Fink 2001).37 During the years of “socialism” (1962-1989), they had to rely on 
overpriced commodities since these entered the Burmese consumer market illegally 
through limited channels. They also had to deal with a paucity of education and 
healthcare infrastructure (James 2005; Jolliffe 2014). For all of these reasons, and also 
because of lax immigration enforcement in Thailand (see chapter four), increasing 
numbers of Burmese migrated to Thailand. Already a hub for black market goods, 
migrants found it easy to cross the unregulated border at any one of more than a dozen 
piers and gates to the north and south of Mae Sot where boats move back and forth across 
the Moei River with great regularity (see Map 5 above and Photo 6 below).  
 
 
Up until the late 1990s, Mae Sot’s growth as a garment production site and target 
for investment was relatively slow, given the isolation of the border, the proximity of 
conflict on the other side of the border, and the lack of infrastructure supporting industry.    
Having opened a Mae Sot branch in 1996 to take advantage of rising numbers of 
migrants, the Federation of Thai Industries started with thirty firms and only increased at 
a rate of five per year for the first three years (Arnold 2007; FTI 2013). Glassman (2010) 
                                                
37 Arbitrary taxation refers to a form of extortion at the hands of military and government actors, and some 
insurgent groups as well. This takes place during temporary or permanent occupation of villages by 
military/armed groups or when patrols pass through, as well as at checkpoints along roads. 
Photo 6: (Left to right) one of many ferries taking migrants across the Moei River; 
goods moving from Myanmar to Thailand; a “market” of cars for import to Myanmar  
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notes that during this time, the border area received only minimal foreign direct 
investment.  
 However, the 1997-98 Southeast Asian economic crisis effected a complete 
reconfiguration of the relationship between industry, labor, and capital in Thailand in a 
way that transformed this localized zone of border trade set in a predominantly 
agricultural region into an industrial site connected to far away centers of capital 
(Maneepong 2006). Harvey (2010) refers to the economic and political changes that 
much of Southeast Asia underwent as a result of this crisis as accumulation by 
dispossession linked to the movement of capital on a global level.38 Ling (2004: 115) 
describes a gendered tone to this crisis and the aftermath, as the institutions of global 
capital sought to “(re)feminize Asia by discrediting the region’s claim to a muscular, 
alternative capitalism” while (re)masculinizing “the role of Western capital in the region 
by buying out Asian capital at bankrupt prices.” This period witnessed the evisceration of 
organized labor, a shift toward foreign control over Southeast Asian economies, and a 
transition to export-oriented economies built on the backs of flexible labor in ways that 
reflected capital’s gendered hierarchies. 
 
6.1 Economic crisis and the relocation of capital to the borderlands 
 
Kicking off two years of harsh economic recession that spread throughout 
Southeast Asia and beyond as far as Brazil and Russia, the Thai baht collapsed in July of 
1997 in the face of massive debt and financial speculation. These trends were a reflection 
                                                
38 Harvey describes the 1997-98 crisis as a safety valve for capital-rich economies trying to avoid their own 
crisis of over-accumulation in the sense that it was a largely manipulated event, which led to the rapid 
devaluation of assets and the subsequent creation of immense opportunity for capital in North America and 
especially East Asia to buy these assets up at a lower cost and with fewer regulations. Harvey points to 
Argentina’s 2001 crisis as another such example.  
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of the previous decade’s drastic economic and political reforms in Thailand. In the 1980s, 
the Thai government followed the World Bank’s advice to liberalize its external trade and 
deregulate foreign investment, which helped transform the economy into one built on 
export-oriented manufacturing (Pasuk and Baker 2008). The following decade saw a 
flood of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Thailand’s retail and manufacturing 
sectors, such as telecommunications and the automobile industry. From 1987 to 1997, 
Thailand experienced an economic boom with an influx of investment into industry as 
East Asian countries relocated their manufacturing overseas to Thai factories. Investment 
in property, real estate, retail, and telecoms also soared (Pasuk and Baker 2007). The 
biggest portion of this investment came from East Asia, particularly Japan, but also 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong-based firms.39 Bello (1997) points out that in Thailand during 
this period, fifty percent of all investment came from property-related loans and between 
thirty and fifty percent of annual growth of the GDP came from property development. 
By the 1990s, firms in the US and Europe also entered the speculation market by 
investing in Thai loans and property. In addition, domestic firms began borrowing from 
international lenders with lower interest rates than Thai banks, and to an extreme degree 
as they sought to keep up with the pace of growth. During the decade of economic 
success, the private sector’s debt “ballooned from 8 billion baht in 1988 to 74 billion in 
1996” (Pasuk and Baker 2008: 7).   
As soon as the Thai baht was unyoked from the US dollar in July 1997, the 
bubble popped and the value of the baht decreased by half over the following five 
                                                
39 Piya (2007: 132) writes: “Between 1985 and 1990, about US $15 billion of Japanese direct investment 
poured into Southeast Asia, and by 1996 about US $48 billion in Japanese FDI was concentrated in the 
countries of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.” 
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months. But because so much of the debt in Thailand was foreign-held, the devaluation of 
the baht meant that firms in Thailand had to pay out double for fixed interest debt 
payments to foreign institutions (Wade and Veneroso 1998). Lenders clambered to 
collect their loans as borrowers defaulted on their debt; the Thai economy recoiled and 
effectively shuttered with GDP decreasing by eleven percent (Natenapha 2008). Instead 
of remedying the situation, the IMF greatly exacerbated the crisis with a support package 
that included deflation, further shrinking consumer spending (Pasuk and Baker 2008; 
Wade and Veneroso 1998).40 Many Thai finance companies closed, and banks stopped 
operating. As a result of the crisis, by the end of 1997, there were an estimated two 
million people out of work. Millions of Thais had migrated from rural to urban areas in 
the 1980s and 1990s, many to participate in the burgeoning manufacturing industries. As 
part of the gendered aspect of this crisis, hundreds of thousands of Thai women who had 
left agricultural villages in the north and northeast of the country to join the workforces 
of the garment and textile industries lost their jobs (Mills 1999; Piya 2007).41 In the few 
years after the crisis hit Thailand, nearly 350,000 industrial workers (including 150,000 
women) lost their jobs as hundreds of factories shut their doors (Piya 2007: 134).   
The crisis and the recovery moved Thailand from an economy built on domestic 
capital to one where it was minimal compared to the percent owned by multinational 
                                                
40 The IMF provided a package to Thailand meant to help deal with crises related to excessive government 
borrowing, not the accumulation of private debt. Their insistence on further liberalization and deregulation 
appears to have been built on the notion that reshaping the Thai economy to more closely resemble Western 
economies would help Thailand recover. 
41 There were certainly many men who lost their jobs as well in that the crisis hit multiple industries. 
However, more flexible, low-wage manufacturing industries, which have a disproportionately female 
workforce, were quicker to close doors and relocate elsewhere. It is often the case in financial crises that 
flexible industries de-materialize and re-materialize. It is also the case that women are usually the first to be 
laid off in such crises, with the assumption that men are the real income-earners in their households 
(Pollard 2012; Pollock and Soe Lin Aung 2010). 
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firms. Natenapha (2008: 23) writes, “in the 10 years following the crisis, the average 
annual inflow of FDI was almost three times higher than in the boom decade in dollar 
terms, almost five times higher in baht terms, and over double as a proportion of GDP.” 
Japan emerged as the primary investor and the industry sector received the bulk of this 
investment (see Table 2). Natenapha (2008) estimates that 25% of Thai capital was either 
liquidated or subordinated to foreign investment acquiring stakes in those firms.   
Table 2: Foreign direct investment by sector and country (1970-2006) (Nathenapa 2008: 24) 
 1970-1986 1987-1996 1997-2006 
FDI yearly average    
US$ billion 0.2 1.7 5.1 
Baht billion 3.5 43.7 202.3 
% of GDP 0.0 1.6 3.6 
Shares by country    
Japan 29.5 28.9 37.6 
US 30.9 14.3 12.1 
EU 15.5 9.4 18.7 
ASEAN 6.1 10.2 14.5 
Hong Kong 10.3 15.5 6.2 
Taiwan 0.6 6.9 2.5 
Shares by sector    
Industry 32.3 37.3 51.6 
Trade 19.7 17.9 15.3 
Services 7.3 3.8 7.3 
Finance 5.2 6.6 4.7 
Real Estate 2.8 23.0 5.6 
Construction 15.2 8.3 0.8 
Other 17.6 3.1 14.7 
 
 
In the increasingly masculinized Thai economy, marked by increased 
liberalization and less regulation, multinational capital, which had quickly become 
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dominant, was increasingly mobile in search of low-cost production strategies that could 
circumvent new labor protection standards and Thai labor unions; the “virgin territory” 
Ling (2004) writes about (see also Klein 2007). Through the creative destruction that left 
many hundreds of domestic firms closed or converted into majority foreign companies, 
there was an opportunity to assert a new model for production that reflects what Arnold 
and Pickles (2011) refer to as “dual-space economies.” In certain high-value sectors, such 
as the auto industry and electronics, foreign companies predicted that over the long term 
it would be profitable to continue manufacturing in Thailand. In many cases, including 
the auto industry, ownership converted to foreign-majority, FDI increased, and 
production increasingly targeted the export market in light of low domestic consumption 
(Nathenapha 2008). This high-value production represented Thailand’s “First World” 
economy. For labor-intensive sectors like garment production, the crisis coincided with a 
broader global decrease in profit rates. Thus, investors in Thailand and elsewhere sought 
to drastically reduce the cost of this industry through a number of initiatives that 
effectively relegated garment production to “Third World” spaces. As elsewhere, in 
Thailand this meant the break-up of larger firms with assembly-line systems into a 
network of sub-contractors filling orders at a piece-rate for multinational companies. This 
further linked the garment industry in Thailand to the new global economy, while 
lowering the cost of production significantly.  
But while some states who had had thriving garment sectors outsourced 
production to other countries with lower wages, fewer rights for workers, and less 
regulation, firms in Thailand looked to its borders where the wages and working 
conditions enabled competition with markets in China and Bangladesh. Instead of 
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instilling companies with policies of fiscal responsibility, Walden Bello (1998: 48) and 
colleagues observed, “Thailand’s manufacturers took the easy way out: relying on ever 
cheaper labor,…reducing the size of factories to contain production costs and inhibit 
unionizing, and farming out more and more production to temporary workers, contract 
workers, and migrant workers.” This reflects a global pattern of rendering migrants into 
flexible labor, a pattern that often intersects with various forms of displacement, 
economic crisis, gendered assumptions, and neoliberal spatial fixes (Castles and Miller 
2009; Bacon 2008; De Genova 2005; Massey 1999; Castells 1975).   
This was a new era for the Thai garment industry which, in order to remain 
competitive, relocated itself to the site of cheaper production costs, less regulation, less 
accountability, and lower wages: Mae Sot. Based on the history described above, the 
Thai-Myanmar border, particularly Mae Sot, was an ideal host for a less formal garment 
industry based on subcontractors. As I have shown, Mae Sot emerged as a particular 
space with characteristics that made it attractive to multinational investors looking to 
locate capital in a setting with little to no regulation. Dennis Arnold (2010) stresses that 
local business leaders, and town, district, and provincial authorities, heavily lobbied 
investors and the central Thai government to make Mae Sot a special economic zone. As 
a space where stakeholders have thrived on largely illegal trade in timber, gems, and all 
the other black market goods moving between Myanmar and Thailand, this was the 
perfect environment to build an unregulated labor-intensive sector. In addition, 
Thailand’s outlying provinces, like Tak, have lower minimum wages than central 
provinces, such as those around Bangkok that used to host the many hundreds of garment 
factories that have since been disassembled and moved to the margins of the state (Piya 
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2007). Finally, the large surplus of women migrants spoke to the gendered ideas that 
women can earn less, work at a contract or piece-rate, including from home, and are 
easier to manage and fire (Wright 2006). It was not necessary, Mae Sot’s business leaders 
and local authorities argued, for firms in Thailand to outsource production to neighboring 
countries with cheaper costs because they could offer a site for “Third World” production 
without crossing borders, built on the backs of mostly women migrants from Myanmar. 
With investors receiving exemptions from paying taxes on imports, businesses, 
machinery, raw materials, and equipment, regional capital eagerly clustered in places like 
Mae Sot (Silp 2007; Maneepong 2006). The Federation of Thai Industries, which started 
in Mae Sot in 1996 with thirty members, now has 144 (FTI 2013). The number of firms 
investing in Mae Sot jumped in 2000 when it became easier to hire migrant workers 
legally (Interview, Federation of Thai Industries, 6 February 2014). As of 2013 in Mae 
Sot there are 365 registered factories with 49,101 workers, the vast majority of whom are 
migrants from Myanmar (FTI 2013). See Table 3 to compare Mae Sot district with the 
other districts of Tak Province (see also Map 1 in chapter 1). 
Table 3 Registered factories in Tak Province 
No. District # Factories Capital (millions of baht) Male Female Total 
1 Muang Tak 146 5,044.3 1,874 432 2,306 
2 Baan Tak  32 343.9 539 159 698 
3 Sam Ngao 18 3,680.9 487 254 741 
4 Mae Ramat 23 173.2 246 269 515 
5 Tha Song Yang 18 33.9 238 80 318 
6 Mae Sot 365 6,013 13,774 35,327 49,101 
7 Phob Phra 26 125.7 259 47 306 
8 Umphang 10 37.6 36 4 40 
9 Wang Jao 39 876.4 351 157 508 
Total 677 16,329.2 17,804 36,729 54,533 
Federation of Thai Industries 2013 
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Mae Sot’s registered factories represent more than six billion baht of annual capital (US 
$186 million) (Federation of Thai Industries 2013).   
 As a result of such growth and the town’s strategic location, today Mae Sot 
features in new regional spatial bodies that re-imagine the geography of mainland 
Southeast Asia in economic terms 
and that recast the role of women 
and men in global production circuits. 
That is, Mae Sot is now one of a set of 
focal points on the maps of regional 
governmental bodies, investors, and 
multinational financial institutions, 
particularly the Asian Development 
Bank and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see Photo 7). These maps convey the notion that Mae Sot plays 
a significant role in broader regional development as it represents Thailand’s 
westernmost point on what is known as the East-West Economic Corridor, part of a 
development plan for the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) (see Map 6), sponsored by 
the Asian Development Bank (Glassman 2010).42 The East-West Economic Corridor and 
the Greater Mekong Subregion are both constructs of the Asian Development Bank and 
ASEAN geared towards enhancing economic activities among mainland Southeast Asian 
                                                
42 Recent changes in Myanmar that have led to the lifting of international sanctions and an influx of foreign 
investment inspired fear among some Thai employers that they would lose their migrant labor force. Since 
2012, the Japanese have begun investing in large-scale infrastructural development projects on the Burmese 
side of the border—what will become production zones with even lower costs—in order to take advantage 
of a decrease in Thailand’s capacity to ensure cheap labor.   
Photo 7: Former PM Yingluk Shinawatra on a billboard 
showing Mae Sot as the keystone of the ASEAN Economic 
Community 
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countries, strengthening south-south linkages and enabling greater global competitiveness 
(Glassman 2010, Asian Development Bank 2009). Incorporating China’s Yunnan 
Province, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, the GMS is quickly 
expanding its capacity for regional trade via transport routes that cut across borders and 
connect trade zones in these various countries (Asian Development Bank 2011). The 
East-West Economic Corridor represents the first and only route connecting the Indian 
Ocean (the coast of Myanmar) and the South China Sea (the coast of Vietnam) and is part 
of ASEAN’s and regional financial institutions’ (like Asian Development Bank) efforts 
to better plug the GMS into circuits of global trade (Arnold and Pickles 2011; ADB 
2009). As Map 6 illustrates, Mae Sot lies squarely on the Asia Highway and represents 
the gateway to Thailand and territories east. As such, the town is expected to continue to 
grow dramatically in the next decades as the flow of multinational investment is 
channeled through this town.  
  
Map 6: Greater Mekong 
Subregion transportation 
corridors (adapted from 
ADB) 
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Despite Mae Sot’s apparent prominence in this reconfiguration of Southeast 
Asia’s geography, the town’s position on this map is rather fragile. This is because the 
maintenance of the border’s status as a competitive zone of exception relies entirely on 
the restriction of migrants’ rights and status; that is, on their continued flexibility as a 
workforce (De Genova 2005). In Thailand, there are five significant mechanisms 
employed to reproduce migrant precarity and thus the status of the border as outside the 
state’s normative legal and political frameworks. I briefly outline them here.  
 First, the predominant tool used by the Thai government, which I explore in 
greater detail in chapter four, is the country’s immigration system, which places migrants 
permanently in what Pitch (2007) calls a “registered illegal immigrant worker” category. 
Various registration schemes since 1992 have led to partial registration of migrants from 
Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia, ensuring a vulnerable status for documented migrant 
workers with limited rights as well as a significant population that has remained 
undocumented. There are currently 1.6 million migrants from neighboring countries 
registered in Thailand, but there are believed to be at least the same number living and 
working without legal status (Penchan 2014). The numbers corresponding to workers 
mentioned in Table 3 above actually belie the reality of how many migrant workers are in 
Mae Sot, which includes what is a much larger undocumented population (Saltsman 
2011).43 With migrants in a constant state of “deportability,” it has been more possible for 
employers to get away with exploitative practices. 
Second, in Mae Sot, much of the employment is informal and distanced from the 
                                                
43 In the profiling study done for the International Rescue Committee and the Feinstein International 
Center, results found that 60% of migrants in Mae Sot were undocumented (Saltsman 2011: 24). This 
resonates with Campbell’s observations (2013) and the work of Pearson and Kusakabe (2012) whose 
estimate is closer to 50%. 
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brand name companies for whom the garments are produced. Like the numbers of 
registered migrants mentioned in Table 3 and referred to above, the Federation of Thai 
Industries’ statistics for the number of firms operating in Mae Sot do not account for the 
many unregistered factories. These are usually “home factories” with no more than fifty 
workers, and sometimes as few as three or four set up around sewing machines in the 
house of an “owner.”44 There is no known number of home factories in Mae Sot, but it is 
believed that there are upwards of fifty of them (Arnold 2010). These unregistered 
facilities help ensure a level of flexibility for garment production in Mae Sot. Not only 
are they built on a subcontract system like the larger registered factories, but they are 
essentially invisible, can pay little and violate worker’s rights in other ways, and can shut 
down and reopen whenever necessary.   
Third, employers in Mae Sot’s garment industry maintain a largely female 
workforce. That nearly 72% of the registered workers in Mae Sot (and 80% of registered 
garment workers in Tak) are women is no accident (FTI 2013; see also Saltsman 2011). 
As in a number of contexts, Thai labor-intensive industries have long depended on 
women to fill the factory floors, a reflection of what Salzinger (2003: 157) calls the 
“transnational trope of productive femininity” (see also Mills 1999; Piya 2007). This 
trope lies behind what makes women’s labor attractive to factory owners and investors. 
Mills (1999) argues that many employers make assumptions about women, believing they 
will only work for limited periods of time (until they quit to marry and raise families) and 
                                                
44 These can also be somewhat formal operations that are located far away from main roads or urban areas. 
This was the case with one factory that I visited during research in February 2014. The unregistered factory 
I visited employed approximately fifty Burmese migrants living in one village in Phob Phra district to 
produce plastic figurines. The space was clearly constructed as a factory (as opposed to a private home 
operating as a factory). Yet, far from the eyes of anybody who might crack down, conditions in this 
workplace were substandard and some of the workers were under eighteen years old.    
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that they are therefore less likely to protest low wages and harsh working conditions. 
Though a wide body of scholarship shows this to be far from the reality, this trope fuels 
recruitment trends and hiring practices in manufacturing industries attempting to cut 
production costs (Pearson and Kusakabe 2012). In Thailand, when the crisis engendered a 
flight of capital to the borders for the garment industry, the feminized workforce also 
shifted nationalities, populated increasingly by Burmese as opposed to Thai women. 
A fourth tool consists of the policies and practices of local authorities in Mae Sot 
and along the border. As I have noted elsewhere (Saltsman 2014), interactions between 
migrants and representatives of the Thai state are instances for the performative 
reproduction of migrant illegality and deportability. Migrants are reminded of their 
flexible status. In addition, provincial governors, district authorities, employers, and local 
FTI branches have worked together to establish rules to limit migrant freedoms in an ad 
hoc fashion. For example, in late 2006, five provincial governors issued provincial 
decrees that prohibited migrants from public gatherings and from owning mobile phones, 
motorbikes, or cars (Human Rights Watch 2010). In 2012, in response to complaints from 
employers about migrants leaving Mae Sot, the police began turning migrants back at 
checkpoints on the way out of town, even those migrants with registration (Lawi Weng 
2012; see also chapter four for further details). In 2014, the governor of Surat Thani 
province imposed a curfew on migrant workers (Supapong 2014).  
 Finally, there is in Thailand a prominent discourse that reproduces public enmity 
and disdain for Burmese migrants based on particular narratives of regional history. 
Politicians have used Burma-Siam conflicts that took place more than two hundred years 
ago to justify restrictions on the freedoms of migrants (Arnold and Pickles 2011). Thai 
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television programming portrays Burmese as “bad neighbors and socially inferior” (Zaw 
Aung 2012); and government actors have insisted that migrants give DNA samples for 
the establishment of a national database of foreigners to prevent “foreign murderers 
lurking in the country” (The Nation 2013). “One consequence,” of these portrayals, 
according to Arnold and Pickles (2011: 17), “has been the easy justification of intolerable 
conditions for migrants, and especially for those working in low-skilled, low-wage labor-
intensive industries.” While it is not clear that such discourse is successful in generating a 
wave of hatred or condescension towards Burmese among the broader Thai public, there 
is no doubt that this kind of racialization is linked to rationales for the exploitative 
treatment migrants face. 
 All of these mechanisms demonstrate a widespread effort to buttress the notion of 
the borderlands as a space set apart from the rest of Thailand. During the era of economic 
liberalization, which, in this context, began in the early 1990s, the Thailand-Myanmar 
borderlands increasingly attracted multi-national capital because of the perceived 
exceptional status of this space. And yet, to the extent that the flow of undocumented 
migrants and the promise of cheap labor motivated investment and supported an image of 
the border as a special zone, employers and authorities have, ever since, faced the 
challenge of reproducing the terms of exclusion in Mae Sot and surrounding districts. 
They are, in a sense, captive to the narratives that have been discursively constructed 
throughout history, but which do not often reflect the lived experiences of the people 
inhabiting the borderland. 
  
7. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have shown how the highlands between Thailand and Myanmar 
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emerged as a multi-dimensional border. At once a boundary between two states and a 
conceptual tool to articulate the differentiation between the incorporated national 
community and the excluded space of the “other,” the construction of the Thailand-
Myanmar border is a process that is still ongoing.   
While prior to colonialism the highlands between the lowland polities of Burma 
and Siam were imagined as peripheral peoples and spaces in comparison to the center, 
the colonial era was significant in that during these years, colonial and nationalist powers 
affixed such categories in racial/ethnic terms at the same time they concretized national 
boundaries. The concept of this national border as a site of difference was significant in 
the postcolonial period as well in that both Burmese and Thai government authorities 
located threats to their sovereignty at the borders and simultaneously profited off of the 
illicit practices taking place there, including opium production and rampant deforestation. 
And, as I have shown in the last section of the chapter, the rise of a special economic 
zone on the border in Mae Sot is contingent on the notion of the border as a site of 
difference set apart from the regulatory frameworks of the rest of the country.   
Nevertheless, intersecting with each of these iterations of border construction are 
the lived experiences of the people inhabiting this frontier space, the diverse local 
histories that center this marginal space. This includes both their various organized 
efforts to remain autonomous from the control of the state as well as their everyday 
encounters which do not adhere to the hierarchies, definitions, or categories dominant 
power relations have applied to them over the years. The contrast between popular 
discourse and lived experience is part of what constitutes the borderland; a space of 
contradictions where concepts of nation, ethnicity, belonging, and identity are 
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performatively negotiated on an everyday basis. As such, the social dynamics I analyze in 
this dissertation are a product of the multitude of conflicting relations of power. The 
specific nature of governance and sovereignty in their fractured and variegated forms in 
this borderland speak to the various constructions of the border as separate and untamed.   
These relations are not only discursive, but take on a material form as well in the 
shape of changes to the natural topography of the highlands. Labor camps, informal 
activist offices, checkpoints, expansive plantations, factories, highways, and deforested 
hills are all the product of the particular discourses that have made this territory a space 
of labor-intensive production, refuge, resistance, and transit. The material forms of this 
border interact with the discursive and relational, giving rise to and shaping each other.   
This dissertation positions its analysis at a particular juncture in space and time 
where the material and the relational borders appear to be tearing apart from one another 
even as they contribute to each other’s reproduction. In the age of advanced capitalism, 
the political and economic value of the border is increasingly becoming centered on the 
bodies of migrant workers and their labor-power. No longer a point strategic to national 
security, and quickly depleted of its natural resources, the profitability of the border lies 
in the export potential of the garment and agriculture industries as well as in the role Mae 
Sot will play in future regional trade and transit. The mechanisms mentioned in the 
previous section for ensuring migrant flexibility are not specifically yoked to the physical 
territory of the Thailand-Myanmar border, though the latter has been central in the 
creation of each of these strategies, as the chapter has shown. Indeed, the differentiation 
between statuses linking to wages, rights, and entitlements, which derives from the 
historic categories of center/periphery and all their social meaning, can now be applied 
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anywhere migrants find themselves in Thailand. That is, migrants, and their interactions 
with local authorities and employers, embody the border, and as such reproduce it and 
have the power to change its contours and nature. I focus on this “multiplication of 
borders” because within the performative embodiment of historical violence and 
exclusion are opportunities to assert local histories and alternative subjectivities.  
 Finally, throughout the chapter, I have noted the shifting role and presence of 
gender. This includes the use of metaphors for considering how the border fits into 
broader, regional, constructions; from colonial representations of Europe and Asia to the 
more contemporary relationship between economies, global capital, and states. In 
addition, I referenced the assumptions that adhere to men and women and result in the 
materialization of unequal relationships within the border space. Weaving the gendered 
construction of space through the more general analysis in this chapter helps set the stage 
for the practices and discourses that this dissertation looks at in subsequent chapters. 
114 
Chapter 3—Representation and the “local”: Knowledge construction and the power 
of discourse in a collaborative action research project 
 
1. The trailer of knowledge construction  
There are thirteen of us crammed into the portable trailer, around two long and 
narrow folding tables that give us just enough room to sit, but not enough room to move 
about. It is March, approaching the hottest time of the year in Mae Sot; outside the 
pavement is baking, but we are insulated, kept unnaturally cool by the humming air-
conditioner perched above us from the top of the wall. Bathed in florescent lights that 
reflect dully off the matte gray plastic walls are the signs of our prolonged discussion: 
scattered papers; flip-charts with tables and notes in Thai, English, and Burmese marked 
on them; and lap-tops connected to a tangle of chargers that all seem to flow from one 
overburdened multi-plug.   
In the cramped comfort of the trailer, the conversation centers on the ongoing 
evaluation of our interview questions, a daily occurrence. Ye Winn War notes that in one-
on-one interviews when she gets to questions that ask about problems women face in the 
community, domestic violence never comes up. “To the people in the communities” she 
says, “violence will always be something that happens outside the home, on the road or at 
the edge of the community. It’s not what’s going on in people’s homes or in the 
families.” Others nod their heads in agreement; there is a widespread feeling among co-
researchers, many of whom have done health, education, and women’s protection work in 
those settlements for years, that during interviews respondents must be downplaying the 
prevalence of domestic violence. As the ensuing discussion moves toward ideas to 
address this dilemma, to get a clearer picture of what violence against women looks like 
in migrant worker settlements, I realize that the group is debating more than a 
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methodological approach; they are exchanging interpretations of what gender-based 
violence means in the communities where they are doing research. Further, they are also 
voicing their own different notions of the concept with subtle articulations of power and 
influence. As a technical term rooted in academic, social movement, and international 
human rights discourse, the term and its deployment in dialogue among this team of 
researchers has become reflective of the multiple discursive refractions held in tension in 
that space, and representative of status and difference—both among the group and 
between us and the migrant worker participants who are part of the assessment, but have 
no voice of their own in this discussion.  
This narrow room was our forum for dialogue, questioning, and planning related 
to “collaborative” data collection in four settlements—two in Mae Sot and two in Phob 
Phra. It is an eight by twenty foot mobile office trailer installed next to a large villa where 
two international NGOs are based, one of which was funding this assessment of gender-
based violence on the Thai-Myanmar border. For nearly four months, the group of co-
researchers and I met every day; first to adapt interview questions and finalize plans for 
sampling, recruitment, and data collection, and then, once we had started the research, to 
debrief about the day’s interviews and focus groups, discuss any logistical or security 
issues, further adjust the interview guide, and reflect on the work we were doing. At the 
same time, as representatives of Burmese migrant communities, I considered co-
researchers as participants because, as I made it clear to the group, I was not only 
studying violence in migrant communities, but also the ways that research projects are 
implicated in generating important discourse. During our daily meetings, I observed and 
took notes as we discussed the process of our project. The trailer was, in this sense, our 
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research laboratory where we fine-tuned our instruments, conducted analysis, and made 
interpretations on multiple levels.   
As such, the crowded trailer was the space in which we constructed knowledge 
about research, the nature of migrant worker settlements where data collection took place, 
and about gender and gender-based violence for Burmese displaced in Thailand. The co-
researchers themselves were a mix of Burmese and Thai staff of international NGOs and 
more local Burmese organizations, which many refer to as community-based 
organizations (CBOs).1 I was the head of the project, a white male outsider from the 
“Global North”2 and representative of the international NGO mentioned above. 
Representing different backgrounds, communities, and organizations, and coming to the 
table with vastly different resources and amounts of privilege, our laboratory was also the 
site of implicit power struggles; concepts of community, organizing, social change, 
gender, and gendered violence shifted constantly but quietly under the unstable terrain of 
our imbalanced dialogue. We not only gathered data about discourse, we generated it in 
our own right, and the use of that information by the various organizations involved and 
by me in this dissertation constitutes an exertion of power; that is, the power to amplify 
or submerge certain knowledges (Lykes 2010). All this was situated within the logic of 
                                                           
1 As in any context, the extent to which Burmese organizations in Mae Sot are actually based in 
communities with work agendas that advance community interests varies from organization to 
organization. While some groups more closely resemble social service or civilian wings of political parties 
or non-state armed groups, others are run by migrant workers for the benefit of migrant workers. However, 
international NGOs, UN agencies, and Burmese organizations themselves refer to this diverse group as 
CBOs. This issue will be discussed at length elsewhere, but at the risk of contributing to such 
homogenization, I will refer to these groups as CBOs as well.  
2 I use the phrase Global North here instead of other terms like First World or Western to imply the 
element of privilege that it suggests (as opposed to racial difference or geopolitical distinctions). See 
Mohanty (2003: 226-227) for a detailed perspective on the various meanings implied by this analytical 
language. 
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the international humanitarian NGO funding us; an added layer of knowledge 
frameworks, power, and priorities which guided our project.  
  In this chapter, I show that it is by looking carefully at representation and at 
whose voice counts and whose does not that one can understand how collaborative action 
research can aid or constrain community efforts to survive. Such work has real 
consequences for the lives of people struggling to negotiate displacement. Contexts of 
migration and displacement are spaces for the production and contestation of racialized 
and gendered identities, and NGOs are enmeshed in these dynamics (Markowitz and Tice 
2002; Mohanty 2003). As such they play a role in affirming and constructing certain 
concepts and identities in ways that constitute constraints and opportunities for migrant 
agency. The programs of NGOs on the border constitute interventions that affect 
migrants in many ways, from the opening and maintenance of schools and health 
programs to influencing the flow and content of information to migrant settlements—
including regarding notions of gender and inequality—to the promotion (explicitly or 
unwittingly) of certain individuals to positions of authority over others. Staff from these 
groups act as organizers in labor camps, factories, and informal settlements who hope to 
achieve particular agendas relating to health, women’s protection, education, child 
protection, and labor rights, among other goals. Through their organizing work, they 
interpellate, performatively reproduce, and collectively construct certain notions. This 
research project is just one reflection of the construction of discourse about violence and 
gendered social problems that lies at the heart of the logic of aid interventions (i.e., 
international humanitarian and development work). In addition, because this context is 
one not only of displacement but also of flexible capital accumulation, it impossible to 
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disengage the impact of aid discourse from the logics of labor extraction and production. 
While this chapter does not aim to point out all of the ways that development, 
humanitarianism, and capitalism are imbricated, I am careful to place my analysis within 
a consideration of this context. Chapter seven will pick up this issue, looking at how the 
interventions of women’s rights groups, supply chain production, border politics, and the 
performative production of gendered identities are interconnected.  
Here, I both analyze and interrogate the research process reflexively in this 
chapter, an approach that will highlight important methodological concerns with research 
in liminal power-laden spaces of marginality and locate the project in broader questions 
about discourse and agency. In the next section of this chapter, I look at the relationship 
between power and knowledge construction in contexts of research on displacement, 
asking who has the authority to represent migrant voices and define and analyze their 
social problems. I then introduce the collaborative action research project as a method 
built to allow for multiple voices and levels of participation in a project that had the goals 
of social change, solidarity-building, and a dissertation. In the fourth part, I show that 
despite such efforts, there remained—as there always does—important lines of difference 
between our research team and the groups of migrants who participated in the project. By 
looking reflexively at my own assumptions and at the background of the co-researchers 
and other community representatives, I offer an analysis of the source of these differences 
and their implications for the production and privileging of particular forms of knowledge 
over others. Finally, in the fifth part, I provide some accounts from the research process 
to illustrate moments of knowledge construction and how the collaborative process 
resulted in certain ideas of needed interventions in the four sites where research took 
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place. Thus, the first part of this chapter deals with theory and the methods of the study 
while the second relies on certain findings to critique the process. I close the chapter with 
some reflections on the research method and how researchers might improve upon it in 
the future.  
 
2. Power and knowledge construction in a context of research and dispossession 
 Stories of displacement and the migration it triggers are often marked by 
encounters with power and authority and by the expression of agency in the face of what 
is often extreme subjugation. The more visible forms of power in this context are 
manifested in migrants’ interactions with employers, managers, Burmese settlement 
leaders (yakwet lugyi), representatives of the Thai state such as village heads (puyai 
baan), police and other security officials or staff at government facilities and institutions, 
including hospitals, rural health centers, the labor protection office, or the court. For 
migrants who are unauthorized, a trip down the street involves the threat of extortion or 
violence, the possibility of arrest and deportation, and requires a certain amount of tact to 
remain invisible to representatives of the state (e.g., Coutin 2003). In many ways these 
dangers are gendered, as women face a particular threat of physical and sexual violence 
on the border, from these authorities as well as at home (Pearson and Kusakabe 2012). 
Such repressive, physical forms of power are likely predominant in migrants’ lives as 
they dictate the everyday life struggle to earn wages and stay safe and healthy. I discuss 
the prevalence of such violence in chapter four.  
 Nevertheless, this corporeal power is imbricated with the relational power of 
discourse and knowledge as both resonate against each other to constrain or facilitate 
agency and structure the experience of migration. In a sense, this dissertation is centered 
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on that overlap and that resonance between the physicality of violence and migrants’ 
responses on the one hand and the discourse around such practices, which in turn lead to 
exchanges that affect the lived realities of Burmese migrants. Given that power is 
intimately tied to knowledge in the sense that the control over knowledge production and 
dissemination for the purpose of influencing perceptions of reality is a manifestation of 
the exercise of power (Gaventa and Cornwall, 2008: 174), I am concerned with how this 
collaborative action research project plugs in to the circuits of power extant on the 
border.   
Dorothy Smith (1990a) distinguishes between two forms of knowledge that are in 
constant struggle. First, the knowledge of the local and the particular is knowledge 
generated through experience. (The notion of “local” here is not taken to necessarily be a 
spatial reference, but rather in regards to a level of discourse and language rooted in lived 
experience, not abstracted.) Second, the objectified knowledge of the “extra-local” is that 
which has been abstracted from lived experience to be useful on an institutional and 
administrative level. As such, objectified knowledge—considered official, textual, and 
academic—subjugates the knowledge of the local and experienced as irrelevant, chaotic, 
or even dangerous. To Smith (1990b: 15), the governing processes of society construct a 
knowledge for the purpose of management and control in which “issues are formulated 
because they are administratively relevant, not because they are significant first in the 
experience of those who live them.”  Such processes “eliminate the presence of subjects 
as agents” (ibid.: 31) as they maintain the dominance of the ontological perspective of 
those considered representatives of power. Such a position of authority is socially 
constructed and maintained on a discursive level and can be understood in terms of 
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whose voice counts and whose does not (Smith 1987: 30). Smith offers this framework as 
a tool for analyzing the power relations involved wherein certain forms of knowledge 
become dominant over others. Dominant knowledges are reproduced through legislation, 
state power, organizational policy, or discourse while on a deeper level, the adoption of 
particular knowledges into the social fabric influences the way individuals see and govern 
themselves (Foucault 1972).   
The duality of local and extra-local knowledge means that for every dominant or 
normative idea of which interpretations of a concept are true, and for every notion of 
what it means to fit within a particular category of identity, there are alternative 
assessments of behavior and identity that are submerged into a silence that haunts 
repressive technologies with murky utterances of discordance (Gordon 2008). Such 
theories speak to the invisibility and “ghostly nature” of Burmese migrant narratives in 
any of the discursive forces influencing their lives, including the discourse of Thai 
immigration and border security policy, the Burmese government, Thai society, 
humanitarian intervention, much academic research, and employer networks, all of which 
are undergirded by the dynamics of flexible accumulation in a system of globalized 
capitalism.   
This corresponds to broader trends affecting social movements including feminist 
movements, e.g., global women’s movements, that struggle with donor pressures to 
depoliticize activist agendas and to professionalize, substituting transformative goals for 
more service-oriented roles that step in where governmental programs have been reduced 
as part of neoliberal cuts to social welfare sectors (Armstrong 2004; Markowitz and Tice 
2002; Townsend and Townsend 2004). As Armstrong (2004: 41-42) notes, “Efficiency 
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slides into efficacy, when the politics of an NGO is measured in these easily quantifiable 
ways.” The efforts of international and local NGOs to meet donor requirements may 
introduce new social hierarchies into global movements as discourse increasingly 
prioritizes professional over grassroots (Baillie Smith and Jenkins 2011; Markowitz and 
Tice 2002). Moreover, Hemmit (2011) warns that issues and knowledge relevant to donor 
interests—which are those particularly situated within “Global North” or “Western” 
perspectives toward women’s rights and gender-based violence—are privileged while 
more local conceptions are subverted (see also White and Perelman 2011). These kinds of 
power dynamics are manifested in the daily interactions and decisions of movement 
activists and NGO workers who must make meaning out of a multitude of concepts that 
relate to their work; including more international or global approaches, and 
interpretations of the local or traditional, all of which are mediated by dominant 
discourses that highlight certain knowledge systems over others (Merry 2006; White and 
Perelman 2011; Wies and Haldane 2011). Looking closely at these power dynamics, 
paying attention to voice and representation is something more often done in name than 
in action. Such terms often remain invisible in questions of policy and development, 
despite their deployment as tropes to convey elements of participation and empowerment 
(Cornwall and Edwards 2014). As Cornwall and Edwards argue, the language of 
participation has dominated development work for the last two and a half decades, but 
tends to leave out a reckoning with the relations of power that assert particular ways of 
knowing and subvert others.   
Despite the exertion of such discursive power relations upon the lives of migrants, 
we can see here that working from that same discursive position, it is possible to engage 
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in work that surfaces migrant voices for the purpose of challenging an economic, 
political, and social order that constructs them as voiceless. This involves striving to 
work on the level of experiential knowledge to understand what in the everyday lives of 
migrants constitutes strategies for negotiating displacement. As Nyamu-Musembi (2002: 
145) writes, “a genuine engagement with practice at the local level is powerful in 
dislodging both the abolitionist imagination of the local as the repository of unchanging 
patriarchal values and the defensive relativist portrayal of official norms as bounded, 
immutable, and well settled.” 
 However, this requires us to define the “local.” Positionality and the multiple 
layers of privilege and inequality confront efforts to locate oneself on the level of 
experiential knowledge. Our research laboratory sat in juxtaposition to the “field,” that is, 
the “communities;” everyday the team would leave the climate-controlled safety of the 
NGO compound for the unpredictable migrant worker settlements. In so doing, we 
defined ourselves as outsiders. However, many of the co-researchers themselves were 
from migrant worker settlements; some of them had grown up in such places and many 
now lived in predominately Burmese neighborhoods in Mae Sot.3 Their proximity to the 
spaces where we collected data contrasts with the distance of our trailer of knowledge 
construction to the lives of our respondents. This insider-outsider dynamic enabled our 
group to “know” the people we researched while, at the same time, exerting our power of 
analysis over them. The fact that there were also some in the team, particularly those 
identifying as Thai, who lived in more middle-class or elite parts of Mae Sot served as an 
                                                           
3 It is important to note here that the Burmese neighborhoods in which co-researchers live are all in Mae 
Sot and not Phob Phra, creating a greater sense of familiarity to the two settlements where we collected 
data in Mae Sot and a greater sense of distance to the sites in Phob Phra.  
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important marker of difference within the group not only in terms of social class, 
ethnicity, and citizenship status, but also of what kind of expertise could be claimed; that 
is, expert knowledge over migrant lives as opposed to expert knowledge over research 
methods. Therefore local is a hard concept to pin down geographically. I find that it is 
more contingent on time as well as space and relations as well as position. 
The distances noted here—between the hub of our research endeavor and the 
migrant worker respondents, among the co-researchers, and, importantly, between the co-
researchers and me—are all sites for the articulation of power relations that are necessary 
to interrogate in order to build an understanding of how discourse about migrant workers 
and their modes of social organization, particularly related to gender and gendered 
violence, exerts an ordering influence upon migrant spaces and is, at the same time, 
contested in a variety of ways by Burmese migrant workers struggling to survive. As this 
chapter shows, in some cases this power manifests itself solely on the level of discourse, 
that is, via the circulation and reproduction of knowledge about the lives and experiences 
of Burmese migrants which disseminate certain notions of identity; while in other cases, 
migrants experience concrete and tangible effects of such discourse in terms of 
humanitarian interventions that categorize, educate, delimit, and mobilize displaced 
Burmese for various agendas that relate to some mix of donor concerns, findings from 
data collected, and moral and ethical representations of Burmese culture forged in the 
process of liminality and dispossession. Raising voice and representation to the surface 
and interrogating them in this research context helps to uncover the multitude of divisions 
and inequalities that are themselves generative of social forms and systems affecting 
migrant lives. Through this method, I hope to tease forth the nature of the border between 
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privileged and subjugated knowledges in the fluid space of migrant worker settlements. 
   
3. Study design: collaborative research for action  
This section reviews the methods selected for this study to show how efforts were 
made to engage with a multitude of voices through several distinct levels of participation. 
With the aim of designing a project to listen to narratives that are often overlooked, the 
methods chosen for this dissertation were inspired by the principles of Participatory 
Action Research. As Lykes and Hershberg (2012: 332) write, PAR is an approach: 
…wherein collaborations or partnerships are formed between those directly 
affected by an issue or problem that becomes the focus of the project…and others 
with technical skills and formal knowledge that complement indigenous 
knowledge systems and expertise to facilitate knowledge construction, education, 
collaborative learning, and transformative action.  
 
In its approach, PAR is fundamentally a dynamic locus between the collective and 
individual development of knowledge forms that propose a practical alternative to 
marginalizing discourses. Gaventa and Cornwall (2008: 179) write, “‘Truths’ become 
products of a process in which people come together to share experiences through a 
dynamic process of action, reflection and collective investigation.” Smith (1997: 184) 
contributes to this notion describing a PAR project as one where a “group embarks on a 
transforming path, making decisions, and taking on activities that are grounded in 
members’ experiences.” Using PAR-inspired methods presents opportunities to highlight 
alternative, marginalized interpretations of reality, surfacing what Foucault and Gordon 
consider repressed knowledges, recognizing that these repressed knowledges are in and 
of themselves constructions that are contested and partial. Such collaboration is often the 
best—or even the only—way to understand not only how people in disadvantaged 
positions struggle for their rights, but also how various communities conceive of rights 
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and rights practice (Perelman and White 2011). Lykes and Crosby (2014: 146) reflect that 
the decision to rely on:  
…praxis at the interface of feminist, community-based, and participatory action 
research stems from the fundamental epistemological and methodological 
challenges that arise in undertaking research in contexts that continue to be 
overshadowed by ever-present histories of colonization and imperial intervention, 
which include the hegemonic power of Northern academics. 
 
While I stop short of labeling the methods used in this dissertation as PAR, the 
design of this study was informed by a similar awareness of how research is often 
embedded in the reproduction of marginality. I relied on a PAR framework to build a 
design that privileged the diverse sets of knowledge and expertise of Burmese activists in 
Mae Sot and to put the latter into conversation with my own technical skills related to 
carrying out research. The focus of my analysis as well, which engages my various 
subjectivities as I work with the multiplicity of voices, ideas, and participation of 
Burmese migrants, is founded on reflexive praxis and what Avishai and colleagues 
(2013: 396) call “institutional reflexivity.” While the former refers to more of a process 
of reflection and action based on an awareness of my individual positioning vis-à-vis the 
research context, the latter relates to the interrogation of the institutional methodological 
and theoretical frameworks that “both constrain and enable interpretations of the social 
world.” As noted above, the collaborative research methods described in this section 
served multiple purposes; the primary and immediate function was to enable NGOs and 
CBOs working on the border to plan coordinated actions to address the consequences and 
causes of gendered violence in Burmese migrant settlements. As a result, the project was 
infused with the agendas and theoretical positioning of these organizations and their 
donors. Among the other more discursive impacts this had on the project, the emphasis 
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on an applied goal as opposed to my own academic purposes introduced a level of rushed 
pragmatism to the study that both limited a reflexive focus on process during the course 
of the project and legitimized the work in the eyes of co-researchers committed to the 
betterment of Burmese migrants in Thailand.  
  
3.1 Overview of Research Design 
 This study is based on a qualitative multi-modal research design that brings 
together an extended case method and PAR principles. As Figure 2 below shows, I 
embed a collaborative assessment in 
which I took part within a broader 
constructivist qualitative study, and I 
employ different analytical tools to 
explore different layers of meaning-
making. Principles of PAR undergird 
the whole design, even those pieces 
that were not collaborative (the outer 
two rings in the figure below), in the 
sense that I approach the study reflexively with a focus on knowledge construction, in the 
interest of partnership and transformative action, and that I measure validity as much as 
possible in terms of authenticity (Lincoln and Guba 2000: 180-181). As the inset circles 
in Figure 2 suggest, there was also an inside-outside dynamic to the design of the study, 
which corresponded to the different phases or layers of the project. At the core is a 
collaborative action research project, followed by an initial thematic analysis, which co-
researchers and I conducted. Moving toward the outer two rings or circles, I stepped 
Figure 2: Embedded research design 
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outside of the collaborative process to critically examine it and supplement its results 
with additional interviews. I then applied my own discursive and narrative analysis to the 
findings of the initial collaborative assessment, process of collaboration itself, and the 
additional qualitative data I collected.  
 The study relied on a series of data collection tools, including semi-structured 
interviews, key informant interviews, and interpretive focus group discussions carried out 
in an iterative and collaborative way. Figure 3 illustrates how these various methods 
interacted. This subsection is followed by a more detailed discussion of the dissertation’s 
methods.  
An advisory group made up of fifteen 
representatives from seven 
organizations, including four 
unregistered Burmese CBOs, one Thai 
NGO, and two international NGOs 
formed to put together a study that 
would inform the work these 
organizations do on protecting women 
and children from violence. Many 
organizations represented had 
previously worked together in the mid-
2000s to write up a coordinated response plan to rape. I solicited the participation of these 
groups and others that had emerged in the last ten years as important voices for migrant 
women’s rights. The advisory group and I developed the primary research questions for 
Collaborative design of 
assessment 
Peer interviews & 
focus groups 
Revise Qs Debrief 
Group analysis 
Interpretive focus group 
Follow up interviews 
with co-researchers 
Final analysis 
Figure 3: Organization of methods 
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the assessment, decided where to conduct it, which methods to use, and what the sample 
sizes should be in each site. They decided on two communities in Mae Sot and two in 
Phob Phra with the goal of conducting in-depth interviews with women and community 
leaders and focus group 
discussions with women, 
men, and community 
workers, separately (see 
Figure 4, left). The group 
chose to structure focus 
group discussions around 
community mapping 
exercises for some groups 
and the discussion of 
particular case studies with others. With these basic elements of the design in place, the 
advisory group transitioned into a team of co-researchers. Some members from the 
former joined the latter.4 In other instances, their organizations chose to send somebody 
else as a representative or chose not to participate in the data collection phase.5 I provided 
training on research methods and ethics to the group, and they also engaged in 
                                                           
4 Half of the advisory group members later took on the role of co-researchers. For those organizations 
whose representatives did not become co-researchers, some sent other staff to join. Two organizations 
represented in the advisory group chose not to participate in data collection and sent no one as co-
researchers.  
5 Organizations that decided not to participate in the data collection phase typically did so because the 
locations where the advisory group had decided to conduct the research were not familiar to them or their 
staff. For example, one health organization that was in the advisory group played an instrumental role in 
designing the study based on their decades of experience providing healthcare to women who had 
experienced violence, but they do not go out into migrant areas to provide care and therefore felt it was not 
the best use of their staffs time to participate in data collection (in this particular case, it is worth noting 
that the son of the health organizations director did participate as a co-researcher). 
*This category includes teenagers who participated in focus groups 
In-depth interviews 
10-15 ppl/community 
4 Communities 
Mae Sot: 2  
Phob phra: 2 
Focus-group discussion  
6 groups/community  
(25-30 ppl/community) 
Women* Men Community workers 
(M/W) 
Community 
leadership 
(M/W) 
Figure 4: Data collection, sample sites, & participant groups 
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discussions on issues related to gender-based violence. Together we made plans for the 
recruitment of participants via a chain-referral, or “snowball” method, and moved from 
the main research questions developed by the advisory group to more detailed interview 
and focus group discussion guides.   
 The co-researchers collected data in a semi-iterative fashion. We met every day 
before they went to conduct interviews and focus group discussions to “debrief” from the 
day before, a chance to discuss both logistical issues and the research process. While we 
did not engage in cycles of analysis and data collection, the group worked to refine the 
method based on reflections on how research participants were responding. After 
multiple visits to each site, the group had conducted 74 interviews and focus group 
discussions with a total of 154 people. We hired two transcribers and translators to 
produce English-language transcripts. The two transcribers were asked to review each 
other’s work in an effort to triangulate and minimize translation error. Co-researchers and 
I conducted an initial analysis of the data and then held a meeting with the remaining 
members of the advisory group for a discussion of the results, analysis, and possible 
actions that could emerge for the organizations involved.  
 In the following months, I conducted key informant interviews with the directors 
of three out of four Burmese CBOs involved in the assessment and with nearly every co-
researcher to gain their interpretation of the assessment and understand their background 
in more detail.6 At the time of writing, the members of the advisory group are involved in 
different stages of action, some together with the other members, and some on their own.  
                                                           
6 As noted earlier there were seven groups total who participated in the advisory group. I was not able to 
interview the heads of the Thai or international NGOs. In addition the advisory group representative from 
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 It is important to interrogate the power relations implicit in the process of working 
together to develop the research design. Each step along the way consisted of decisions 
made through the exchange of different perspectives. We did not have a method to 
evaluate or ensure consensus, but we tried to make space for everybody who wanted to 
speak to do so. It is inevitable that some participants in the advisory group refrained from 
speaking at various moments. For me, I entered the process with the desire to have a 
participatory method that adequately collected information in a way that achieves 
“validity as authenticity.” I tried to remain open but involved though I recognize that my 
support of certain ideas over others introduced a less democratic aspect to the process.  
 
3.2 Sample design 
 This dissertation makes use of multiple overlapping samples. The largest sample 
for this study was purposively developed from among the population of Burmese migrant 
workers living in Mae Sot and Phob Phra. But I also consider the co-researchers with 
whom I worked a sample as I took extensive field notes of our group discussions, 
conducted in-depth interviews with most of them, and rely on such information to address 
the primary questions behind the dissertation.7 In addition, I conducted in-depth semi-
structured interviews with people in leadership roles from nine different Burmese CBOs 
working in Mae Sot and Phob Phra, representing three of the member organizations from 
the advisory group (see Table 4 below for a complete list of participating organizations). 
This sampling strategy enables me to critically engage with both migrant narratives and 
                                                                                                                                                                               
one of the Burmese organizations had moved away from Mae Sot in the middle of the assessment. These 
interviews were all recorded and then transcribed.  
7 I always recorded key informant interviews. I also recorded the interpretive focus group. Regular group 
discussions, however, were documented solely in my field notes.  
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the research process that accessed such narratives. In this section, I devote particular 
attention to the largest sample. 
Given that I cannot hope to write about a “migrant community” in Mae Sot 
without glossing over numerous differences that divide up the migrant population into 
numerous and quite distinct groups, I pay particular attention to the differences of the 
four locations where we collected data and interrogate the notion of community as it is 
used by civil society, both local CBOs and international NGOs. In some ways, this study 
relied on the notion that through collaborative work, it would be possible to make some 
headway in understanding important differences within and between communities. 
However, it would be essentialist to presume that my co-researchers would be able to 
articulate Mae Sot’s many different communities devoid of the kinds of power relations 
or politics that would cause some differences to be privileged while submerging others. 
As Fine and her colleagues write (2000: 110), it is important to realize that “profound 
fractures, and variation, cut through lives within…communities,” reminding us that even 
when being considerate about differences from one community to another, it is important 
not to forget about differences and power dynamics within communities as well. Thus, I 
made sure to ask questions about community when I interviewed co-researchers in order 
to understand how our research might have confronted or perpetuated marginalizing 
discourse about community dynamics.   
 The advisory group chose the four sites of data collection via a systematic 
analysis that took into consideration questions of access, acceptance and interest by 
residents of the site, familiarity, existing resources in place, and concrete plans for 
involvement in those sites in the future. The advisory group chose to look at Phob Phra as 
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a possible district to conduct the assessment because their previous work there 
highlighted numerous social problems facing the Burmese population working in the 
agricultural sector, including threats to their safety, labor issues, violence, poverty, and a 
lack of freedom of movement, which precludes access to healthcare and justice. In 
deciding where in this vast hilly landscape filled with remote labor camps to focus this 
assessment, the above-mentioned criteria proved useful in identifying five locations. The 
advisory group then narrowed it to two with a vote. In terms of Mae Sot, all of the 
organizations represented in the advisory group worked and had strong relationships in 
the majority of the town’s Burmese neighborhoods or settlements. Thus, in addition to 
the selection criteria, the group considered where previous research had been done and 
where they could identify the most “need” for assistance.8  
 As Figure 3.3 above shows, we chose a sample that would account for gender and 
that would provide a variety of different perspectives. In each site, the advisory group 
elected to recruit a sample of residents divided by gender and age; “community workers,” 
a category that includes anybody considered by the residents there to be a service 
provider, accepting a broad meaning of “service” that included para-professional or non-
professional health workers (such as “community health volunteers”), teachers, 
organizers—effectively those migrant workers who provide some assistance and who are 
part of a network that links them to the work of NGOs and CBOs; Thai community 
workers, which included teachers at official schools and border health workers from the 
Thai government district health offices adjacent to migrant settlements; Burmese 
                                                           
8 Mae Sots Burmese communities are well-studied, particularly by research with a public health focus, 
making the risk of over-saturation high.Our goal was not to find an unstudied population; rather we 
aimed to balance information already generated elsewhere and to engage with migrant workers with greater 
solidarity of purpose than the dominant researcher-subject relationship offers. 
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community leaders—anybody who the Burmese migrants there consider to be in a 
leadership or decision-making role (this included religious leaders, staff from CBOs 
living in that neighborhood who wield authority, or “section leaders” appointed by 
landlords or CBOs to help manage the migrant population there); and local Thai leaders, 
such as village heads (phuyai baan) or their deputies, local administrative authorities, or 
members of security forces who live in the area and have influence (including police or 
border patrol, for example). While this does not build a representative sample, it enabled 
us to access the sensitive local knowledge related to violence and safety that might not 
emerge so easily in larger quantitative studies and from a variety of perspectives.  
Sampling was done purposively, as this study’s respondents were recruited via 
what is known as a “snowball,” “chain-referral,” or “respondent-driven” sampling 
method, which involves relying on participants to help introduce us to and recommend 
subsequent participants, ideally helping to break the ice with potential new respondents in 
terms of familiarity and trust (see for example, Heckenthorn 2002). It was necessary to 
have a purposive snowball sample strategy rather than a simple or stratified random 
sample for three main reasons. First, I was working with a group living on the margins of 
society. It is not always possible to locate individuals with addresses, phone numbers, or 
other markers of identity and location and to randomly knock on doors may inspire a 
level of suspicion difficult to dispel within the duration of the interview. Second, in part 
because of the marginal status of Burmese migrants in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to 
build relationships with research participants to the extent possible and to move from one 
trusted contact to another in putting together a sample of individuals willing to speak in-
depth. Third, I have tried alternative sampling methods for qualitative research in Mae 
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Sot with the migrant worker population and found that missing even the slight familiarity 
that comes with the snowball method made for problematic and uncomfortable interview 
experiences. While I recognize the many drawbacks associated with relying on snowball 
sampling (some particularly associated with doing research with forced migrant 
populations), as noted in Jacobsen and Landau’s (2003) important piece on methodology, 
ethics, and research on forced migrant populations, as an exploratory study this project 
does not claim to capture a representative picture of migrants on the Thai-Myanmar 
border.  
With all this in mind, the sampling of residents started with the links between 
advisory group members and co-researchers and the Burmese “community workers” in 
their networks. The latter were crucial entry points into the settlements, though cannot be 
considered as objective or neutral actors capable—or interested in—generating a 
representative sample. However, because they are in many cases a kind of first-responder 
when violence takes place near them, they were aware of who might be the most willing 
and interested to discuss the issues facing their community. This reflected the goal of 
being as representative as possible within the more paramount aim of accessing a set of 
narratives expressing a partial glimpse of local knowledge. 
Between focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, we hoped to build a 
sample of 35-45 people in each community. Respondents ranged in age from 16 to 64, 
and 67% percent were women. The vast majority of the migrant sample who self-
identified did so as ethnically Burman. We did not inquire about ethnicity or religion. In 
terms of the latter, co-researchers and I felt that with ongoing religious tensions between 
Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar, inquiring about religious identity might cause 
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discomfort, though the topic was not taboo and participants felt free to bring it up often. 
Co-researchers also felt that they did not want to give interviews a formal feeling by 
requesting bio-data such as ethnicity.9 They preferred to let the topic arise naturally in the 
flow of in-depth interviews. The FIC study found that among migrant participants, 49% 
identified Burman, 21% as Karen, 18% as “Muslim”, and 12% as Shan, Pa-O, Mon, 
Rakhine, Chin, Bangladeshi, Chinese, and Indian (Saltsman 2011).10 The ethnic 
population of Phob Phra is more heavily Karen, especially in the border area, though 
labor camps are more diverse. Though we did not ask participants about their legal status 
(for the same reasons), a majority of those who self-identified did so as undocumented in 
Thailand. See Table 4 for a detailed demographic breakdown of participants.  
Table 4: Participant demographics  
Community Gender Total 
 Male Female  
Htone Taung 14 31 45 
Kyuwe Kyan 11 30 41 
Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam 13 22 35 
KM 48 13 20 33 
Total 51 103 154 
                                                           
9 This does not presume that the category of ethnicity would have been particularly contentious, especially 
given the diversity of the co-researcher team (see below). However, like elsewhere ethnicity in Myanmar is 
a heavily politicized term that is, in many ways, a political and social construct that privileges certain 
differences and ignores others. During the FIC study, it became clear that participants interpreted 
ethnicity as nationality, given the contextual link in Myanmars current social environment as well as 
the historical construction of ethnic difference (see for example, Walton 2008).   
10 Though Muslim refers to a religion and not an ethnic group, Muslim respondents self identified as 
ethnically distinct in this way in the FIC study, a reflection of the fact that that this group finds itself 
primarily categorized in Myanmar by their religion. There are in fact multiple ethnic groups in Myanmar 
who are all or majority Muslim (such as Rohingya) or who have a significant Muslim minority, including 
part of the Chinese-Burmese population. It is possible that some of the participants in the FIC study who 
identified as Bangladeshi might, in fact, be Rohingya but were not comfortable to identify as such. 
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Community Age Total 
 Under 18 18-40 41-60 61 and up  
Htone Taung 3 26 14 2 45 
Kyuwe Kyan 4 24 12 1 41 
Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam 3 21 10 1 35 
KM48 - 21 12 - 33 
Total 10 92 48 4 154 
 
3.3 Data collection and analysis methods 
 In order to address the research questions guiding this dissertation, I employed 
multi-modal data collection and multi-layered analysis strategies. The different methods 
illuminate different versions of experience and perception and different approaches for 
different samples. In some cases, the co-researchers and I utilized the same method in 
different ways, depending on the sample. Together they enable a sort of methodological 
triangulation. Data for this study are in the form of qualitative in-depth semi-structured 
interviews and focus group discussions and an interpretive focus group discussion.   
In terms of focus group discussions, we were relying on a method that is, to some 
extent, overused by researchers and NGOs on the migrant population. As such, we risked 
reproducing certain power dynamics and expectations that are familiar to individuals in 
the migrant community who may have participated in focus group discussions in the past. 
To address this issue, we structured discussion around specific topics or activities, 
namely community mapping exercises and case study narratives. Second, we structured 
the focus group with participants as an action-oriented discussion to build a sense of 
commitment and so that the process did not seem useless. Third, I followed the advice of 
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Wilkinson (1999) who recommends researchers recruit participants who know each other 
to enhance the chances of a more natural discussion and allow for and encourage a shift 
in the control of discussion away from the moderator who is more minimally involved 
(this goes against traditional literature on the focus group method, but fits a constructivist 
and phenomenological approach). In our assessment, co-researchers facilitated group 
discussions with Burmese men, community workers, women, and youth. Each group had 
four to five people participating, though this varied as some members of the group 
arrived late or left early, and as small children were frequently present (especially in the 
women’s focus group). These discussions typically lasted one to two hours. 
 I relied on two types of in-depth semi-structured interviews for this research: 
“peer interviews” conducted in Burmese, Karen, and Thai and interviews with key 
informants and co-researchers in English, Thai, and Burmese. By “peer interviews” I 
refer to a method commonly used in collaborative or participatory research, particularly 
with “hard to reach populations and communities” (Warr et al. 2011: 338). The method 
involves asking members of a community to conduct interviews with other members of 
that community, which scholars have argued helps to create a positive dialogic 
environment for the discussion of sensitive topics (Benoit et al. 2005). In principle, this is 
what co-researchers attempted to do. In-depth interviews lasted between 35 minutes and 
1.5 hours and covered a range of topics, differing according to the category of participant. 
During interviews with the largest sample for this method, Burmese women, co-
researchers asked about work, basic household information, differences between men’s 
and women’s roles—both in terms of work and within the household, safety and well-
being in the neighborhood or labor camp, about challenges women face in particular, 
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what sorts of violence women experience (if any), responses to this violence (both 
individual and collective), women’s self-protection tactics, and existing and needed 
services in that place. Questions about violence were asked quite generally and co-
researchers made sure to inform participants that they were not inquiring about their 
personal experiences. This was because, as a group we agreed that we did not want to 
lose the assessment goals to the exigencies of case management. Nevertheless, we 
prepared ourselves to deal with participants’ disclosures of abuse. We focused our 
questions on their well-being; their encounters with employers and the Thai state; their 
strategies for solving social conflicts, particularly related to gendered violence; their 
participation in social welfare programs with grassroots organizations; and their reliance 
on and participation in social and familial networks. Interviews with Thai community 
leaders concentrated on their perspective on policies toward migrants and their role in 
resolving interpersonal conflicts in migrant households.  
Interested in engaging with experiential knowledge, I promoted this method as a 
way to collect data within a social space of familiarity and trust. Having done in-depth 
interviews with a similar population myself in Mae Sot in the past, it is clear that 
participants’ experiences and ideas flow more readily with those staff from local groups 
or organizations they appear to know and trust. However, the extent to which co-
researchers are “members” of the community varied from site to site and warrants further 
discussion (see the subsequent section below). Htone Taung, for example, is where one 
co-researcher lives and works, whereas no co-researcher lives in Phob Phra and they only 
conduct work-based visits there. It is likely this difference in familiarity created some 
difference in the interview results, though both were equally rich. As I note in subsequent 
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sections, the term “peer interview” and the assumptions behind its use raise numerous 
important questions about how and from what position co-researchers relate to migrant 
worker participants. Were co-researchers actually insiders or were they outsiders or some 
combination? Was trust and familiarity—or proximity—sufficient to consider co-
researchers “peers”? Does the use of the term “peer” subordinate important divisions or 
inequalities between co-researchers and participants? And besides what scholarship says 
is gained by reliance on such a method, is there a violence done to local knowledges at 
other stages of the research process, such as analysis and interpretation? 
The in-depth interviews I conducted myself also raised questions about insider-
outsider relationships. I am certainly an outsider in many ways, nevertheless most of the 
key informant interviews were with people I knew, some quite well. Having spent more 
than two and a half years in Mae Sot and having worked on the border on and off since 
2008, I knew the directors and staff from most of the Burmese CBOs there, having been 
together at meetings, trainings, meals, “community events” such as May Day or local 
weekly markets, holidays, weddings, and funerals. In some cases, I had planned activities 
with them or helped them write proposals. My interviews with these individuals had a 
tone of professional familiarity and a level of solidarity. My interviews with these 
representatives of organizations lasted between one and four hours; I interviewed three of 
these participants twice because their busy work schedules required us to keep each 
meeting relatively short. Questions for representatives of grassroots organizations 
focused on the philosophical/ideological mission and vision guiding their work; how 
migrants access basic services; their role in and perspectives on the resolution of 
interpersonal conflicts among migrants; their engagement (or lack thereof) with global 
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discourses such as those from women’s rights and feminist movements; and their 
perspectives on social order and gender.  
With the co-researchers I was able to interview, I perceived a dyadic relationship. 
We shared a sense of camaraderie that came from our work together on the assessment, 
though with these participants, I struggled to negotiate my previous role as the head of 
the project, which proved easier in some cases than others. These interviews lasted 
between one and 2.5 hours. During our conversations, I asked co-researchers about their 
personal histories, experiences working on gender-based violence on the Thai-Myanmar 
border, their perception of and feedback about the collaborative assessment, and the 
actions currently being carried out by their organizations that developed out of the 
research project.  
Language constituted another important barrier. Issues of translation and 
representation were present in all methods used. In terms of my interviews, when the 
language was English or Thai I did not face dilemmas of altering language or meaning 
(e.g., Alarcón 1994) as I can speak Thai well enough to conduct an interview, though I 
sometimes needed the aid of an interpreter. I do not speak Burmese and therefore I 
required an interpreter for those interviews with Burmese-speaking participants. One co-
researcher and one key informant considered both Burmese and Thai to be native 
languages, one key informant is Thai, nine key informants spoke Burmese during the 
interview, one spoke English, two co-researchers preferred to do the interview in 
Burmese to speak as naturally as possible, and four preferred to speak in English. I took 
several measures to negotiate bias from translation: I recorded interviews and hired 
multiple transcribers to create Burmese and English language transcripts and review each 
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other’s work to triangulate meanings and interpretations between the two languages; I 
took my own notes during interviews as well and reviewed these together with translated 
transcripts. For the collaborative interviews conducted in Burmese, Karen, and Thai, I 
also relied on multiple individuals to triangulate transcription. In addition, co-researchers 
traded roles, acting as note-takers and as interviewers with migrant participants; for every 
audio file and transcript from one of these peer interviews or focus group discussions 
there is also a set of notes in Burmese or Thai that I had translated into English. I 
consider these shifts and mutations imposed on the spoken words of participants through 
translation and interpretation an extension of the reification of spoken words as they 
move from the participant into the interpretive space of the researcher. Like any 
researcher, I claim the privilege of interpretation, but I do so with the recognition that my 
interpretation is just another layer upon the interpretation of others. 
Thus, while I had transgressed some of the distances between my North American 
university setting and the context of Mae Sot through my work over the years on the 
Thai-Myanmar border, I fully recognize both that it is not possible to shed my privilege 
and outsider status and that I also built on this privilege and “foreign expert” role to 
accomplish my research in ways that constructed new lines of division and new chasms 
separating me from the work of Thai and Burmese activists. Aware that the privilege I 
carried with me to the Thai-Myanmar border stems from my socioeconomic position in 
the “Global North”, and my whiteness, gender, sexuality, and education, it was never my 
ambition to discard something that is so utterly ineradicable. Rather, my aim has been to 
be mindful of such power and to interrogate its place in my work and in the social 
relations that constituted my research environment.  
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3.3.1 Data analysis strategies 
 Data analysis was multi-layered in order to account for the multiple levels of this 
study. As Figure 2 at the start of section 3.1 shows, co-researchers and I employed one 
level of analysis upon completing peer interviews and focus group discussions. Once 
complete, we compiled our findings and presented them to the advisory group in an 
interpretive focus group discussion. I then conducted an additional level of analysis on 
the results of the interpretive focus group discussion, the data collected during the 
collaborative project, and results from my own key informant interviews. I outline these 
layers briefly below. 
1) Co-researcher analysis: First, daily debrief sessions during data collection served as 
regular opportunities to evaluate the research process, interpret initial findings, and 
reflect on the work, enabling me to observe and document the circulation of discourse 
and the co-construction of knowledge. Co-researchers also employed a deductive line-by-
line coding system to findings in order to identify forms of gender-based violence 
prevalent in the four sites; local efforts to respond to this violence; and needs for external 
services. Co-researchers then divided coded results into these analytical categories for 
discussion and project planning.   
2) Interpretive focus group: In addition to employing focus group discussions as a 
method of data collection, I also relied on them as a tool to facilitate analysis in this study 
(Dodson et al. 2007; Dodson et al. 2006). The research team and I organized an 
interpretive focus group at the end of the assessment (see Figure 3 above) with the 
additional members of the advisory group. We presented our findings and initial analysis 
as prompts for discussion and I documented with a voice recorder the conversation that 
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followed as the participants shared reflections and interpretations of the data and 
dialogued on possible actions that could come from the results. This interpretive focus 
group lasted a half-day and resulted in a list of plausible activities the network of CBOs 
and NGOs might carry out. Missing in this method was an additional discussion with the 
migrant workers who had participated in the assessment as respondents. While it was our 
goal to share findings with participants, elicit their feedback, and factor this into the 
analysis, co-researchers and I found that we had already demanded too much of the little 
free time participants had to offer, an observation made through follow-up discussions 
with individual participants. Rather than set up such a meeting, we planned to incorporate 
presentation and discussion of the results in smaller meetings more focused on 
community-based actions, some of which have taken place since I left. 
3) Constructivist analysis:  Stepping outside of the collaborative action research project, I 
applied additional layers of analysis to the data. I conducted inductive line-by-line coding 
in the spirit of Charmaz’s (2005) constructivist grounded theory, identifying emerging 
themes and concepts. The themes that were most salient form the basis for the subsequent 
sections of this chapter and chapters four through six in this dissertation. Concerned with 
the way participants framed a variety of topics that my coding surfaced, I applied a 
discursive analysis to this data in the sense that I searched for meaning in participants’ 
discourse to identify their performative reproduction of and struggle over meanings, 
knowledge, and the practice of subjectivity (Foucault 1972). When participants’ 
responses took the form of narrative, I broke from grounded theory and kept their 
accounts intact to apply what Riessman calls “thematic narrative analysis” (2008: 53), a 
tool that looks at participants’ stories as units of meaning from which it is possible to 
145 
build comparison across cases and themes. I use these narratives throughout the 
dissertation.  
 
3.4 Collaborating with organizations: concerns for ethics and validity in a context of 
marginality 
 Deciding which method to employ for this dissertation, I was deeply aware that 
from an ethical perspective, it would be highly problematic to “extract information” from 
individuals struggling from a marginalized position (Speed 2008; Turton 1996) without 
engaging with these groups to help shift the relations of power and social structures that 
help maintain their disenfranchised position. However, as a social scientist, I know that 
my methods must be grounded in more than moral considerations, such as validity. And 
when I write “validity” here, I mean the proximity of theoretical assertions to the lived 
experience of those about whom the theoretical assertions are postulated, a definition 
broadly derived from Lincoln and Guba’s (2000: 180-181) constructivist “validity as 
authenticity.” As Hale (2008: 12) writes, “activist research methods have a built-in test of 
validity that is much more demanding and stringent than conventional alternatives: Is it 
comprehensible to, and does it work for, a specific group of people who helped to 
formulate the research goals to begin with?”  Greenwood (2008: 331) adds: 
Action research, unlike conventional social science, to use John Dewey’s term, 
issues “warrants for action” where the interested and at-risk parties gain sufficient 
confidence in the validity of their research results to risk harm to themselves by 
putting them into action. In my view, this is a “real” significance test.  
 
Thus, by developing this study’s research questions through reflective dialogue with 
community activists during my preliminary work in Thailand, by merging my expertise 
and interests with local knowledges and goals to refine methods and to initially interpret 
results, I strived to put together a study that is exploratory and partial, as any study is, but 
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also valid in terms of the experiences and perceptions of activist co-researchers 
(Perelman and White 2011). Echoing Hale (2008) in his edited volume on activist-
scholarship, this collaborative effort does not necessarily signify a complete rejection and 
disposal of post-positivist methods or interpretive claims; rather I recognize that in the 
world of collaboration for action on the level of community and policy, it is often 
important to frame assertions from the data in post-positivist terms or categories imposed 
from external orders (see also Speed 2008).   
 Those who collaborated in this study brought multiple different perspectives to 
the table, with varying knowledges and experiences that contrasted well with one another 
and with my own background. As Table 5 shows, among the organizations who worked 
together for this study were two health organizations (one solely focused on women’s 
health), a labor rights group registered as a Thai NGO, an international education NGO, 
an international NGO broadly focused on humanitarian assistance for refugees and IDPs, 
and two Burmese groups focused on women’s protection. Four of these groups provide 
some sort of shelter and safety to survivors of abuse, two coordinate legal assistance 
through the Thai court system, and one acts a source of curriculum and funding for a 
network of dozens of “migrant learning centers” along the border.   
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Table 5: Organization profiles 
Organization Established Focus/Type Involvement in project 
Burma Lawyer’s Council 1994 Legal assistance /advocacy Key informant 
Burmese Women’s Union 1995 Womense rights/service & advocacy Key informant 
International Rescue Committee 1998* Service  Donor, advisory group, co-researchers 
KMR Karen Youth Organization ~1980s** Mediation/Youth Organi Key informant 
Mae Tao Clinic 1989 Health/service Advisory group 
MAP Foundation 1996 Labor rights/legal assistance/activist Advisory group 
Overseas Irrawaddy Association 2004 Gen. welfare/service Key informant 
Peoplefo Volunteer Association 2008 Gen. welfare/ protection Key informant 
Sana Yar Thi Pan Women’s Center 2004 WomenYa health/service Advisory group, co-researcher 
Social Action for Women 2000 Womenl  rights & women’s health/service 
Advisory group, co-
researcher 
Tavoy Women’s Union 1995 Women W rights & women’s health/service 
Advisory group, co-
researcher 
World Education 1998* Education/service Advisory group 
Yaung Chi Oo Worker Assn 1999 Labor rights/activist Co-researcher 
 
 
*Date corresponds to the first year the organization became involved on the Thai-Myanmar border.  Organizations may 
have been operating elsewhere in Thailand prior to this year. 
**Respondents had a hard time pinning down the year the KMR-KYO was established.  This may be because there 
was no formal opening of an organization, but rather a growing presence of a network.  
 
Almost all of them have long-term networks in migrant worker settlements and 
neighborhoods including through “community contacts” they refer to as “community 
health volunteers,” “peer educators,” or “community organizers;” or through “mobile 
health visits,” labor organizing activities, vocational training programs, or “women talk” 
activities. One of the health organizations involved is the primary health care provider for 
hundreds of thousands of migrants on the border who do not have access or choose not to 
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go to Mae Sot General Hospital. This unregistered organization is the oldest on the 
border; they have provided medical assistance to refugees, migrant workers, and IDPs on 
the Burmese side of the border since the late-1980s.   
As Table 5 shows, participating organizations differed from one another not only 
in terms of focus but also by what I call type of organization here. I categorize the 
different participating groups according to whether they primarily carry out their 
objectives via advocacy, service provision, activism (or mobilization), or “protection;” 
the latter a reference to the variety of tasks those groups carry out as power brokers and 
intermediaries between the state and the migrant population. The categorization is not 
meant to suggest groups’ rigid adherence to one focus or one way of working. In reality, 
each organization employs a variety of tactics; advocacy groups deliver services and 
service groups may engage in advocacy or “protection,” for example. Table 5 represents 
an assessment of groups’ primary focus and strategy. As the rest of the chapter shows—
and as I discuss further in chapter seven—organizations’ strategies are significant in that 
they are often indicative of their broader objectives, including the provision of life-saving 
services or a commitment to action that is transformative on the level of social and 
political structures and systems.  
The representatives from the seven participating organizations were also 
reflective of Mae Sot’s diverse constituencies across social classes, genders, labor 
sectors, ethnicities, and nationalities. Missing, however, were representatives from Mae 
Sot’s substantial Muslim communities, itself an ethnically and socially diverse 
population. As I note throughout the dissertation, this proved to be an important gap. 
Moreover, there is always room to include more voices in the process; each member of 
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the advisory group and the co-researcher team brought her or his own ideas and opinions, 
which sometimes echoed the perspective of that person’s organization, and which always 
reflected an amalgam of partial and situated lived and learned experiences.   
 As this section has shown, the design of the research project had different layers 
of participation built into it with the purpose of bringing forth and giving attention to a 
variety of voices. Paying attention to co-researcher’s perspectives about the migrant 
populations in the four sites where we did research deepens the analysis of conditions in 
those locales. At the same time, it also enables a critical look at the project based on co-
researcher’s reflections and attitudes. In the next section, I show that despite the design of 
this project, there were numerous unanticipated additional layers of difference and power 
that emerge in the analysis and that had an influence on the direction and result of the 
research.  
 
4. Power, voice, and representation on the border 
 
 Having discussed the relationship between knowledge and power in the research 
of displacement and the specific methodological steps employed to take such a dynamic 
into consideration, I turn now to a critique of the methods. I do so by looking at two 
aspects of the findings, which turn the gaze back onto the research process. The first 
focuses in particular on representation, looking at the narratives of co-researchers who 
explain their transformation into activists and social workers. In that section, I present my 
own set of assumptions that affected the research process as well. I show how these 
reflect different power-laden positions that likely influenced our awareness of and 
attention to certain voices while leaving us unaware of or inattentive to others. The 
second aspect involves a look at the different interpretations of violence by co-
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researchers. As noted at the start of the chapter, the ongoing reflections and analysis of 
our research team surfaced the realization of important differences in understandings of 
violence, particularly as related to gender. At these instances where difference is 
articulated, I locate sites for the production and circulation of knowledges that ultimately 
had an important impact on the trajectory of our project.   
4.1 Representation and the production of insider-outsider relationships 
 As noted above, this dissertation relies in part on a PAR-infused epistemology 
that privileges the narratives of those Burmese migrants who—as representatives of 
NGOs (including local groups)—participated in a dialogic data collection process among 
other migrants in Mae Sot and Phob Phra. However, rather than taking for granted the 
link between co-researchers and migrant worker participants, in this sub-section I ask 
who gets to be a representative of migrant narratives, whose voice counts in this process, 
and what discourses and notions haunt us from the shadows beyond the scope of the 
programmatic analysis that came out of the assessment we conducted in the four migrant 
settlements. I present three of the co-researchers’ narratives they shared during in-depth 
interviews with me as exemplars of migrants working with NGOs. I highlight the factors 
that motivated co-researchers to become involved as activists or providers of essential 
social services to their fellow migrant workers. In terms of their demographic 
backgrounds, the team of co-researchers reflects in many ways Mae Sot’s diversity, 
though they are not representative of it. They range in age from twenty-one to fifty-three 
years old: three are in their twenties, six in their thirties, one in her forties, and one in her 
fifties. Two are men while the rest are women. Ethnically, two co-researchers identified 
as Burman, four as Karen (two as from Myanmar and two from the Thai side of the 
border), one as Tavoyan, one as Shan, one as Karenni, and two as multi-ethnic (Shan-
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Karen and Burman-Karen). Linguistically, seven members of the team were bi- or multi-
lingual between Thai, English, Karen, and Burmese while three speak only Burmese. Co-
researchers brought a range of professional experiences to the project. All but one was 
working with an NGO at the time of the assessment (the same organizations mentioned in 
the previous section above), describing different roles from “capacity building” for 
women’s shelter staff, to health workers, to directors. While most co-researchers are 
working in the NGO sector, they all recalled varied formative experiences, including 
those that brought them to their current work. Such experiences are important in their 
own right for the way they ground—or do not ground—co-researchers’ knowledge in the 
local knowledge of migrant participants. Their stories reveal lines of connection and 
diversion with the greater population of Burmese migrants; none come from privileged 
backgrounds but all three of these individuals now find themselves in positions of power 
relative to the communities in which they work. They describe such transformations as 
they also explain how they arrived at their particular social platform. Finally, I also pay 
attention to what their narratives say about the production of insider/outsider status in 
their relationship to the broader migrant population.  
 
*** 
Zin Mar Thet 
Zin Mar Thet’s story describes her decision to come to Mae Sot as a young 
woman looking for the opportunity to make a living wage. Zin Mar Thet is thirty-two. 
She is one of the co-researchers who speaks Burmese but not English so I communicated 
with her through an interpreter, Sweet: 
ADAM: Where are you from in Burma? 
 
SWEET: Which village are you from? 
152 
 
ZIN MAR: I am from Pegu11 district, Kawa township.  
 
ADAM: Would you mind telling me what is the main reason you left your village? 
 
ZIN MAR: It was about economic problems. There are five siblings, including me. Then 
my mom and dad so there are seven people in our family. My eldest brother went 
to school with support of my aunt. The rest, my parents supported us to go to 
school. We did not have rice fields. In the village those who have rice field still 
have money. Even if you don't have a rice field but if you have a business that can 
get income everyday, it is okay. So in the village people who are doing fine are 
those who have either rice fields or a shop.  
 
SWEET: Did you have to support the rest of your siblings to go to school? 
 
ZIN MAR: No, I didn't have to. I mean my eldest brother was supported by my aunt. Then 
the four of us including myself were supported by our parents. My parents do not 
have any regular income. My father is day labour worker so for the day he is 
called he got income but the day he is not called he doesn't have income. Only 
when there is job he will get income if there is not job he doesn't get any. Then my 
mother is selling lottery. She sells the three-digit lottery tickets. Then in my 
village, if there is a fair, our family makes home made snack and sells them in the 
fair. When we have to overcome our life in that way, as we grow older and school 
grade is higher, expenditure becomes more. When we are in high school grade 
eight, grade nine, the expenses become very high so we cannot afford it. Next 
thing is in the school, although you tried your best, if you cannot bribe the 
teachers some people can fail the exam. My eldest brother failed in that way. My 
brother got very disappointed and doesn't want to continue to study any further. 
He stopped studying.   
 
My health was not good so I quit school, as I could not take the exam. To repeat 
the class, I was getting one year older so I didn't want to join those who are 
younger than me. I felt shy so I did not continue to go to school. Then another 
thing was in my village, after you quit school you have to solve economic 
problems. I could find a job in my village but not the kind of job you can use to 
upgrade your living standard. The job available was growing paddy, picking 
beans. I still did it, but labor cost per day is only 300 kyats Burmese money [US 
$0.31]. Sometimes 250 kyats [US $0.26]. If you work very hard you can make 
300. Under that situation, I could not support my family. It was not even enough 
for myself by making 300 kyats per day. That is the reason why I am here.  
 
As soon as I arrived in Mae Sot in 1999, I worked in a factory. First I worked in 
Champion's factory. After Champion, Ban Song Kweh. Then Mae Pa. Mae Pa 
                                                           
11 Zin Mar Thet refers here to Pegu, which is the older name of a district now referred to as Bago within 
Bago division. Bago district is about fifty miles northeast of Yangon.   
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then Ban Nuer located behind Tesco Lotus right close to LLC office [Labor Law 
Clinic]. It was my last factory. In that factory we did a demonstration. The factory 
got a problem. So after we demonstrated in that factory, Yaung Chi Oo helped us 
to solve our problem. While in the process of solving the problem, in 2005 with 
support of Yaung Chi Oo I was able to attend the trainings of BLC [Burma 
Lawyer’s Council] as a representative of Yaung Chi Oo. After I attended BLC 
trainings, BLC had a plan to choose their volunteer. I was selected as a BLC 
volunteer there. Then they checked and observed my attitude for one week then 
after one week I became staff. So when I started with BLC, my role was office 
assistant and from office work to legal aid. 
 
 Zin Mar Thet’s experience growing up in a family struggling to survive in rural 
lower Myanmar bears similarities to the challenge faced by millions of Burmese, 
including many of the hundreds of thousands who left Myanmar to find work in 
Thailand. Zin Mar Thet grew up in a Myanmar (still Burma at the time) afflicted with 
crippling economic disaster after thirty years of dictatorship and mismanagement by Ne 
Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism;” an era marked by almost complete dependence by 
the public on black markets and government financial decisions that eradicated people’s 
savings overnight.12 She describes her situation as particularly difficult because her 
family was poor relative to those others in her village who themselves did not have much; 
her family was landless and dependent on irregular day wages or sales of lottery tickets. 
Zin Mar Thet suggests that it was not the difficulty of daily life that persuaded her to 
leave her town, though, but the way her family’s poverty affected her chance to complete 
her education. Her explanation of why she did not complete school appears multifaceted. 
She mentions that she was not in good health and could not take the exam, which set her 
back a year; that her family could not afford the expenses of school for all five children, 
                                                           
12 For example in 1963, Ne Win decreed that fifty and 100 kyat notes were no longer legal tender. In 1987, 
he acted on the advice of an astrologer and eliminated many of the larger kyat notes. Both acts resulted in 
the sudden loss of savings for much of the public (see Matthews 2006).   
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especially as they got older; and that the corruption endemic in the school system meant 
that one could only obtain the best grades by bribing the teachers.    
 After dropping out of school, and faced with the prospect of earning less than fifty 
cents per day working as a farm hand on others’ rice fields, Zin Mar Thet decided to join 
the ranks of the industrial workforce growing in Mae Sot where she could earn more than 
ten times as much (though still far below Thailand’s minimum wage). Her experience in 
Mae Sot as a factory worker resonates with the stories told by many migrants. In Mae 
Sot, garment factories open and close with some regularity as mobile capital deploys, 
shifts, and redeploys rapidly; it is not uncommon for factories in Mae Sot to shut their 
doors overnight ,leaving workers surprised the next day and without their wages from the 
previous month(s) (Arnold 2007). When workers face problems at one factory, such as 
closure or a failure to pay wages (or a host of other issues), they often find a job at 
another factory that is expanding its workforce. For six years, Zin Mar Thet worked the 
line at garment and knitting factories; each of the factories she mentions are large 
producers—concrete structures with slats for windows and high ceilings and fans for 
ventilation; adjacent are dormitories and workers remain within a high-walled compound 
except for their monthly or weekly day off (depending on the factory). At least two of the 
factories where she worked—Champions and Ban Nuer—were sites of large-scale 
worker protests and strikes (Campbell 2013).  
 For Zin Mar Thet, the exploitation she faced at the Ban Nuer garment factory 
precipitated her transition from an assembly-line worker to staff at a local CBO. It was 
her involvement in the protest there that connected her to the Yaung Chi Oo Worker’s 
Association, a proxy for a garment workers’ union on the border, and the legal aid group, 
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Burma Lawyer’s Council, both of which work together to organize workers and train 
them on topics such as labor rights and human rights. She had shown herself to be 
particularly capable and perhaps her interests aligned with the work of these 
organizations; among all the workers on strike, she was the one who became a volunteer, 
then an office assistant, and finally a legal officer. She remained with BLC for nearly ten 
years, until the organization closed its office due to a lack of funding and she moved to 
work with Yaung Chi Oo in 2013 where she works as legal staff and helps to manage a 
safe house for workers who have faced workplace abuse.   
 In her account, one finds an experience of poverty in Myanmar and a struggle to 
make ends meet in Mae Sot. Her transformation from a factory worker to a staff member 
at a local worker’s rights association relates to her own efforts to protest unfair labor 
practices. The Yaung Chi Oo worker’s association probably saw her as somebody who 
was willing to stand up and advocate for change. In the subsequent years, Zin Mar Thet 
received substantial training on human rights, labor law, and gender based violence.  
These experiences no doubt both enhanced Zin Mar Thet’s ability to advocate for migrant 
rights on the border, but perhaps on some level they also created some distance between 
her and the knowledge level of her former colleagues who did not have the chance to 
attend such trainings.  
 
*** 
Min Min 
The second segment tells Min Min’s story. He is thirty-nine years old, lives and 
works in the Htone Taung neighborhood as one of the heads of a CBO there. Like Zin 
Mar Thet, Min Min and I communicated through the interpretation of Sweet: 
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MIN MIN: In the beginning I was just a regular migrant person. As a migrant worker I 
worked on the building construction, welding. I lived in the section where I could 
see many children left behind when parents went to work in the morning at 7:30 
am. They got back at 6:00 pm in the evening. This was their regular life. The 
problem was the children. In the area I lived there were 32 households with about 
260 people. There were 40 children in total. Children means from 3, 4 years old 
up to 12 years old. Around those ages. In the morning when working people went 
to work, only those children and a few very old people left behind. So what 
happened there was I heard those children’s ways of talking. The words I had 
never heard. Terms that were too rude. They cursed each other with the words I 
had never heard in my life. I saw that. Another thing was when people were away 
for work, those children were stealing things from people's houses. Another thing 
was they were playing and swimming in the pond and some drowned. No adults 
were watching so the children playing in water died. Another thing was drugs. At 
that time, police paid attention to adults who were dealing drugs so these children 
were used to bring drugs by paying them small amounts of money. Another thing 
was that children were asked to become beggars. When I saw those many 
problems, I thought these children are Burman. One day they will become adults. 
Then they will go back to their country. If these kinds of children from different 
areas go back, there will be many bad people. Their current life is not good. It 
will not contribute to the dignity of the nation. Their future is not good. This is not 
good for our country either. If we look at adults there, they went to work in the 
morning and got back in the evening. When they came home in the evening, men 
were drinking and at night they gambled. Then they fought each other, you know. 
Their way of living was min meh zayike [living without having any king] like 
people who live without any chief. Then what came to my mind was that I must do 
something about this.  
 
I discussed with the adults. In the discussion, we were looking at their future; the 
future of the children, and the goal of their lives. At that time they did not know 
anything. They only thought about their day-to-day survival. Then I asked if it was 
a good idea to do some education for the children. They said it would be good. I 
arrived here in 1997 and since 1999, I have been a teacher. Together we began to 
prepare a teaching place and it started from there. Me and one of my friends—the 
two of us were founders and started by teaching 12 children. We worked for our 
own income and we also taught the children. We took turns. When he taught, I 
went out to work. With the income we made we bought the teaching materials 
needed. As for our daily food, the 30 households took responsibility to feed us. 
Our own income was used for teaching.  
 
ADAM: Before you came to Mae Sot, where you were living? 
 
MIN MIN: Before I came to Mae Sot I lived in Yangon. My older brothers were university 
students. In 1988, they were involved in the uprising. They asked me to send 
messages here and there about their appointments. My brothers had to go to the 
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jungle. Then I never heard about them again. I thought maybe I could find them 
here so I came.  
 
ADAM: Did you find your brothers? 
 
MIN MIN: Not yet. I think they died already.  
 
Like so many on the border, Min Min’s history is deeply colored by the persecution of 
political activists that the Burmese government carried out on a large scale in the 
aftermath of the 1988 student protests. Just beyond the border, Mae Sot was indeed a 
locale to which those escaping the Burmese government could hide, and during the years 
of war and violence, there remained a chasm between the then-capital Yangon and the 
outside world with little information getting in or out (Fink 2009). Also like many on the 
border, Min Min sought work as a manual laborer; Burmese men in Mae Sot often find 
work in construction or agriculture while women are more likely to work in the feminized 
garment factories there or as domestic workers (IOM 2011). For Min Min, however, his 
time as a construction worker was short-lived.   
As he recounts his experience responding to the dilemmas in his community, 
which, as he shares, reached extreme levels of child mortality, crime, and drug-
trafficking, Min Min stresses the grassroots nature of his transformation from migrant 
worker to service provider. This is a key component of Min Min’s story. It implies his 
status as a self-made organizer, as somebody who could see rationally while the others 
were, according to him, mired in ignorance (“at that time they did not know anything”). 
He saw immense social need, organized the neighboring households, developed a plan to 
provide the neighborhood’s children with education and childcare, and sacrificed his own 
well-being by donating his now part-time earnings to the school and living off his 
neighbors. The logical and fluid flow of his narrative belies what was surely a grueling 
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experience of hardship. At the root of his efforts appear to be the desire to bring order to 
this group of Burmese people living in chaos “without a chief,” though Min Min does not 
claim a sense of leadership over those in his community. Contributing some sense of 
order, via an informal school and a system of reciprocity and exchange (daycare for 
food), Min Min appeared to believe that his fellow migrant workers could live in dignity, 
and, importantly, be better subjects of a future state in which they would reside as 
respectful citizens.    
 
*** 
Nor Da 
 In this third narrative, Nor Da explains her years of displacement, moving from 
Burma to Thailand and then from camp to camp.  Leaving her home in the early 1980s 
and now in her early fifties, Nor Da was essentially mobile for twenty years. Yet these 
years reflect the period in her life when she developed her career skills and emerged as a 
survivor of repeated abuse, committed to helping women who face gender-based 
violence. This interview was conducted in English, a second language for Nor Da.  
NOR DA: Mostly I grew up in Burma, yeah. Hpa'an. Karen state, yeah.   
 
ADAM: So, I want to ask you a little bit, like uh, in your background. How old were you 
when you left Hpa'an to go to--did you leave Hpa-an to go to the camp in 1986 
like that? 
 
NOR DA: R: Ah...19...81, I came with all our family because of the situation in Burma. 
My father was working in construction, the leader of a construction team and they 
had a very very low salary. My mother was a teacher and they had to pay to 
support the family and not enough, they borrowed the money and after the debt 
increased and they couldn't pay it so they—we moved all our family to Mae 
Thawar village and we stayed there and after Mae Thawar—fighting, the 
Burmese coming and fighting with the KNU [Karen National Union], and after 
we moved to Wa Lay, Wa Lay and then after my family went to stay there, and 
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then Mor Kur and then I moved with my husband and my children to Bor Nok 
camp. So he was the secretary in Bor Nok camp.   
 
After the—when the MSF [Medecins Sans Frontieres] started working, they had 
the KNU nurses, they could not speak English and so she asked me many times, 
please come and help me translate. I was very shy to speak but besides me there 
was no one. They were going inside Karen state to help, so I saw that it was really 
needed to work in our community so I—the basic thing, I started to work on the 
basic things, like nurse to do the dressing or pharmacy, and after that I started to 
do like uh consultation. 
 
So I married and then after...in the beginning, I didn’t have any problem because 
we were under our parents so even if he wanted to do something, he could not 
because we were under the control of our parents and like, uh, not, we don't have 
any problem for the family. I selected the man who can manage the kitchen! 
[laughs]. Yeah, so I found like that and I can get my husband, my husband can 
cook very well before he was the-how do you say? Very clever and polite, no 
drinking. No smoking. Not speaking a lot. So uh it is good and also my mother, my 
mother, how do you say...engaged and selected for me also. And we stayed—when 
we—after our family, we separated, we stayed in Bor Nok camp, before Bor Nok 
burned, burned—the DKBA burned the Bor Nok camp naw, before it burned there 
was like a little conflict in my family. Like he [the husband] was the leader in the 
camp, and he started to drink, also he cannot—he didn't come in the night, like 
sometimes he came back at midnight, sometimes in the early morning. Even when 
I was pregnant. So sometimes I took some pill of the promethyzin or the 
chloraphinaramine [ADAM: Sorry?] Tablets to sleep, sometimes..uh..[not 
during] pregnancy, sometimes I drank the regency also—drink—and I slept. 
[ADAM: Regency?] Yes, a whole bottle! Like, uh...I wanted to commit suicide. I 
was thinking...because our mind, mostly for Karen and Burmese, naw, we love 
one, only one—I was thinking just one, about religion and also ethnicity, 
something like this. After Bor Nok burned and I moved to—1995, we started to 
move to the Mae La camp, so in the Mae La camp, I was the head in 
the...uh...midwife in Mae La camp for SMRU [health clinic]. In the beginning in 
Mae La camp, naw, he drank more and more. After coming home, like uh 
domestic violence came and shocked the children and talking a lot, but he didn't 
beat naw, he never used the weapon or something, because of, he said his mother 
said “don't beat or use the weapon to your family” so always, he kept this in his 
mind. But! Talking, like emotional violence, was very, very painful for me. Yes! 
Sometimes, he is very, how do you say, he's shouting and talking and sometimes I 
can be patient but very painful in my head but I didn't say anything.  But 
sometimes the domestic violence and like uh, emotional violence and also the sex 
violence. He was a very strong man for the sex. Sometimes, we don't know before, 
we don't know. Most of the women, normally if you can, if you ask, they cannot 
answer, they don't dare answer, but sometimes I share my experience and then 
after they speak out also. I was thinking, I am the one who gets the money we 
need to support the family. You don't know, you don't know—you didn't give me 
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money, and I cannot support the family like that. So during five years I needed to 
be patient for this problem so after that I could not stay for longer than that.   
 
Nor Da’s experiences, as told here, reflect the interlocking and cyclical nature of 
abuse and displacement that is prevalent in the border space and among Burmese 
migrants. The debt her family faced was, and continues to be, extremely common in 
southeastern Myanmar, particularly in those areas affected by conflict; a combination of 
the heavy taxes imposed on the population by the Burmese military and other armed 
groups and spiraling inflation (South 2008). Moving to an area under the KNU’s control 
near the border provided initial reprieve, but during the 1980s this became increasingly 
volatile and Nor Da and her family were caught in the fighting between the Tatmadaw 
(Burmese military) and the Karen National Liberation Army. Like many thousands of 
Karen displaced from their villages, Nor Da fled to the border area across from Phob Phra 
district, where she and her family could quickly escape to Thailand if the situation 
became dangerous. Impermanent make-shift settlements dotted both sides of the border, 
housing these forced migrants in informal camps that were under the authority of the 
KNU; for more than a decade, families moved back and forth across the border, uprooted 
every dry season when the Tatmadaw launched an offensive against the KNLA. 
This cyclical displacement led Nor Da to marry and move to Bor Nok camp, 
where she found herself thrown into health care, learning the skills of midwifery that 
would become a cornerstone of her professional life. She feels that her time in the camp 
crystallized her awareness of a responsibility to help her “community” of displaced Karen 
people and so she joined the international NGO Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors 
without Borders), eventually becoming a head mid-wife, effectively in charge of delivery 
for that health facility in the camp.  
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The camp was also where she began to experience verbal and then sexual abuse at 
the hands of her husband, a powerful man in a patriarchal and militarized system of 
governance. Her husband’s drinking and abuse worsened after the Democratic Karen 
Buddhist Army (DKBA) attacked and burned Bor Nok camp, pushing them to another 
camp, Mae La—displacement layered upon and resonating with cycles of domestic 
violence. Nor Da’s story of abuse as she tells it here explicitly conveys her desperation; 
how close she was to killing herself as she took sleeping pills and consumed large 
quantities of alcohol. Implicit is her courage to continue surviving and working as a 
midwife despite the horror she faced at home, and then to face the stigma and divorce her 
husband in a highly religious Christian society that tacitly prohibited such practice.  
During my interview with Nor Da, I did not ask her about her experience with 
violence, but she chose to share this with me. In fact, it was not the first time that I heard 
her describe this part of her life; the previous year she had stood up in front of a 
workshop on domestic violence and told her story. When Nor Da says, “Most of the 
women, normally if you can, if you ask, they cannot answer, they don’t dare answer, but 
sometimes I share my experience and then after they speak out also,” she is suggesting an 
informal role that has developed together with her midwifery. She uses narrative-telling 
as a tactic to inspire strength in other women who have experienced abuse and then she 
works to find those that express the need for resources to help them seek medical 
attention, safety, shelter, justice, or any other solution. Though such interventions are not 
part of her everyday work duties as a health worker and trainer, Nor Da has explained 
that she fulfills this role informally: “Even I gave the training, after it doesn’t stop there. 
They always communicate with me, if they have the problem they call me in the night 
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time,” suggesting that through her formal training and activities, she expands her network 
and makes herself available to provide assistance.   
In this way, Nor Da reveals that she arrived at her social change agenda through 
both her years of health work and her particular strategies to turn abuse into a way to care 
for others. She identifies herself as a different kind of organizer than Min Min. While 
Min Min describes the development of his organizer identity as arising explicitly out of a 
need for order and protection, Nor Da became a midwife through work with an 
international NGO, but then built on that connection and the network it fostered, 
combining her knowledge of care and her own traumatic experiences as a tool to 
informally counsel organize response services for victims of violence. However, for Nor 
Da, her organizing work must be on the side because, while there are a number of 
women’s protection organizations in Mae Sot, her role within the organizations for which 
she works does not encompass such work, and moreover those organizations do not, 
according to Nor Da, recognize her autodidact skills as valid. She gained these skills 
during waves of displacement and her own efforts to make meaning out of the violence 
inflicted on her and to act upon that meaning. Her experiences caring for others 
constitutes a form of local knowledge that took constraints upon agency and wrought 
them into opportunities for social and personal healing. 
 
*** 
Nor Da, Min Min, and Zin Mar Thet narrate three accounts of displacement and 
violence: stories linked to political persecution, years of conflict, economic destitution 
and dictatorship, domestic and sexual violence, and workplace exploitation. And all three 
convey different avenues for making transitions from previous roles to that of activist, 
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organizer, and/or service provider. Other co-researchers supplement these three stories 
with memories of growing up on both sides of the border, the experience of being raised 
by a health CBO as the son of its director, and going through the Thai school system 
negotiating both Karen and Thai identities, to name a few.   
Co-researchers for this project were at once representative of the broader migrant 
population on the border and simultaneously different as their service-provider 
backgrounds thrust a border between them and the rest to the extent they are influenced 
and guided by NGO or social movement discourse and training. This is a distance that 
enables co-researchers to maintain an analytical eye, but at the same time may lead to 
agendas not fully rooted in needs and interests of the diverse migrant populations in and 
around Mae Sot. Thus, the placement of these individuals as those who represent the 
voice of migrant workers must engender some reflection. As intermediaries (Merry 
2006), they are migrants themselves, and yet they have stepped out from the space of 
daily struggle in which they once found themselves and in which the majority of Burmese 
on the border still live and work, and into the space of programmatic analysis, budgeting, 
the allocation of limited resources, and the logics of organizational thinking. This 
bestows a kind of insider-outsider status upon co-researchers, a challenging place for 
them to be situated.   
 
4.1.1 Insider/outsider tensions at the level of authorship and project coordination 
With my own assumptions and agenda, I, of course, also affected the 
insider/outsider nature of the project. I mention three relevant attributes here. First, I 
primarily engaged in this project in terms of my professional identity as somebody 
working from a perspective grounded in principles of human rights but working in a 
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development context. Influenced by years of human rights monitoring, I recognized in 
myself a tendency to focus on violations of rights on which to base advocacy. At the 
same time, as the head of a project funded by a large NGO, I had to be mindful of 
deadlines, deal with pressure to speed up the work, and work within the program 
framework of an NGO which was primarily concerned with keeping a balanced budget 
and achieving pre-determined indicators that they agreed to with their donor, USAID. In 
that role, I honed my skills in finding ways to articulate the details of the project in the 
language of reports to development practitioners. 
A second point to note here is that I also brought to the project certain 
expectations for a participatory process based on my study of PAR methods and 
epistemology. In some ways this contrasted with the aspects of my background and 
requirements of the project mentioned above. In this space of project design, the 
academic prodded the professional, not only in terms of my own internal struggle, but on 
a group level. I found myself pushing the advisory group and co-researchers to engage in 
dialogue; sometimes I was on my own in this effort while others, pressed by time and 
busy schedules, were ready to forgo discussion and consensus in exchange for speed. My 
focus on transformative work and the co-construction of knowledge was sometimes at 
odds with not only the NGO funding the project, but also with co-researchers and the 
advisory group who were more interested in how the project could improve women’s 
safety in a more immediate sense, short-term goals and action over the longer term and 
process. Upon reflection, this raises important questions about trying to focus on the co-
construction of knowledge in a context of chronic liminality, especially one most service 
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providers and donors label a prolonged emergency. I further explore this question at the 
end of the chapter. 
Third, as noted above, I brought my multiple layers of privilege to the project as 
well as my intentions. This included my dependency on the English language (as Thai 
was only marginally used in group discussions). While I made constant and accurate 
translation a priority (as noted in section 3.3 above), and while the emphasis of the 
project was on producing materials in Burmese for Burmese people, I am also sure that 
my privilege and the power of the organization funding the project took on a linguistic 
form. On one level, this manifested itself in terms of use of time. Meetings were longer 
when I was there and when the discussion was translated, even if simultaneously. On 
another level, in the space created by gaps in understanding, co-researchers and I were 
left to develop our own assumptions about what the other was saying; assumptions that 
likely reinforced what we wanted or expected to hear. And finally, in terms of the 
concepts central to the project, including violence, gender-based violence, and gender, 
among the multiple meanings that each has, I believe there was an unspoken influence 
toward English-language terms and meanings (as I demonstrate in section five below). 
This was likely a result of my role as head of the project, though in addition, there are 
definitions for such terms rooted in the language of the UN and international NGOs. Both 
my privilege and the co-researchers’ years of working with NGOs pushed us toward a 
singular interpretation of concepts whose meaning varies quite widely from place to 
place, language to language, and culture to culture.    
My expectations and assumptions mixed with those of the co-researchers and 
advisory group members to create a project that represented an amalgam of our various 
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priorities and ideas. In this sense, we co-constructed a research project and knowledge 
about the subjects of our research. And it was in the process of this effort that we built up 
lines of additional difference between participants and us designers of the study. These 
constitute the kinds of social hierarchies that one often finds in research among 
participants experiencing hardship or disadvantage. By recognizing these and including 
them in the discussion, I can show how this study is partial and situated, even as it is 
important. And in its partiality, I find ways in which we not only gathered information 
but generated it and circulated it as well.  
   
4.2 Representation and hidden logics on the level of participants    
While the previous section posed questions of representation and discursive 
performance on the level of the research team, including me, it is also important to 
consider this in terms of those community workers and leaders interviewed as 
representatives of their communities (i.e., not co-researchers; see Figure 3.3 above for 
participant categories). As noted above, in each of the four sites, the research team 
identified key participants who play a leadership role among migrants there or who work 
as some sort of service provider, usually on an informal level. Even as co-researchers 
considered themselves qualified to speak on behalf of various migrant communities, most 
tended to look toward this group of participants for a more accurate sense of residents’ 
lived experiences. One co-researcher, for example, recognized her position as both a 
representative “working with people very closely on the grass-roots level” and 
simultaneously distant, aware of her need to listen to her organization’s community 
representative in Kyuwe Kyan: “Sometimes I have to take her ideas because she lives 
with the community, she stays there, sleeps there, eats there so she knows about the 
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situation more.” At such moments, co-researchers made explicit the ambiguity of their 
position vis-à-vis settlements of migrant populations.  
Yet even relying on these representatives to gain more of an insider’s perspective 
constrains the type of knowledge that entered the analytical space of our research project, 
privileging certain perspectives while subverting others. For example, in the focus group 
discussions with informal service providers (also referred to in this dissertation as 
“community workers”) in the Htone Taung location, participants identified themselves 
thusly: 
R1: My name is U Wa Sin. I am the health representative of IRC, Mae Sot 
General Hospital and IOM but I am the leader of that community.  
R2: I am Ma Thein from Sanayar Thi Pan Center and IOM as well. I earn 1,500 
baht [US $46] per month. My responsibility is sending patients to Mae Sot 
hospital. If there are some difficulties, I have to inform my organization. 
R3: I am a teacher of the education program for SAW. I teach the children in this 
community and villages. 
R4: I am Yar Pao Min from SAW. As a part of the SAW, I am a health trainer. 
R5: My name is Win Win Mar- Gender Based Violence Coordinator.   
(MM&CC-HT-CW-(18.3.13)01) 
 
All those considered community workers from Htone Taung for this assessment—and 
one leader—are representatives of NGOs, several of which were involved in this research 
project. This is perhaps not surprising in the Htone Taung neighborhood since this is the 
locale where many civil society staff live. Some of the participants in this focus group are 
individuals who have committed their lives to providing crucial services to migrant 
workers around them, sometimes as volunteers who find time after or during work or 
with the support of a wage from a larger NGO (except one participant, who is a full-time 
staff person with a CBO). As U Wa Sin explains, “My responsibilities are cleaning the 
community, to help and to bring the patients with TB [tuberculosis], malaria, diarrhea or 
pregnant women—or whoever calls us—to Mae Sot hospital or Mae Tao Clinic.” With 
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all these responsibilities, U Wa Sin plays many roles; he is the representative of two 
international NGOs, Mae Sot’s government hospital, and one of the leaders of Htone 
Taung’s Burmese population, an informal position chosen by the local Thai kam nan, or 
sub-district head. Thus, we inadvertently ensured that the perspective of community 
workers would in some way be tempered by their awareness of NGO interests and 
priorities. The missions of these NGOs are primarily oriented toward social service in a 
non-confrontational way. They provide life-saving services without questioning the 
broader inequalities that reproduce migrant precarity (see for example, Ong 2006). This 
means other logics relating to more radical forms of social change might have less strong 
of a voice in this study.   
In the two Phob Phra sites, KM48 and Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam, representatives 
included Burmese community leaders. These are individuals whom local employers or 
landlords select to maintain an ordered work force or set of tenants. “Leaders” in Phob 
Phra were thus those considered best at speaking for and controlling the worker 
population, as I discuss in greater detail in chapter five. Comparing representatives for 
Htone Taung and Phob Phra, it is important to note important differences between the 
sources of power on which these actors are able to draw. While those in the former can 
rely on the institutional resources of NGOs and government actors, Phob Phra 
representatives have the support of bosses and landowners who, in the isolation of those 
agricultural areas, wield a kind of absolute control.   
Narratives from Htone Taung, then, should be considered for the logic of NGOs 
that undergirds the presentation of social problems and local strategies for dealing with 
gendered violence, a discursive and power-laden link between migrant communities and 
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NGO and Thai governmental citizenship regimes. In Phob Phra, on the other hand, the 
logic of production dominates the unspoken discursive space between the words of these 
representatives. It is crucial to ask how these knowledge frameworks differ and converge 
and I attempt to consider this throughout the dissertation. While the immediate priorities 
of the capitalist logic of production seem highly variant from that of NGOs providing key 
services to unauthorized migrants, in some sense the service-oriented paradigm that 
prevailed over other ways of knowing in our study—such as a more transformational or 
confrontational approach—shares with the needs of capital an ordered and well-governed 
or self-governing population of workers or service-users. That is, these two dominant 
sources of discursive power present on the border and in our research group both 
prioritize a kind of non-confrontational mode of social organization over a more 
contentious dynamic. This relates to what Aihwa Ong (2006: 212) refers to as 
“biowelfare,” which constitutes “an ethical claim that skirts the issue of political rights by 
focusing on the sheer survival of foreign female workers.” Thus by looking at who 
speaks for the migrant population—including in this study—I look at representation as a 
series of concepts, experiences, and relations that inform individual perception and 
influence the co-construction of certain realities which are imposed on those who are 
spoken for but whose voice is not recognized. With this perspective, I attempt to engage 
throughout this dissertation in what Martín-Baró (1998) referred to as “de-ideologizing” 
(desideologización), that is, examining the power structures behind the construction of 
certain knowledges (see also Lindorfer 2009).  
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5. When violence isn’t violent: Interpreting social problems and dialectical 
knowledge construction  
 
The underlying discursive power of who gets to represent and speak for a 
population is directly linked to the construction of knowledge in our group about the 
social problems affecting the four research locations. While this is significant in its own 
right for the way it can affix certain notions of identity to individuals and groups, these 
knowledges also lead to concrete and tangible realities in the research locations in the 
form of organizational interventions or changes in practice by leaders and community 
workers. In this section, I reflect on two ways that our group produced or perpetuated 
certain knowledges which, in the end, resulted in tangible impacts on Mae Sot and Phob 
Phra’s migrant populations. The first relates to an interpretation of the term violence and 
the second highlights analytical maneuvers to draw comparisons and make programming 
decisions.   
In conducting thematic analysis of the data, a pattern emerged in interviews 
conducted by multiple different co-researchers. They asked participants about violence in 
their communities and participants often answered that this was a non-existent social 
problem. The following excerpt serves as an example.  
I: How about violence between husband and wife? 
R: Between husband and wife, it does not commonly happen. They only fight 
verbally. There is no such violence in this section between women and men.  
I: Then in this section, is there any bodily harm occurred between couples?  
R: No.  
I: How about psychological violence?  
R: No. 
I: When husband and wife fight, what are they doing? 
R: If husband and wife fight, they shout and scold each other.  
I: They shout and scold each other. Then?  
R: Then “you are what?”  “I am what?” “You take a stick, I take a knife.” 
I: Do they beat each other? 
R: Beat, they beat.  
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I: They beat, they shout. 
R: If the women are beaten by men, they shout, they cry. (HT F2Fw-7) 
 
 Aside from the number of interesting observations one can make about this excerpt, I 
focus here on the interview style and the evolution of a “no” answer to a question about 
violence to a “yes” answer.  At first when the interviewer asks about violence, the 
participant explains that it is something that “does not commonly happen” as “there is no 
such violence” but a moment later when the interviewer asks if partners “beat each other” 
the answer is yes. What changed in the interview for the participant to make her decide to 
discuss the nature of physical and verbal violence between couples in Htone Taung? Did 
the interviewer’s repeated questioning wear down the participant? Or is violence 
somehow not the same as physical beating?   
 Consistently in almost every interview when this type of interaction took place, 
interviewers used the Burmese word “ajanpet mhu,” which is a literal translation of 
violence. One finds this term in Burmese language media headlines describing riots and 
military conflict or attacks. It is also a term commonly used in NGO trainings on 
women’s rights, human rights, and gender-based violence, but less in everyday life.13 It 
was only when interviewers used the term “yaigt,” which translates to “beat” in the 
infinitive, that it was possible to achieve understanding. Thus, it is not that participants do 
not consider what goes on in their neighborhood to be violence. Rather, there appears to 
be a language barrier between the professional Burmese that interviewers were using and 
the Burmese that participants could understand. This may also be a conceptual barrier as 
well to the extent that “ajanpet mhu” as violence is an abstract term while “yaigt” as 
beating is concrete. 
                                                           
13 Personal correspondence with Chotayaporn Higashi (15 August 2014).  
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 In such moments during interviews, which clearly demonstrate the types of subtle 
social hierarchies and lines of difference that separate interviewers and participants, I 
identify sites for the construction of particular knowledges about the migrant population. 
This is because I worked with co-researchers to divide the data up into administratively 
useful categories to aid our efforts in designing programs appropriate for migrant 
workers. This produced numbers for “how many people are talking about, for example, 
physical violence or emotional violence…from each community” (IFGD, CC). Such 
considerations ultimately factored into discussions during the interpretive focus group 
about which sites were in need of which kinds of interventions. Some co-researchers 
interpreted interactions like the one quoted above as a sign of participants’ acceptance of 
violence: “According to their answers, they are used to these problems. They don’t report 
it as a family problem” (IFGD, MM). The assumption that intimate partner violence is 
part of the banality of everyday suffering affixes violence to the people and the 
communities in which they live in a way that speaks less to participants’ lived reality and 
more to the research team’s expectations and interpretations.  
 Another site for the construction and circulation of knowledge was when the 
interpretation of our research findings intersected with the tendency to essentialize 
participants along cultural and religious lines, a form of othering. This was particularly 
the case when some co-researchers formulated analyses in reference to the Kyuwe Kyan 
neighborhood. Buddhist and Christian Burmese co-researchers pointed to the all-Muslim 
site as illustrative of gendered violence as an aspect of that neighborhood’s residents’ 
culture. At one moment during the interpretive focus group discussion, a co-researcher 
reflected on the prevalence of gendered-violence in Kyuwe Kyan and identified 
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“attitude” as an issue in this site where “if a wife is forced to have sex, it does not mean it 
is a rape case, but if a wife makes a mistake, it is acceptable for the husband to beat her” 
(IFGD, NO).  Following up on this, another co-researcher added, “They have the belief 
like that in some communities.” Co-researchers did not make comments like this about 
other locations, though during a one-on-one interview with me, one co-researcher 
explained that in Phob Phra sites, “the Burmese…are very…they didn’t go to school 
when they were young so they don’t have any idea…how to deal with their life” (CC). 
These are clearly co-researchers’ ways of making sense of the fear and violence migrant 
workers revealed to them. Nevertheless, these moments are also productive of knowledge 
about migrants as our team divided participants into analytical categories as if culture, 
ethnicity, and religion were static traits.   
The decision-making process—both in the deliberate sense of what takes place in 
debriefing sessions and the interpretive focus group discussion in our trailer meeting 
room and in a more nuanced subconscious mediation of power-laden discourses—
directly relates to the range of ideas considered reasonable and appropriate as ways to 
engage with the migrant population to decrease rates of gender-based violence, both in 
the domestic sphere and public abuses that are the product of a more generalized violence 
affecting Burmese people. The interpretive focus group discussion, which, as noted 
above, was structured as a forum for analysis, interpretation, and action-planning, 
generated much debate and discussion about what each of the co-researchers’ 
organizations might do with the assessment’s findings. The meeting surfaced different 
individual and group agendas and interpretations of the data. Eventually, the advisory 
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group and co-researchers came up with a condensed list of potential projects their 
organizations could implement in the four sites. I include an abbreviated version here: 
1. Information center on Thai law/legal services 
2. Drug awareness training 
3. Integrating videos and cartoons into outreach because of illiteracy 
4. GBV trainings to men and women (separately) 
5. Shelter for women and children 
6. Awareness raising for men 
7. A new organization that can “take action effectively” or a network of Burmese, 
Thai, and “NGOs” to collaborate 
8. Women’s associations in communities/women’s exchange/women talk 
9. Resource library in each community 
10.Radio or film production for outreach 
11.Domestic violence awareness training for health workers and teachers 
12.Basic first responder trainings 
13.Better referral network 
14.Integrate GBV knowledge into school curriculum 
15.Involve religious actors in awareness raising 
 
These suggestions cover a wide variety of activities that attempt to deal with the social 
problems as co-researchers and members of the advisory group interpreted them. 
Interpreting violence as a symptom of attitude or lack of education, for example, inspired 
awareness-raising activities. Agreement on the need for greater coordination among those 
organizing responses to violence coalesced into activity ideas relating to referrals and the 
training of “first-responders.” The list of possible actions here also communicates an 
absence of a more transformative approach that would confront the structural violence 
that resonates so clearly in the narratives of Burmese migrants on the border, including 
co-researchers themselves. More dominant are activities that educate communities 
towards a more peaceful existence and strengthen services for victims. As noted above, 
this adheres to a more passive NGO focus on biowelfare, which, despite co-researchers’ 
personal encounters with exploitation and violence, proved to be the dominant discourse. 
Thus, in this sense it is possible to see the link between individual and collective forms of 
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knowledge, the construction of social hierarchies, and the process of using a variety of 
logics to determine social service programs for a subject population that ultimately have 
an ordering effect without confronting the systemic or structural inequalities that frame 
the setting for the interpersonal violence these groups are committed to stopping.  
 
6. Reflections: methodological reflections and alternative narratives 
By making visible questions of representation and voice in this way, I center my 
focus on the ways in which the research space of our collaborative project was itself an 
important site for the production, selection, and performance of knowledge, albeit in 
subtle ways. Unpacking terms like representation and voice helps gauge the circulation of 
power and the production of discourse vis-à-vis migrant worker lives. Even though, as 
noted above, some co-researchers live in or are from the same neighborhoods they 
analyzed in the study, the task of analysis and a variety of individual encounters with 
efforts to professionalize their work over the years engendered the deployment of certain 
discursive maneuvers that wedge space between these individuals and the subjects of the 
research. In the end, one might argue that there is no one individual empowered to speak 
on behalf of another subject. In fact, it is for this reason that the collaborative research 
endeavor relied primarily on individuals identifying as members of a broader migrant 
community. The assumption of voice is an assumption of representation, but at the same 
time overlooks the many divisions between research participants and those recruited to 
play the role of researcher. To the extent to which one’s position vis-à-vis research 
participants is an assumption, representation threatens to deny a subject her or his agency 
because such an act imposes one’s own subjectivity onto another’s.  
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Validity as authenticity, a phrase mentioned earlier in this chapter, implies that 
researchers recognize and respect participants’ and/or co-researchers’ agency and 
knowledge; it implies a level of trust that participants invest in the research process, a 
sentiment that is reinforced only by researchers’ efforts to ground their analysis in the 
knowledge system or framework of participants, to actively co-construct knowledge. 
Ensuring and maintaining “just enough trust” (Lykes and Moane 2009) in the research 
context countervails the forces of power that might push for the privileging of alternative, 
administrative, market-centered, knowledge systems over the local. This dissertation’s 
methods are premised on multiple levels of trust: among co-researchers, between co-
researchers and me, and between migrant worker participants and our team as we 
conducted interviews and focus group discussions with them. Given the topic of the 
assessment, the study was premised on an assumption that migrant worker participants 
and co-researchers’ relationships were founded on a strong bond of trust that would 
enable candid discussion about social problems in their community, albeit not in their 
households. 
 This was perhaps a simplistic and problematic presumption rooted, despite my 
best efforts, in a homogenizing perception of the border. First, there were certain levels of 
difference that we did not take into consideration during the design phase of this project. 
Co-researchers and I maintain different notions of culture and its relationship to violence 
and gendered social relations. Additionally, the tying of religion to culture and behavior 
in our discussions and analysis suggests that we did not build sufficient trust or did not 
navigate well the lines of social difference between our group and Muslim participants, 
who are a majority in the Kyuwe Kyan neighborhood. These participants appear as more 
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essentialized than other participants with patterns of violence linked inextricably to 
cultural beliefs. This constitutes an important gap and limit in this dissertation’s approach 
that could have been better addressed through constructive dialogue in our team to 
confront questions of difference, power, and representation as they relate to certain 
subsets of our sample.   
 Second, the insider-outsider dynamic of our group and the powerful structures of 
support and funding for our project meant that the discourse of our collective discussions 
trended toward a system of knowledge rooted in organizational frames for planning and 
analysis, at times more so than the local knowledge of the communities where we 
conducted research. Thus on one level, I attempt to maintain a constructivist 
epistemology as I approach my analysis of the collaborative research project, but on 
another level, our collective analysis of violence against women and strategies to respond 
to or diminish such violence adhered to more of a post-positivist framework that sought 
to discover certain “truths” about the migrant worker population. As I have shown in this 
chapter, such a tendency is incredibly significant for what it reflects. It reveals the power 
of certain logics on the border, a type of relational force that imposes discursive and 
practical order on the lives of migrant workers. If pursued further, it might also provide 
some clarity to evaluative questions looking at the effectiveness of development work 
and how there might be a kind of insularity, or circular feedback loop, to strategizing 
about programming and interventions.  
 Reflecting back on the critiques outlined here for the epistemologies and methods 
relied on in this dissertation and the ways in which they can relate to the construction of 
and perpetuation of knowledges that have an ordering effect on certain populations, there 
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are certain questions that should be asked. These are both reflexive and they can serve as 
starting points for ethical and methodological considerations of other collaborative action 
research projects in contexts of displacement. I take as a guide the writing of Fine and 
colleagues (2000) who call for researchers to give attention to the ways their analyses 
relate to participants’ voices, wishes, interpretations, agendas, and welfare.   
1) How do we own all the knowledges we construct and circulate? 
This first question relates to all contexts in which a PAR methodology guides research 
methods. I could not reconcile in this project what to do with analyses that essentialize or 
unfairly homogenize or divide up groups of people. Beyond addressing such issues in 
dialogue, how should such concepts and discourses fit within the final analysis and 
interpretation of data? As is clear in this dissertation, I have chosen to interrogate such 
moments, but I know that these findings are likely not to be welcome to co-researchers 
and the advisory group who did not commit time and effort in order to be critiqued. 
Perhaps in this sense, I am writing against the interests of the people with whom I 
collaborated. To ensure that all the findings that make it into this dissertation are those I 
can share with the research team, perhaps I do not need to cut out the critiques that I 
include here, but rather find a way to pose thought-provoking questions to the team that 
puts together in discussion the needs of migrants and the impact our organizational 
knowledge frameworks and institutional assumptions about those migrants can have. This 
relates to how I share my findings with participants, co-researchers, and advisory group 
members. Building off of Avishai et al. (2013), findings that run contrary to participating 
organizations’ assumptions are cause for reflexivity about one’s institutional 
assumptions, and I pick up that idea in chapter seven, looking at the various and 
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sometimes contradictory notions of women’s empowerment that influenced the 
implementation of this study.   
2) Is a PAR methodology suited to “humanitarian goals”? 
Subsequent work should pose this question at the outset of a project. I don’t think there is 
one right answer. As noted above, the co-construction of knowledge in the service of 
transformative social and political change are central tenets of a PAR epistemology. 
When the goal the project’s architects articulate is more closely related to biowelfare, it 
may become difficult to keep in focus the aims of a deeper shift (see for example, 
Lindorfer 2009). The immediate needs associated with a response to violence, such as 
shelters, referral networks, and a variety of other solutions, can sometimes dominate over 
questions about inequalities (gender, ethnic, and social) and discrimination that are 
systemic and institutionalized. And this is best since questions about biowelfare arise 
because of the urgency of the situation. As one advisory group member put it, “they are 
struggling for their lives so they cannot give time” (IFGD, ES). It was my own goal and 
the goal of some co-researchers and advisory group members to try to keep the 
immediate concerns for safety and the broader structural forces linked in our discussions 
and in the formulation of tangible actions and strategies. This proved difficult in practice 
both because of donor pressure and because of the differing goals of other members of 
the team.   
3) What does transformation mean in contexts of displacement? 
There are two interrelated components to this question. First, this research was conducted 
in a space that was highly liminal. Participants’ time in Thailand varied from only a few 
months to a couple decades; participants’ time in specific settlements also varied, 
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especially in Phob Phra as migrants reported moving regularly between different farms 
and plantation in the area. With so many people transitioning in and out, is there time in 
this context for collaboration on longer-term goals? But the transience of the space also 
raises questions about what is to be transformed. Do we focus on transformation of 
oppressive migration trajectories, helping to foster stronger networks, addressing the root 
causes that place migrants in the situation of having to rely on predatory brokers? On 
xenophobia and racial as well as ethnic discrimination? Or on the abuse of power by local 
officials? It was hard to find agreement among this project’s participants and in the end 
we settled on pragmatism, that is, immediate, lower-cost, concrete, and shorter-term 
goals. Second, in such contexts, how do we measure representation and voice? That is, 
are there communities to represent? Such spaces are not only marked by a fragmentation 
of sovereignties with local authorities and NGOs stepping in to perform the work of order 
and welfare. They are marked by social fragmentation as well; settlements consist of 
individuals and families who have been uprooted at different times from different places 
and who have come together to work. When thinking about representation and voice, 
then, we need to ask not only what lines of difference and inequality divide communities, 
but also whether we are doing harm by imposing a sense of community onto people.   
 Such research projects can always strive to be more vigilant about these issues. 
Even though it is common for collaborative methods working from a PAR epistemology 
to involve multiple layers of participants, some of which are more involved than others in 
the co-construction of knowledge, maybe in this context of urgency and transience, 
participatory action would be more transformative and more grounded in the lived 
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realities of migrants if there was no boundary between participants and co-researchers. 
That is, if all participants were co-researchers and we maintained a smaller sample size.   
 In addition to questions about methods and epistemology, this chapter provides 
one angle for thinking about knowledge construction and the articulation and 
interpellation of particular ideas and concepts that have an impact on the lives of migrants 
who are on the receiving end of NGO projects. This can be considered a form of ordering 
that influences migrant lives. In the next chapters, I will look more at the influence of 
other ordering mechanisms linked to precarity and structural violence, moving from the 
more discursive to an analysis of people, relations, and places in terms of power and the 
development of social organization.  
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Chapter4—A Proliferation of virtual boundaries: Violence and precarity in the 
production of migrant spaces 
 
“The crackdown started on Thursday in the wake of the Thai coup. Some 1,000 
Myanmar workers in Tak’s nine districts, including Mae Sot, were under detention. 
Myanmar migrants living in major cities like Bangkok and Chiang Mai have been 
keeping low profile for fear of being rounded up by the authorities. ‘Some have been 
in hiding near forests and farms. In cities, they stay in locked apartments without 
making noise,’ said Moe Gyo, chairperson of the Joint Action Committee for Burma 
Affairs.” 
—Eleven Myanmar, 14 June 2014 
 
1. Introduction 
 In mid-June 2014, the Thai army and local authorities deported several thousand 
Burmese and Cambodian migrant workers from both central and border provinces, 
triggering a mass exodus of almost 250,000 people in the following days (Bangkok Post 
2014; Finch 2014). This took place in the second month of Thailand’s National Council 
for Peace and Order (NCPO) government, led by the military after a May 22 coup d’état.1 
The raids followed the NCPO’s directive to create a new military-led committee to 
develop new policies on “foreign labor,” a top priority after enforcing an end to the 
political turmoil that had rocked the country for so many months prior to the coup. This 
crackdown clearly targeted undocumented migrants in an effort to “clean up society,” and 
defend the nation’s security, with references to illegal weapons, drugs, and migrants 
(Asian Correspondent, June 17, 2014). Factory owners employing hundreds of 
                                                
1 The May 22, 2014 coup d’état in Thailand was the culmination of months of political tension between the 
Pheu Thai party that held power in the government at that time; their allies, the United Front for 
Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD); and the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). But 
beyond this specific event, the coup was only the most recent iteration of more than a decade of unrest and 
political conflict between multiple factions that divided along social class, center-periphery, pro/anti 
monarchy, and geographic lines. Additional incidents in the last decade include a coup in 2006, which 
ousted then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the government’s suppression of mass protests in 2010 
with military force, resulting in more than 90 deaths. For a detailed account of Thailand’s political conflict 
over the last 20 years, see the special issue of Current Anthropology online, “The Wheel of Crisis in 
Thailand,”(2014) edited by Ben Tausig, Claudio Sopranzetti, Felicity Aulino, and Eli Elinoff. [Accessed 
on September 26, 2014 at http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/582-the-wheel-of-crisis-in-thailand]. 
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undocumented migrants closed their doors out of fear that they would be punished. 
Landlords renting out space for migrant housing, including individual homes and entire 
labor camps announced they would no longer make their land available for those without 
legal status (The Nation, June 12, 2014).   
While these events may have signaled the new military government’s earnest 
commitment to solve two decades of contradictory migrant labor policies and revolving 
door enforcement, the excerpt above reminds us that “cleansing” is never clean. Raids 
detain individuals, remove them from their homes, separate them from their families, and 
tear apart social networks that have developed over years of people living and working 
together (Mendoza and Olivos 2009). Much scholarship has devoted attention to the 
machinery of deportation, its relevance to states’ articulation of sovereignty, and the ways 
it affects the lives of migrants (De Genova 2010; Coutin 2007; Brabeck et al. 2011; De 
Genova and Peutz 2010).   
In the case of Thailand, the government’s goal, according to weekly nation-wide 
addresses made by the country’s military leader, General Prayuth Chan-Ocha, is not to 
rid the country of migrant labor, a point he has vigorously stressed as factories emptied 
and hundreds of thousands left in an effort to get out of the country on their own terms. 
Rather it is to “restrict people from coming into the inner parts of the country;” 
effectively to enforce what has been the practice for many years of concentrating migrant 
work in special economic zones along borders (Asian Correspondent, June 17, 2014). 
Indeed, for decades Thailand has worked to create a “dual economy” with labor-intensive 
industries drawing on migrant populations clustered in zones where employers pay as low 
as 1/4 the national minimum wage (Arnold and Pickles 2011). As noted in earlier 
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chapters, this kind of graduated sovereignty (Ong 2000) is a product of the border’s 
relationship with the state and global supply chains; a messy history of conflicting 
interests, displacement, primitive accumulation, and the movement of capital. But as the 
excerpt at the start of this chapter shows, the work of zoning migrants into border spaces 
can be just as violent as deportations. In fact, the latter is often a tool in the service of the 
former. Such moments stand out, but they are not exceptional. Rather they are individual 
events in the commonplace violence inscribed upon migrant bodies. In the time since the 
coup, the military government has coupled roundups of undocumented migrants with 
directives to enable smoother migrant registration and the creation of new day-passes for 
seasonal agricultural workers in border areas, though in practice little has changed, as the 
government repeats the familiar pattern of deadlines for registration backed by the threat 
of deportation (Bangkok Post 2014; Penchan 2014; Nyan Lynn Aung).  
In my dissertation, I interrogate the productive violence of this zoning work. 
Coming from a phenomenological perspective to ask how migrants survive and negotiate 
such conditions, it is crucial to consider migrant subjectivities, technologies of 
governance, and violent spaces as mutually constitutive. That means looking at how the 
everyday acts of violence involved in enforcing Thailand’s migration policies play a key 
role in Burmese migrants’ development of tactics to get by. When I write “everyday acts 
of violence” here, I mean both harmful physical behavior and a more invisible set of 
forces that renders migrants’ hardship and suffering seemingly inevitable and justified. 
As McGuffey writes, “‘when things fall apart’ we learn a lot about structure and agency 
by observing the ways social actors attempt to put things back together again” (2008: 
216). To consider how all this violence effects certain survival strategies among migrants, 
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I devote this chapter to understanding how violence manifests itself on the Thai-
Myanmar border, how migrants embody this violence, and how violent conditions lead to 
certain constraints on migrant lives and certain ways of regarding oneself and one’s 
surrounding world.   
These issues speak also to the ways in which the reproduction of labor flexibility 
consists of everyday practices of domination that construct a particular kind of precarious 
alterity as well as a social space marked by violence. This is to place emphasis on the 
implications everyday practice bears for broader social and power relationships (de 
Certeau 1984) and on the productive nature of such relations (Foucault 1980). I write this 
with the recognition that practice, as a performative and repetitive set of actions, exists 
within a complex system in which power and resistance are relational and interconnected; 
both pass through “apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them” 
(Foucault 1990: 96). Thus, while I focus on precarity and violence in this chapter, it is 
with the knowledge that these are not dynamics contained within the local context of the 
border, but which are enacted there. Futhermore, it is my argument that their iterative 
nature can lead to new social forms or formations of power that can have a resistive, or at 
least an altering, quality to them, leaving open the potential for the breaking or changing 
of seemingly fixed structures of domination (Deleuze 1994; Žižek 2004). Along similar 
lines, as I refer to social space and violent space above, I do not mean to infer that space 
and violence are inherently joined, but that as a “relational assemblage,” violent acts can 
produce space, which can in turn affect the social relations of the people inhabiting that 
space (Massey 2005; Springer 2011). Violence, as Springer (2011: 91) explains, is never 
a “cultural” phenomenon just as violence never sits fixedly in place. Rather “seemingly 
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local expressions of violence are…always imbricated within wider socio-spatial and 
political economic patterns.” Thus, it becomes possible to see connections and 
understand contingent relationships between violence within migrant communities 
perceived as beyond the law, the broader violence of government practices of zoning or 
territorialization, and the dynamics of global capitalism. Considering the resonance 
between social space, practice/relations, and discourse, Lefebvre (1991: 26, author’s 
emphasis) explains that “(social) space is a (social) product” and “serves as a tool of 
thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of 
control, and hence of domination, of power.” 
It is from this perspective that I approach the issue of violence and migrants’ 
survival in this chapter. I begin with a look at the relationship between precarity, invisible 
violence, and interpersonal violence, particularly as perpetrated against women. 
Interpersonal violence refers to a range of different types of behaviors that take place on 
an individual scale, such as personal confrontations and attacks by one person on another 
(Collins 2008). Invisible violence and precarity are two concepts that have developed in 
proximity to one another but have not been substantially put into dialogue. When I write 
invisible violence here, I am referring to Philippe Bourgois’s (2009) triad of structural 
violence, symbolic violence, and normalized violence (each of which is outlined below), 
which enables us to look at what Paul Farmer calls “the social machinery of oppression” 
(2004: 307), the social, economic, and institutional dimensions of violence and suffering 
(Benson 2008). Precarity also refers to the multileveled violence that produces insecurity, 
illness, and poverty, but places an emphasis on process or “precaritization” as Butler and 
Athanasiou put it (2013). I consider these concepts together in order to build a sense of 
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how law and institutional policy, history, and global forces interact with the experiences 
of individuals who find themselves squeezed into untenable circumstances and who 
encounter multiple forms of violence. This suggests a perspective that regards precarity 
not merely as an external set of forces imposed on migrants, but a space of performative 
practice and interpretation. I attempt to frame the chapter in this way in the 
acknowledgement that my efforts to study violence and suffering and the tactics to 
mitigate those dynamics risks constituting an essentialism of migrants as categorically 
victims (Mohanty 2003). While this chapter is overwhelmingly focused on violence 
waged against migrants, I caution the reader not to consider this a portrayal of passive 
subjects. Subsequent chapters (5-7) are more devoted to the multiple ways migrants 
formulate responses to the harsh conditions of the border. 
I then look at specific mechanisms used in Thailand that have constructed a 
flexible migrant labor force, including legal, social, and economic developments. I place 
emphasis on the extent to which the current situation in which migrants find themselves 
is not a product of a united effort, but rather an amalgam of disparate interests and 
broader processes. The historical developments that I presented in chapter two have led to 
a particular relationship between the border and the state, and in this chapter I show the 
way that in recent years this relationship correlates with the enactment of certain policies 
and practices that do violence to the population of migrants living on the Thai-Myanmar 
border. This constitutes a production of space, which corresponds to particular social 
relations, including those linked to production and the reproduction of the social relations 
of production (Lefebvre 1991). I organize this as a comparison between the four sites 
where we conducted research to draw inferences about the rural and urban experiences 
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for migrants. Within this comparison, I sometimes include a gendered analysis, though 
this chapter is not centered on the topic of gender in the way some others are.  
I show also in this part that the precarious spaces of practice or performance are 
capable of producing, reproducing, or challenging structures that make life “bare,” to use 
Agamben’s term (1998). In so doing, I remind the reader to keep in mind Mignolo’s 
notion of “border thinking” to identify mechanisms for the production of knowledge and 
subjectivities that make use of but may lie outside of normative/dominant epistemologies 
linked to class, gender, and race in striving for decolonized identities and collectivities 
(2000). In this sense, the precarious social space I am examining is simultaneously a 
contested space of both fear and survival, but also a potentially resistive and/or 
transformative space of reciprocal power, as subsequent chapters show.  
  
2.  “Invisible violence” and “precaritization” 
 There is no shortage of terms to analyze and interpret the type of violence behind 
the social and power relations that reproduce poverty and everyday individual suffering. 
Bourdieu and colleagues (1999) refer to “social suffering” to study the lived experience 
of oppressive social structures (see also Frost and Hogget 2008). Bourdieu (2001) also 
developed the notion of “symbolic violence,” the naturalization and internalization of 
unequal and oppressive relations; violence that is misrecognized as inevitable status quo 
(see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004: 19) 
propose “everyday violence,” “normalized violence,” and “peace-time violence” as 
useful ways to frame the multitude of conditions that create suffering under poverty or 
marginalization because it allows for the conceptualization of violence as a continuum 
“comprised of a multitude of ‘small wars and invisible genocides’…conducted 
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in…normative social spaces” (see also Bourgois 2009). With the proposition of a 
continuum, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois insist that the violence of war, such as rape or 
mass-slaughter, be linked and associated with the violence of peacetime as utterly human 
activities on a broad scale, often state-sanctioned and institutionalized.   
 “Structural violence” refers to the violence of multiple contingent and overlapping 
forms of domination placed within institutional and political economic conceptual 
frameworks (Benson et al. 2008; see also Galtung 1969). Farmer (2004: 308) makes an 
important contribution to this notion as he emphasizes erasure. He considers dominant 
accounts of how and why the people of Haiti have witnessed and continue to experience 
poverty, interpersonal violence, and illness on a broad scale and concludes that “the 
architects of structural violence” are perhaps most pernicious in their ability to erase, 
distort, and desocialize history, which reproduces a cultural explanation for suffering and 
subverts the linking of contemporary suffering in Haiti to the legacy of colonialism, 
geopolitical marginalization, and economic exploitation. The insistence on placing 
contemporary violence and suffering within its appropriate historical place is a constant 
reminder to consider the ways one’s analysis of the local and contemporary is situated 
and contingent to understand not only why the violence or suffering in question is 
happening, but also why and how a particular discourse is most prevalent and dominant 
in justifying or explaining that violence both in public and academic circles.   
 Applying a spatial lens to the concept of structural violence, Rodgers and O’Neill 
(2012) developed the term “infrastructural violence” to explain the ways in which 
poverty, racial prejudice, gender inequality, and other forms of oppression are manifested 
and reproduced through the material world of spatial arrangements that deny certain 
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segments of the population access to clean water, healthcare, or healthy food. This 
analysis both grounds the individual’s everyday experience of suffering in the spatial and 
follows a Lefebvrian tendency to make space an active agent in the production of social 
relations (Lefebvre 1991; see also Mbembé 2004). A focus on infrastructural violence 
means looking at the placement and meanings of buildings, facilities, fences, walls, 
monuments, sanitation systems, and other spatial arrangements in the reproduction of 
marginality or precarity. While Rodgers, O’Neill, and the contributors to their special 
issue on infrastructural violence tend to emphasize the urban setting for this concept, it is 
entirely possible to think about ways in which the material arrangement of space in rural 
areas reproduces the products of structural violence. Indeed, Benson (2008) writes about 
the brutal power of the labor camp for Latin American migrants working on tobacco 
plantations in North Carolina.  
 Analytically linking interpersonal violence with the symbolic and the structural, 
Bourgois (2009) brings together multiple theories on violence in offering one term 
“invisible violence” to account for structural, symbolic, and normalized violence (see 
also Dominguez and Menjívar 2014). This emphasizes situating individuated perceptions 
of or encounters with violence and survival within a broader analysis of the “order of 
things” that is often not considered part of that violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
It is to center the analysis where “multiple, layered forms of violence coalesce, setting the 
conditions within which individuals hurt one another and social relations are distorted” 
(Dominguez and Menjívar 2014: 185; see also Bourgois 2003). This approach is in 
contrast to—though not in rejection of—more individual-centered frameworks that look 
for explanations of violence in personal histories, psychological profiles, or the use of 
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drugs and alcohol, among other factors (Klostermann and Fals-Steward 2006; Martin et 
al. 2002). And it is an explicit move away from research suggesting a “culture” of 
interpersonal violence, though I do consider how culture can act as a mediating force, 
shaping violence, though not giving rise to it (Lee and Ousey 2011; Waldmann 2007).   
 The notion of precarity helps to target the analysis of the invisible violence 
Burmese migrants experience with its particular focus on the relations and networks of 
global supply chains. The concept refers to the social condition of insecurity and the 
process of integrating that insecurity into all facets of life whereby a population must 
come to terms with a new reality as one defined and governed by uncertainty and 
marginality.While some scholars, especially in the French school, have tended to use 
precarity (or précarité in French) in reference to changes affecting a society in its 
totality—as in a precarious society (Barbier 2002; Offredi 1988)—I use the term in my 
dissertation more for the way it reflects differentiation at the same time it annihilates 
diversity, that is, the production of heterogeneity via the interpellation among particular 
groups and not others that they are expendable and yet inextricably yoked to supply 
chains (Neilson and Rossiter 2005; Tsianos and Papadoupoulos 2006).2   
Scholars have often referred to precarity as a symptom of life in post-industrial, 
post-Fordist societies, emphasizing conditions in the 21st century “Global North” (Butler 
2004, Furedi 2002; Neilson and Rossiter 2005). However, Neilson and Rossiter (2008: 
54) assert that by looking at capitalism from a “wide historical and geographic scope,” 
one finds that “it is precarity that is the norm and not Fordist economic organization.” 
                                                
2 It should be noted that Pierre Bourdieu is credited with coining the term “précarité(1963), and he used 
the term to describe the difference between temporary and permanent workers in Algeria, reflecting the 
term’s origins in the study of the relationship between economic conditions and social life. 
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Instead of seeing as different concepts the insecurity engendered by large-scale events 
singular in time and space, such as 9/11 (Butler 2004), and the “microspaces” of 
“contingent work conditions,” Ettlinger (2007) argues that precarity transcends time and 
space boundaries, linking the individual laborer working at a piece-rate on the Thai-
Myanmar border, for example, and the part-time no-benefits service worker in the US 
with enormous credit card debt.   
In this sense, precarity refers to those experiencing Harvey’s “accumulation by 
dispossession,” that is, those at whose expense capital is consolidated in increasingly 
small corners of the globe. As Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 90) put it: “As capital is 
driven to deliver higher productivity and profitability, labor not only assumes increased 
degrees of risk but is also subject to demands for increased productivity, more flexible 
hours, and the payment of lower real wages.” This is the production of a flexible or 
expendable labor class, and precaritization is the process of acclimatizing a population to 
those conditions, to understanding that their “proper place is non-being” as Butler and 
Athanasiou write (2013:19). They explicate further: 
…the logic of dispossession is interminably mapped onto our bodies, onto 
particular bodies-in-place, through normative matrices but also through situated 
practices of raciality, gender, sexuality, intimacy, able-bodiedness, economy, and 
citizenship. It produces dispossessed subjectivities, rendering them subhuman or 
hauntingly all-too-human, binding them within calculable self-same identities, 
and putting them in their proper place—the only special condition of being that 
they can possibly occupy, namely one of perennial occupation as non-being and 
non-having (ibid). 
 
This excerpt raises a number of key points. First, that using a conceptual framework 
based on precarity enables one to draw important qualitative connections between quite 
disparate encounters with violence. While structural, symbolic, and normalized violence 
convey the interaction of experience with social structure, Butler and Athanasiou’s use of 
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precarity emphasizes the performativity involved in constituting or deconstituting 
subjectivities, a process that is constant, repetitive, and ongoing and embedded in text, 
discourse, and interaction. Seen in this iterative and relational way, the violence of 
precarity is always active and transformative; each exchange with oppressive social 
structures or abusive individuals is simultaneously constituting and deconstituting 
relations of power and relationships between individuals or groups and dominant social 
structures or layers of discourse. As Butler and Athanasiou explain it, the performative 
production of precarity can similarly be found in the way women who have been raped 
are performatively deconstituted as subjects of the law when their narrative is deemed to 
have no value and in the way a worker dies from a treatable infection because of 
unwritten rules that restrict movement and prevent certain groups of people from 
traveling to nearby health clinics.   
Second, precarity provides a frame for analyzing a group’s conditions and 
differentiation not only as disposable, but also, importantly, as a site for subjectivation.  
In that precarity performatively sears and inscribes insecurity onto precarious bodies, it 
also leads to the production of particular political subjectivities, shaping lives that in turn 
shape the supply or service chains that have, in part, imposed that insecurity onto them. 
Arguing that post-developmental spatial arrangements that accommodate global supply 
chains have led to a multiplication of labor and borders, Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 
251; see also Sidaway 2007) suggest that this heterogenization “entails the production of 
diverse subject positions and boundaries that crisscross the composition of living labor 
and insert themselves within shifting assemblages of knowledge and power.” That is, a 
multiplication of labor engenders a multiplication of subjectivities. For scholars of 
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citizenship, this relates to the proliferation of statuses and the reshaping of the terms of 
inclusion and exclusion (Bosniak 2006; Honig 2001; Isin 2002). Sassen (2006) describes 
the ways that unauthorized migrants, through their status and their negotiation of 
exclusion and inclusion are active participants in redefining the boundaries of belonging. 
The notion of precarity reminds us that political subjectivation is not only a matter of 
institutional or corporate mutations of citizenship and sovereignty (Ong 2006). Rather it 
implies that the condition of precarity itself is constitutive of subjectivities that 
experience the violence of insecurity and exclusion and that must negotiate that 
treacherous terrain. Thus, the material manifestations of structural violence and other 
invisible violences are in feedback loops with the conditions of precarity.  
Finally, scholars in the precarity movement have identified this social condition as 
one that bears potential for the formation of transnational networks and political 
mobilization against dominant power relations (Gibson-Graham 1996; Hardt and Negri 
2004; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). Butler and Athanasiou question how it might be 
possible in the repetitive discursive and gestural acts that reproduce the unequal power 
relations of precarity and dispossession for new forms of collectivity or mobilization to 
emerge that do not embrace liberal concepts of ownership as a political goal, but that 
have a decolonizing effect instead. While Neilson and Rossiter (2008) point out that 
precarity as a rallying cry for social movements in Europe has been on the decline, even 
as the academic concept gains traction in Anglophone scholarship, it is possible to look to 
the social movements against austerity that swept through Greece and Spain in 2012-
2013 or the various Occupy movements as examples of collective action constituted by 
otherwise disparate groups of individuals unified by a shared sense of precarity (Schram 
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2013). This is not to say that precarity necessarily leads to collective action for social 
change, but that the performative process of constituting and deconstituting precarious 
subjectivities has a generative quality to it.   
This notion of “generativity” is key to my dissertation. And in this chapter I focus 
on the link between various forms of invisible violence and precarity in order to shed 
light on the performative construction of political subjectivities. It is in my exploration of 
violence that I hope to begin to tease forth a sense of subjectivity, agency, and forms of 
social organization. At this point, one might ask whether all this is to imply an argument 
that structural violence gives rise to interpersonal violence. Therefore, before moving on, 
it is important to clarify my interpretation of how interpersonal violence, 
structural/invisible violence, and precarity are intertwined. This is contentious territory, 
recalling Randall Collins’s (2008: 24-25) polemical statement, “Macro-cultural 
approaches to violence become vacuous when they reach the concept of ‘symbolic 
violence.’ This helps us not at all to explain real violence, but muddies the analytical 
task…‘Symbolic violence’ is mere theoretical word play.” While I do reject Collins’ 
narrow definition of violence because he uses his empirical work to claim a totality of 
knowledge on violence—which, in effect, excludes other forms of knowledge about 
violence that do not fit within his framework, I cannot dispute his claim that empirical 
evidence does not show a causal link between the violence of social structures and the 
specific motivations for an individual to become physically violent. But, in my analysis 
this is irrelevant because I am not concerned with making causal links. Instead, I point to 
precarity and structural violence as forces that shape individuals’ assessments of 
constraints and opportunities as well as their ontological perspectives. This, in turn, may 
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influence how people react when violence is done to them and how they make sense of 
and discuss that violence. This is where I see the important connection between the 
structural and the interpersonal.  
 
3. Constructing a flexible labor force in Thailand  
To inquire about the construction of precarious migrant bodies on the Thailand-
Myanmar border is to look into the heterogeneity of boundaries that define those 
migrants as flexible, disposable, and deportable. It is to look beyond the geographic 
borders between states and question the ways that inequalities—maintained and 
reproduced socially and institutionally—divide people, including or excluding them 
within the space of rights or entitlements of a society. Participants in this study linked the 
challenges of their everyday lives to their possession or lack of legal status in Thailand. 
In many cases, they present the migrant experience as a binary: those who have legal 
status and those who do not. However, upon closer examination, migrant discourse 
around legal status goes way beyond the contents or language of the law. Their words and 
descriptions pertain to so much more than that for which the law provides. Legal status, 
rather, is a metonym for the boundary between exposure to violence as bare life 
(Agamben 1998) and some relative sense of security; that is, between the wide range of 
violent experiences migrants encounter on a daily basis on the job, in dangerous living 
conditions, or at the hands of abusive or corrupt government officials on the one hand, 
and earning a living wage, feeling confident to travel outside one’s house, or call the 
police in an attempt to access the judicial system, on the other. Legal status for 
undocumented Burmese migrants does not always constitute a fix. Indeed, many have 
shown that even those migrant workers who are registered to work in Thailand still find 
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themselves in exploitative employment circumstances and are susceptible to the 
predations of brokers, bosses, authorities, or aggressive others (Human Rights Watch 
2010). Moreover, there are other lines of difference based on gender, race, and religion 
that cut across this space, erecting additional boundaries among the broader population of 
migrants, subjecting some to greater or other forms of violence than others. Nevertheless, 
the symbolic value of legal status reflects some level of power in the hands of those the 
law and production systems place into an identity of powerlessness and vulnerability.  
The metonymic power of legal status may be a product of the pervasive yet 
abstract quality of law that becomes concrete through interpretation and interaction 
(Ewick and Silbey 1998; Merry 1992). As I have argued elsewhere in the context of 
Burmese migrants in Thailand, the many exchanges migrants have with employers, other 
migrants, local authorities, and many others certainly give meaning to the law and its 
categories in a performative and iterative fashion (Saltsman 2014). But in addition, as this 
section shows, the laws and policies governing migration in Thailand developed in such a 
way as to create what Agamben (2005) refers to as a “zone of exception,” where migrants 
are under the law namely in the way that they are beyond the law, stuck in a space of 
illegality, and thus deportability (De Genova 2002; 2005). This is not to say that Thai law 
does not apply to migrant workers—it certainly does—but rather that its construction 
lends itself to migrant liminality and illegality, and leaves the interpretation of the law—
and by extension in practice the decision whether or not to follow the law—in the hands 
of those with power over migrants, such as employers or local authorities. This is what 
Pitch Pongsawat (2007) refers to as a border partial citizenship regime, and he includes in 
this category a number of groups—both migrants and highland communities—to which 
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the Thai government has granted residency permits limited to space and time.3  It is in 
this way that legal status, and access to that status, in Thailand, as in many other states, 
can be interpreted as one aspect of structural violence waged upon migrant bodies, 
rendering them precarious. This reflects a pattern of institutionalized precarity, an 
arrangement of the state and economic forces that complements flexible modes of 
production (Harvey 1989) and exploitative employment practices. 
3.1 Legal loopholes for a flexible migrant population 
There are two pillars to the set of laws governing migrant workers: the B.E. 2522 
Immigration Act (1979) and the B.E. 2551 Alien Employment Act (2008 and earlier 
versions).4 As I show in this section, both lay the foundation for migrant precarity in 
Thailand in that they construct a narrow channel for legal migration, heavily penalize 
unauthorized migration, and place such migrants’ ability to stay in Thailand within a 
space of high-level government discretion.   
In addition to forming the architecture for Thailand’s immigration governance 
structure—calling for the establishment of a multi-disciplinary committee representing 
labor, business, foreign affairs, and national security interests—the Immigration Act 
outlines in broad terms who is and is not allowed to enter Thailand, penalties for illegal 
                                                
3 Each group received cards of different colors indicating their status. For example, the Thai government 
granted former Koumintang soldiers from Batallion 93 a white card; Chinese families of Koumintang 
soldiers who arrived in Thailand between 1950 and 1961 received yellow cards; Tai Lue communities, 
some of which who inhabited Thailand’s northern provinces since before the modern era, received orange 
cards as long as they were born in Thailand and live in three northernmost provinces; and Burmese 
displaced in Thailand prior to 1976 and living in western or northern parts of the country received pink 
cards. Each of these groups are the subject of different cabinet resolutions starting in the 1970s and 
continuing through today. In many, but not all cases, members of the second generation to receive the card 
are eligible for full nationality/citizenship (see Pongsawat 2007: 170-176).  
4 The Immigration Act B.E. 2522 was the Thai kingdom’s third immigration law, the first being passed in 
1950 and the second in 1954. The Alien Employment Act B.E. 2551 replaced the law under the same name 
from 1978 and a subsequent version in 2001.  
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entry, and the procedures for deportation. Among some of the provisions of Section 12 of 
the Immigration Act regarding which types of “aliens” are excluded from entering 
Thailand are sub-sections one and two, which declare as illegal all those entering without 
passports, other travel documents, or the appropriate visas, or those who come to 
Thailand without the means to support themselves. This accounts for the vast majority of 
migrants from neighboring countries who cross the border without authorization. 
Punishment for an unauthorized presence in Thailand can be up to two years 
imprisonment and a 20,000 baht fine (~US $600). Those aiding or harboring 
unauthorized migrants face even more jail time and steeper fines.   
While the Immigration Act does not detail a process of regularization—that is, if 
one enters illegally, one remains unlawfully present until arrest and deportation—Section 
17 is an important loophole that forms the basis of the vast majority of migrants’ status in 
that it grants “in certain special cases” and only with Cabinet approval the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to “permit any alien or any group of aliens to stay in the Kingdom under 
certain conditions.” This provision creates an avenue toward regularizing one’s stay in 
Thailand even after arriving illegally, albeit one that remains permanently on a 
discretionary level and that must be determined at the highest levels of the government. 
Toyota (2007) considers use of this law as a tactic to distinguish different legal rights for 
different members of Thai society, based on whether they are part of highland (periphery) 
or the lowland of the country.5 It is from this section that the Thai government has 
                                                
5 Toyota (2007) notes that there are more than 370,000 members of highland communities who are 
effectively denied citizenship rights by being considered illegal migrants, even though most inhabited Thai 
territory before the delineation of contemporary boundaries. Through Section 17, the Government of 
Thailand has allowed for a variety of ad hoc statuses that correspond to the spatial location of the 
populations, deny them full citizen rights, and restrict their movement and participation in the national 
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created certain exceptions over the years, allowing for an encamped population of 
150,000 “temporarily displaced persons” from Myanmar and migrant workers from 
neighboring countries who crossed the borders without authorization. This means that 
there is no law in Thailand specifically regarding asylum. Though the government has 
developed policies over the last several decades to govern the granting of temporary 
shelter to those fleeing active military conflict or the consequences of civil war, they have 
used these policies in an ad hoc way to manage the flow of asylum seekers, a method that 
has left many thousands of would-be refugees in a place of illegality.6 Additionally, those 
protected under Section 17 of the Immigration Act do not receive a visa and they remain 
in violation of the law for their unauthorized presence. 
The biggest use of Section 17 is the B.E. 2551 Alien Employment Act, which 
contains provisions for the regularization of unauthorized migrant workers and the 
importation of workers from neighboring countries. In terms of the latter, the Thai 
government signed memoranda of understanding with its neighboring countries 
Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos to set up a system for recruiting labor from these 
countries to address labor shortages in Thailand, a desired form of migration in that it is a 
completely regulated process. Employers apply to the Thai Ministry of Labor, pay 
registration fees, and the neighboring country sends the requested numbers of workers to 
                                                                                                                                            
community. Toyota notes this as a legal aspect to the discursive exclusion of the highland spaces 
throughout Thailand’s recent history. 
6 Thailand is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and has chosen to develop policies for 
asylum seekers on a case-by-case basis as decided by the Cabinet. The criteria determined to accept 
Burmese seeking refuge emerged from Cabinet-level decisions and has been applied to those Burmese 
forced migrants who reside within one of the nine “temporary shelters”managed by the Ministry of Interior 
on the provincial level. However, in order to fall under the Section 17 exception to the Immigration Act, 
Burmese asylum seekers must have their status determined by a Provincial Admission Board (PAB), and 
the PAB has largely ceased such registration in an effort to halt the influx of refugees. This means that all 
Burmese people entering the camps but without an official review of their status are in violation of 
Thailand’s immigration law and are therefore subject to arrest and deportation.  
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be employed for a fixed period of time. Since the signing of the MOUs and since this 
labor recruitment program has started, this form of migration has constituted a minority 
compared to those who enter Thailand illegally and then seek to regularize their status.   
The B.E. 2551 Alien Employment Act also outlines this process. While migrant 
workers who enter Thailand without authorization remain in violation of Thai law and are 
still subject to deportation, paragraph 2 of Section 13 states that as long as they apply for 
a work permit, they will be permitted “to stay in the Kingdom temporarily pending 
repatriation.” This was the case in the earlier iterations of the law as well from 1978 and 
2001. One of the new features of the 2008 law is the extent to which it criminalizes 
migrants who do not get a work permit. Those caught working in Thailand without such a 
permit can be jailed for five years and fined up to 100,000 baht (~US $3,100). Authorities 
can conduct raids to look for undocumented migrants without any warrants, and migrant 
workers are required to contribute to a fund from which authorities will cover the cost of 
deportations.7 Anybody caught employing undocumented migrants is susceptible to a 
high fine and the law provides for a reward for those who inform on undocumented 
migrant work to the relevant authorities.8 In this sense the law has two functions: 
regularize the undocumented and punish those who are not regularized. This puts the 
onus onto migrant workers and employers to avoid harsh punishment by getting 
registered. This means that a migrant’s status vis-à-vis the law is completely contingent 
on the registration process itself, which is significant in its own right because the law 
places the power to determine legality in the hands of a bureaucratic process that, as 
                                                
7 This fund was finally set up early in 2014 and employers are required to deduct 1,000 baht (~US $30) 
from their workers’wages for this purpose. 
8 See Alien Employment Act, Section 27 and Section 54. 
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noted above, is discretionary and ad hoc. This is not to say that undocumented migrants 
have zero protections in Thailand. In theory, the Thai Constitution, Criminal and Civil 
Codes, the B.E. 2551 Anti-Human Trafficking Act, the B.E. 2546 Child Protection Act, 
the B.E. 2541 Labor Protection Act of 1998, and its 2008 amendments guarantee certain 
rights for migrants and workplace protections for all workers, regardless of their legal 
status, including eight-hour workdays, the right to fair wages, equal treatment between 
men and women, humane working conditions, complaints mechanisms, protections for 
children, and fair access to the legal system.9 However, the experiences of migrants 
reflects that there are immense challenges to access to these rights if one is 
undocumented as authorities often act on migrants’ status as “illegal” before considering 
other laws and the rights they grant (Human Rights Watch 2010; Saltsman 2011). 
 
3.2 The dilemmas of bureaucracy and a precarious labor class 
The discretionary nature of Thailand’s immigration policy has made it possible to 
regulate the flow of low-skilled migrant labor from neighboring countries as somewhat of 
a revolving door. A series of Cabinet Resolutions in the 1990s and early 2000s admitted 
migrants with temporary work permits. Each resolution declared the length of time 
migrant workers were permitted to stay, where in Thailand they could work, and in which 
labor sectors they would be permitted to work. For example, the 1996 Cabinet Resolution 
provided for a two-year work permit for work in forty-three provinces in the following 
sectors: “agriculture, construction, sea fishing, land freight, sea freight, mining, 
production and domestic services” (Archavanitkul 2010). Migrants working in the fishing 
                                                
9 See Labor Protection Act B.E. 2551, Sections 8, 9, 12, 19 and Labor Protection Act B.E. 2541, Sections  
44-49, 51-52, 123, 125. See also Muntarbhorn 2005: 14-15.   
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industry are subject to different timeframes (IOM 2013). When the permits expired, it 
was common for authorities to conduct raids and deport many hundreds or thousands of 
migrants who failed to renew, and eventually the Cabinet would pass an amnesty, 
allowing for a new round of registration and work permits (Hall 2011; Archavanitkul and 
Vajanasara 2008). The B.E. 2518 Labor Relations Act of 1975, which precludes non-
Thais from forming their own unions, further bolsters migrant flexibility. Though 
registered migrants can join Thai labor unions, Deyo (2012) notes that the labor 
movement in Thailand is on the decline with only four percent of the country’s workforce 
unionized.    
A look at the pattern of deportations and amnesties over the last two decades 
reflects the Thai government’s tension between economic demand for low-skilled and 
low-wage labor and the predominance of a nationalistic and national security-focused 
perspective toward migration (Arnold and Hewison 2005). Large-scale deportations have 
tended to take place during times of economic or political crisis in Thailand with more 
than 300,000 Burmese workers deported in the wake of the 1997-1998 financial crisis, 
many thousands after the 2008 recession, and just recently unknown numbers after the 
May 2014 military coup (Pearson and Kusakabe 2013; Weng 2009; Bangkok Post 2014). 
These have been largely political and symbolic actions from a migration policy 
perspective in that authorities drop migrants at the border and migrants typically return 
immediately or within a short period of time, though the consequences these deportations 
have on migrants’ lives are sometimes great (Saltsman 2014).  
Within this legal structure, the process of obtaining a work permit layers on 
obstacles to migrant regularization through formal channels. Challenges relate to the cost 
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of the process, travel required to go through the regularization process, the role of the 
employer, the steps involved, and the semi-formalized role of broker agencies. Starting in 
2006, based on regional agreements with neighboring countries, Thailand began to 
require that all migrants holding work permits undergo a process of “Nationality 
Verification” and those without valid ID documents received a temporary passport that 
they would need to use to renew their work permit.10 Initially, migrants had to cross back 
into their country to verify their nationality, but after the first year of Burmese nationality 
verification revealed that few Burmese migrants went through the process (citing 
financial difficulties and security concerns traveling through Thailand or returning to 
Myanmar) (Hall 2011), Thailand and Myanmar began a process of setting up increasing 
numbers of “NV” centers along the borders and eventually throughout the country. Thus, 
for the last few years, the nationality verification of current work permit holders and the 
registration of new migrants has occurred simultaneously, the idea being to regularize all 
migrants in Thailand. The reality, however, is that new migrants have continued to come 
to Thailand, existing migrants and their employers were letting work permits expire, and 
not everybody was undergoing nationality verification. The government issued Cabinet 
Resolution after Cabinet Resolution between 2010 and 2014 extending the deadline for 
nationality verification in the hope of reaching everybody. When they let the deadline 
finally pass in December 2013, there were still many undocumented migrants without 
temporary or permanent passports. Since the military takeover in May 2014, there are 
signs that regularization will continue in some new form. Going through the nationality 
verification process and receiving the temporary passports entitles migrants to a longer 
                                                
10 This process started in 2006 with Cambodia and Laos and in 2009 with Myanmar. 
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work visa before being required to return home for a period of time, access to worker’s 
compensation, and greater freedom of movement (Hall 2011). There are, however, 
certain groups that are not eligible for this process. The government of Myanmar refuses 
to recognize as Burmese certain ethnic groups, precluding them from nationality 
verification, and thus registration in Thailand. This is the case with most residents of the 
Kyuwe Kyan site as residents are Rohingya or members of unrecognized Burmese 
Muslim communities. 
In terms of the registration process for a work permit, employers and migrants 
face strict timeframes. As of mid-2013 registration was to take place between August and 
December of that year with the months during that period divided up into different 
phases, including: 
1) Employers submitting “a letter of demand” for labor, noting a list of migrant 
names (20 August – 20 September) 
2) Submitting an application for a registration form at the provincial employment 
office and passport photographs at the local registrar office (16 September – 16 
October) 
3) Health examination (including blood test and chest x-ray) once the registration 
form has been received (16 September – 30 October) 
4) Application for work permit, again once the initial registration form is received 
(16 September – 14 November) 
5) Receipt of work permit (migrants technically required to pick up the work 
permit in person) 
 
Each step along the way incurs particular costs. In total the official cost for this process is 
close to 4,000 baht (~US $120), a cost employers often deduct from their staff’s wages 
(Hall 2011). Important to note here is the extent to which migrants are completely 
dependent on their employers for the registration process. Employers must apply on 
behalf of migrants. Once migrants are registered, their work permits attach them to their 
employers and the provinces where they are employed (though possession of a temporary 
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passport technically means migrants can travel anywhere in Thailand). This means 
migrants who went through this regularization process are only legally permitted to stay 
in Thailand as long as they are working for the employer noted in their work permit. 
Migrants can only change jobs and get new work permits if: 
• The employer dies 
• Termination or dissolution of employment 
• Employer commits abuse  
• Employer does not comply with labor laws 
 Consent of the employer for change the job 
 
Nowhere mentioned is the possibility that migrants choose of their own free will 
to leave but do not get the consent of their employer, face abusive treatment but do not 
know how to file a complaint, or decide to quit in search of a better job but find 
themselves temporarily unemployed. There are many circumstances that workers might 
face that push them to leave or give up their positions but that are not included in this 
short list. Or they might be left alone to figure out the registration process because they 
have employers who are reluctant to invest the money. It is also not uncommon for police 
to stop migrant workers on the way to fulfill some part of the registration process; in most 
cases—especially before the proliferation of locations to undergo nationality verification 
and work permit application—migrants have had to travel long distances, sometimes 
across provincial boundaries. In all those situations, migrants find themselves at risk of 
arrest and deportation. As Campbell (2014: 4) writes, even after nationality verification 
was complete: 
Those [migrants] who sought to work in central Thailand still depended on human 
smuggling in order to get from the border to their workplace. Only after starting 
work at their place of employment could they apply for legal documentation. 
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In response to these laws and policies that leave migrants in a precarious situation, 
it has become increasingly common to rely on broker agencies to facilitate regularization. 
Crucially, this allows migrants to circumvent the power the policy places in the hands of 
employers because many brokers offer the service of lining up a migrant with an 
unknown employer—either somebody the migrant will go to work for in the future or just 
a name and a face to go on the application, which enables the migrant to hold a work 
permit but have some greater freedom to choose her or his place of work. While Thailand 
and Myanmar agreed that the overall process of nationality verification and worker 
registration should not exceed a cost of 5,000 baht (a decrease from initial prices of 9,000 
baht in 2009), since the process began formal and informal broker offices have opened up 
all over Thailand in areas with high concentrations of migrant workers, promising the 
services of a one-stop-shop for all regularization needs. According to the Ministry of 
Labor, there are more than 120 such agencies, though it is estimated that Mae Sot alone 
has nearly half that amount, many of which operate informally (author’s personal 
correspondence). Some agencies charge as much as 20,000 baht (~US $600) for a 
temporary passport and a work permit, four times the maximum official cost. However, 
they can afford to maintain such exorbitant rates because so many migrants are afraid to 
travel and risk encounters with police and because of the language barrier they face, 
especially those who have only been in Thailand for a short time. In addition, many 
migrants in the border areas might be willing to pay such high fees in the anticipation of 
being able to travel to the center of Thailand where wages are, on average, higher. Thus, 
in an effort to regularize (at least temporarily), migrants often find themselves relying on 
illegal methods, bending or sneaking around the rules of the system, and putting 
208 
themselves at risk of losing the money they had saved up to buy their passport and work 
permit, getting mired in debt, or facing arrest and abuse (Campbell 2014). 
 
3.3 Ad hoc migrant registration, migrant rights, and the construction of virtual borders 
Central to the Thai state’s institutionalization of a flexible migrant worker force is 
the geographical dimension, whereby the government, in an effort to lower the cost of its 
labor-intensive industries, has used the discretionary and ad hoc nature of migration 
policy to codify border areas and other designated export processing zones as migrant-
labor corridors. As chapter two indicates, there is also a national security aspect to this 
policy landscape. The government has sought to limit migration to the periphery of 
Thailand, a move that both reifies the inside/outside binary and affirms internal 
boundaries within Thai territory. In the 1990s, during the earlier years of registration, 
Cabinet Resolutions sought to build up a low-wage labor-intensive sector on Thailand’s 
borders by restricting migrants to unskilled labor in border provinces. The first Cabinet 
Resolution in March 1992 specified that unauthorized Burmese migrants may be granted 
temporary permission to remain and work in Thailand for one year only in four border 
provinces for their employer at that time; by 1995 the Cabinet had widened the list to 
nine (Pongsawat 2007).11 A 1996 Cabinet Resolution expanded the list of approved 
provinces to forty-three and included migrants from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. This 
was designed as an amnesty whereby employers had to bring their “illegal” workers to 
the immigration office and “bail” them out and get them registered. As chapter two 
explained, it was the 1997-1998 economic crisis in Thailand that led to a spatial shift in 
the conception of borders and border-based employment.   
                                                
11 These were Chiang Rai, Kanchanaburi, Ranong, and Tak. 
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With the liberalization of the Thai economy in the wake of the crisis, industry 
pressed the government to fill jobs that Thai workers had previously held prior to the 
widespread unemployment engendered by the crisis. Two Cabinet Resolutions in 1998 
allowed for another amnesty of unauthorized migrant workers, but this time granted them 
permission to work in fifty-four provinces which included areas along the borders, 
coastal provinces with a large fishery industry, and other provinces where employers 
were looking for low-wage workers in the agricultural sector (particularly on rubber, 
sugar and palm oil plantations) (Pongsawat 2007). Under Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s pro-business government, the 2001 Cabinet Resolution lifted all geographic 
and employment sector restrictions, allowing migrants to register as workers throughout 
Thailand. The areas with the highest number of registrations were in Tak (border 
province), Samut Sakhorn (fisheries), and Bangkok (service and industry). These new 
policies designated new spaces as border spaces, with social, economic, and political 
rights constituting a dividing line. 
These migration policies in Thailand have created somewhat of a paradox, which 
in turn, has brought about additional policies that seek to enforce migrant precarity. 
While the spatial arrangements noted above signify Thailand’s place within regional 
economic networks that transgress national borders to link sites as nodes on a supply 
chain (Glassman 2010), nationality verification and temporary passports have empowered 
migrants to get around the territorial confinement of work permits. Thus, as the garment 
and agricultural industries hope to draw capital from foreign investors based on the 
promise of low-cost production in certain key zones along the border, many thousands of 
migrants who received their temporary passports have protested harsh working conditions 
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and below-minimum wage pay by moving to more central parts of the country where they 
can work in fisheries and earn higher salaries (Soe Lin Aung 2014). This has created 
somewhat of a crisis for industry along the border, with many factories reporting labor 
shortages, and in some cases for the Thai government as well which has increasingly 
emphasized such border zones as integral to its role within the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC).   
As a fix, in June 2012, the Tak provincial government issued an order to prevent 
migrants from leaving the province, even those with valid passports, unless they had a 
work permit linking them to an employer in a different province. This new policy directly 
contradicted the nation-wide laws that granted those with valid passports and visas the 
right to travel freely anywhere in the country. Nevertheless, as the provincial governor at 
the time explained, “there has to be a balance between the white and the black. If I am too 
white, it will upset the black, but if I am too black it will not be good either,” explaining 
the need to respect the national government’s needs, but not at the expense of the needs 
of local business.12 Police at checkpoints outside of Mae Sot have enforced this new rule 
by turning back thousands of migrants or accepting bribes to let them pass. This means 
that against national law but in line with local decree, migrants who cross into Thailand at 
Mae Sot and apply there for temporary passports must stay and find work in Mae Sot or 
surrounding districts. To enter Mae Sot and continue into more central parts of Thailand 
to apply there for regularization means moving through smuggling networks and risking 
any number of abuses (Gjerdingen 2009). As Campbell (2014) writes, this is exactly what 
many migrants are doing.   
                                                
12 Field notes, Amphoe Muang, Tak province, November 4, 2012. 
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This brings us back to the beginning of the chapter and the details of the June 
2014 raids on migrants throughout Thailand. The new military government’s desire to 
“reset” migration policy by once again affixing it to territorial borders reflects both a 
national security perspective and a desire to achieve the AEC’s roadmap to regional 
integration, a plan built on border economic zones that are only viable as long as it is 
possible to keep migrant workers in those spaces working long hours for low wages. But 
in practice, such shifts can wreak havoc on people’s lives. For example, in the aftermath 
of recent arrests and deportations, families hid in fields and forests and hesitated to 
attempt to travel to Mae Sot’s Burmese community health center, Mae Tao Clinic, for 
fear of being stopped by the police (Karen News 2014). The current government’s effort, 
as well as the past twenty-five years of policy development, has led to a partial status for 
migrants (to refer again to Pongsawat’s concept). The “status of partiality,” Pongsawat 
(2007: 143) writes, “was intentionally created by the state as an effective means of 
entitlement, control and exploitation.” Through the development of policies that place 
migrants within a space of legal flexibility, it has been possible to subject them to the 
ebbs and flows of the economy and the various pressures of the Thai state. Even when 
registered, they do not entirely inhabit the space of legality or illegality in Thailand. They 
are in a space of discretion, which in a sense is both within the law and beyond it 
(Saltsman 2014). Moreover, the policies themselves act as a filter because of the 
challenge migrants face in acting fully in accordance with the law. The financial cost is 
high, as is the risk to one’s security just for traveling to obtain registration. In addition, 
the bureaucratic process is complex and constantly changing with new Cabinet 
Resolutions every year or two years. And all of this is in a language newly arrived 
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migrants typically do not speak. The nature of this ad hoc system excludes an unknown 
number of migrants who lack the chance or decide not to undergo regularization. Instead, 
many find it safer, easier, and cheaper to sacrifice the benefits gained by regularization 
and to remain “illegal,” and all that this entails. 
While it is crucial to understand the way institutional regimes constitute migrants 
as precarious, this legal and policy framework is only a piece of the story. In my 
dissertation, I am concerned with the law as a set of discourses and relations that impact 
migrant lives on the Thailand-Myanmar border. Policies are present in migrants’ lives, 
but they do not govern them outright. Rather, migrants interact with those charged with 
carrying out these policies, they make decisions that take notions of these policies into 
consideration, and they are influenced by employers and landlords reacting (or not) to 
new resolutions and registration schemes. Migrants generate discourse and conceive of 
themselves vis-à-vis Thailand’s migration laws and policies. Workers, employers, 
landlords, and various authority figures are all engaged in performatively articulating the 
meaning of the law and, in particular, the meaning of migrant identities. Thailand’s 
institutional framework is present in instilling a sense of precarity in migrants, and their 
status in front of the law plays into the strategies and tactics migrants rely upon as they 
develop and reproduce modes of social organization.   
As this dissertation makes clear, migrants feel the weight of and respond to these 
policies and enforcement practices in ways that are gendered. As scholarship shows, men 
and women migrants have vastly different experiences as a result of local and global 
conceptions of gender identities, displacement, and production systems (Indra 1999; 
Mills 2003). Thus, though this chapter does not focus especially on gender, I do highlight 
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certain moments when the structural violence of displacement and export processing in 
border spaces manifests itself in different ways for men and women and when men and 
women experience different sorts of constraints or opportunities in this space. In chapters 
six and seven, I center my analysis particularly on the gendered nature of how migrants 
respond to these constraints, especially the interpersonal violence that is bound up in this 
context of precarity.  
 
4. Everyday violence and the experience of precarity in rural and urban parts of the 
Thailand-Myanmar border 
 
Having considered the legal construction of a flexible migrant labor class in 
Thailand, I now look into some of the ways that precarity and structural violence 
manifest themselves on the Thailand-Myanmar border in migrants’ lived experiences. I 
do so in order to address the question of how such broader forces shape or limit migrants’ 
choices, their sense of place in Thailand, and their opportunities (or lack thereof) to 
structure their lives. In this section, I compare conditions in the Mae Sot and Phob Phra 
sites where we conducted research. This enables me to differentiate, when possible, 
between urban and rural settings as well as between violence in space designated as an 
export-processing zone for the garment industry and an agricultural sector less tied to 
networks of global supply. I structure my comparison according to indicators related to 
migrants’ safety and access to healthcare, education, and livelihoods. These are 
categories that emerged inductively through my thematic analysis of qualitative data 
collected through peer interviews and other semi-structured interviews with key 
informants. Quantitative data I collected in 2011 for a multi-country profiling study run 
by the Feinstein International Center cover these categories along with others as the basis 
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for a measure of vulnerability, though only for the urban area of Mae Sot. A factor 
analysis grouped a series of variables, including those mentioned above, into a 
vulnerability index with categories of “employment security,” “household 
security/physical safety,” “community security/access to justice,” and “assets and 
housing” (Saltsman 2011). When relevant, I rely on the statistics from that study to form 
a baseline of information about migrants in Mae Sot, though in this dissertation I do not 
make conclusions about migrant vulnerability as that is not the focus of this work.  
4.1 Livelihoods 
As noted earlier, migrants engage in a variety of different livelihoods on the 
border, including garment production and knitting (primarily in Mae Sot), construction, 
domestic work, agriculture, waste picking, recycling, and hospitality work among others. 
Qualitative research suggests that wages differ widely, depending on one’s type of work, 
tenure at the work place, and legal status (Saltsman 2011). As well, Thai labor law and 
policies regarding social welfare preclude certain protections and entitlements for 
laborers in agriculture, domestic work, and the fishing industry (MMN 2012; ILO 
2013).13 While the minimum wage throughout Thailand is now 300 baht (~US $9.50) per 
day, it has been possible for garment and agricultural firms on the border to employ 
migrants for less than a quarter of the minimum wage (75 baht/~US $2.35) and require 
them to work long hours without risking significant repercussions due to migrant 
precarity (Campbell 2013; Pearson and Kusakabe 2012). Data gathered in 2011 for the 
FIC study show that in Mae Sot almost half of undocumented migrants made between 30 
and 162 baht per day (162 baht per day was the previous minimum wage in Tak province 
                                                
13 In 2012, the Thai government passed Ministerial Regulation No. 14 to grant greater labor protections for 
domestic workers regarding rest days, minimum age requirements, and payment.  
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before the application of a nationwide wage, see Htwe 2011), while 31 percent of those 
with documents earned in that category and 20 percent earned above that. Data from this 
study’s peer interviews shows that 64 percent of participants who mentioned their wages 
(n=35) reported making between 75 and 150 baht per day.   
On top of being grossly underpaid, employers also often deduct from wages to 
cover the cost of accommodation, food, and a “protection” fee paid to keep the police 
away (Arnold and Pickles 2011; Human Rights Watch 2010). In addition, many migrants 
report that their employment is not regular or secure. The FIC study shows that nearly 
one quarter of all migrants in Mae Sot worked in insecure low-end jobs or low-end self-
employment (day labor, porter, waste-picker). Twelve percent of undocumented migrants 
reported part-time wage-labor work, compared to 11 percent of those with documents. 
Only ten percent of all migrants reported full-time wage labor work, while 14 percent of 
undocumented migrants were unemployed as opposed to four percent of those with 
documents (Saltsman 2011). As research in Mae Sot shows, it is common for factories to 
halt work for days at a time, or even to shutter their doors completely and move 
elsewhere, particularly in response to workers’ successful collective action (Arnold 
2007). Arnold (2007) argues that such behavior is characteristic of the type of 
transnational mobile capital invested in Mae Sot and interested in flexible labor and 
production. Over the years there have been numerous cases in which Burmese garment or 
knitting factory workers organized collective action, filed complaints with the Labor 
Protection Department, and won, only to find their employer close down or flee before 
paying the compensation they owe (Campbell 2013). 
With most research focused on Mae Sot’s garment industry, there is a paucity of 
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research on informal work in Mae Sot and the agricultural sector outside of Mae Sot, 
such as in Phob Phra district. This makes it impossible to produce an even baseline 
against which to consider the data gathered for this dissertation. Nevertheless, as I 
compare the signs and products of precarity in the rural and urban settings below, I note 
that there are some differences in terms of how each sector experiences uncertainty and 
everyday violence. In making this comparison, I disaggregate my analysis of livelihood 
experiences by gender, as research suggests that in both agriculture and manufacturing 
work, women migrants receive less pay in Thailand than their male counterparts; are 
more likely to be verbally harassed by senior workers or supervisors; and must worry 
about the possibility of workplace sexual assault in Mae Sot’s factories (Jampaklay et al. 
2009; Leiter et al. 2006; Sciortino and Punpuing 2009).   
 
Urban context 
 In the Kok Kwai/Kyuwe Kyan and Htone Taung sites, participants engage in a 
wide range of livelihood activities. Table 6 below shows the list of occupations 
mentioned during interviews and focus group discussions.  
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 Table 6: Livelihood activities in urban sites 
 
Htone Taung Kyuwe Kyan 
Domestic work/house maids  Collecting & reselling used metals 
Driving sam lor Day labor in construction  
Factory work (garment or knitting, formal sector) Domestic work 
Home-based garment sewing or fabric work (garment 
or knitting, informal sector) 
Driving sam lor 
Masonry/construction (skilled, long-term work w/ 
regular hours; different wages for 
registered/unregistered workers) 
Picking and selling water lilies, watercress 
Rolling cigarettes Seasonal agricultural work 
Service (general) Vendors/small shop owner 
Supplemental income through farm-work Waste pickers/Collecting and selling 
plastic & glass to recyclers  
Vendors/small shop owner  
Waste pickers/Collecting and selling plastic & garbage   
 
 
Both Htone Taung and Kyuwe Kyan are areas with a diverse range of peoples and 
livelihoods. So much focus in the literature on factory work overlooks the trend of 
informal or self-employed work in which migrants are engaged in Mae Sot. Participants’ 
livelihoods between the two locations overlap almost completely, though no residents 
from Kyuwe Kyan worked in a factory and more participants there engaged in collection 
and waste picking than Htone Taung residents. Several participants from Htone Taung 
work in the garment industry, either as laborers on the factory floor or working from 
home to cut cloth or sew garments at a piece rate. Most income for those participants in 
Kyuwe Kyan is self-earned in work related to collection of recyclable materials. The 
more one can collect, the more one makes. The work of collecting, cleaning, and reselling 
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plastic, metal, or glass contrasts with the garment factory jobs most Burmese migrants are 
known for in Mae Sot in that it is not part of the primary production sector, but represents 
the informal labor which undergirds the town’s formal systems. Multiple families in both 
sites strategize when possible, sending different members to seek different forms of 
employment as a way to find greater security. At times this also means separations across 
greater distances with children working in Bangkok and parents in Mae Sot or vice versa. 
Decisions in terms of who goes to work where and in what sector represent some of the 
important survival strategies migrants employ to secure livelihoods and general well-
being. Brees (2009: 117-133) found that Burmese migrants inside and outside refugee 
camps make decisions based on structural constraints and opportunities and individual 
members’ capacities in order to maximize family income, secure protection, and to gain 
useful skills.  Pearson and Kusakabe (2012) stress that livelihood decisions are also 
intimately connected to families’ care strategies, with women bearing the burden of 
childcare responsibilities.   
As there is a diversity of livelihoods in these neighborhoods, wages also vary. 
Construction workers’ wages depend on experience and tenure. In Kyuwe Kyan, 
participants in construction mentioned making a similar wage as waste pickers (100-150 
baht per day), but in Htone Taung, the range is much greater, with participants citing 
daily wages up to 250 and 400 baht and as low as 70 baht. Sam Lor drivers make money 
depending on the number of passengers/clients they receive; participants mentioned a 
range from 100-300 baht. They may carry goods, such as produce or a shipment from one 
part of town to another, or people, or sometimes both. Factory workers living in Htone 
Taung who participated in this study reported getting 100-150 baht per day and 10-15 
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baht more per hour of overtime work, unless they were in a supervisory role in which 
case they received a higher wage. This compares to people working from home or in 
informal home-factories doing garment work who report earning only 60-80 baht per day 
depending on how much they can sew (piece-rate). Participants noted that some vendors 
or domestic workers (only women) make 80-90 baht per day. Others noted that as 
domestic workers, they make closer to 100-150 baht per day. This discrepancy could be 
because the rate of pay is highly contingent on negotiation with employers and may 
involve deductions for room and board. Only three participants in the two urban sites 
reported making the minimum wage of 300 baht per day or more (two in Htone Taung 
and one in Kyuwe Kyan).   
While these numbers are not representative, participants noted important 
differences across genders. For example, a community worker explained that “mostly, 
only men have legal documents in the family. The wife and children don’t have the legal 
documents. They can be arrested at anytime. They don’t have income either” (R5HT 
CW-1). A resident of Kyuwe Kyan explained that this is also common in her 
neighborhood and constitutes a key difference between men and women’s experience 
there, though it appears most men are also undocumented (KK F2Fw-2). This may be a 
consequence of family decisions, and strategies to earn income and ensure childcare. 
Women participants in both sites mentioned that they used to have jobs until they got 
married and had children at which point they stayed home to provide care, though this 
was not true for all women. In addition, when the cost of a passport and work permit, 
especially one that allows people to travel outside of Mae Sot to earn higher wages, 
amounts to as much as half a year’s salary, it is extremely difficult for people to save 
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enough money to get more than one, especially if a family is paying off debts related to 
the purchase of the first work permit. While this is more in reference to the population of 
workers not employed in factories, this resonates with findings elsewhere, which states 
that more women migrants are unregistered in Thailand than men (Kanchana and Richter 
2011). Another participant in Htone Taung mentioned that men working in construction 
receive up to 100 baht more per day than women in the same job (HT FGDm-2). He cited 
different duties on the job, noting that men get paid more because they do more strenuous 
work such as digging and carrying bags of cement. Participants in Kyuwe Kyan echoed 
this explanation for a difference in wages between men and women. As this was not the 
main focus of peer interviews, it remains a question for subsequent research to ask 
whether such individual experiences are representative of the rest of the population. 
Additionally, if it is statistically the case that women earn less than men, is it because 
women are less likely to have legal status, or are women less likely to have legal status 
because of persistent gender discrimination? An excerpt from a focus group discussion 
among women in Htone Taung expressed this challenge: 
I: Which kinds of situations can affect the safety of women and children in this 
community?  
R: Although most women from here want to go out for work, they don’t have any 
registration cards. They have 20-year-old, 16-year-old children. Parents face 
terrible situations. In a family, only one person can work. Two to three people 
from a family can’t work. They also don’t go to other places because they are 
worried for police fee [bribe], accommodations and the matter of registration 
card. They can have foods for one day with one day of work. It costs twelve 
thousand, fourteen thousand to do a passport. It is that expensive! How can people 
do it!? They have to struggle a lot even to have it for one person. How they can do 
the passport for all in a family? Employer also doesn’t give any job if they don’t 
have any registration card.  
R2: They have to save the money for a long time to make the passport for one 
person.  
(HT FGDw-2) 
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This segment from the discussion illustrates the ways that legal status, income, fear of the 
police, gender, and employment practices are all bound together. A lack of legal status 
greatly restricts one’s choice of employment and diminishes her or his ability to seek 
redress or change jobs as this participant suggests. “Though we are paid only 120 baht or 
100 baht,” a 40-year-old woman in Kyuwe Kyan explained, “We have to work here 
because we have survival problems. We do not have registration cards so we dare not 
find jobs outside because we worry that we will be arrested” (KK F2Fw-2). 
Participants in Htone Taung and Kyuwe Kyan cited workplace problems and the 
challenges of making ends meet. Some participants explained that receiving irregular pay 
greatly destabilized them. For example: 
The problem was that an employee was not paid by his employer so he was not 
able to pay his rent. Then the landlord asked, “Why don’t you pay rent?” He 
replied, “I am not paid by my employer yet so I cannot pay.” Then the landlord 
said, “What do you have?” He said, “All I have are two containers. If you want 
take them.” Then landlord said, “Fine, bring the two containers and put them in 
my house. Only when you get 900 baht come and take them back.” There are still 
many people who do not get paid by their employer. (HT F2Fw-7) 
 
With wages so low for migrants, participants “work one day, eat one day” (HT F2Fw-8) 
without saving. A participant from Kyuwe Kyan who works as a mason recalled that he 
could not depend on his employer to pay him what he was owed:  
The employer had to give me 1,600 baht for ten working days but he gave only 
500 or 600 baht. When he cleared all the inventories, he did give us the rest of our 
money. I had to receive 2,000 baht or 3,000 baht from him so I decided to resign 
from his work. Then, I switched to a new job. (KK FGDm-2) 
 
As this quote shows, despite uncertainty, participants indicate that they have a strong 
sense of mobility, even if that means moving from job to job within a field of options 
restricted by a lack of legal status. Day-to-day life is clearly precarious for most 
participants, but it is important to recognize that this does not render them helpless or 
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passive. In the case above, a worker was able to receive the wages he was owed and 
decided to move on to seek other employment. But another participant explained a 
different outcome for her husband: 
The employer offered a job to my husband on a construction site. [My husband] 
asked for money when there was a lot of money owed. They [employers] refused 
to pay it. After asking three times, he was killed when he asked for money a 
fourth time. (KK F2Fw-7) 
 
Most participants have not experienced such tragic incidents, but the fact that they 
happen at all, and with some regularity, serves to instill a deep sense of insecurity in 
migrants in this space.   
In addition, employers “cut the money from [employees’] salary” to apply for 
work permits and pay the associated fees (HT CL-1). Participants complained that 
income does not meet the cost of living in Thailand and so migrants “face difficulties in 
paying house rent fee, electricity bill and water bills” (HT CL-2). Such difficulty means 
that migrants working in factories come to really depend on overtime work where they 
can earn an extra ten to fifteen baht per hour, sometimes working late into the night. This 
also means that migrants have limited choices as to their living conditions. However, this 
means that when orders and the demand for intensive night and day production at 
factories dry up, workers must make do without overtime or even full-time work and live 
off their insufficient day rate. When asked if a participant in an interview was interested 
in knowing more about social welfare programs for migrant women, she answered, “I 
don’t want to know about anything. Only thing I want to know is: Tomorrow what can I 
eat? In the nighttime, how can I sleep? What job to do and how to do it? That is all I have 
in mind” (KK F2Fw-8). 
 In Kyuwe Kyan, participants complained of irregular employment, which puts the 
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daily earnings mentioned above into context. A male participant in a focus group 
discussion reflected, “I get between 150 and 200 baht per day. Sometimes, I do not get 
any money by buying and selling old things” (KK FGDm-2). With so many residents of 
Kyuwe Kyan engaged in waste picking work, there is nothing regular about their 
livelihood, except that they can rely on residents of Mae Sot to keep throwing their 
garbage out. A 53-year-old woman in that neighborhood explained how an irregular and 
insufficient income affects migrants’ wellbeing and safety, “When the bosses come and 
call for work, some who want to work follow them. If they have work, they are fine. But, 
if they don’t have work, they are not ok. At that time, there is a conflict between husband 
and wife and [they] beat each other” (KK F2Fw-1). While this participant’s words 
generalize a rather linear path from work insecurity to intimate partner violence, they 
nevertheless reflect an important perception among some in Mae Sot. This is an issue I 
pick up on in more detail in chapter six.  
 
Rural context 
 Participants’ voices in Phob Phra suggest a similar dynamic of precarity, though 
with key differences rooted in the isolation of Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam and KM48 
labor camps as well as in the dynamics of seasonal agricultural work. In terms of 
livelihoods, there are some differences between these two rural areas given that KM48 is 
a formal village with a market and small service and domestic work industries. Table 7 
below reflects a narrower range of livelihood activities than those found in Mae Sot as 
participants are much more heavily involved in farm work. 
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 Table 7: Livelihood activities in rural sites 
 
Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam KM48 
Agriculture: all season farming Agriculture: all season farming 
Agriculture: seasonal farming Agriculture: seasonal farming 
Animal husbandry  Animal husbandry 
Garden production Day labor in construction  
Vendors (selling and delivering goods) Domestic work 
 Factory work (electric coil) 
 Vendors/small shop owner 
 
 
In Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam, there are only a few employers so most participants work 
together. In fact, as explained in the introduction, this site actually refers to two adjacent 
locations. Pyaung Gyi Win, which as mentioned earlier, means “Baldy’s Land,” is one 
compound in which the employer is the landlord for the approximately 300 farm workers 
who live there. Therefore, as one participant responded when asked if there are residents 
of the camp who work elsewhere, “We are not allowed to do that. If we live here we have 
to work here” (KM42 F2Fw-1). On the adjacent land, workers are freer to choose their 
employer, but since this is also the land of a farmer, most just work for him. One 
participant noted that choice of livelihood depends to some extent on one’s legal status, 
as in Mae Sot. She explained, “Here, they work for hill-side farms belonging to the boss. 
People with some money or a registration card have their own small business such as 
selling things, rice and so on. The poor people work on hill-side farms” (KM42 F2Fw-4). 
In both parts of Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam some residents have enough space to raise 
pigs and chickens as well as grow small plots of vegetables for personal consumption and 
to sell or trade with others in the area. Thus, where it says animal husbandry and garden 
225 
production under the Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam column in the table above, these lines 
refer to individual houshold-level production.   
 Migrants work in similar ways in KM48, though there appears to be a wider 
variance in employers and types of work. Migrants are spread out in different compounds 
across fifteen soi. Some participants mentioned that they have farm work all year long; 
they plant different varieties of corn in the dry and rainy season, and mustard and 
cabbage all year long (KM48 CL-1). With a greater diversity of employers as well as 
living arrangements that do not always involve migrants living on their employer’s land, 
participants express the ability to be more strategic with their income than those in 
Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam. In one family, for example, different individuals might work 
on different farms at different times of the year, on construction sites, as domestic 
workers, or vendors in the market (KM48 F2Fw-10; KM48 F2Fw-11). And, like migrants 
in Mae Sot, it is not uncommon for some members of the family to seek employment 
elsewhere in Thailand to supplement the income of the household.  
 Looking at participants’ responses, there is less of a wage range in the rural 
context than in Mae Sot. In Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam, where many participants work 
for the same employer, all those who mentioned their income make between 90 and 150 
baht per day (~US $2.80 and $4.66), the majority citing the same day rate of 100-120 
baht per day. Like Mae Sot, though, participants report that men make more than women, 
even if just by ten baht per day. In fact, it appears that this difference is part of a scale, as 
children working in the fields earn approximately 60 to 80 percent of what women make. 
Though it was not possible for this study to measure the material impact of the wage 
difference between men and women (roughly ten to 20 percent), it nevertheless reflects 
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one among many instances of gender discrimination that is sometimes subtle and 
sometimes blatant. Most participants who noted this discrepancy echoed their employers’ 
explanations about different wages for different work: “The reason they pay like that is 
men have to work harder than women. That’s what they said” (KM42 F2Fw-1). Men 
manually till the fields and handle fertilizers and therefore get more pay, say respondents. 
However, one participant, a community worker in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam, rejected 
his employer’s explanation as he answered why he thinks women are paid less, “This is 
because…they are women. However, if we talk about labor rights, men, women, and 
children should get equal an amount of salary without discrimination” (R1KM42 CW-1).   
 Wages in KM48 varied with the greater range of livelihoods. Working in the coil 
factory is piece-rate and participants note that beginners tend to make 130-150 baht per 
day while the more experienced workers can earn 250-300 baht per day, the highest 
salary of anybody around. Participants suggest that both men and women migrants work 
in this site. Construction workers, all of who were men, reported getting 130-160 baht per 
day. Day labor and agricultural work earned around 120-150 baht per day, according to 
participants, though some women reported receiving only 100 baht per day. Other 
respondents report that women get 120 and men get 150 baht per day. As elsewhere in 
Thailand (and the world), many see earning income as a domestic worker as a feminine 
livelihood in KM48. It is also not a regular form of income, conditions are unpredictable, 
and until recently there were no registration options for domestic workers.  
All these different wages depend to some extent on the employer, though it is 
likely that farmers communicate and coordinate on wages, given the highly mobile 
worker population on which they rely. Participants during a focus group discussion 
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among men in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam suggested that local government officials 
(many of whom are local farm owners or investors) also play a role in setting wages:  
I1: How about business? 
R2: Regarding work, both husband and wife have to work to support families. At 
least, if we get 100 baht per day, it just covers our household expenses. However, 
the Thai village leaders announced not to give [more than] 100 baht to Burmese. 
If the employer gives more than 100 baht, [authorities] make a problem for that 
employer. So, we face the problem for our survival.  
R1: We can just survive if we earn 100 baht per day. If we do not work for one day, 
we do not have money to buy food for that day. If we have three family members, 
100 baht does not cover our household expense.  
I1: Who said not to give [more than] 100 baht per day? 
R2: Thai village leader— 
I1: They announced with a document? 
R1: No, they announced it by car. […] Also, employers told us about this. Thai 
village leaders told them not to pay us [more than] 100 baht per day. If they pay 
more than 100 baht per day, the employees will save the money and then go to 
Bangkok. Some get only 90 baht.  (KM42 FGDm-2) 
 
As the participants explain, the rationale for the wage rate at 1/3 the minimum is to keep 
migrant workers earning too little to save money so that they will remain stuck working 
at a near-subsistence level unable to leave the farm in search of higher wages in Bangkok. 
What is not said explicitly here is that because these migrants are also undocumented, the 
money they would be saving might go toward either a forged work permit allowing them 
to travel away from the border and/or the cost of being smuggled to Bangkok or 
elsewhere nearby. All this suggests a level of enforced precarity for these participants 
who must navigate multiple levels of employer and government efforts to enforce border 
regimes of low-cost production.  
 Like participants in Kyuwe Kyan, irregular employment constitutes a major 
concern and a barrier to wellbeing for migrants in KM48 and Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam. 
As one participant in the latter site said, his job is, “cutting corn but I don’t have any job 
now as there is no corn to cut” (KM42 F2Fw-3). Irregular employment was an issue 
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highlighted especially by residents of KM48. Nearly half of these participants expressed 
the challenge of making ends meet during the dry season. A monk living in KM48 
explained: 
As plantation workers, there are many jobs available for them in the rainy season, 
but in the dry season, it’s really hard to get a job as the plantation period is over. 
At that time they have a very hard time, even to survive for one day. (KM48 CL-
3) 
 
Instead of returning to Myanmar at the end of the harvest season, participants indicate 
that many workers stay in their labor camp, looking for other work, doing odd jobs, and 
waiting for the return of a labor-intensive period. During this low season, some 
participants take out loans and accumulate debt. A thirty-four year old woman in KM48 
reflected that her and her husband’s wage of 100 baht per day is just barely “enough for 
our food. No extra.” She continued:   
We have been here for five years but we have nothing. We must earn and eat. 
Now, we have work so we save a little money but when the time we have no work 
comes, we will eat up what we have saved within one month or so.  (KM48 
F2Fw-10) 
 
Within single-earner families, this irregularity has an especially significant impact. While 
men and women both earn wages in Phob Phra, it is also the case that unpaid care work 
falls to women. This means that for many women, they are faced with double the work 
and fewer wages. For many participants, when a couple has a child, the mother ceases to 
work because no other care option is available.  
An important point to note here is that the challenge facing migrants in these 
locations to make ends meet, to save money, or even to be mobile cannot be chalked up 
to the nature of agricultural work. They are rooted in employer’s own concerns about 
profit and the fear that migrants will move away from the border in search of higher 
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wages in central parts of the country. This reflects a shared set of interests among 
Thailand’s leaders and border-based farmers. Indeed as we will see in subsequent 
chapters, local security officials play an important role in enforcing employers’ demands. 
This reflects a kind of structural violence perpetrated by employers and government 
actors against migrant workers. It is an indirect violence wherein state policy intersects 
with local practices of authorities to create work conditions on farms that are near 
servitude. While migrants in Mae Sot are also subject to the same power arrangement 
geared towards keeping low-wage labor on the border, they have a much greater choice 
of livelihoods available to them and a wider range of salaries. Moreover, comparing 
participants’ perspectives illustrates that factory work in Mae Sot, on which most 
research on this town has focused as evidence of precarity on the border, is a far more 
secure form of livelihood for migrants than farm work in Phob Phra or informal day jobs 
in Mae Sot. These qualitative results suggest that formal factories pay more, provide 
more regular employment (though not without exceptions), and are more likely to register 
at least a significant percentage of their workers. This suggests a greater need to examine 
the role of informal labor in reproducing the conditions of labor for factories in global 
supply chains.  
 
4.2 Access to education, children’s well-being  
 Since Burmese migrants began coming to Thailand in increasingly large numbers 
in the early 1990s, access to education for youth has been a challenge. An excerpt from 
one of the co-researchers in chapter three depicted the difficult conditions for minors as 
he described children left at home when parents and older siblings went to work. Until 
the mid-2000s, the Thai government did not recognize migrant learning centers, which 
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were established by a number of entities, including migrants themselves, political groups, 
religious organizations, and international NGOs. Unregulated and unsystematically 
established at first, there are a diversity of administrative, curricular, and financial 
structures in the dozens of learning centers along the border, ranging from schools that 
originally functioned as ethno-nationalist government entities teaching their curricula in 
quasi-shelters supported by individuals around the world (Horstmann 2011). With 
changes in Thai law, migrant learning centers now fall under the umbrella of non-state 
education services (Lee 2014).14 As a hub for undocumented migrants, Mae Sot and 
surrounding border districts have the largest number of schools with 74 learning centers 
(this includes 12 in Phob Phra and 54 in the broader Mae Sot area) (Salmon et al. 2012). 
Thai schools also permit migrant children to enroll, but this is most common for migrant 
families living in or near Bangkok (Lee 2014). In addition, though public and technically 
free, Thai schools are prohibitively expensive for many migrant families, mostly due to 
the hidden costs of education linked to transportation, materials, and uniforms (CPPCR 
2009). 
Despite the proliferation of migrant learning centers and the increasing access for 
migrant children to Thai schools, Burmese families still face difficulties in accessing 
education, protecting children’s safety, and managing childcare. There is a general lack 
of valid statistics for the number of migrant children not in school border-wide, but the 
FIC survey shows that in Mae Sot 70 percent of school-age children from undocumented 
migrant families and 74 percent of those from families with documents were in school, 
                                                
14 In 1999, the Thai government passed the B.E. 2542 National Education Act stating that all children 
under 12 in Thailand, regardless of nationality, must have the opportunity to receive a basic education. In 
2005, as part of the global “Education for All”movement, the government passed a Cabinet Resolution 
allowing for undocumented migrant children to access education services. 
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compared to 93 percent of Thai children in the same age group (Saltsman 2012: 35). This 
contrasts with a 2009 community assessment which found that just over half of migrant 
school-age youth in or near Mae Sot were in school, either in Thailand or Myanmar 
(CPPCR 2009). According to the FIC study, almost a third of undocumented migrants 
who reported having one or more school-aged child out of school reported the need to 
work as a reason (compared to only six percent of documented migrants and four percent 
of Thai nationals) (Saltsman 2012). Qualitative results from that study reflect that barriers 
to school attendance include: 
High costs (mostly hidden costs such as uniform fees, the cost of food, and 
transportation), lack of security (making trips to and from school difficult), and 
the requirement of some schools, including Thai schools, for what respondents 
called “recommendations” in order to gain entry into schools (letters vouching for 
students) (p. 35). 
 
What these factors boil down to are poverty and the undocumented status of many 
migrants, especially on the border (see also Salmon et al. 2012). Even among those youth 
in school, barriers to education still exist, including a lack of access to school materials 
and insufficient or unsafe school infrastructures (ibid). Unfortunately this data is not 
disaggregated by gender, though qualitative findings suggest parents typically send both 
boys and girls to school and participants mentioned both boys and girls who were taken 
out of school for work.    
The Mae Sot-based Committee for the Promotion and Protection of Children’s 
Rights (CPPCR) documented additional protection concerns for children, including 
exposure to drugs and alcohol, child labor, and violence at home as well as in the 
community and at school (2009). There are a great many children on their own in 
Thailand for a variety of reasons. For example, many parents in Myanmar send children 
232 
across the border for school in Thailand (CPPCR 2009).15 Families are also separated 
during deportations leaving children on their own or, more commonly, in the care of 
relatives. In a 2006 report for the ILO, Robertson and the Federation of Trade Unions-
Burma (2006) found widespread migrant child labor in and around Mae Sot, 
documenting that a majority of child workers were under 17, lacked basic rights, and 
worked long hours without days off in unsafe conditions for far below minimum wage.16   
While migrant learning centers and Thai schools are scattered in both Phob Phra 
and Mae Sot districts, my qualitative findings suggest a difference in access to education 
and general well-being for youth. This also varies by specific site as participants indicate 
that access differs according to the proximity of certain neighborhoods and labor camps 
to schools as well as on family income levels and childcare options.  
 
Urban context 
 As indicated here, there are major differences between access to education in rural 
and urban areas. There are four schools run by CBOs (SAW, BLSO, Min Ma Haw, and 
Moe Ma Kha) and a Chinese private school in Htone Taung alone (see Map 2, chapter 1). 
The Chinese school lies just outside the community perimeter. This does not mean that 
all Burmese children in Htone Taung go to school. But fewer participants cited as a 
problem a low attendance rate of children as compared to other communities. During a 
focus group discussion, teenage girls in Htone Taung mentioned that there are some 
households who cannot afford to send at least one child to school. According to these 
                                                
15 For example, CPPCR found that in 2008 there were more than 2,300 Burmese children living in 
dormitory-style boarding houses in Mae Sot, mostly to attend school (CPPCR 2009).  
16 The minimum legal age for work in Thailand is 15 (under the B.E. 2551 Labor Protection Act of 2008). 
Non-Thai nationals 15 and older are allowed to register for work permits and, as documented workers, are 
covered by Thai labor laws.  
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participants,  
…the uneducated boys have to work as masons, some collect the garbage in the 
hot weather and work in the garbage cars which are very smelly. Parents also ask 
them to work for any job they need as they are boys. Parents think that it isn’t 
necessary for boys to be educated. (HT FGDg-1) 
 
In Kyuwe Kyan, participants described a similar dilemma for children not in school, but 
in this neighborhood, which lies just a few kilometers away, participants expressed that 
access to education was a major issue for this place. One community worker kept a list 
noting that there were 50 children in the neighborhood who did not attend school (KK 
CW-1). Participants stress that children missing school is a product of their poverty, that 
parents cannot cope with the explicit and hidden costs of schools in Mae Sot. Two 
teenage girls participating in a focus group discussion in this neighborhood reflect this 
view: 
R1- There are so many children who can’t go to the school in this community.  
R3- Yes, the parents can’t afford to send their children to the schools. Some of the 
schools can enroll free of charge but some schools ask enrolment fees. 
(KK FGDg-1) 
 
To these school-age girls, the consequence they most identified with not being able to 
attend school is that, “We are looked down on by others because we can’t go to school.”   
They also noted that the youth in Kyuwe Kyan who do not go to school end up finding 
jobs in Mae Sot. 
I: Do you have friends who can’t go to the school? You already told me that you 
know the boys who can’t go to the school. Can you tell me more about which 
kinds of problems those boys face? 
R1: They are discriminated against by others because they are illiterate. 
R3: They will have to breed cows when they grow old.  
I: Do they work? 
R3: Yes 
R4: But, most of them do not work and just spend their parents’ money.  
I: If they work, what kind of work do they work? 
R3: They collect plastic. 
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R2: Some work as masons. 
R4: Some work in the night market.  
I: Do they get the same salary as adult? 
R2: Yes 
R3: No, they do not get the same salary. Adults get 150 baht per day and children get 
120 baht per day. 
R2: It depends on the work. They get same salary as adults in some work like 
carrying the goods in the market. (KK FGDg-1) 
 
These participants suggest here that the lack of education for some children in Kyuwe 
Kyan leads many of those youth straight into child labor performing the same work as 
their parents. In addition, because there are no schools in Kyuwe Kyan and given the fear 
of moving about outside of the community, it is also possible that there are some families 
who decide it is more secure to keep their children at home or take their children with 
them to collect and resell plastic, even though most schools run by CBOs or NGOs have 
a transportation system in place.   
 
Rural context 
 As noted above, there are many more migrant learning centers that are more 
easily accessible in Mae Sot than Phob Phra. While there are no statistics to measure the 
per capita access to education services for youth in these two districts, participants in this 
study highlight some of the differences they experience. A community leader in Htone 
Taung explains his view of Phob Phra here:  
Getting 120 baht [per day] can support a family’s basic needs but they can’t send 
their children to school. There are no schools near the farm. So many children are 
illiterate. The Burmese children cannot attend the Thai schools. That we can’t 
solve the problems mean these problem will happen continuously. (HT CL-1) 
 
With these words, this leader comments on the link between the struggle experienced by 
migrants in Phob Phra engaged in low-wage seasonal farm labor and the effects this has 
on children. While legally Burmese children do have access to Thai schools, and in 
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practice participants in Phob Phra mentioned that this is one avenue for youth in their 
locations to attend school, it is possible this community leader in Htone Taung was 
referring to the obstacle faced by undocumented migrants who are precluded from such 
an opportunity. To this community leader in Htone Taung, the difficulty in accessing 
education for some youth in Phob Phra means that they will be less equipped as they 
grow up to struggle against the structural violence pervasive around them.   
 In Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam, there are no schools in the immediate compound or 
the adjacent worker camp. But there are migrant schools nearby and school buses come 
to pick up some of the youth in these sites for the equivalent of K-12 education at 
facilities sponsored by grassroots organizations in Mae Sot or larger NGOs. There are 
Thai government schools in the district as well, which some of the registered migrant 
youth attend, though none from participants’ families. This compares with KM48, which 
has two migrant schools, one Thai secondary school (Baan Rom Klao 2), and a Thai 
primary school. A participant noted that there is also a Chinese school in the village, 
though no participants reported sending their children there. Some registered children 
(including those with “ten-year cards”) can attend the Thai school. At the time of my 
follow-up interviews in February 2014, one of the migrant schools in KM48 had just 
been displaced into a field for making fertilizer. The teachers were still trying to maintain 
a functioning school while looking for funding to set up a more permanent site, but at that 
time they were in difficult conditions for learning. The other school, which is a primary 
school, is in a private home.   
In both KM48 and Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam, there are children who do not go 
to school and who work instead. A teacher who lives in Rim Nam, which some residents 
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also referred to as “44,” explained that he kept records of the population, including 
numbers attending school: 
For education, we are here because we are living in bad conditions. I just speak 
for 44-village only. I am not interested about other villages. There are 700 or 800 
children here. Only about 40 students go to school. In addition to the Thai school, 
there may be 80 students. I do not know about the rest of the 600, whether they 
are working or wandering around the village or what they are doing. 
(KM42 CL-1) 
 
This participants’ words are significant here as he frames his comments about education 
by highlighting the “bad conditions” in which migrants there are living. According to 
him, going to school is only an activity for about ten percent of the youth in this site. 
Among those who are getting an education, as much as 50 percent are attending a Thai 
school and 50 percent a migrant learning center. Those children going to a Thai school 
may be from families who are registered workers, they may have been born in Thailand, 
or they and their parents may have lived for long enough in Thailand to receive a “ten-
year card.” Students attending migrant learning centers have two options, each not more 
than a 20-minute drive away.   
For some families in Phob Phra, the proximity and cost of an education is less of a 
factor in making decisions about sending children to school than the day-to-day struggle 
for survival. A woman living in KM48 implicitly linked the challenge of accessing 
education with low wages and the difficulties of securing livelihoods, when she made 
clear that all migrants in her area had to work, “even at the age of my daughter” who was 
12. She described the reasons for this, noting, “Everybody has to work, because we all 
have to pay for food, house rent, electricity and water. In the past three years, we had to 
pay monthly bribes to police.” This resonates with participants’ comments in both 
Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam and KM48 who referred to children working as an everyday 
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part of life. With such low pay and irregular work, some families cannot afford to spare 
an able-bodied member. According to the participant quoted above, this is the case even 
though children do not always make the same wage as adults. In her view, it depends on 
the employer, “If it’s a bad owner, they only pay 30, 40, or 60 baht per day to the 
children” (KM48 F2Fw-1).   
The consequences of children not going to school and working on farms in Phob 
Phra are many. Participants above have referenced illiteracy and an inability to escape the 
poverty of their families. In addition, the community leader and teacher from Rim Nam 
pointed to significant health issues which can affect children’s long-term development:  
We have many under-aged workers who do not know how to handle farming 
equipment. Especially for fumigation. By doing this work, they can earn more 
money. As a side effect of fumigation, some people get asthma, some people get 
serious dizziness and sometimes we even need to send them to the hospital at 
night. Some kids do not know how to wash their hands after work. Some people 
got the problem in their lungs. (KM42 CL-1) 
 
Child labor and a lack of access to education is a significant barrier border-wide. In both 
Mae Sot and Phob Phra, children are missing out on school and, in some cases, working 
instead primarily due to poverty more than a lack of opportunity. Participants’ narratives 
suggest that both sites in Phob Phra as well as Kyuwe Kyan share the problem of low 
education rates and a prevalence of child labor. In Htone Taung, participants also 
identified child labor as an issue but on a lesser scale. There, they did not identify it as a 
primary concern while participants in the other three sites did. This suggests an inverse 
relationship between informal work and access to education. Putting these qualitative 
results into conversation with the FIC study’s findings, noted above, it appears that in 
Mae Sot, the difference between access to education for children from documented 
families and those from undocumented families is not so great (only four percentage 
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points, statistically significant at the p < 0.1 level). This may be for a wide variety of 
reasons, including because documented migrant households still face financial and 
linguistic barriers to Thai schools and a lack of place at migrant learning centers; because 
many families in Mae Sot are transient and might not put children in school since they 
plan to leave; or because parents’ care arrangements are not conducive to sending 
children to school (for example, if parents take their children to work with them). Further 
answers on this would provide important insights as to the nature of accessing education 
on the border.   
While it would also be useful to statistically determine access to education for 
youth in Phop Phra and make comparisons, the point is to highlight the way that precarity 
and structural violence constrain and manipulate migrants’ options in everyday life. 
Participants’ voices in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam and KM48 make clear that the 
challenges of life for migrants in Phob Phra’s farm labor camps in terms of isolation, 
irregular work, and low wages make education an impossibility for some and child labor 
an everyday reality for many. Similarly, for residents of Kyuwe Kyan, the work of waste 
picking, domestic care, and small-scale agriculture is so unpredictable and leaves 
households with so little to live on that migrants must prioritize survival.  
4.3 Access to healthcare 
Access to healthcare for Burmese people in this border space has greatly 
increased over the decades of intensive labor there. The community health center, Mae 
Tao Clinic, opened in 1989 and quickly became the primary healthcare provider for both 
migrant workers on the border and internally displaced Burmese people living in 
southeastern Myanmar or on the border with Thailand. As they have expanded in terms 
of services, staff, and space, greater numbers of displaced Burmese people have sought 
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their services. The work of Mae Tao Clinic has spawned several other facilities in the 
Mae Sot area, including the Adolescent Reproductive Health Network and Social Action 
for Women. There are multiple smaller groups operating as migrant health and social 
welfare organizations that provide targeted care focused on men with HIV or herbal 
health for women, to name two examples. A large-scale effort by the SHIELD and 
subsequently PLE projects has led to the proliferation of health posts and centers, 
including in numerous factories and other types of worksites in Mae Sot and elsewhere 
along the border.17 Additionally, registered migrants have gained increased access to the 
Thai health system with the establishment of universal low-cost healthcare in 2004 and 
an expansion of “community-level healthcare” through district health offices (Samrit et 
al. 2010). As of 2012, migrants with temporary passports and work permits must buy into 
Thailand’s social security scheme with monthly 5% deductions from their wages, which 
contains specific benefits for maternity, unemployment, disability, and general health, 
though it is still not clear to which benefits migrants have access. Thus, over the years the 
Thai government has taken steps to include migrants in their structures of social 
support.18  
                                                
17 A joint project involving multiple stakeholders, SHIELD stands for Support to Health, Institution 
Building, Education and Leadership in Policy Dialogue. The project ran from 2006 to 2011. PLE (Project 
for Local Empowerment) is a four-year continuation to SHIELD. Both have been funded by USAID. See 
chapter seven for more details.  
18 The Thai Social Security system dates back to the early 1930s (when the country transitioned to a 
constitutional monarchy) and has evolved over the years to include worker’s compensation, maternity 
leave, disability, retirement, and death (i.e., such as life insurance). Registered migrants gained access to 
part of this system as a product of the nationality verification initiative, which made tracking individuals 
and membership more possible. In addition, Thailand sought to bring registered migrants into the fold of 
their healthcare system out of a desire to more effectively manage and regulate their health; a way to 
prevent the spread of communicable infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and cholera. At first this took 
the form of annual payments into the National Health Care system, which meant registered migrants were 
eligible for low-cost healthcare (30 baht per visit). However, as of 2011, registered migrants have been 
required to buy into the social security system with monthly payments of 5% of their wage. Questions still 
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However, there are a number of factors that prevent migrants from accessing 
healthcare, as this study confirms. The lack of legal status for many of the Burmese in 
Mae Sot translates to restricted movement. Unregistered, and sometimes even registered 
migrants explain that they often have a hard time to access healthcare because they are 
subject to arrest, extortion, and/or deportation if police catch them outside their 
workplace (Pearson and Kusakabe 2010; Pearson et al. 2006). Canavati and colleagues 
(2011) note that a main cause of disease for Burmese migrants on the border are vaccine-
preventable diseases such as hepatitis, mumps, tuberculosis, and measles because most of 
the population does not have access to immunizations. They quote a set of parents 
explaining why they do not take their children to health centers for immunization: “The 
only reason we would risk accessing a Thai clinic is when our child is very ill because 
under those circumstances the Thai police would not do anything to us” (p. 529). Of the 
1.1 million migrants registered with the Labor Department in 2010, only 24,800 were 
covered by the Social Security Scheme (Mekong Migration Network 2012).  
Additional barriers for migrants to access healthcare are a lack of money, distance 
from health sites, and a lack of time off work (Hobstetter et al. 2012). Getting to a health 
center or hospital might mean taking a day off of work and traveling across Mae Sot by 
paying for a motorbike taxi or sam lor—or for those outside Mae Sot, traveling longer 
distances in a bus, all in addition to whatever costs might be incurred at the health 
facility. Migrants have also cited language barriers and discrimination as a deterrent to 
accessing Thai facilities (Mekong Migration Network 2012: 33; Saltsman 2011). While 
the prevalence of preventable disease among the migrant population is clearly linked to 
                                                                                                                                            
remain as to how fair this is, given that migrants—who have two-year work permits—are unable to benefit 
from some of the system’s provisions, such as retirement. See Hall, 2012: 85-99). 
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their insufficient access to healthcare in Thailand, Thai popular opinion has capitalized 
on this trend to construct racialized discourse of migrants creating a public health crisis as 
they bring disease into Thailand (Nigoon 2009).  
These barriers have an especially serious impact on migrant women, who are 
often in a position of sole responsibility over social reproduction, including household 
health (Pearson and Kusakabe 2012b). The structural barriers noted above mean migrant 
women experience insufficient access to reproductive healthcare, which leads to a lack of 
family planning, high mortality rates during childbirth, and unsafe abortions and other 
procedures (Hobstetter et al. 2012; Sullivan et al. 2004). Mae Tao Clinic reports 
approximately five maternal deaths per year, often from unsafe abortions, though this is 
not considered representative of the migrant population border-wide (Hobstetter et al. 
2012). Hobstetter and colleagues note that migrant women in Phob Phra face greater 
difficulties to access healthcare than those in Mae Sot because one or more police 
checkpoints lie between them and Mae Tao Clinic or Mae Sot Hospital. 
Urban context 
 The Htone Taung neighborhood is located just behind Mae Sot General Hospital, 
but this facility is primarily accessible only to registered migrants. This is not to say that 
the hospital discriminates against undocumented migrants, but the latter do not have 
access to the social welfare benefits that come with registration. Therefore they end up 
paying the full bill. As a result, undocumented migrants report that they typically only go 
to the government-run hospital when it is an emergency and they have nowhere else to 
go. The vast majority of migrants in Mae Sot, Phob Phra, and other border districts look 
to Mae Tao Clinic as the best option. However, the primary obstacle to healthcare in both 
Mae Sot and Phob Phra stems from the restrictions on migrants’ mobility.   
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 Community workers in Htone Taung articulated that their efforts to bring 
migrants to health facilities are hampered by their own lack of legal status. During a 
focus group discussion, one volunteer who works with a number of NGOs and Mae Sot 
General Hospital described his difficulty: 
It is hard to travel sometimes because we don’t have legal documents. Thus, when 
policemen stop us, we don’t have the chance to explain to them. We already 
talked about this issue with Mae Sot General Hospital and they said they would 
give documents to us. When the policemen check, we don’t have the documents 
and patients don’t have the documents either. At that time, we have to pay bribes 
to the policemen. This is the challenge and the situation in our community.  (HT 
CW-1) 
 
At the same time the Thai government-run hospital depends on this volunteer for the 
work he does liaising with the migrant communities in Mae Sot and promoting health 
education, they have left him unprotected as he fulfills an important service of 
transporting migrants to the hospital or Mae Tao Clinic, a service that is usually the 
responsibility of the government. One resident of Kyuwe Kyan explained that people in 
her community go to Mae Tao Clinic, but must take a “forest path” to get there to avoid 
checkpoints, which presents its own risks since there are believed to be criminals, drug-
users, and gangs on such routes.  
 Since participants also restrict their movement at night to avoid dangerous 
elements, some are hesitant to access health facilities when it is past their curfew (either 
self-appointed or according to the rule of the local leader). A woman participant recalled 
her own experience with this: 
If a person is seriously sick at night, we dare not bring this person to Mae Tao 
Clinic. It is dangerous for them. We are afraid of police and hooligans. So, we 
have to wait till next morning. My child broke his hand around 10 pm. We dared 
not bring him to the clinic at that time. We could only do palliative treatment for 
him at home by tying his hand with a bandage and a stick. We brought him to the 
hospital the next morning. (HT F2Fw-1) 
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Rural context 
 Migrants in the two Phob Phra sites expressed similar difficulties in accessing 
healthcare, but for them Mae Sot General Hospital and Mae Tao Clinic is between 30 and 
50 kilometers away. Participants explained they would go there only in emergencies, as 
the quote related to immunizations above indicates. This is not to say that there are no 
health services in Phob Phra sites, but what is available nearby provides only limited 
services. In Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam, there are no health facilities, though there used to 
be a small health post with health education materials in Rim Nam until a fire destroyed it 
in 2008. Migrants from there must either travel to the Thai sub-district health office 
(anamai) at KM44, wait for regular CBO visits, or consult local informal practitioners. 
As the teacher from Rim Nam put it: 
A mobile clinic is coming once in three months […] Since the IRC clinic and 
Wadaw clinic burnt down in 2008, we face more difficulties. Mostly, we just go 
to a small pharmacy and buy our own concoction from the medicine seller. One 
time-drink, three kinds of medicine concoctions or four kinds, it costs 25 baht. We 
solve the problem like this. And we call Aphone [illegal medicine practitioner].  
By curing with him, there is no language barrier. (KM42 CL-1) 
 
Such a challenge in terms of access is serious in Rim Nam, according to this leader and 
teacher, as there are acute health issues there. Residents there need to buy their own water 
from trucks that deliver on a weekly basis and they store it next to their houses in large 
blue plastic oil drum containers. But, as this teacher suggests, this water is not enough 
and alternative sources are not clean: 
For health, we always have water problems. We cannot have clean water 
especially in March and April. We always have skin disease because of unclean 
water. We even have to buy unclean water. Many get skin infections during the 
rainy season. Some kids including my children [students] got dengue fever and 
died. (KM42 CL-1) 
 
Migrants living in KM48 do not have to travel far to access some minimum level of 
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health services, as there is a sub-district health office in the village with “community 
health volunteers” who work to disseminate health awareness information. This also 
enables the Thai health system to monitor for potential outbreaks of tuberculosis, dengue, 
cholera, and malaria (malaria is virtually non-existent in Thailand save for border areas 
because it is still prevalent in Myanmar). The health facility enables access to medication 
for HIV-positive migrants as well. Participants noted that though there is a health facility 
in their village, only registered migrants are likely to go there. Unregistered migrants are 
more dependent on the community health volunteers, informal practitioners, and the 
occasional visit from doctors or other health workers when serious problems arise. Some 
participants, even those who are registered, complained that the relatively low cost of 
visits to the district health office was still too high for them to pay, based on the wages 
they get.   
[A]t this time of the year there are not enough jobs. Some people don’t even have 
enough money to buy medicine when they are sick. If we went to anamai, it costs 
fifty baht. Once it was only 30 baht. So we just go to an unprofessional 
practitioner and buy his concoction.  One dose with four or five pills costs only 
five baht. (KM48 CW-1) 
 
This resonates with the trend of migrants seeking medical help only in the case of 
emergencies. A community health volunteer herself, the participant noted above relies 
primarily on self-medication. Presumably she might be more qualified to do that than 
others given that she has had some medical training, but nevertheless she indicates a 
narrowing of options for healthcare because of financial reasons.   
Participants in KM48 also pointed to nighttime dangers as a source of risk that 
sometimes prevented them from going out to seek healthcare at night. For example, one 
community worker shared that drug users hanging out at night where there are no street 
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lights next to the sub-district health office assaulted her 16-year-old son who was on his 
way home from work. 
 These examples suggest that migrants must reframe the way they think about their 
options when it comes to seeking health care. Participants shared their strategies for 
circumventing restrictions on their mobility. Palliative care for mild injuries and 
consulting with illegal and informal healers are two solutions that participants noted, but 
both of these come with significant risks to health and safety. As a monk in KM48 put it: 
For those who don’t have any legal documents, it’s very hard for them to go to the 
clinic and hospital when any health problems occur because they have to be afraid 
of getting caught by the Thai authorities. Some people do not deserve to die, but 
they don’t have any documents to go to the clinic or hospital, so they just pass 
away without getting any care. (KM48 CL-3)  
 
Barriers to healthcare for migrants constitute infrastructural violence as Rodgers and 
O’Neill (2012: 404-405) frame it in the sense that they are the “instrumental medium[s],” 
and material representations of structurally imposed suffering. A lack of access to clean 
drinking water, reproductive health, or basic physical care is the result of a complex 
power arrangement in which migrants are positioned geographically, politically, and 
economically in such a way as to prevent them from the same rights to these important 
components of infrastructure that others in Thailand enjoy. In that they are stuck in 
employer’s compounds and relegated to traveling on back roads at odd times to avoid 
police, physical space on the border appears differently for migrants, especially those 
without documentation.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 As the monk quoted in the last section says, “Some people do not deserve to die, 
but they don’t have any documents to go to the clinic or hospital, so they just pass away 
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without getting any care,” he puts into focus the violent impact a lack of legal status can 
have on one’s life. While undocumented status does not signify a death sentence, it 
demarcates the boundary between the right to inhabit visible space and the necessity of 
remaining in the shadows of a state’s formal systems where migrants bear the weight of 
many constraints, from earning a wage far below the country’s minimum to feeling a 
level of fear too immense to seek urgent health care.   
As I have shown in this chapter, the space of illegality and deportability in 
Thailand is a violent one, as it is in many places around the world. In this border zone, 
even those migrants who have documents face a variety of conditions that render them 
precarious. The everyday brutality of poverty, restricted rights, and a lack of access to 
vital services for Burmese workers in Phob Phra and Mae Sot performatively produces a 
category of migrant that reflects both alterity and disposability. By focusing on precarity 
in this chapter, I have shown that the multiple forms of structural violence that suffuse the 
border area not only give rise to suffering and hardship, but also have a shaping 
influence. As invisible violence weighs on migrants, it also reminds them of the 
particular set of constraints and limited opportunities that has a governing or ordering 
effect on their lives. Such precarity is thus implicated in the work of producing political 
subjectivities that are unique to supply chain spaces.  
Moreover, precarity’s manifestation in quotidian struggles to earn enough money 
to put food on the table, send children to school, or pay bribes to police on the way to a 
clinic and still have the amount needed to cover the cost of care gives meaning to the 
delineating effect of migrant illegality. That is, the difference between migrants and 
citizens and between documented and undocumented migrants lies less in the official 
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determination of status and more in the performative actions of police who maintain 
extortion rackets, of employers who pay 1/3 the minimum wage, and immigration 
officials who stop migrants from leaving Mae Sot for central Thailand. These repetitive 
exchanges are equally as generative of status for migrants as the daily experience of not 
having clean water or protective gear while spraying fertilizers. The lives of agricultural 
workers, sam lor drivers, waste pickers, domestic assistants, and factory laborers are 
mediated by these daily encounters. But these reminders of status do not thrive 
independently. Rather they are ultimately a product of concerns for national security and 
market-oriented calculations on the part of the Thai government and mobile capital. 
These are the factors that lead to certain types of immigration policies and worker 
registration schemes which construct flexible categories of workers. In this way, the 
violence of government and market machinations spawns a plethora of other types of 
structural violence that performatively demarcates territories and tempers migrant 
subjectivities.   
  Comparing the situation in Phob Phra and Mae Sot in terms of livelihoods, child 
welfare, and access to healthcare, I have shown that border spaces are not homogenous 
zones with uniform social conditions. But it is not possible to state that rural is more 
violent than urban or the other way around. Migrants in all four locations presented 
different ways of articulating suffering and the constraints that it places on them. While 
migrants in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam or KM48 are geographically remote, factory 
workers in Htone Taung are often stuck inside their place of work six days a week, and 
residents of Kyuwe Kyan feel they are cut off from the world even though they are just 
on the edge of Mae Sot—all different ways of phrasing exclusion. Within each of the four 
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sites there are significant wage differentials as certain households have several income 
earners, members with work permits, and steady work while others have multiple 
children and only one wage earner with irregular work. The same is true for migrants’ 
ability to access healthcare or education services. While legal status makes a significant 
difference for migrants’ wellbeing as the FIC study shows, registered and unregistered 
migrants alike must contend with various forms of structural violence. All this suggests 
that the dynamics of export processing zones like Mae Sot do not necessarily have a 
monopoly over the production of precarious workers since violence falls upon all workers 
in all four sites, including those in Phob Phra, which is outside the EPZ area. The border 
itself, which has been discursively and physically constructed over time as a space set 
apart from the rest of the country, presents a history of particular power relations that 
intersects with the demands and interests of state and capital to engender certain realities 
for migrants there.  
 Having considered here the multiple forms of structural violence that produces 
migrant precarity on the border, I have given less attention to migrants’ agency and the 
gendered nature of production and subjectivation that takes place amidst this violence. 
This is an angle I pick up in the next chapter, where I look at how such forces result in 
forms of social organization that fracture sovereignties far beyond the effects of 
government immigration policies. These constitute technologies of governance that 
manifest themselves and make certain kinds of order through gendered discourse about 
tradition, community, and homeland.  
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Chapter 5—“Make big problems small and small problems disappear”: Gendering 
order, restorative justice, and survival in border spaces 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last chapters, I built a sense of how the border, structural violence, and 
precarity are contingent and interconnected. At this juncture, I take these building blocks 
and provide an analysis that demonstrates the generative nature of the border. I center my 
gaze on borders as fabrica mundi (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013), spaces that are 
constructed politically and economically and that then produce particular political 
subjectivities and modes of social organization. In the way that border spaces lead to 
certain dynamics of production and sovereignty, they also contribute to the fashioning of 
gendered conceptions of self, group, and place by making use of cross-border networks 
and the exceptional status migrants have in terms of the state and capital. In particular, in 
this chapter I look at the ways a plurality of governance regimes manifests itself in the 
four migrant settlements and at how various actors attempt to address social problems, 
particularly social conflicts, in these spaces.    
Such a focus means that this chapter considers how social conflict and its 
resolution constitute interactive moments for the construction of meaning (Rössel and 
Collins 2001; Simmel 1955; Wagner-Pacifici and Hall 2012). To Simmel (1955: 18-19), 
conflict and the tension surrounding it are part of what constitutes a collectivity in the 
sense that it is a key aspect of relationships and serves also to iterate, demarcate, and 
reaffirm a groups’ boundaries. With this in mind, I consider moments of conflict to be 
doubly liminal, as interactions that represent transition—in the sense they are 
generative—and as social and power relations defined by displacement and movement.    
Michel de Certeau’s (1984) concept of “tactics” is significant here as well as it 
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helps spotlight practices of subordinated groups that reshape or alter relations or spaces 
constructed by more dominant forces. To de Certeau (1984), strategies represent the 
conscious tools, calculations, and maneuvers that reproduce dominant systems, 
structures, knowledges, and relations, while tactics refer to the absorption of such forces 
through repetitive consumption and their inevitable altering and rerouting on the 
individual level to produce new social forms. “Strategies are able to produce, tabulate, 
and impose…spaces,” writes de Certeau, “…whereas tactics can only use, manipulate, 
and divert these spaces” (ibid: 30). Tactics are the “cross-cuts, fragments, cracks and 
lucky hits in the framework of a system” (ibid: 38). The interaction between dominant 
systems, such as the local enactment of global supply chains, and local interpretations 
and ways of being in reaction to and within those systems proves, as I show in this 
chapter, to be an important lens to analyze life on the Thailand-Myanmar border because 
it helps us to understand how precarity and the conditions of production might give way 
to particular social forms that are of these exploitative hierarchies, but that also extend 
beyond them as well.   
I apply this kind of “border thinking” to consider the productive nature of 
violence and precarity in this context (Mignolo 2000). I stress that by examining the 
means through which order is manifested for migrants in this border space, it is possible 
to identify some of the ways in which the violence of advanced capitalism, biopolitical 
governance, and migrant networks of power intersect to cause shifts and multiplications 
in sovereignty. Benjamin’s (1978: 295) notion of law-making as “an immediate 
manifestation of violence” is useful here as a way of looking at how order-making in this 
context can be about protection, submission, and creating homogeneity over difference—
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all mechanisms for the reproduction of violent hierarchies. I show that the ordering of 
migrant workers in these border spaces does not always take the form of workplace rules 
enforced on a biopolitical level. The construction of space as violently productive 
involves a sense of order-making that extends beyond the economic and beyond the state. 
As Mezzaddra and Neilson (2013: 195) point out, “The assemblages of power that come 
together in these contexts are almost always highly differentiated” in that “they bring 
together and even combine different forms of sovereign, disciplinary, and biopower in 
distinct and highly contextual formations.”   
In a sense, I offer a notion of legal pluralism here as a way to think about the 
complex arrangements of power in border spaces that are linked in to global supply 
chains. As Pospisil (1971: 107) wrote in his formative work, “Every functioning 
subgroup in a society has its own legal system which is necessarily different in some 
respects from those of the other subgroups” to the point that “virtually every society is 
legally plural” (Merry 1988). But what I am referring to here is less about different laws 
for different groups, and more about a multiplication of laws for one group: Burmese 
migrants. The extent to which parallel justice mechanisms are part of a redrawing of 
territory and a multiplication of borders bound up in regional and global forces requires 
new consideration of how certain subjects relate to and produce sovereignties and 
political subjectivities in their everyday practices and interactions (Lund 2011). Borders 
between legality and illegality shift constantly and are fluid and contingent with gendered 
dimensions as well. This means that borders work to “regulate rather than exclude legal 
and illegal migrant labor,” to the extent that migrants are living in the interstitial space 
“between law and non-law” (Brown 2008: 16-17). Thus, the experience of legal plurality 
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in everyday life for Burmese migrants is reflective of their own experience as well as 
broader forces in motion. 
This chapter deals with the resolution of social problems that are, in one sense, 
commonplace issues dealt with by people in multiple, non-precarious situations around 
the world. Migrant workers struggle with alcohol and drug abuse, intimate partner 
violence, debt and loan issues just like citizens. But the context of these problems (as 
shown in the last chapter) and their resolution (as I discuss in this chapter) are what sets 
migrants in a space apart; what draws a border between them and subjects (whether 
citizens or not) who are not working in such exploitative circumstances. Comaroff and 
Comaroff (2006: 20) point out, “As governance disperses itself and monopolies over 
coercion fragment, crime and policing provide a rich repertoire of idioms and allegories 
with which to address, imaginatively, the nature of sovereignty, justice, and social 
order.”. 
I structure this chapter around two narrative accounts of dispute resolution 
processes, each from mediators describing their work. Rather than breaking these up into 
smaller excerpts, I follow Riessman’s (2008) model of displaying lengthier segments of 
narrative, that is, stories or longer pieces of an interview to convey both participants’ 
style of presenting their perspectives and the fluid way in which certain topics and themes 
flowed together during conversations.1 I introduce each narrative and then provide a brief 
description to add relevant details that help further understanding. The first narrative 
pertains to solving problems in Phob Phra communities while the second relates to Mae 
                                                
1 This method of analysis should be distinguished from linguistic narrative analysis (see for example, 
Riessman 2008), which I do not claim to be doing here since the latter emphasizes studying excerpts for the 
meaning conveyed through linguistic and literary components. As noted in chapter 3, the analytical 
methods I apply here are thematic narrative analysis and discourse analysis.   
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Sot sites. They both represent the work of organized groups who identify as grassroots 
migrant social welfare organizations. As such, they reflect the perspective of local 
migrant power-brokers as opposed to the ordinary migrant workers who live in the four 
sites where this study was conducted. To maintain some balance here, I provide several 
excerpts from the latter as well throughout the chapter to put them into dialogue with the 
longer narratives. In my analysis and interpretation of these two narratives, I bring in the 
voices of co-researchers and migrant workers in KM48, Rim Nam/Pyaung Gyi Win, 
Kyuwe Kyan, and Htone Taung.   
In addition to dividing the chapter by narrative, the two main sections also 
correspond to two levels of analysis. The first deals with socio-political networks and 
borders more from an institutional and systemic perspective while the second half is 
focused on the discursive constructions of gendered order. Central to this second part is 
the way that mediators and power-brokers rely on particular notions of gender to 
articulate conceptions of state, homeland, morality, tradition, and order. It is by looking at 
both the structure and the discourse of governance in this context that it is possible to 
deepen our understanding of the complexity of migrants’ political subjectivation. 
 
2. Dispute resolution and technologies of governance 
 
 In this section, I use Narrative 1 below as an example of a complex and cross-
border mode of governance for Burmese migrants. I am particularly interested in what 
this segment reveals about why such groups operate the way they do and how they 
consolidate their power in social networks that are at times local, situated across 
boundary lines in complex ways, and that engage with official actors of the Thai state. 
This section does not focus especially on gender, but lays out the architecture of 
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multiplied governance mechanisms that I show in subsequent sections have gendered 
implications.  
Narrative 1: Kaw Mu Rah-Karen Youth Organization (KMR-KYO) mediator 
 
 The first narrative comes from a representative of the Kaw Mu Rah Karen Youth 
Organization (KMR-KYO), a group that has operated  on the border since 1979.2 High-
ranking members of the Karen National Liberation Army and the KNU formed KMR-
KYO not as a branch of the government in exile but as an informal network of 
governance. The name Kaw Mu Rah refers to the place in Karen state where certain key 
military figures in the KNU apparatus are from. These senior officers formed the KMR-
KYO as a way of extending the reach of the KNU into Thailand, though not explicitly. 
From their inception through the time of writing, the KMR-KYO reports directly to the 
central level of the KNLA. In practice, the KMR-KYO maintains a low profile in 
Thailand, particularly since they operate as an unregistered organization and a somewhat 
informal network. They operate only along the border areas in Tak province, in Phob 
Phra, Mae Sot, and Mae Ramat districts. They do not receive outside funding, and its 
members do not officially draw salaries. This interview took place in Thai and Karen 
languages. I was able to conduct the Thai sections myself with some interpretation 
assistance while Sweet interpreted the Karen language parts into English.  
HSAR MOO:  Our purpose is to go and organize Karen people who fled from Burma and 
spread out everywhere unorganized. And our role is to go and organize them, put them 
back together let them know that we have to be together. The scope of KYO is to work 
for people who stay together in the community who are not only Karen but also 
                                                
2 This group is not to be confused with another by the same name, the Karen Youth Organization which 
operates primarily in the Karen-majority refugee camps along the border. The KMR-KYO shares only the 
name with the camp-based KYO. While the Karen National Union formed the KYO to organize youth 
activities in camps and educate youth on a particular historical narrative of Karen history and politics, 
KMR-KYO, despite its name, does not actually have a focus on youth at all.   
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Burmese people. The KNU has their own law, but they cannot operate fully and they 
have no court [here]. So they only handle the case traditionally as village heads have 
done for their villagers since long ago. Like leaders of the community who help with 
mediating cases. For example, when fighting occurs between couples, they mediate for 
them, have them sign promissory notes that say they will not do it again. If they repeat, 
the offenders may have to pay a fine. They have to promise they will not use violence 
again. That is the method that is used. This is only for small fights between a couple or 
in the family. But the next stage is if they repeat [an offense] or if someone breaks the 
promise. Then they’ll have to pay a fine. If we don't do it this way, they will not be 
afraid of us. When a criminal offense has happened any place along the border area, 
we ask KYO people who stay in that area to refer it to the Thai village head first. If the 
village head decides to refer it to the police, then the case will go though the Thai 
justice system. Because we are in Thailand and the event occurred in Thailand. 
Sometimes if the case is not too serious the village can mediate it. This is how we 
work. But we do have authority to mediate all smaller cases. The method of mediation 
is easy. Our principle is to make big problems small and to make small problems 
disappear.  
Debt and loan cases where people don't pay back their debt are very common. 
We deal with such cases to protect the migrants. If a debt and loan case is between 
migrant workers, and we do not get in and help out, sometimes it can lead to a murder 
case. Because they can do it [murder] when they get angry. Sometimes such cases 
between migrant workers don’t involve big money—only four or five hundred baht 
[US $12.50-15.50]—but for them, they have to work many days to make up that 
amount. […]  
Sometimes there are also cases about adultery. This is also a big problem.  
Just imagine the husband of a woman is not happy, he gets angry and commits a 
serious crime. We sometimes use negotiation for this. For example, we ask if she can 
forgive him and stay together with him. The man who commits adultery may have to 
pay her compensation. We don’t decide how much the compensation is but it is the 
result of negotiation between the two parties. We just produce a promissory note for 
them to sign. It is written that they are not going to repeat this behavior. But if they 
repeat it again we have to think how to punish them so we may have them pay fine or 
another form of punishment or community service order. We talked about those 
possibilities first then we make a promissory note.  
You see, the problems like this, like debt and loan and adultery, if we do not do 
it ourselves but if we bring it to Thai Justice, the Thai government will not accept 
those cases. Because […] when problems occur there is no evidence. When there is no 
written document relating to debt and loan, the police cannot proceed with the case. 
With adultery cases, police also do not know how to charge them. Therefore, we have 
to use the method that is called community wisdom. […] What we are doing is helping 
Thai village leaders in their work such as we help with dealing with small issues.  
ADAM: And what about bigger issues? 
HSAR MOO: Even robbery, like for only a small thing, we can mediate it too. This is for 
robbery or theft between migrant workers. We have the robber pay compensation. For 
example, we negotiate how much they will have to reimburse the victim when they 
steal their bike. This is a criminal offense, but we mediate it because it is not serious 
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and since the parties are both Burmese migrant workers. But, if the theft is between 
Burmese migrant workers and non-Burmese, we do not dare to interfere. That case, 
we will refer to the Thai justice system because we are afraid that more problems will 
follow later. In any case, if both parties do not agree, we cannot force them. Only if 
both parties agree, we can produce a written document about their agreement just to 
be a kind of evidence. We can do that. […] 
ADAM: And how about a divorce paper or something like that? 
HSAR MOO: Divorce paper, we don't do. If a couple is fighting, and the man continues to 
commit violence against his wife, we have to plan a punishment for him. It can be a 
community service order or a fine that becomes a community fund.  
ADAM: Like what kind of work? 
HSAR MOO: Depending on the community. What kind of thing will benefit them? 
Sometimes they have to clean the learning center or clean anything. We just do like 
that. Don't really know how to punish him. We have to use many forms so that 
problems will not be big. If we ask, “do we do every process legally?” we may not in 
some processes. But if we don't do like the way we do, and plan to refer to the Thai 
justice only, the police do not accept some cases. They do not give protection to some 
cases so if we let it be, then domestic violence can be more violent.  
ADAM: So if KYO is not present on the border to help…I see that there are a lot of 
problems like domestic violence and other issues— 
HSAR MOO: True, true, a lot. The example yesterday we call it sexual abuse, though not 
rape. The mother [of the victim] came and reported. I said, “You need to report it to 
the police because it is the case that we cannot mediate.” Mother of the woman does 
not want to because she afraid since she is in-charge of a gambling outfit. If an 
investigation started and [the police] found out about the gambling, then both parties 
will be guilty by law. So KYO asked, “How do you want to do it? What do you want to 
be satisfied?” The mother of the victim said she would like 300,000 baht [US $9,300] 
as compensation. Oh ho! We asked why that much. “Can you talk and agree to the 
amount so both can be satisfied because the man has no ability to pay that much. If 
you go to the justice system, both parties will be guilty.” So finally, the mother of the 
victim agreed to receive 5,000 baht [US $150] as compensation. The man paid 5,000 
baht. If we look, both are legally wrong. We don't say that we did the right thing for 
this but as long as they both agree, we don't say anything. If one party cannot be 
satisfied then we must proceed to the legal system. […] 
 
This exemplar, which describes the KMR-KYO’s efforts to make order and keep 
peace in a context of structural violence and precarity, raises a number of important 
questions. For example, what are the broader implications of the discursive elements 
KMR-KYO and groups like them use to legitimize their work? How are ideas of 
authority and governance constituted here? How does order actually manifest itself in an 
everyday sense for migrant workers? And, what do the methods of this group and others 
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like them tell us about the circulation and (re)production of gendered concepts of home, 
displacement, and tradition? In addressing these questions, it is crucial to give attention 
not only to the language of those representing top-down governance mechanisms, but 
also to migrant workers and individual mediators who provide a perspective from the 
level of everyday practice. I frame the following section in terms of the three questions 
mentioned above; by looking at both levels of discourse in this way, it is possible to build 
a sense of how borders are productive spaces with particular modes of social organization 
that push us to rethink the relationship between gender, migration, and the nation.   
 
2.1 Legitimizing tactics  
 In Narrative 1 above, Hsar Moo deploys a number of conversational devices to 
both explain and justify the work of KMR-KYO. As I show, these are important not only 
for illustrating how this group legitimizes their work, but also for what it highlights about 
the connection between the use of symbol and allegory and the order-making power of 
discourse. I divide this section into two salient themes from the data that are well 
illustrated by Narrative 1: (1) The portrayal of cohesive community and (2) The need for 
protection against violence. Informal groups use the latter tactic to explain their role and 
in so doing affix people to certain gendered notions of community, tradition, and order. 
When Hsar Moo explains his group’s existence as a function of Karen 
displacement, his words almost take on the structure of a narrative and make important 
references to tradition and community. He depicts a simplified version of a story in which 
people are uprooted and lost in Thailand. His main point here is to spotlight the need for a 
group to “organize” the wandering Karen refugees for their own benefit and wellbeing 
and “put them back together.” Implied here is a notion of a once cohesive community of 
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Karen people; part of a historical, social, and political narrative that has particular 
strength among the networks of Christian (particularly Baptist) Karen people on both 
sides of the Thailand-Myanmar border (Horstmann 2011). Horstmann (2011:86) points 
out that “[w]hile the physical space of a Karen homeland Kawthoolei has been gradually 
lost, the spiritual idea of a ‘homeland’ is still alive” though at the expense of the actual 
socio-linguistic and religious diversity of the Karen population in Myanmar and 
Thailand.3 Part of this narrative is the need for Karen people to re-organize in a diaspora 
and together maintain the idea of Kawthoolei. Hsar Moo’s account portrays what Charles 
Keyes (2008) refers to as “ethno-fiction,” a version of Anderson’s (1991) “imagined 
community,” in which groups assert particular notions of history that privilege certain 
collective ethnic identities over others. As Anderson argues, whether these bonds are 
factual or based in fiction is less important than the way or style this construction takes 
place (1991). Hsar Moo suggests that over time, this mission has changed to one more 
focused on governance and only sometimes pertaining to the work of maintaining 
concepts of ethno-nationality. This is because increasing numbers of non-Karen people 
from Myanmar have joined the Karen displaced in Thailand.   
As Hsar Moo suggests, part of the effort to bring organization to displaced people 
on the border includes the use of “traditional methods.” These methods, as Hsar Moo 
explains them, include a practice he defines as “mediation” in which parties to a conflict 
come together, agree to end their conflict, and sign a promissory note to affirm their 
resolution. Fines are also involved for parties that refuse to abide by the signed statement 
or, depending on the conflict, one party may need to pay compensation to the other. 
                                                
3 Kawthoolei is the Karen language term for the Karen nation.   
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Aside from or in addition to fines, a failure to refrain from fighting or violence may also 
incur a punishment, the nature of which is to be determined by mediators in that situation. 
Describing such practices in the terms of “tradition” clearly give some level of 
legitimacy to the work his organization does to resolve disputes, especially as he stresses 
that KMR-KYO practices methods used in “villages since long ago.” With such words, 
Hsar Moo links the practices of his mediators to the notions of convention and custom. 
Referring to the methods of dispute resolution as “community wisdom,” it becomes 
impossible to critique his group’s practice without also assaulting Karen culture overall. 
While it is possible that the work of KMR-KYO to resolve conflicts relies on tactics 
learned in KNU controlled areas in Myanmar, Hsar Moo’s comments gloss over what is 
in reality a complicated zone of mixed control (Smith 2007; South 2011). In this sense, 
his use of the concept of “tradition” not only justifies the work of his group, it also is in 
service of the broader goal outlined above of defining a notion of homeland or nation. In 
addition to material symbols of nation-hood that are prevalent in refugee camps and 
Karen-migrant villages in Thailand (Horstmann 2011), perhaps it is also possible to 
consider dispute resolution tactics as part of an “invented tradition” that conveys a 
factitious sense of continuity between current practice and an historical order of things in 
the homeland (Hobsbawm 1983). 
A second device Hsar Moo deploys to justify the work of his organization is the 
repeated reference to violence. He states explicitly that due to the Thai government’s 
reluctance to solve petty crimes among Burmese migrants, and because of the precarious 
conditions in which migrants find themselves, a small problem can often erupt into 
physical brutality. Debt and loan cases, Hsar Moo argues, can become murder cases, even 
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when the amount owed is only four or five hundred baht. Spouses can commit revenge on 
unfaithful spouses. Stressing the desperation of migrant conditions, leaving them in what 
he describes as a lawless space means that violent chaos will be rampant. He depicts a 
tense scene for migrants on the Thailand-Myanmar border, where serious violence is 
always a possibility, and never far off. KMR-KYO is there to address this and “make big 
problems small and…small problems disappear” instead of the other way around. 
Another participant who acts as mediator seconded this perspective, “In the past I was 
fighting alone for the Burmese people. At that time there was no organization.” But, he 
felt that “KYO must be organized because in our Phop Phra township, child trafficking 
cases occurred, rape case occurred, killing occurred, so on and so forth that we have to 
face” (UWMPP). Like Narrative 1, this excerpt portrays a story of origin that begins with 
a violent and out of control landscape in need of an entity to make peace and order. Even 
mediators not working with KMR-KYO explain the origin of their work in the stark 
terms of a violent past: 
When I began to work around here, Hmong people and Burmese people were 
fighting all the time. When Hmong and Burmese fought, they would kill our 
Burmese people. So I went and told the village head, “Wait a minute. If you kill, I 
will let you kill, but listen to what I say first. If we, Burmese people are wrong, 
you will kill them. If Hmong people are wrong what action do you want us to take 
against them?” When I asked him like that, he understood and said, “If we kill 
each other, things will get messy. There will be a big issue between us.” If Hmong 
kill Burmese and if we kill Hmong when they are wrong, big problems will occur. 
The village head said, “That doesn't work. If Hmong people are wrong, fine 
them.” So we talk about the two parties who were fighting. I said, “Now the 
village head can fine both of them as both are fighting. (UOHMPP) 
 
In this narrative, the participant uses descriptions of violence to explain how he started 
his work as a mediator and to convey a trajectory moving from destructive chaos to a 
kind of localized order. Though there is no reference to homeland or tradition, this 
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mediator does frame his account in terms of ethnicity and nationality in the sense that 
Burmese people as a collectivity were under attack from another ethnic group, the 
Hmong in this case who have legal status in Thailand. Thus, the participant uses violence 
to convey a sense of group solidarity as well as to stress the need for the kind of 
intervention he provides. In the excerpts presented, narratives of violence form a link 
between broader structural conditions that constrain migrants’ options for survival and 
the need for particular forms of order-making that are informal and rooted in Burmese or 
Karen group identity. As I show in the next chapter, the role violence takes in individual 
and collective narratives is an important aspect of gendered political subjectivation. 
 
2.2 Constitution of authority and governance 
Results from interviews and focus group discussions illustrate complex power 
arrangements between migrants, employers, and the state. Narrative 1 shows that far from 
ad hoc responses to social problems, Burmese migrants are engaged in a process of 
setting up and reproducing structures to govern and order themselves, though not without 
the involvement of local Thai authorities. These modes of social organization are many 
and diverse. While the narrative shown here is a rather top-down example, even as this 
group seeks to define itself as a loose-knit network or a membership-based organization, 
many participants living and working in migrant settlements speak of smaller ordering 
arrangements that relate only to those Burmese households within a labor camp or 
landlord’s compound. I take all such instances as building blocks to conceive of broader 
themes related to migrant survival and discourse. 
 In Narrative 1 above, the representative of KMR-KYO mentions explicitly a 
unique positioning of institutional and political networks to support the maintenance of 
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order in migrant communities in Phob Phra and elsewhere along the border.  In a clear 
reference to a cross-border source of power, Hsar Moo explained that his group was 
created and receives its directives from a Myanmar-based ethnic armed organization, the 
Karen National Union and the Karen National Liberation Army. As chapter two 
demonstrates, the KNU and its military have been most active in the border area during 
their more than six decades of struggle and they have wielded authority for much of this 
time on both sides of the border. Studies refer to the KNU’s presence in Thailand 
primarily in terms of their implicit role in managing the seven predominately ethnic 
Karen refugee camps in Ratchaburi, Kanchanaburi, and Tak provinces (McConnachie 
2014; South 2011). In my own previous research, I demonstrate connections between 
camp management and the KNU and the KNLA as members of camp security in more 
than one camp noted their former roles as combatants (Human Rights Watch 2012). 
However, as chapter two notes, the KNU has a long history of involvement in Thailand 
outside the camps, including during the years of Thailand’s civil war and the 
establishment of cross-border religious networks (Horstmann 2011). The presence and 
work of the KMR-KYO in Phob Phra relates to these decades-old connections.   
 Does this mean that migrants in Thailand are ultimately governed and organized 
by a group or groups based in Myanmar? In fact, Hsar Moo indicates in Narrative 1 that 
the situation is a bit more complicated. Just in the first paragraph, he mentions both that 
his group applies some version of KNU law for migrant communities in Thailand and 
that it is also important to operate within the Thai legal framework. He stressed multiple 
times the importance of working with Thai authorities to promote access to justice for 
migrants. Other groups who solve conflicts did the same; for example, one emphasized, 
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“The People’s Volunteer Association does not have its own law. It is a social 
organization and it is in Thailand so it does things according to Thai law.” The deliberate 
recognition of their place within the Thai sovereign-juridical structure is strategic here as 
such groups know that their work falls somewhere between the boundary of inside and 
outside that framework. Yet Hsar Moo’s reference to both KNU law and Thai law is not a 
contradiction. Rather, he constructs an argument to show that his group almost reluctantly 
plays a role in solving conflict using “traditional methods” precisely because of migrants’ 
partial exclusion from the Thai justice system. And, he insists, they know their place. 
When cases involve Thai nationals, KMR-KYO does not attempt to deal with the case 
outside the governmental system. Thus, he inserts a role for KMR-KYO as an 
intermediary to bridge the gap between the informal space of chaos and violence into 
which a precarious system thrusts migrants and the formal space of the Thai law, which 
may include migrants once the case reaches a certain level of severity or involves those 
considered entitled to formal justice.   
However, rather than a stable system, there is a flexible and performative quality 
to this order-making just as there is a flexible and performative quality to the 
interpretation and application of Thai law and policy, as noted in chapter four. As Hsar 
Moo’s account of handling a sexual abuse case illustrates, the lived reality is different, 
and sometimes KMR-KYO takes on more than they think is appropriate because they 
believe the Burmese parties to the crime or conflict will not get a fair trial in the Thai 
system. This is the case with many other mediators and groups interviewed for this study. 
Hsar Moo makes clear in this example that his group thought the sexual abuse case 
should go to the Thai legal system, but that it was the protestation of the victim’s mother 
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which kept the process informal. He implies a level of collaboration between KMR-KYO 
and migrant parties to a conflict to determine the best course of action, that is, whether a 
case should go to the legal system or remain in the legal space of the group’s “traditional” 
or customary rules. As chapter four suggests, this reinforces the idea that the law for 
Burmese migrants is made and remade in practice by an overlapping arrangement of 
power, part of what constitutes the border space as a structurally violent and precarious 
one. Or another way to say this is, “law and lawlessness are conditions of each other’s 
possibility” (Comoroff and Comoroff 2006: 21). As long as Thai nationals are not 
involved, the extent to which migrants have access to KNU law or Thai law or any law at 
all is unpredictable and more contingent on the stakeholders involved in the conflict than 
on the situation itself. As Butler and Athanasiou (2013: 129) write, “the law is produced 
and elaborated every time it is invoked in the scene of its anticipation” (see also Ewick 
and Silbey 1998). That is, migrants’ place before the law is performatively constituted 
through interactions and discourse. What this also means is that to the extent to which 
law is an element of sovereignty, the movement in and out of jurisdictions in this way is 
also indicative of a certain permeability and flexibility to the quality of state boundaries. 
However, rather than implying that migrants move in an out of legality with ease, I argue 
here that their place within the sovereign-juridical space and the constitution of the 
border is a function of the work of individuals, informal authorities, and state actors in a 
context of migrant precarity and illegality. 
Fragmenting conceptions of how order is constituted even further is the notion 
that informal groups of power brokers like KMR-KYO are, in fact, loose-knit and made 
up of more local-level articulations of authority. No migrant worker who participated in 
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this study mentioned the KMR-KYO group by name. Instead, they referred only to 
Burmese community leaders who do mediation when social problems arise. Yet, upon 
further research, I find that many of those leaders mentioned are, in fact, affiliated 
somehow with KMR-KYO in a voluntary capacity (KMR-KYO pays no salary). Less an 
organization with an established hierarchy extending from the village/community level of 
migrant workers in Thailand to the upper echelons of the KNU, the KMR-KYO more 
closely resembles a core group of individuals affiliated with the Karen government in 
exile who are in touch with migrant community leaders and who occasionally engage in 
some form of dispute resolution themselves. Maintaining a shadowy and vague role is 
part of their operational strategy to operate behind the scenes. The individuals doing 
dispute resolution, not the organization, make the impression on participants.   
From this perspective it becomes necessary to envision governance on the border 
as stemming from a multitude of groups, many operative only in one cluster of houses, 
one labor camp, or in two or three villages. Such sources of order are often not in concert 
with one another. Conceiving of governance in this fashion raises questions about how 
certain groups or individuals constitute order-making authorities and how the many local-
level practices are important on a broader level in terms of conceptions of social 
organization and governance in border spaces. As I explain in the following pages, such 
questions pertain to how certain individuals gain and maintain power as well as the 
multifaceted manifestations of power as an order-making force in this context.4 I present 
two examples here; the first describes a Thai man in the Htone Taung neighborhood who 
                                                
4 Although stories explaining mediators’and leaders’sense of vocation for such work were not the focus of 
this dissertation and therefore are not the subject of detailed analysis, I touch on this issue both in this 
section as well as in chapter seven. 
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Burmese residents there have looked to as a source of authority who can resolve disputes 
and make peace. The second is a Karen local leader who was affiliated with KMR-KYO 
until recently. In neither case was I able to interview them. The first passed away in early 
2014 and the second moved back to Myanmar for business. Nevertheless, participants at 
all levels of this study mentioned these individuals frequently enough that they merit 
consideration here.  
 
Ah Baing Gyi [Big/older brother]5 
 
The following brief profile provides one example of locally derived power that 
can have broader implications for the formulation of order and sovereignty vis-à-vis 
migrants. The moniker “Ah Baing Gyi” refers to a retired Thai police officer living in the 
Htone Taung neighborhood who speaks Burmese and acts as a problem-solver for the 
migrants. In contrast to earlier excerpts, his power does not come from a complex 
network extending beyond the bounds of Mae Sot—or Thailand for that matter—but 
rather from his institutional affiliation with the police, personal connections, linguistic 
abilities, and long-term tenure in the community; that is, it is more locally derived. In a 
way, this is characteristic of the Htone Taung site as it resembles a more established 
neighborhood with both Thai and Burmese residents figuring out how to live together. It 
is also a locale inhabited by multiple CBOs; a physical space where residents recognize 
informal hierarchies that have developed over time. One participant echoed the local 
nature of Ah Baing Gyi’s power as he compared him to other individuals who had tried to 
assume the role of “community leader” before. “In the past,” he said, “the old man who 
                                                
5 Ah Baing Gyi is not the individual’s real name.  The term, which is a mix of Burmese and Arabic, is an 
affectionate moniker for a male elder in Burmese Muslim communities.   
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owns the wood shop worked as a community leader but he couldn’t take this 
responsibility for too long because of so many rivals” (HT CL-1). This illustrates a level 
of competing individuals or factions; the one who can neutralize a threat from rivals is 
the one who can govern successfully.   
Yet, the authority of power brokers like Ah Baing Gyi is confined by invisible 
boundaries bisecting communities allowing for rule over discrete areas and not others. 
When describing one incident, a participant from Htone Taung pointed out, “I can’t 
inform [this case] to Ah Bi because it happened in a different community. If I report to 
Ah Bi, he can’t do anything because it is not his community” (HT CL-1).6 However, 
within the bounds of his space, Ah Baing Gyi is the ultimate source of power:  
If problems happen we cannot call an organizations from outside. A Baing will 
not give permission to do that. A Baing doesn’t give permission because in this 
way the section will become disorderly. We just have to do it with him. If he 
decides, we must accept it […] Whether problems are between husband and wife, 
between women and women who argue over their children, debt and loan 
issues—once he decides for us, we have to accept. “I am not happy with the 
decision of A Baing, I will go to the police station,” we cannot do that. He closes 
all channels. People who live in this section are his people and he will discipline 
his people on his own. That is his absolute way of working. If he disciplines us as 
a parent we must accept it. We must accept it and get satisfied. (HT F2Fw-7) 
 
Such words convey the sense of a clear jurisdiction for Ah Baing Gyi who, according to 
this participant, stands between migrants and any other type of authority, including the 
police, when a crime or a conflict takes place in his area. The language of possession and 
paternalism deployed here is extremely evocative of the type of rule Ah Baing Gyi 
maintained in this section of Htone Taung. He appears here as an authoritarian father 
figure who dispenses his sense of the law in an absolutist sense.    
                                                
6 Ah Bi is another nickname for Ah Baing Gyi. Bi may be his Thai nickname, but this is not clear.   
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Participants spoke of his role in resolving interpersonal conflicts, including 
intimate partner violence. “When [couples] have a problem,” one community worker in 
Htone Taung explained, “they go and complain to Police Ah Baing Gyi. At that time, 
Police Ah Baing Gyi asks men or women about their problem. Then, Police Ah Baing 
Gyi reprimands the couple”… 
For example, Police Ah Baing Gyi told them that the two of them came and 
worked in Thailand to find money for their future. If both of them are working 
hard, “two of you can collect enough money to go back to your home country. 
But, if the two of you keep finding problems like this, I will give you a severe 
punishment.” At that time, the couple keeps quiet and avoids the problem because 
they know that Police Ah Baing Gyi has power. (HT CW-1) 
 
Reinforcing the idea that Ah Baing Gyi is a strong leader, this participant’s words 
indicate her perception that migrants fear and obey him, aware that his power can turn to 
force if migrants do not heed his directives. His goal is to bring order to conflicting 
parties by reminding them of their purpose in Thailand: earning money. But if they 
cannot refrain from fighting, they will get a “severe punishment.” The lesson here for 
migrants is significant: stay quiet and be good workers.   
Saw Htoo 
 This second profile introduces a different sort of authority figure who not only 
illustrates the fragmentized structures of order-making on the border, but who also 
confounds any expectation of a normative sovereign-juridical structure in this space as 
well. Saw Htoo is a Karen man from Myanmar with Thai nationality. He was part of the 
KMR-KYO apparatus up until 2013. He had a house in the KM48 village and resolved 
disputes in the area. During four key informant interviews, two assessment interviews, 
and five focus group discussions—all of the latter in the Phob Phra sites—participants 
mentioned this individual as an important, though controversial leader: 
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MIN MIN: How about the security issues? Will you inform the police? 
R4: We won’t inform to the police but we will inform to the related authority. 
MIN MIN: What is related authority? 
R5: Related authority means our bosses.  
MIN MIN: Why don’t you inform the police? 
R3: We will inform related authorities, that is U Saw Htoo, first because he governs 
both Burmese and Thai. He will inform to the police when needed. (KM48 
FGDm-2) 
 
In this excerpt, one participant appears to see Saw Htoo as powerful enough to control 
not only the Burmese migrants, but also the Thai people in the area. When asked if there 
is a local Burmese leader during a women’s focus group discussion, one participant 
answered that employers “organized our Burmese and appointed a Burmese leader. 
However, people don’t respect him, don’t pay attention to him and aren’t afraid of him as 
he is Burmese.” Another participant added, “They aren’t afraid of anyone apart from Bo 
Saw Htoo” (KM42 FGDw-2).7 Not only intimidating, others note that Saw Htoo had a 
reputation for abuse and corruption. Referring implicitly to Saw Htoo, the director of a 
migrant social welfare organization in Mae Sot said: 
In Phop Phra there is a group who acts like gangsters. In the village, people have 
to be afraid of them because they associate with the police. They are people from 
Burma, but they associate with Thai police. In cases of couples fighting, [this 
group] doesn’t just mediate for them, but they make them pay money too. 
(AAMS) 
 
Though he was working, at least nominally, for KMR-KYO, no individual directly linked 
him to this organization. They referred to him instead as a strong Karen leader or as 
somebody related to the KNU, but always in a vague way, like in the excerpt above. In 
this sense, Saw Htoo’s authority is completely local as it is based on an association with 
certain police in the area. Yet, in another way he represents the trans-local set of ideas 
                                                
7“Bo”in front of Saw Htoo’s name is a Karen honorific for military commanders.  
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(including homeland, tradition, and community) that is rooted in the Karen struggle for 
autonomy and that forms the basis of KMR-KYO’s mission. (Aware that his rough tactics 
ultimately get in the way of their work, KMR-KYO leadership actually removed Saw 
Htoo from his position in 2013. Nevertheless, respondents continued to refer to him as an 
ongoing source of power in the Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam and KM48 areas.)   
 A third way that Saw Htoo’s role is important here is the assumed relationship 
with local authorities. Like Ah Baing Gyi, who is a retired police officer, Saw Htoo 
maintains some connections with local police who, though they do not often get involved 
in crimes that transpire among Burmese migrants, continue to be a source of power in the 
area. As armed actors of the Thai state, one might assume that they hold ultimate power 
over the various local and informal authorities. But as the excerpt above shows, some 
migrants hint that this may, in fact, not always be the case.   
 Narrative 1 above, and the brief profiles of informal authorities like Saw Htoo and 
Ah Baing Gyi, reveal a complex arrangement of authority between larger groups like 
KMR-KYO, local mediators, employers, and Thai security officials. In all four sites in 
this study, migrant worker settlements rely on a Burmese leader who is an interlocutor 
with an employer, landlord, the police, or an informal group. As one participant in Htone 
Taung averred, “There is a person called U Win Sin. Thai police made him a leader. 
People talk with him. All people from this quarter rely on him. He takes responsibilities 
until the area of Madi Nar” (HT FGDw-1R5). A proliferation of local leaders appointed 
by various actors engenders, as this excerpt suggests, a multiplication of borders between 
different groups of migrants with different authorities and, often, different rules and 
methods of maintaining order. Three of the grassroots migrant welfare organizations 
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interviewed for this study confirmed that they also appoint such leaders to keep order, as 
they have identified that order maintenance is crucial for the wellbeing of their target 
populations. One director of an organization in Mae Sot reflected:  
In the past when this kind of case occurred, people thought, “It is not my 
business,” and they would not get involved as they were afraid. But now, we have 
community leaders in those communities. Community leaders have to deal with 
social affairs. We trained some people to become community leaders and we are 
informed about the cases from them. If cases occur, the community leader reports 
to us or sends a message to us. (AAMS) 
 
In the two Phob Phra sites, employers and landlords usually choose the leaders in 
individual compounds, though there are also some participants who state that their leader 
is in charge because he has been in the compound the longest. A Thai employer and 
landowner in Pyaung Gyi Win explained that in response to intimate partner violence, he 
“mediated and asked them to stop quarreling because it is very noisy” (TNp10). 
According to him, migrants will report social conflicts to “employers, the village head, 
civilian preparedness volunteers, or the police,” and he acknowledged that typically 
migrants handle problems within their own families or households. On the other hand, a 
migrant in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam who also works as a volunteer for multiple NGOs 
explained, “For me, I can’t speak Thai. The village leader can’t speak Burmese. So, they 
can’t solve the problems. The Thai village leader selected a Burmese leader to solve the 
problems” (KM42 CW-1). In such cases, “The owner just talks to the group leader about 
what we have to do” (R1KM42 FGDm-1). While most participants in Kyuwe Kyan 
named a local Burmese leader as the one responsible for maintaining order, one pointed 
to the landlord for this role, saying, “There is a Thai Muslim who is the landlord in this 
community. When the violence cases happen here, people report to this landlord. So, he 
solves the problems” (KK F2Fw-2). 
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While the above excerpts reflect the importance of local individuals and 
collectivities in the manifestation of governance technologies, it is important to consider 
how the dispute resolution mechanisms in migrant spaces are situated within societies 
where village-level adjudication is common practice. That is, it is not uncommon in 
Thailand or Myanmar for people to rely on community-level solutions that are similar in 
process to what I have outlined above. Indeed, many scholars consider village-level 
justice to be the “traditional” way of solving most conflicts in both of these countries 
(Callister and Wall 2004; MDR and Kempel 2012; Kittipong 2003).   
Kittipong (2003: 8) notes that in Thailand, “many conflicts were resolved, with 
mutual consent and satisfaction of the adversaries, within the communities by respectable 
persons in the communities, mostly the elders, village-leaders, etc.”  Using the term 
yutitham samarn chan—which translates to “justice for social harmony,” Kittipong 
laments the loss of such traditions with the rise of a more centralized system of 
governance in Thailand, but notes that contemporary decentralization creates space for a 
revival of community justice and restorative justice. The Thai Ministry of Interior and the 
Ministry of Justice have both initiated nation-wide programs to train village-level 
authorities on mediation techniques; several dozen villages now have government-
established community justice centers where Thai village residents can have their 
disputes heard and resolved. Wanchai (2010) studied local dispute resolution methods in 
Thailand’s deep south in Pattani, and in the Isan region in the Northeast, and found 
different but equally effective mechanisms to maintain peace and order, in the 
predominately Muslim south relying on religious networks and in the Northeast on kin-
networks. Wanchai also observed in Phetchabun province a system implemented on the 
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sub-district level where residents of seven participating villages approved a set of rules to 
govern themselves, which include fines for disrupting festivals, excessive drinking, and 
loud noise after 11 pm. A committee of elders adjudicates such offenses.  
In the early 2000s, several scholars in Thailand looked in particular at the 
possibility of including intimate partner violence cases in restorative and community 
justice mechanisms because of both an increasingly documented trend of such violence 
and a collective sense that the criminal justice system in Thailand has failed both victims 
and perpetrators (Angkana et al. 2004; Kittipong 2003; Chitruedee 2006). All note that 
police hesitate to get involved in such cases because of the view that intimate partner 
violence is a family problem. Police involvement, according to a community leader 
interviewed by Angkana and colleagues, “leads to divorce. In cases where the accusation 
is taken to the police, it is difficult to reconcile because it destroys the honor of the 
husband” (Angkana et al. 2004: 9). Many see restorative justice as an ideal alternative as 
it allows for the option of maintaining family unity.   
In 2007, the Thai government responded to research findings, creating a legal 
mechanism that allows for intimate partner violence to be handled in the court or to 
remain within the family. The Domestic Violence Victim Protection Act, BE 2550 of 
2007, states, “the court shall…cause the parties to settle the case for peaceful 
cohabitation of the family,” albeit with the protection of the rights of the victim as a 
priority (Section 15). This law codifies a restorative outlet for intimate partner violence 
cases, empowering the court to impose a sentence of rehabilitation for the offender 
(Section 12). Section 16 allows for “a mediator which is a person or a group of persons 
who are fathers, mothers, guardians or relatives” or a variety of other actors including 
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social workers or a social welfare agency to resolve such disputes as long as they submit 
a report of the result of the mediation to the court and the judge deems the results fair. 
Emphasis on protecting the honor of the parties involved, codifying a preference to keep 
families together, and effecting a legal area for informal familial management of intimate 
partner violence reflect not only the recognition of the role of local justice mechanisms, 
but also the utterly gendered and collectivist nature of such processes in Thailand (as 
elsewhere). In addition, it is inevitable that in practice, a wider variety of actors than 
those mentioned in the law are involved in mediating such conflicts, do not do so as a 
court-sanctioned remedy, and rely on methods and networks of power that are beyond the 
normative legal framework. In my own fieldwork, I found that village-level justice 
centers in the border areas of Thailand were often minimally run or non-functional with 
greater reliance on informal but respected individuals to deal with problems.  
There is less written on contemporary strategies for dispute resolution and legal 
plurality in Myanmar, though I mention later the relevance of the colonial era’s 
conception of such practices. At this juncture, it is important to note the great diversity of 
governance mechanisms in Myanmar, including highland spaces controlled fully or 
partially by a multitude of ethnic armed groups, divided further into hundreds of smaller 
territories controlled by patrons offering security for local residents (Jolliffe 2014; KHRG 
2010; South 2011). For a large part of the country, particularly in the lowland areas that 
have been less affected by conflict (such as the Aeyeyarwady delta and the Dry Zone), it 
is quite common for village level authorities to resolve minor disputes, or even 
sometimes more serious issues, outside the criminal justice system. Village-tract level 
dispute resolution relates to the official duties of village-tract administrators (VTA) as 
275 
stipulated in the 2012 Ward or Village-Tract Administration Law (see chapter 7: 
functions and duties of the ward or village-tract administrator). The law provides for 
VTAs to resolve disputes, maintain peace and order, and to manage disciplinary matters 
for residents. In recent years, unpublished reports for development agencies document the 
practice of village-level management. Although village-tracts are the smallest 
administrative unit in Myanmar today, most of the work of maintaining order and 
resolving disputes takes place on the village level with village administrators (those in 
leadership positions over 100 households), area leaders (ten households), village elders 
and respected persons all playing a role in this work, with much variance from village to 
village (see Anonymous 2011; MDR and Kempel 2012). There are also village militias 
throughout the country involved in maintaining security and enforcing local rules (MDR 
and Kempel 2012). Such actors are agents of the state in Myanmar, unlike village heads 
operating in areas still mostly controlled by ethnic armed groups who are part of those 
ethno-nationalist governance structures. Nevertheless both maintain significant autonomy 
when it comes to the day-to-day management of local affairs.  
A key difference between the mechanisms in Thailand and Myanmar discussed 
above and the practices for Burmese migrants on the border is the extent to which the 
latter is rooted in exceptional networks of power that are connected to, but largely 
detached from, the power structures of the state. This jumble of overlapping hierarchies 
and mechanisms for making order are contingent on local, trans-local, and cross-border 
relationships. A look at these networks shows that authority is constituted in connection 
to the state but not necessarily under the state’s bureaucratic, political, or institutional 
power structure. Instead, authority is constituted via a series of interlocked power 
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saturated networks of which local Thai officials are one part, though not necessarily the 
head. The work of restorative justice for migrants has been outsourced to a series of well-
connected power-brokers.   
An example that involves KMR-KYO illustrates this most clearly. U Oh Han, a 
Burmese man who works full time as a mediator, and who started affiliating himself with 
KMR-KYO in the recent past, described the aftermath of a child abduction case to which 
he responded near KM48: 
We returned the girl to her parents. The KYO leader returned the man to his 
employer. Right now, KYO does not have a place to detain people. So they asked 
the employer to take responsibility with contract. The employer said yes so KYO 
asked him to put his signature. Whenever they need to call [the offender], he must 
be there. If he is not there, the employer is responsible.  (UOHMPP) 
 
When asked what the role of local authorities were, the mediator continued: “The 
difficulty is our village head. We called the village head and the Or Bor Tor. We 
informed them about the man. Then they asked for the man, but I did not hand him over 
because I was afraid they may kill him.” And in terms of the police, he replied, “I didn’t 
ask them to arrest him. I just asked them to bring the case to the KYO office in Phop Phra 
and they did it.” For this case, KMR-KYO (referred to only as KYO above), assumed 
responsibility for making the arrest of a man who allegedly kidnapped and raped a young 
girl, but instead of turning the offender in to face the consequences of the Thai legal 
system, KMR-KYO, in order to protect him from what the mediator perceived to be 
dangerous local authorities, got the police to send the man back to his employer with the 
instructions to restrict his movement, effectively subjecting him to a kind of servitude.   
This case confounds and inverts much of what might be considered a normative 
bureaucratic-legal framework. The employer becomes the offender’s warden at the same 
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time he continues to extract his labor-power; police become informal actors who 
transport offenders of serious crimes to sites of unofficial detention not under their 
control; and an informal group with power that cuts across the border represents what 
migrants come to see as the real source of power in their area. On the other hand, the 
young girl, who experienced abuse in this story and who does not receive care in the 
aftermath of her abuse, continues to be a precarious migrant in a context of structural 
violence. For all the different varieties of authority assuming some part of the power to 
govern and make order among migrants, none in this story really seemed to look out for 
the wellbeing of the victim. Instead they only reproduce the violence that is already 
around her.  
Thus, authority in this context is constituted through precarity in a way that 
reproduces precarity. The diversity of authorities and regimes of governance discussed 
here reflects what Teubner (1997: 7) calls a “new living law growing out of fragmented 
social institutions.” The border zone in and around Mae Sot is a space removed “from… 
normative arrangements” which “allows a plurality of legal orders…and even cultural 
styles to emerge” in the service of producing flexible labor regimes (Mezzadra and 
Neilson 2013: 208). The powerful individuals and groups that I mention in this section 
are only able to wield the control they do because of the violent nature of the space in 
which migrant lives are situated on the border. As the Thai government cedes its 
monopoly over the permissible use of force and as a variety of overlapping entities 
assume the state’s responsibilities to provide protection and administer justice, “social 
order itself becomes like a hall of mirrors” (Comoroff and Comoroff 2006: 34). In this 
space where sovereignties and boundaries have proliferated and shattered the border’s 
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geography into dozens of imbricated discontinuous shards, migrants are further 
constrained by this disorderly array of orders.  
 
3. Migrants’ everyday experience of a plurality of orders 
 
While I have thus far explored the fractured geography of order-making on the 
border, a question remains as to how ordinary migrants experience such technologies of 
governance and what their role is in the maintenance of order. For those cases that do not 
go to the Thai legal system, a variety of informal sets of rules apply in solving disputes. 
In addition, migrants are aware of rules they must obey in their communities and 
workplaces. It is not the case that migrants who do not access the legal system inhabit a 
space of lawlessness. On the contrary, they often remain under tight regimes of 
biopolitical control. This raises the importance of distinguishing between law as 
sovereign code and law as an informal set of practices and rules that govern particular 
subjects. In Ong’s (2000) notion of graduated sovereignty, this distinction is key as it is 
an illustration of the difference between those in a territory subject to a state’s sovereign 
laws and those who are in a specially designated territory, subject to rules and regulations 
that adhere more to market-oriented practices, such as the guidelines dictating behavior 
on a factory floor or farm. Ong (2006: 85).notes: 
In the industrial zones of Sumatra and Java, the army works hand in hand with 
factories to maintain social order among the labor force of seven million 
people…earn[ing] less than a living wage in factories operated by ethnic Chinese 
and Korean subcontractors for brand-name companies such as Nike, Reebok, and 
Gap…Widespread surveillance and much of the daily control of female workers 
center on their bodies: in the provision of food, in the granting or withholding of 
permission for menstrual leave, in the pressure for family planning, and in the 
physical confinement imposed during work hours. 
 
In such a way, states work together with employers to order lives of workers in ways that 
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are different than in other spaces or for other groups. However, on the Thailand-
Myanmar border, migrant workers are neither entirely part of a market-oriented scheme 
to order subjects in such a way as to extract a maximum of labor power nor subject to the 
laws and policies of Thailand. Just as governance is fractured in this context, so are the 
laws ordering life. Regimes of order appear to come from multiple sources at the same 
time and include biopolitical control, surveillance, and moral discipline that adheres to a 
variety of ethical frameworks, which often manifest themselves in ways that play on 
racial and gendered hierarchies. In this section, I briefly look at how migrants view and 
incorporate such regimes as they participate in restorative justice processes, engage with 
different systems of rule-making, and perceive themselves as governed and governing 
subjects. 
3.1 Management of social conflict 
 Participants expressed some ambivalence regarding the ways authorities deal with 
social conflict that arises in their community. Most discussed such practices as permanent 
or semi-permanent features of everyday life. Migrants go to leaders within the 
community or external mediators/authorities (including those that work on behalf of a 
larger organization) to get help resolving debt and loan disputes, divorces, intimate 
partner conflict and violence, or to settle any variety of other conflicts. For example: 
When husband and wife quarrel with each other and live separately, she informs 
the community leaders that she doesn’t receive any support from her husband. So, 
the community leaders call her husband and ask him. If the girl has no house to 
live, the community leaders told her husband to rent one house for her and pay the 
house rent fees monthly. They try to negotiate between the couple. (KK F2Fw-7) 
 
A 30-year-old woman in Kyuwe Kyan explained it in simple terms, “If this person is 
wrong, this person has to compensate. If another person is wrong, that person has to 
compensate. Compensation is 2,000 baht. If [leaders] ask to pay fine, both the man and 
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the woman have to pay 500 baht each” (KK F2Fw-5). What this participant indicates here 
is that 2,000 baht [~US $62] is a standard penalty for a variety of petty crimes such as 
theft or verbal abuse. Once a conflict between partners becomes so loud or so violent that 
other community members or leaders consider it necessary to intervene, local leaders in 
Kyuwe Kyan will require the couple to pay a fine of 500 baht [~US $15.50], regardless of 
who is guilty. Some participants explained that members of the community are 
sometimes reluctant to have their domestic disputes handled by their leader because 
ultimately this means the household loses 1,000 baht [~US $31]. During a focus group 
discussion with community workers in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam, participants explained 
the challenge in making peace between two people engaged in a personal conflict: 
R1: It is difficult to handle. Although we reprimand them as we are Burmese, 
some follow our words but some do not.  
R2: They say to us, “This is our problem. Is it your business?” But they pay 
attention when the people from other places come here. They don’t care about 
people from here. […] 
R1: We will tell them not to fight each other. If we can’t control it, we will report 
about this to related organizations. If they do not accept our negotiation, we will 
refer them to the police office or Thai village leader.  (KM42 CW-1) 
 
In such cases, these community workers are not acting as leaders who dispense justice, 
but as concerned members of the labor camp who want to keep order and prevent a 
problem from escalating. These two participants suggest, though, that other workers in 
their camp only tend to listen when outside groups come to resolve the situation, 
including individual authorities or KMR-KYO. This is because such groups wield greater 
power and can more effectively act on threats to bring police into the situation.   
For other participants, the role of the local Burmese leader is the closest they can 
get to a sense of justice and right over wrong. When asked how she thought about the 
leader’s role in solving disputes, a 34-year-old woman in KM48 answered: 
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R: As we are Burmese, we like it. If he decides, he makes it absolute. Those who 
are guilty will be treated as a guilty person. When he disciplines, people must be 
quiet. If the man is not quiet, if he needs to punish him with his hand, he also 
punishes him [like that]. If he needs to talk, he talks. It can be hard or it can be 
soft depending on the situation. The leader is like that. Mostly we obey when the 
leader says things. (KM48 F2Fw-10)   
 
Although this participant describes a somewhat autocratic leader in her compound, she 
makes clear her view that this is a positive influence as it ensures a level of peace and 
order. Though some participants were critical of the kind of firm authority they encounter 
in their communities, most in all four sites expressed approval for leaders who can bring 
and keep order.   
 
3.2 Rules, edicts, orders 
   A diverse array of authorities in the border space divides migrants up into discrete 
locales, each one subject to different or overlapping structures of power. The mechanisms 
of order in each of the four communities varied, though the most common mentioned 
explicitly by migrants was a restriction imposed on their movement. For example: “One 
is not allowed to enter after 7 pm and the door is closed at 8 pm. In the morning they 
open at 5 am, 6 am as the workers go out,” as a 41-year old Burmese woman in the 
Pyaung Gyi Win compound said (KM42 F2Fw-7). Another example of this comes from a 
Burmese woman in Kyuwe Kyan who explained:  
I: Who prohibits them to go outside? 
R: The community leaders… If someone from the community goes outside, the 
community leaders have the right to ask them where they are going. It is not 
allowed to go out after 8pm. the guards watch and check every night. There is a 
group of guards (10 people in one group). People can go outside [at night] only 
after informing this group. (KKF2Fw-7) 
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In this case, the participant alludes to a curfew and guards to enforce it among the 
migrant population, though it appears residents can exit if they need to, as long as they 
can provide an appropriate explanation.   
 In some sites, leaders’ rules about movement have particularly gendered 
dimensions to them, and women tended to face greater restrictions than men. This was 
especially the case in terms of rules established by Burmese leaders as tactics to protect 
whom they see as the more vulnerable members of their community. For example, a 
community leader in a KM48 compound explicated, “Girls cannot go freely, especially at 
night even within our village. If we went out, we would have problems. Even we men 
have problems, let alone girls going out alone. A lot of drunk Thais and Burmese, and 
Myot” (KM48 CL-1). This was not uncommon. In fact, in all four sites, participants 
mentioned the need for order in this way, restricting in particular the movement of 
women and girls for their own safety.   
While the extent to which migrants feel they must follow such rules strictly varies 
from place to place and depending on the amount of power attributed to leaders in those 
spaces, a participant in one compound in KM48 stressed that breaking the rules meant a 
problem with the landlord. “If anyone talks back to the house owner,” said the 
participant, “the person will be kicked out. House owners do not keep someone they do 
not like” (KM48 F2Fw-10). This is because in KM48 migrants are spread out in smaller 
compounds—between a few to more than a dozen houses in a compound—and in some 
cases, people find themselves living next to their landlords while in other spaces, they are 
alone without landlord or employer.   
Migrants also highlighted other types of rules that governed their general behavior 
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in the community. A 38-year-old woman explained: 
The Karen group, they tell the people not to drink and not to make noise in the 
community. I am glad to have those groups in our community. They make sure 
that in the morning we can go to work. Many people who live in this community 
are daily paid workers and they have to wake up early in the morning. (BR6) 
 
As this excerpt shows, such proscriptions on excessive drinking and noise are directly 
linked to migrants’ ability to get up every morning and perform the labor they are there to 
do.  
Participants pointed out that in addition to these more explicit marks of order, 
there are also more abstract forms of regulation that affect their choices and their 
wellbeing. For example, instead of arranging for employees to get legal status, some 
factories print their own IDs that they give to workers, informing them that it is a form of 
protection that will enable irregular migrants to travel freely within the bounds of Mae 
Sot. These IDs only enable migrants the level of protection they do because employers 
pay police to stay away from those factories and their workers. This creates an alterative 
and informal form of legality for migrants that is completely contingent on their 
employer and his or her agreement with local police. If payment stops, these workers go 
back to being completely “illegal.” For the many workers who live where they work, 
whether on a farm, in a factory, or in the employer’s house as a domestic worker, bosses 
are increasingly empowered to make decisions about migrants’ healthcare, as this 35-
year-old woman in Htone Taung reflects, “The factory gives us medicine when we are 
sick. When people are seriously ill, they sent them to the hospital” (BR29).  
 
3.3 Self-regulation, self-governance 
 The fear many of these migrants live with (as noted in the previous chapter) 
means that the ordering of their movement in this way was sometimes welcome. 
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However, participants typically saw these as protective measures. When asked what 
kinds of protections there were in the compound, a participant commented, “They protect 
us by keeping us in a compound.” Thus it is not surprising that despite the many forms of 
governance present on the border, by far the most pervasive mechanisms for making 
order came from participants themselves. Responding to their sense of insecurity and fear 
for their safety, migrants in this context frequently described measures they took to 
protect themselves that also constituted a form of regulating their behavior, including 
their movement and their decisions for care. A participant in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam 
said, “There are difficulties in this community. People dare not go outside at night after 8 
pm including men because there are criminals” (Rim Nam FGDm-2), indicating that 
there is some element of self-regulation in remaining in the compound after dark. Citing 
fear of criminals lurking outside labor camps, it was more common for participants to 
curtail their own movement outside in the evening than for employers, leaders, or 
landlords to impose a strict curfew. As one participant noted, “We dare not go outside at 
nighttime if there is no electricity. We have to buy food early when we want to eat. The 
glue sniffers are very bad” (R3 KM48 FGDw-1).   
While this is in response to a fear of violence lingering outside one’s house or 
labor camp compound, it results in a distinctly gendered form of biopolitical control. In 
Htone Taung, a community leader added: 
They go to the factory from home. At nighttime, parents pick them up from 
factories. Some come back home with group. The girls appoint with their 
boyfriends to meet secretly so their parents worry about that […] It is unseemly 
for girls to go out alone. That’s why I reprimand them not to go outside alone like 
that. (HT CL-2). 
 
In this excerpt, this participant explains that once young women get off of work from 
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their factories, parents need to be vigilant in ensuring their girls come directly home 
instead of meeting men. Parents, garment factories, and community leaders are working 
together to maintain a certain kind of gendered order among workers. Participants cite the 
prevalence of rape and disorder around them when articulating the need for extra care in 
regulating the behavior of young women. The structural violence that presents a constant 
risk to migrants motivates people to restrict themselves to the extent they will go out only 
when the situation is urgent, as this excerpt from Htone Taung suggests: 
R1: There is no specific restriction in here. 
R2: They don’t go out after 8 pm.  
R4: They don’t go out at around 10 pm by themselves as there are not many 
people outside. They just follow this rule by themselves. They stay home and 
watch movies. 
R3: If they need to go to the clinic or hospital, they go but if nothing special to go 
out, they stay at home. (HT FGDw-2) 
 
Even when the situation becomes serious, migrants must make decisions about what 
kinds of care they can manage for their bodies. In Htone Taung and Kyuwe Kyan, 
migrants reported the risks of taking alternate routes to Mae Tao Clinic; they had to 
subject themselves to further risk in the process of going out. One’s legal status also 
determines the type of care one can receive, as illustrated below: 
During an emergency, we choose this road (Oo Htote Road) because it is close to 
the hospital and Mae Tao clinic. The people who have legal documents are sent to 
Mae Sot hospital whereas the people who don’t have legal document are sent to 
Mae Tao Clinic. This is the only one road we have to use because it is short cut. 
(HT FGDw-1) 
 
These types of constraints and choices are a product of both migrants’ precarious status 
as well as their fear of the violence they may encounter. I deal with the latter issue in 
detail in the next chapter, showing how violence takes on a communicative role and leads 
to the construction of certain gendered subjectivities. 
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Ultimately, migrants show that orders imposed from specific leaders are 
intertwined with these types of efforts to self-regulate movement and behavior. The way 
that migrants in all four sites interpreted threats to their security through a gendered 
perspective can contribute to an understanding of how biopolitical control, 
governmentality, and the structural violence of border spaces converge to produce 
particular kinds of regimes of order. An excerpt from a focus group discussion among 
women in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam helps illustrate this point: 
R3: Now, there is a rule that Burmese are not allowed to go out at night from 8 
pm. 9 pm is the latest.  
I1: Who passed this rule? 
R1: This rule was made by the Burmese village leader. Both men and women are 
not allowed to go out after 9 pm. If someone goes out, this person will be 
recognized as a thief, robber or bad person.  
R5: They [Hmong] also pulled forcefully even their own ethnic young girls. They 
put young girls in the car and run away. A guy from 48KM came and took a 
young Shan girl. It was frightening when they came to get her. Our Burmese 
people here were afraid to help her. They dragged her as a dog and a pig.  It was 
impossible to hear from outside as it was a brick building […] She could not 
struggle free.  
I1: How do you deal with that kind of violence? 
R1: We can’t do anything against them [Hmong people]. 
R4: If they do something wrong to our people, all our Burmese will do something 
back to them. Even if we can’t do anything, we will report to related 
organizations.  
R5: If the victim is Burmese, we will try to help her as much as possible, even if 
we die in the process.  
R2: The styles of our young ladies are not appropriate. They wear short skirts or 
pants [and] these people are more willing to do bad things to them. That’s why, 
bad things happen.  
R4: It depends on their (Burmese girls’) behavior as well. It is also happened 
because they don’t live in an appropriate way. We can’t blame others. 
R3: We found a young lady when we came back after harvesting chilies. “Aw she 
dresses like that. How bad it is!” I felt like that in my heart. They can dress like 
that. For me, I am not happy to wear clothes like that. That’s why hooligans 
followed her. My husband and I were on our bicycles. It was already 8pm. Many 
young boys followed her from behind. 
R4: The leader should reprimand those girls.  (KM42 FGDw-2) 
 
This excerpt shows the natural flow of conversation between participants and the 
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facilitator, from describing rules in their compound to recalling a story of outsiders—
Hmong men from a neighboring community, in this case—raping a young Burmese, 
ethnic Shan girl. Participants describe a commitment to helping Burmese who experience 
abuse. While some express a sense of powerlessness to stop such problems, one 
participant conveys the possibility of revenge or justice either at her hands or via some 
organization that resolves problems on behalf of Burmese people in that area, quite 
possibly KMR-KYO. But the conversation quickly turns to a discussion of how such 
incidents of abuse are linked to the attire of young women, changes in fashion, and a loss 
of what these participants consider traditional dress. Participants use the claim that 
women who dress “inappropriately” bring on the sexual abuse they get—a ubiquitous 
comment found in every corner of the world—as a call for order and control amidst 
widespread violence. Reference to gender in this way is a sort of trope for articulating 
precarity, a site to project insecurity and anxiety about migrants’ difficult conditions. 
While such gendered comments can be found everywhere, in this context they cannot be 
untangled from migrants’ insecurity.   
 
4. Gendered discourses of morality in sites of precarity 
 
 While the previous section looks at governance in terms of systems, networks, 
and informal institutions, that is, modes of organization prevalent in the lives of migrants 
on the border, I consider now the discursive level; the narratives of tradition, gender, and 
home/away that migrants’ evoke as they consider and describe their experiences with 
order-making and dispute resolution. It is on this level that we see more clearly how 
migrants—including those in positions of power—make meaning out of these systems. I 
start with the second narrative of the chapter, which I will engage in subsequent sections 
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with an analysis that involves the voices of participants from all four migrant settlements 
and other migrant social welfare organizations.  
In this narrative, I introduce the work of the People’s Volunteer Association 
(PVA). A former member of the ABSDF (All Burma Students Democratic Front) 
founded PVA in 2004 to protect Burmese migrants in Thailand and help them gain access 
to crucial services, including healthcare and education. They are part of NGO networks in 
Mae Sot that meet regularly to coordinate on child welfare, women’s protection, and 
labor rights. In contrast to KMR-KYO, PVA operates openly on the border, primarily in 
Mae Sot. They are a membership organization and boast having a volunteer base in the 
hundreds in Tak’s border districts. It is not uncommon in Mae Sot to see young Burmese 
men cycling to work at factories or elsewhere wearing PVA t-shirts, which are army-
green and have the image of a dove inside a six-pointed star. At the time of writing, they 
had 285 “likes” on their Facebook page, which links to other social media sites that 
mention them and news coverage of the group.8  This page also states their raison d'être:  
No one/organization comes up and stands up to solve all the problems of our 
Burmese migrant workers regardless. The situations demand an organization to 
defend our people. And, that’s the reason for us to form PVA. People must know 
that they have the organization named PVA to depend on no matter what. 
 
PVA works in multiple migrant settlements in Mae Sot, but in terms of this study, 
PVA is particularly relevant for Htone Taung and Kyuwe Kyan. In recent years, they 
have increasingly worked with predominately Muslim communities, coordinating with a 
religious council to address social problems. They do not appoint local leaders, but work 
with them or directly with the migrant workers who file complaints. Though they work 
                                                
8 For their Facebook page, see: https://www.facebook.com/pages/People-Volunteers-
Association/199415453432990 (Accessed on 16 July 2014).  
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openly in Mae Sot, they are still not a registered organization and most of their members 
are not documented so they occasionally face arrest. Participants in both Kyuwe Kyan 
and Htone Taung sites noted that PVA plays a central role in resolving disputes. Some 
participants consider PVA a primary actor for this, but overall, findings in both sites 
suggest that PVA is more engaged as a back-up to the Burmese leaders embedded in 
communities. Local authorities we interviewed also explained that they rely on PVA 
when parties to a conflict reject their orders. This is because PVA can mobilize their 
volunteers, but also because they have connections with local police. PVA will also 
detain individuals in their office if they are drunk or acting violently, locking them in a 
room for some duration of time until they can safely interrogate them.   
 PVA works in a way that is far more centralized than KMR-KYO. Though they 
claim to have an expansive network with community leaders up and down the border in 
Tak province handling cases, the majority of clients come to their office in Mae Sot for 
dispute resolution or to file complaints. Between one and three people from PVA sit 
behind a desk outside the office and hear cases from migrants who come in (or who were 
brought in). PVA staff keep log-books of all cases they have dealt with; each entry is 
handwritten and signed by the PVA leadership, often by the founder of PVA who states 
his position as Central Leadership Committee member. There are multiple volumes from 
all the disputes PVA has handled over the years pertaining to intimate partner violence, 
sexual harassment, labor disputes, debt and loan cases, theft, drug abuse, disturbing the 
peace, and a variety of other crimes. Parties to the conflict sign the case notes and 
promissory statements that come from the resolution process to signal their acquiescence, 
and PVA can then use these documents as evidence if problems arise in the future.   
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One volunteer heads a Women’s Affairs Department at PVA and is also 
responsible for child protection. This department liaises with other NGOs and CBOs, 
offers counseling to victims and discipline to perpetrators, and assists with referring cases 
to relevant services, including Mae Sot hospital. In addition, PVA runs a school in Mae 
Sot, participates in handling labor disputes between employers and employees, and sells 
membership cards renewable monthly that are supposed to prevent stops by police.    
The following narrative represents an interview done in Burmese with English 
translation. When relevant I include the voice of Sweet who helped with interpretation. 
The names of participants have been changed to pseudonyms. Ma Say refers to a woman 
volunteer and Maung Law is a male volunteer. 
Narrative 2: PVA responds to domestic violence 
ADAM: What is the method for dealing with domestic violence cases? 
MA SAY: For example, a man beats a woman. He beats one time, two times, and more so 
women who suffer cannot stand it any longer and come and inform us. If we get 
informed, we get the man to come with us […] I want to give you a real example. He is 
a Karen man and his mother is a school director, he said. He beats his wife in that 
way. How I dealt with this, I will tell.  
“Why do you drink alcohol all the time?How many bottles do you drink each day?”  
“Five bottles he said.” Apa! [oh my] so, “If you drink five bottles a day can't you 
reduce it to three bottles a day? From three to two, from two to one from one half 
bottle and at the end if you can completely stop drinking, your family will be peaceful. 
In your family, in order for your wife and children to respect you, you must be a good 
person. You don't have to be [in] our office like this. Your wife does not have to feel 
pain about you. Men are the head of the household. If the wife and children who 
depend on the head of the house do not love but hate and are afraid of the head of the 
house, this is not good. They must love and respect you.” That kind of thing, I told 
people. When I said this, the man cried […] This is not the first case. I saw many cases 
like this. He looked at me and said, “I know, my mother is also a teacher.” I said, “If 
you mother is a teacher you must know a lot. You must feel sorry for your mother as it 
affects her dignity when you got drunk and make problems.” I told him that and he 
was so quiet. He promised me but I don't know if he will keep his promise or not. He 
said he will reduce the amount he drinks and eventually quit drinking. He will not 
make trouble at home any longer. Six months have passed by and his wife doesn't 
come again. […] 
ADAM: Are there other ways you discipline the people involved in such a conflict? 
MA SAY: First I ask, “What is your nationality?”  
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“Buddhist.”  
“How about parents? Are they wild like you?”  
“Not wild.”  
“So why do you have to speak like this? If you speak like this and people hear it, it is 
not good for your own dignity. Even if you get upset, pretend you don't see. It can 
reduce your emotions too. It can reduce a lot of your stress too. It is not the right thing 
to shout. When people hear don't you feel shy?” They have children. “As you have 
children, if you are wild like this and your children see this every day you cannot say 
your children will not speak the same way you do. And when your children are 
growing, they will have to socialize themselves with people around them. ‘Don't go 
close to this girl, this boy, their mother’s personality is very wild.’ The children will 
experience that exclusion from people around them. Then these children will become 
more wild.”  
MAUNG LAW: In all issues we use culture and religion to discipline them as the clients 
are from many different religious backgrounds. If they are Muslim we have to mention 
the teaching of Islam, we have to talk according to their religion so that they like to 
hear what we say. We also let them know the legal aspect, what laws they are breaking 
and what the punishments are. In religion for example, in Buddhist teaching, what 
kinds of evil they will receive. No one likes what they do, our families don't like, others 
also don't like it, so when we do something that no one likes, they cause problems and 
so they have to face the consequences— 
MA SAY: Religious, legal— 
MAUNG LAW: We discipline them with religious teaching, legal teaching, cultural 
teaching— 
MA SAY: Social— 
MAUNG LAW: Socially also. As you do things that people around you cannot accept so 
you are guilty. They must understand this. Okay, now say it.  
MA SAY: The reason is, when a man becomes the head of the family, he has 
responsibilities as the head of the family. In order to have enough food and clothes for 
his family, if they live in another country they have to rent a house, there is no way to 
own a house. He'll have to pay rent for the house, the water and electricity bill. Food 
and clothes and plus food for babies. Those are the responsibilities of a father. 
However, here [in Thailand] people do not divide what is the father’s role, the 
mother’s role. Mom works, father also works. The income of both will cover the cost 
for family wellbeing. If they have extra, they will keep it as extra. They may eat better 
food, wear better clothes or give donations. Like that. Man has a responsibility as a 
man and woman has a responsibility as a woman. This is what you already know too, 
Adam. [laughs] 
ADAM: So what about the cultural side? 
MAUNG LAW: About culture. For a woman, according to our Burmese culture, as a 
woman is a house wife, she has five duties as a man also has five duties according to 
Buddhist teaching. The five duties of wife and five duties of husband— 
MA SAY: In Burmese traditional culture.  
MAUNG LAW: The five duties of wife and the five duties of the husband. Since we have 
those kinds of rules we use them to control people and discipline people.  
ADAM: [um] I see. Okay. [um] do you know what those are? The five, do you— 
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MA SAY: The five duties of the wife in our Burmese culture. Treat your husband as your 
master. Keep and use your husband's money neatly. When your husband comes back 
from work, talk sweetly to him and prepare nice food for him. Prepare and maintain 
the bed and yourself according to the desire of her husband. Be loyal to your husband. 
Deal with your husband with full honesty. As a woman, these are the five duties but it 
can be translated to a lot of meaning.  
ADAM: And what points for the man? 
SWEET: For man, find money and give to your wife. And second one is give your time 
and love and care to your wife. Third one is treat your wife as [er] see your wife as 
[er] oh no. Be kind to your wife as if you will be kind to your mother and your sister.  
MA SAY: Then be loyal to your wife. Be with only your wife. Then don't betray your wife. 
MAUNG LAW: Anything relating to Burmese cultural teaching are in the lawkaniti…the 
lawkaniti-kyan. 
 
 This narrative is rich with meaning about both the significance of dispute 
resolution methods and the ways participants discuss such methods. Mediators describe 
their attempt to appeal to the parties’ sense of gender, honor, dignity, family, culture, and 
religion. While the outcome of PVA’s adjudications typically involves some form of 
compensation or community service work, as the narrative above suggests, PVA also 
emphasizes a form of moral disciplining in addition. Ma Say and Maung Law highlight 
four ways of instilling morality into their disciplinary methods, according to Narrative 2 
above. First, they appeal to a cultural-religious narrative derived from religious texts to 
explain rules and roles. Second, they refer to a sense of social dignity; an attempt to make 
offenders aware of how parents and people in a surrounding community might see them 
based on their behavior. Third, Ma Say and Maung Law ask offenders to recall their 
purpose for being in Thailand, reminding them that they are there to pursue financial gain 
and that excessive drinking or social conflict is counterproductive to that goal. And 
finally, the PVA mediators rely on particular interpretations of gender roles to guide 
offenders in seeing how they should reform their behavior. They deploy idealized images 
of men and women to push offenders (who are men in the narrative above) to reflect on 
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how their behavior upholds or degrades their masculinity. Like the local leaders 
described in the previous section, PVA sees its role toward the migrant community as a 
protective one, arguing that they address social problems and conflicts for Burmese 
migrants when nobody else will, instilling migrants with lessons to improve themselves.   
All these tactics, I argue here, are part of the complex arrangement of governance 
on the border. The reliance on ethical codes to maintain order on the border is a strategy 
we found in all four sites, though mediators in Mae Sot are most expansive and explicit 
about this. The data reflects that mediators often rely on narratives of morality, which 
include some combination of these codes to explain their methods to co-researchers and 
me, and to draw connections between their work and the broader dilemmas facing 
Burmese migrants in Thailand. By looking at the intersection of gendered discourse and 
the resolution of social problems among migrants, I can see how gender becomes a tool 
for producing particular modes of social organization in this border context. I analyze this 
discourse here and consider how such productive power deepens our conceptualization of 
how migrants survive and negotiate displacement. This also furthers an understanding of 
how the dynamics of capital and questions of family, morality, memory, and tradition are 
interlaced in the fashioning of a new kind of worker “suited to the new type of work and 
production process” in this context (Gramsci 1971: 286).  
I divide this section into two parts, looking first at the narrative above and other 
excerpts from Burmese migrant participants in the four sites to put together an analysis of 
how custom and religion constitute a gendered discourse to make order among worker-
subjects. In the second part, I focus in particular on the use of gender in the form of 
gendered hierarchies as a tool of governance.  
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4.1 Custom, dignity, and religious-moral discourse in the resolution of social conflicts 
 The religious-moral framework that PVA mediators outline in Narrative 2 is one 
other participants echo in descriptions of methods for resolving intimate partner violence 
and in framing their mission. However, as I show in this section, it is a contested and 
socially constructed discourse that relates more to mechanisms of social ordering and less 
to faith-based doctrines. Like Ma Say and Maung Law, several participants, especially 
those in a leadership position, explained their use of religion or ethics as a set of rules to 
live and judge by as well as a popular discourse capable of persuading or mobilizing the 
average migrant worker, whether Christian, Muslim, or Buddhist. Buddhist monks in 
Phob Phra described using Buddhist teachings to solve marital problems; a pastor in 
KM48 explained using teachings from the bible for the same purpose; and participants 
note that imams, elders, or other respectable people in Mae Sot’s Muslim community 
often handle family cases for other Muslims in their communities, sometimes in 
conjunction with PVA. Such tools in dispute resolution are considered to be “customary” 
or “traditional.” 
On the one hand, analysis suggests that this appears to be a logical strategy 
because multiple participants—nearly half—cited religion or cultural custom as a guide 
through or explanation of their situation. Numerous Buddhist participants mentioned that 
they use religion to find peace amidst difficulty, advising themselves “according to the 
Dhamma when problems happen,” for example (KM48 F2Fw-5).   
While on the surface it appears a common, perhaps ubiquitous practice to rely on 
religious authorities for such issues, it is nevertheless important to interrogate the 
doctrines or methods referred to as “traditional” or “customary.” In the case of religion 
and custom, what is commonly referred to as “traditional law” and “Burmese Buddhist 
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customary law” are in fact constructions of the British colonial era that have left a lasting 
legacy on discourses of law and society. As initially Burma was a part of the British Raj, 
the Anglo-Indian laws developed and applied there extended to the Burmese. This 
included a system of legal pluralism that allowed for different religious-moral laws to be 
applied to four main religious categories of Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, and Hindu for 
cases relating to inheritance, marriage, divorce, and adoption (Hla Aung 1968; Ikeya 
2012). Ikeya (2012: 27) notes that this had the effect of reifying ethnic boundaries in 
colonial Burma. This designation, which was part of the Burma Laws Act of 1898, meant 
that family issues were not subject to the formal Anglo-Indian legal system, but rather to 
a notion of religious customary law. Institutionalizing the informality of family law was 
born from two false assumptions, in addition to gross generalization. First, the English 
divined that Burmese family conflicts were best dealt with outside the legal system; that 
“in the Burmese family system the reasonable is to precede the legal” (Jardine 1882: 197, 
quoted in Furnivall 1948: 131). And second, the British supposed that the “custom” upon 
which Burmese relied to decide family cases was from a religiously derived text, the 
Dhammathats, when in fact these were more annals of Burmese rulers’ principles and 
beliefs than religious doctrine, even if these rulers were influenced by Buddhism (Hla 
Aung 1968; Davids 1932). In their Orientalist approach to understanding Indian and 
Burmese societies and social structures, the British appropriated and adapted local 
knowledge to fit their conception (McGeachy 2002).9 As the Burmese legal scholar 
                                                
9 The British also constructed plural legal regimes in colonial Malaysia as well, designating Muslim law as 
the preferred source of authority for deciding cases related to marriage and inheritance. It is worth noting 
here that during the colonial epoch, as Siam attempted to assert control over all the various peoples within 
its designated territory, the government enacted a similar legal pluralism in the predominately Muslim areas 
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Maung Maung (1963: 13) writes,  
Burmese customary laws are civil, not criminal laws, and secular, not 
ecclesiastical laws. Buddhist ethics have doubtless influenced their development, 
but the term “Burmese Buddhist Law,” which was fixed on them under British 
rule and which has passed into common usage, is strictly a misnomer.   
 
The effect was threefold. First this inaccurately conflated a sense of custom and religion 
in colonial Burma that divided different ethnicities and religions from one another. 
Second, this move cemented as law the construction of customary law for dealing with 
family disputes. And third, this simultaneously romanticized and exoticized local 
methods for dealing with disputes as statically “traditional” and unmoving. This is not to 
say that these colonial practices form the basis of what mediators are doing in Phob Phra 
and Mae Sot. To infer this would be to privilege the colonial narrative and ignore the 
more complex relations that developed on the ground in Burma and then Myanmar 
during that time as well as in the intervening decades. However, I highlight this history to 
show that the notion of religion, law, and custom as united in Burmese tradition, is, in 
fact, not an accepted reality.  
In practice, the use of religious customary law to solve family conflicts is 
contested and not always something leaders choose of their own accord. While many 
leaders acknowledge their use of morality, culture, custom, and religion as tools to solve 
intimate partner violence among migrant workers, they tend to agree that cases 
constituting serious crimes or involving serious violence—often highlighting especially 
murder and rape—should be handled through formal legal channels. However, the data 
reflect that this only happens a fraction of the time, meaning that authorities instead use a 
                                                                                                                                            
in the south that was modeled after the British colonial system. See Loos 2006, who argues that the vestiges 
of this pluralism can be found in contemporary Thailand’s southernmost provinces.  
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blend of custom, such as a code of ethics, and local interpretations of the law to mediate 
for people who have suffered gender violence. This raises questions about how the 
decision to use religious codes as tools for the resolution of disputes is a product of 
structural violence and precarity. For example, a religious leader in Kyuwe Kyan 
complained that Thai village heads and police placed the expectation on him to govern 
his neighborhood because of his role as an imam, but that he is reluctant to do this work 
because he feels unqualified for the task and that it is not his responsibility: 
Whenever the police and headmen come, I never try to avoid them because I am 
not wrong. I feel shy because I am doing religious work and if the community 
members commit the crime, the police and headmen will definitely ask me, 
“Don’t you control them as their religious leader?” Although I try to control them, 
they do not listen to my words. They know I am responsible for controlling them 
but I don’t do it so they are mad at me. It’s not my business. It is the 
government’s business! (KK CL-2) 
 
It is not surprising to see this imam’s frustration. From his account, it appears 
government officials have thrown responsibility for security in this settlement to him and 
his religious means for order-making, and they blame him for his apparent shortcomings.     
 It is also the case that migrants do not always prefer to have their social problems 
dealt with using religious language or an appeal to customary or traditional ethics. This is 
especially true for those migrants working with women’s rights organizations. A resident 
of Htone Taung who works for a Burmese organization that provides social welfare to 
women and children attacked the use of religious or “traditional” language: 
Gender discrimination occurs because of the religious belief. The conservative 
thinking still influences Burmese people. For example, women are born for doing 
household chores and men are born for doing business. Women need to have a 
domestic habit to support their family after getting married. The qualities and 
abilities of women decrease after getting married because women have to do 
household chores and men have to find money. At that time, men think that they 
are the only ones who are responsible for finding money to support their family. 
Thus, they didn’t value their wives. (R5 HT CW-1) 
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To this participant, the use of religious doctrine to solve problems related to gender 
violence is a sign of traditions that need to be changed, not reinforced. 
 The fact that it is inevitably often up to Burmese community and religious leaders 
to try to restore order, issue justice, or piece back together a torn community in the wake 
of violent crime is no doubt a product of migrants’ precarity before the law. A Burmese 
lawyer working in Mae Sot told me that while intimate partner violence is a crime in 
Thailand, “the problem is that our Burman people do not have the capacity to solve the 
problem in the legal way. They cannot afford to wait, they cannot afford to do it.” He 
specified that this is because of fear (“if they hear about the courtroom, the police, then 
they are already worried”), money, and because they cannot get away from work (BLC). 
Thus, a lack of free and fair access to the criminal justice system relegates them to having 
serious problems solved—or left unsolved—by informal authorities who explain their 
work as more of a necessity than a choice or a desire for power.   
Because of the way religious texts have the potential to limit the rights of women, 
leaders’ reference to faith-based doctrines to solve domestic conflicts has serious 
gendered implications as well, as the participant who works with a women’s rights 
organization indicates. A frequent issue participants noted in this regard pertained to 
divorce. Several women recalled the pressure some religious groups (or groups who rely 
on religious texts) placed on victims to stay with abusive partners, citing Buddhist, 
Muslim, or Christian “custom.” That said, mediators interviewed who mentioned divorce 
not only referred to such doctrines, but also to their role and the role of organizations like 
theirs as not to separate people but to keep them together. In that this suggests a 
perception that divorce only leads to further social atomization and alienation among 
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displaced persons, the burden of social cohesion and unity ends up disproportionately on 
the shoulders of those who face abuse. In this sense, religion as a set of ordering 
discourses, constitutes a gendered response to the conditions of precarity.  
By placing the constructed nature of  “customary religious law” within the border 
context, it becomes possible to see how the reified assumptions and expectations the Thai 
state maintains about migrants resonates with the lack of access those migrants have to 
formal legal mechanisms. The result is a normalization and naturalization of migrants’ 
use of religious doctrine to solve intimate partner violence, as if it were actually preferred 
as a method. In this way, it becomes possible to imagine how precarity and displacement 
partake in the construction of traditions that are associated with a notion of a homeland 
even when such practices might be anything but standard in Myanmar.   
 
4.2 Gendered morality in a changing context  
In addition to references to religious texts to solve problems, participants 
deployed concepts of gendered hierarchies on multiple occasions. In certain instances this 
was in the context of describing how mediators discipline parties in a conflict. At other 
times, participants relied on gender categories and tropes to frame a discussion about 
changes affecting the Burmese population in displacement. I show in this section that 
both are important for understanding how central concepts of gender are to the way 
migrants make sense of their experience and develop strategies to ensure their wellbeing 
and that of their families.  
 
4.2.1 Gender and behavioral change 
PVA representatives demonstrate that their use of what they refer to as religious 
texts and “cultural guides”—the lawkaniti or lawkanniti-kyan—with key points to remind 
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men and women of their appropriate roles. These go hand in hand with exhortations of 
what religious laws offenders broke and what kinds of karmic punishments they can 
expect to face. In part the mediators indicate that their use of religious language fits what 
migrants like to hear, but beyond this, the gendered concepts of morality they espouse 
also seem to underlie much of their analysis of why violence has taken place and how 
couples can re-order their life to restore harmony. As such, I argue in this section that 
participants frame gender as a cultural concept in their efforts to foster a sense of 
community and make order. 
PVA’s reference to cultural guides refers to a collection of maxims recorded and 
revised over the centuries during the pre-colonial period. The Lokanīti was a Sanskrit 
language text including 109 sayings originating in India and then traveling to Ava (now 
Myanmar) possibly in the 15th century where it was translated into Pali and brought more 
into line with Burmese ethical beliefs, borrowing maxims from the Dhammapada and 
expanding to 167 stanzas (Sternbach 1963; see also Gray 1886).10 Another version of this 
text, the Niti Kyan in Burmese contains 211 maxims and, at least at the time it was 
translated into English in 1858, was thought to be in everyday use in monastery 
teachings, a foundational code of ethics in the precolonial and early colonial system of 
Burmese education (Fowle 1860). The collection contains chapters relating to “the wise 
man,” “the good man,” “the evil-doer,” “friendship,” “women,” “kings,” and 
“miscellaneous” (Sternbach 1963: 332). Some sayings include:  
38. A woman separated from her husband for thirty days endangers her chastity; 
73. A woman is the best and sweetest of blessings; 76. A good mother teaches her 
                                                
10 There is some discrepancy as to the number of maxims in the Lokanīti with Gray (1886) and Sternbach 
(1963) indicating 167 and Khin Win Kyi (1986) writing that there are 165 stanzas. This could be due to 
different versions of the text or numeration of the maxims.    
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son to speak fairly, and a good father teaches him to act honestly; 127. Trust not a 
woman who has separated three times from three different husbands; 134. A good 
wife is as a brother to her husband when he eats or dresses, resembles a sister in 
modesty when in private with him, a slave when he is preparing for a journey, a 
friend when in difficulties; she comforts him quickly to sleep, she attires herself 
neatly to please him, she forbears kindly when he is angry; 149. A man who is 
married and has a family, but stays at home without working, or exerting himself 
for their benefit, is lazy and good for nothing (Fowle 1860: 255-262).  
 
The Lokanīti or Niti Kyan, commonly written also as lawka niti, has remained a source of 
important sayings and is ubiquitous; with more recent editions written (Sein Tu 1962), it 
is printed as small booklets and widely distributed by the government and government-
associated groups (e.g., New Light of Myanmar 2003). While, because of its prevalence, 
it may not be surprising that mediators quote this text, it nevertheless indicates a clear 
strategy to maintain gendered order in this border context and not just a method to inspire 
reflection or to teach or maintain some aspect of Burmese culture. It suggests a particular 
interpretation of “custom” that happens to contain gender hierarchies developed over the 
last six hundred years.  
 The use of such gendered religious-moral frameworks in leaders’ efforts to 
resolve disputes was common in all four sites, though only PVA explicitly mentions the 
work of the Lokanīti. A 40-year-old Burmese woman in Htone Taung who occasionally 
manages couple disputes explained her strategy: 
A girl must understand her husband’s work. “When your husband gets back from 
work and calls you, this is your duty to make sure you respond. Maybe he needs 
to drink water, or eat rice, because those are your duties. Setting the bed is your 
duty. If he takes a shower, giving him a towel and longyi is your duty. If you 
fulfilled all your duty, then your husband, he won’t have any problem with you. 
He is responsible to feed you. He has a duty for your welfare. As he is responsible 
to ensure your wellbeing, listen to what he says as he also must listen to what you 
say.” That was how I handled their couple issue. (HT F2Fw-7) 
 
Though she does not refer to any particular text, her words practically mirror some of the 
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maxims quoted above. A couple in KM48 explains that they offer different moral 
guidelines to the man and woman; each one speaking to both. To the man, they appeal to 
his responsibilities as a father and his identity as a man:  
Female mediator: I tell him “You go gambling, you drink alcohol. You also have 
children and a wife. They also have to eat. You do not bring them food. Instead 
you ask her to find money for you to go gambling. So what do you think of 
yourself?” 
Male mediator: Here money problems are the most common so I talk about money. 
“Little brother, today how much did you spent on your alcohol? You still have a 
future to think about and about your health, too.” […] “Today, you worked and 
made 100 baht [US$3.00]. Little brother, you drank up 60 baht. Sometimes you 
may even drink up 100 baht with friends. Your wife at home has no food to eat. 
Your children at home have no food to eat so they will cry, and if they cry, can 
you put up with hearing it?” As a man, we discipline them in that way.   
 
For women who come to report cases or who are involved in cases to this couple, the 
male mediator refers to women’s responsibilities and duties, while the female mediator 
encourages the woman to be patient: 
Male mediator: And I say to her, “Little sister, it is not nice to behave in that way. 
Your husband is working to bring income so when he comes home your role is to 
cook and give him food. You have to treat your husband nicely. Keep every thing 
neat and tight. Treat a man as you should treat a man. Female roles must be 
fulfilled.”  
Female mediator: I try to discipline them as if I was them and this is how I would 
feel when I hear these words. The people here listen to me and that is why it 
works. What I say is listen to both the man and woman […] Then I will tell his 
wife, “Try staying with him for three months or six months. Then if you are not 
fine, come back to me. Then when she agrees, we make a promissory note for 
them. After we make promissory note they get together peacefully again. 
(UWMPP) 
 
While the tendency for authorities to apply such gendered narratives as 
disciplinary measures is significant in its own right for what it indicates about the types 
of ordering influences imposed on migrant minds and bodies in this context, it is 
important to further question their deployment. That is, what do the uses of such 
narratives say about tactics to manage and survive displacement? The particular 
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combination of economic logics, gendered norms and maxims, and references to 
social/community fabric in migrants’ narratives suggests that scolding offenders and 
victims to be better men and women is more than a tactic to resolve disputes according to 
a notion of tradition. Rather, I argue, it is a way of creating a sense of tradition to help 
strengthen ties, foster a sense of community based on shared values, and maintain order 
among a population on the move affected by poverty, separation, and displacement.  
  
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I show that migrants are neither entirely part of a market-oriented 
scheme for organizing transient people into workers from which employers can extract a 
maximum of labor power nor much subject to the laws and policies of Thailand. Yet, this 
is also not to say that migrants are fully beyond the law and reliant only on their own 
networks of power, including those from ethno-nationalist political groups operating in 
exile. Instead, I assert that the living and working conditions in which Burmese migrants 
find themselves signifies state boundaries, and the commonly held notions of sovereignty 
that go with them, fractured and multiplied into the heterogeneous global spaces of what 
Sidaway (2007) calls postdevelopmental geographies. The overlapping and sometimes 
competing sets of power relations that are evident in migrants’ narratives about dealing 
with social conflict suggest spaces and subjectivities that make use of, are influenced by, 
and transform market dynamics, state governing technologies, and informal social 
networks simultaneously. These arrangements, in their proliferation of hierarchies and 
modes of social organization reflect the unmaking and remaking of borders.  
I have argued that discursive power in this context is constantly in flux and 
always important. What becomes clear is that the border itself, with all of its diverse and 
contradictory technologies of governance and discourses inserts itself in all power 
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relations and imposes a sense of inevitability for the harsh conditions migrants face. This 
emerges as a perception of fixedness upon the people subject to border governance and 
their ways of ordering each other there. In reality, however, such structures and relations 
have only momentarily coalesced in that territory, a result of large-scale displacement, 
state regimes of power, and the demands of capital.  
Discourse about tradition, custom, and religion are all deployed on the border as a 
way to make order and assert community among Burmese displaced in Thailand. In the 
resolution of interpersonal social conflicts, particularly intimate partner violence, power-
brokers legitimize their methods through the circulation of discourse about morality and 
frame their work as traditional dispute resolution derived from village-level practice in 
Myanmar. Migrants and power-brokers within migrant settlements repeat memories of 
traditional life in Myanmar, referring to gender roles, Buddhist, Christian, or Muslim 
religious laws for families, and the importance of providing this moral framework for 
migrants. However, this ascribes less to contemporary lived experience in Myanmar and 
more to an image of cultural and religious pluralism constructed during the era of 
colonial Burma.  
I find that this discourse and the practice of resolving domestic disputes has the 
effect of instilling a homogenizing constructed narrative of “traditional” gender roles 
among migrants that overlooks ethnic, social, and religious differences. I find that this is 
a reaction to the perceived collapse of social fabric among Burmese people living in a 
context of migration and displacement. Thus, spaces designated as sites in a supply chain 
are also sites for the production of gendered identities that overlook an actual diversity of 
lives and experiences in Myanmar and that offer particular narratives for conceiving of 
one’s homeland. The way that such discourse is gendered has implications for the 
construction of particular migrant identities. Gendered discourse helps migrants make 
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sense of their experience at the same time it has an ordering effect. The conservative 
moral overtones reflect a kind of gender reaffirmation, re-asserting some idea of the 
traditional to keep together a social fabric perceived as torn (see chapter six for more on 
this) (McGuffey 2005). To the extent migrants adjust themselves and regulate their 
bodies on a biopolitical level in accordance with the circulating notions of custom and 
gender identity, they will also be living up to implicit standards of a migrant work ethic 
that coincides with the demands of mobile capital.   
While this suggests that migrants’ precarity plays a role in shaping social order on 
the border, the systems that materialize are not contained by or produced solely by that 
precarity. Rather they are unique forms that make their own borders in ways that go 
beyond the influence of global or regional supply chains as well as states’ efforts to 
regulate and contain people. In this sense it becomes possible to envision how the 
reterritorialization and resocialization work of capitalism does not always result in the 
iterative performative reproduction of itself and its dynamics in endless feedback loops. 
This leaves space for what Butler and Athanasiou (2013) refer to as dispossession 
without possession; the amelioration of some or all of the exploitative dynamics that are 
so common to displacement and dispossession today but in ways that do not reproduce 
existing class, race, or gender hierarchies that are intrinsic to advanced capitalism. To 
conceive of knowledge production and social formation in this way is to apply what 
Mignolo (2000; see also Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006) calls “critical border thinking,” 
which seeks to privilege and surface knowledges that have been subjugated by dominant 
historical epistemologies rooted in modernity/coloniality and reveal subjectivities that are 
of these hierarchies but that do not necessarily reproduce them. It is to subsume and 
redefine the conditions of precarity—and its historical roots in colonial orders (what 
Quijano (2000) refers to as the “coloniality of power”)—for the purpose of ascribing to a 
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logic not girded by modernist/colonial systems of knowledge.11 “What border thinking 
produces,” writes Grosfoguel (2008: 16), “is a redefinition/subsumption of citizenship, 
democracy, human rights, humanity, economic relations beyond the narrow definitions 
imposed by European modernity.” In this sense, the result of border thinking is 
Anzaldúa’s (1987) “new mestiza” and W E B Dubois’ “double-consciousness,” (Gilroy 
1993), which do not reject the oppressive structures and epistemologies that give rise to 
racialized and gendered categories, but rather appropriate and redefine them to assert 
decolonized identities with alternative local histories.   
All this is not to say that the formations of social order and the narratives about 
gender and community among Burmese migrants on the Thai-Myanmar border are 
necessarily evidence of “new mestiza” identities, or that they have a liberatory tone. 
Certainly, as this chapter has shown, migrants may be just as likely—if not more likely—
to reproduce as to subsume/redefine gendered hierarchies in the development and 
deployment of tactics to deal with social conflict. Instead, the point is to show that 
precarity, the logic of global supply chains, and the gendered hierarchies that have 
become intrinsic to them are constitutive forces within a complex system that do not have 
a monopoly on migrant agency and, in fact, can lead to unanticipated social formulations 
that make use of certain concepts and serve as important tools for migrant’ survival or 
struggle, just as they also further certain forms of domination. What this implies is that in 
their subsumption of extant hierarchies, modes of social organization born—at least in 
part—from the conditions of dispossession have the potential to have a decolonizing or 
resistive effect on certain relations or structures at the same time it can reaffirm or even 
strengthen other hierarchies. 
                                                
11 This relates to what Foucault calls an “insurrection of subjugated knowledges,”which is essential to his 
genealogical method (1980: 81-82).  
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Chapter 6—Communicative violence in the production of gendered borderlands  
 
1. Introduction 
 
As Judith Butler reminds us, gender is constantly in play despite its appearance as 
an already constituted set of identities (1990). That is, discourse and interaction 
performatively reproduce perceptions of fixed categories with stable meanings. Gender is 
made in the resonating and power-laden spaces between consciousness (cognition) and 
repetitive encounters (recognition). The spaces of displacement and those of mutated 
governance regimes, such as borders and economic zones along production networks, are 
places rich for the study of gender in flux. People are on the move, making new lives at 
the same time they grapple with the old; invariably migration and displacement reflect a 
tension between unmaking and remaking. The phenomenon conjures images of 
deracination and torn social fabric on the one hand and, on the other, reconstituted 
families, practices, and communities, stretched across space and time, not necessarily lost 
but always shifting in different directions that resonate with new relations of power.   
Gender is situated in this dynamic. In spaces of migration, gender is still, as 
always, performatively reproduced, but the demands of capital, the technologies of 
biopolitical governance, and the ungrouping and regrouping of people in collective forms 
of living and working force their way into notions and enactments of gender categories, 
giving life to changes and new trajectories. The study of such spaces shows that gender 
must be conceived of as a set of beliefs that cannot be unyoked from conceptions of state, 
homeland, morality, tradition, and order. Each is bound up in the other as migrants 
attempt to navigate their way in new lands. 
In what sense, then, is gender a tool to make meaning in a context of 
displacement? The question of how migrants make sense of where they are and where 
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they have come from is a topic that has defined much of the social science literature on 
migration in the last decades, from questions of identity (Waters 1999), to memories of 
an invented homeland (Malkki 1995; Turner 2010), to the politics of integration (Haller 
et al. 2011; Portes and Rumbaut 2001); livelihoods (Jacobsen 2005); and the formation of 
transnational networks (Faist et al. 2013; Levitt 2001; Vertovec 2009). Work on gender 
and migration has been quite varied across the disciplines, with calls for greater 
consideration of how displacement and movement affect women and men in particular 
ways (Indra 1999); analyses of the way that genders shift as a result of migration and 
transnational networks (Smith 2006); the intersection of globalized labor regimes and the 
reproduction of gender inequality (Mills 2003); the ways that migrants face interlocked 
hierarchies of race, gender, state, and supply chains (McDowell 2008; Ong 2000); and the 
dynamics of care and social reproduction stretched across borders (Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild 2002; Pearson and Kusakabe 2012). Such work is crucial for the way it 
brings to the fore the importance of distinguishing the different experiences men and 
women have had with migration and pointing to the gendered nature of violence, war, 
migration, and displacement.   
This chapter considers gender a productive force, following Butler’s school of 
thought, as I show that conceptions of gender among Burmese migrants in Thailand are 
part of a process of negotiating the challenges of a new and hostile place. Rather than 
presenting participants’ understandings of gender, I tease out the threads of gender-
making from the interstices and intersections of migrants’ attempts to make order out of a 
harsh and unwelcoming everyday life in factories, farms, and among the waste piles of 
capital’s invisible underbelly on the border. In particular, I am interested in how the 
socio-structural and interpersonal violence of the border space has a communicative force 
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for migrants that is linked to their performative production and reproduction of gendered 
meanings of displacement. This is to argue that just as practice and discourse produce and 
reproduce gender, these performatively constituted gendered identities are also then 
implicated in the way we see our world around us. In the context of the border and the 
lives of migrants, I look at how practices and narratives related to structural and 
interpersonal violence shape and are shaped by gender. Participants in this study rely on 
narratives of violence, including gendered violence, to make meaning of their 
experiences and the relations around them. At the same time, they refer to the encounters 
of daily life in a way that constitutes and applies certain notions of gender identity.  
In this sense, I bring together some of the cognitive dynamics of displacement, 
violence, and the fluid nature of gender to deepen an understanding of political 
subjectivation among Burmese migrants in and around Mae Sot. It is in this sense that 
notions of gender can come to be situated within realities constructed from amidst the 
iterative relationships among capital, sovereignty, and ethnic/racial identities. In such 
moments, it is possible to see the ways that the category “‘woman’ becomes the site of 
multiple contestations” (Skidmore and Lawrence 2007: 27).   
To lay out this argument, I start with a more detailed explanation of this chapter’s 
conceptual framework, putting gender work into conversation with violence as a 
discursive tool. I approach the topic of violence cautiously in this chapter; rather than 
looking at it head on in all its horror, I subject the topic to something of a sideways gaze, 
to reference Žižek (2008). Research on the Thailand-Myanmar border has, perhaps 
unwittingly, turned violence against Burmese migrants into a sort of spectacle of the 
grotesque through such an overwhelming focus on rights violations. While this 
dissertation is certainly at risk of doing the same, I attempt here to use my discursive 
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analytical approach to see how the conspicuous nature of violence narratives is involved 
in the gender work of the border and in the constitution of particular political 
subjectivities for migrants. To show how the literature reveals certain issues while 
ignoring others, in the next section, I briefly consider some of the ways that various 
studies over the years have conceptualized violence on the border. I then turn toward the 
discourse of violence that migrants deploy to explain their situation. I compare and 
contrast individuals’ articulation of everyday structural and interpersonal violence to put 
together an interpretation of how Burmese migrants in Thailand experience and make 
meaning out of precarity. I show the particularly gendered nature of both the violence and 
the perceptions it engenders. As beliefs about masculine and feminine identities feature 
heavily in migrants’ attempts to make sense of the violence in their lives, I also discuss 
how particular conceptions of gender help frame interpretations of everyday life. In that 
such gendered references can have a productive or shaping effect on migrants, I find 
similarities here to McGuffey’s (2008: 216-217) concept of “gender reaffirmation,” 
which refers to the way social actors “extract dominant conceptions of gender, race, and 
class from the macro world to interpret their personal experiences” as they recover from 
sexual trauma perceived as threatening to heteronormative gender identities.  
In the last part of the chapter, I look to the importance of collective memory for 
those negotiating the challenges of displacement. Following Malkki’s (1995) seminal text 
on this subject Purity and Exile, I consider how narratives of migrants’ past in Myanmar 
are, in fact, tools for making sense of the present in Thailand. Supporting the chapter’s 
argument, I analyze particular memories of sexual violence and its resolution as 
mechanisms that both help explain the experiences of displacement and reproduce a 
gendered framework of morality.   
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2. Genders in flux, violence as communicative  
 
This chapter builds on the work of scholars who regard gender as produced and 
producing; discourses, perceptions, and behaviors to be made iteratively at the same time 
they exert an influence to shape the nature of production networks (Bair 2010; 
Hewamanne 2008; Hoang 2014; Ong 1987; Salzinger 2003; Wright 2006). Such 
scholarship changes the way we see both gender and the systems and relations of 
capitalism. Neither are fixed; both are iterative and contingent in that they are involved in 
performatively constituting one another.  
2.1 Gender and capital: mutually constituting relations 
This includes analyses of the everyday practice and discourse of factory managers 
and workers as productive of ideas of femininity and masculinity that are situated in both 
local sets of norms and ethics as well as narratives of global capitalism (Bair 2010; 
Salzinger 2003; Wright 2006). Particular gendered identities arise from iterative everyday 
movements, exchanges, and practices in which social actors bring to life their self-
perception and the expectations they pick up on from others. That said, “gender 
domination is never a thing in and of itself” as these moments of practice and discourse 
are sites where multiple gendered “hierarchized domains” collide, including “the body, 
the family, civil society, the nation, and the transnational arena” (Ong & Peletz 1995: 4).   
One of these domains is the myth of the “disposable third world woman,” which 
Wright (2006) identifies as central to the ideology of contemporary capital accumulation 
and which is manifested in multiple different ways in different sites of production. Less a 
coherent set of ideas, the “myth” Wright discusses is more an agglomeration of disparate 
but often imbricated beliefs and norms pertaining to acceptable or appropriate treatment 
of women workers. Wright calls this myth a “productive technology” (2006: 12) that 
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managers attempt to enforce in various ways rooted in their individual assumptions, the 
demands of their firm, and other intersecting hierarchies linked to race and class. As 
such, these ideas help to justify a certain level of direct or abstract violence inflicted upon 
women’s bodies and minds; violence for which women subjected to this myth are 
considered ultimately accountable (Wright 2006). This technology is productive in that it 
leads to the interpellation of identities linked to ideas of disposability, femininity, and the 
“Third World.” Similar to this is De Genova’s (2002) notion of deportability, which 
refers to the pervasive collective rationalization of harsh treatment to migrants and the 
normalization of technologies of expulsion under the logic of legality. This is a set of 
discourses and practices that effectively reproduces certain migrant identities; even as 
people on the move subvert such treatment and restrictions, they respond to this dominant 
characterization. 
Despite the manifestation of these gendered narratives and discourses wherever 
migrants and capital accumulation operates, Mills (2003) reminds us that the dynamics of 
production do not create the same gendered ideas everywhere. Rather, employers and 
workers invoke diverse interpretations of feminity and masculinity as they voice logics of 
recruitment and discipline or conceive of modes of resistance or autonomy. Yet, in this 
way, concepts of gender among workers and managers shapes the dynamic of individual 
production sites, lending a diversity to the manifestations of capital accumulation. 
Moreover, it is possible to resist certain gendered narratives encountered on the factory 
floor while reinforcing others (Wright 2005). This is because any given individual must 
negotiate multiple levels of gendered expectations and identities simultaneously in ways 
that intersect with race/ethnicity, class, nationality, and geographical location/origin 
(Hewamanne 2008; McDowall 2008; Mills 1999). These intersecting hierarchies lead to 
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the types of inequality that enable migrant work to be characterized with such social 
violence. Both men and women migrant laborers encounter this violence as refracted 
through varying expectations of masculinity and femininity. In this sense the production 
of gender, capitalist relations of power, and migrant experiences are intertwined.   
This chapter also places emphasis on the ways that gender is an important 
framework for understanding shifts in the everyday experiences of migrants. That is, an 
analysis of varying gender ideologies can provide a lens for understanding differences in 
the dynamics of settlement and return for men and women (Hochschild 1989; Smith 
2006). In this chapter, my focus is primarily outside of work hours as I analyze migrants’ 
discourse about life at home and in their communities, though I still consider these to be 
sites and dynamics embedded in and affected by the relations of production. This is 
because as “capital is driven to deliver higher productivity and profitability” and as labor 
assumes greater risk and flexibility, “a growing number of precarious workers are unable 
to support a household, and under these circumstances, the capacity of labor to reproduce 
itself becomes uncertain” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 90). Putting these ideas together, 
I suggest that as the dynamics of capital in border spaces like Mae Sot contribute to the 
production and reproduction of certain notions of masculinity and femininity, it is also 
the case that these identities then shape various perceptions of experiences and 
knowledges in that border space. This is a view of gender and other hierarchies as 
mutually constitutive.   
2.2 Making meaning and producing gender through narratives of violence 
Because of the prominent place violence has in narratives in and about Mae Sot, it 
is important to include and theorize its role in this context. Specifically, I consider how 
discourse about violence is a means to offer certain representations of gender, and how 
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this discourse is also a way to make sense of gendered practices and experiences. To 
write about violence as productive in this way is to analyze it for its communicativity, to 
look at what it reveals about the relationships among individuals, families, communities 
and states. As Rosalind Morris (2006: 59) explains, the communicative power of 
violence: 
…may be contained in the family or staged in the public realm. It may 
demonstrate the presumptive immunity of the [perpetrator] to the state’s 
interventions or call the attention of the state to its own inadequacy. It may 
express the solidity of patriarchal authority as the absolute right to exercise force, 
or it may be a means for asserting sovereignty in the face of competing and 
uncertain claims to power. And this is true of all violence. 
 
That is, even as sexual violence always involves a violation, the communicative force of 
violence shifts temporally and spatially in ways that are contingent on broader social 
factors, including widespread structural violence and precarity. Key to this form of power 
is the visibility or invisibility of violence. Visible violence is in the public view and 
threatens repetition and memesis, while “acts of violence may [also] express power 
precisely to the extent that they prohibit their own revelation,” including the violence of 
the home and that which is perpetrated by the state in a covert manner (such as torture or 
disappearance) (Morris 2006: 79). The power of both often manifests itself in the 
language of morality. Sexual violence that is visible can be a symbol for many things, 
including a lack of law; for being beyond the law; for a lack of social mores, structures, 
or community cohesion to prevent such abuses from happening.  
Thus violence of this sort—and its visibility or invisibility—is imbricated with the 
production and reproduction of gendered subjectivities in multiple ways. Gender 
ideologies intersect with the representation of sexual violence as individuals and 
collectivities overlay horrific acts with moralized interpretations of good women and 
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good men (Das 2008). As well, in the state’s interpretations of and responses to domestic 
violence, which often articulate boundaries between privacy (home) and public (the 
state/community), authorities (whether state or otherwise) reproduce gendered notions of 
acceptable and unacceptable violence. In the realm of the visible, sexual violence, such as 
that depicted in the scenes of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq that were captured in 
photographs by British and US torturers themselves, can serve as a tool for stripping 
humanity through acts of emasculation (Razack 2005). For those who find themselves 
surrounded by multiple forms of violence (e.g., structural, collective, and interpersonal) 
and labeled as victims or as violent themselves, Das (2007b) asserts that the 
conceptualization of this violence as ordinary or everyday often manifests itself as a fear 
of potential aggression that allows for management and certain forms of gendered 
governmentality.  
  In this sense, I use discourse about domestic and community-level violence to 
frame political subjectivity and personal agency vis-à-vis the state, employers, cross-
border networks, and the law.  In the context of the Thai-Myanmar border, migrants 
discuss violence as a symbol for their gendered position before the law and for a lack of 
social structures and community cohesion to prevent such abuses from happening. Power 
is also imbued in discourse about migrants and violence, whether from scholarly and 
NGO research, the state, or society in the sense that such discourse tends to normalize 
violence among this group as a result of culture or social dislocation. Crosby and Lykes 
(2011) explain how it is possible for “expert” discourse to reify gendered images of 
victimhood at the same time that individuals who have faced abuse in the past can 
transgress these images of powerlessness to claim an empowered survivor identity. Such 
contested relations are part of what inevitably constitutes migrant identities, because is in 
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this sense that, as Morris (2006: 80) writes, “sexual violence often erupts in the abyssal 
space between personal agency and political subjectivity.”  
2.3 Mythico-histories, feminine visibility, and images of order  
 A particular manifestation of violent narratives that surface on the border and that 
have a communicative effect are those relating to memories of life in Myanmar. Burmese 
migrants’ accounts about order, displacement, and the gendered resolution of disputes are 
rich with references to “home” as an analytical category distinct from “away” in 
Thailand. Discussing “memory” here, I refer to the social and collective narratives 
migrants produce about gender identity and dispute resolution in Myanmar. Rather than 
debating whether or not these are factual histories, I refer to Halbwachs (1992: 40), who 
wrote, “the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present.”   
Viewing memories as social constructs, it becomes possible to consider the ways in 
which individuals and groups can use interpretations of the past to negotiate the present 
as well as how the present dictates the nature of recollections of the past (French 2012).   
Moreover, in recent decades, scholars have increasingly recognized the centrality 
of collective memory to discussions of how societies move forward in the aftermath of 
both individual and mass violence, constructing particular narratives of the past and 
erasing others (Hayner 2002; Moon 2009; Rosenblum 2002). Thus, I am less concerned 
with analyzing individual memories and more interested in learning what the recollection 
of past experiences and realities pertaining to violence says about the present and about 
gender. This is to look at memory as discourse that is individually produced through the 
process of personal telling, and collectively significant for the narratives they generate.   
I consider it important to engage with participant’s recollections and comparisons 
between life in Myanmar and life in Thailand as I view such narratives to be what Malkki 
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(1995: 54) calls “mythico-histories,” that is, “a set of moral and cosmological ordering 
stories: stories which classify the world according to certain principles, thereby 
simultaneously creating it.” Such a concept is useful here because it enables an analysis 
of memory as socially productive. This is, in part, the nature of myth, which, as Asad 
(2003: 29) writes, is “not merely a (mis) representation of the real. It [is] material for 
shaping the possibilities and limits of action. And in general it appears to have done this 
by feeding the desire to display the actual.” By being grounded in the work of memory, 
mythico-histories partake in the interpellation of certain gendered identities as they 
invoke a fabricated interpretation of the past to order the reality of the present through the 
imposition of certain perceptions and hierarchies (Althusser 1971). In the context of 
migration and capital accumulation, these narratives of memory normalize and help 
explain current gendered power relations in the wake of displacement in terms that make 
sense of present conditions and assert dominant perceptions of how to survive (Wright 
2006).  
 
3. A place rife with abuse: Mae Sot under the lens of research 
Much of the scholarly research and studies conducted by NGOs about Burmese 
migrants in Mae Sot over the last ten to fifteen years has made note of abuses migrants 
experience at the hands of multiple actors, including police and other security officials, 
employers, landlords, smugglers, and brokers, to name a few (Amnesty International 
2005; Arnold and Hewison 2006; Zaw Aung 2010; Campbell 2013; Caouette and Pack 
2002; Human Rights Watch 2010, 2004; Kusakabe and Pearson 2010; Pearson et al. 
2006; Pearson and Kusakabe 2012a,b; Robertson 2006; Saltsman 2012, 2014). Migrants, 
particularly those without documents, are subject to harsh treatment by Thai security 
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officials, such as extortion, verbal harassment, or even physical violence, which often 
take place at the approximately half-dozen informal checkpoints set up in and around the 
town (Human Rights Watch 2010). Thai authorities have been linked to the trafficking of 
Burmese women into the sex trade and men into the fishing industry (Feingold 2013; 
International Labor Organization 2013; Leiter et al. 2006). Afraid of arrest and abuse by 
authorities, migrants often rely on unscrupulous smugglers who sometimes extort them 
for all their money or put them into dangerous or even fatal situations (Gjerdingen 2009).   
In 2008, the Labor Rights Subcommittee of Thailand’s National Human Rights 
Commission found that: 
[W]hen migrant workers appointed a representative to bargain about wages or 
welfare, the employers harassed them, discretely arranged for physical attacks 
against them, had them arrested and charged with criminal offenses, and as we 
always found when there was bargaining taking place or a dispute within the 
factory, called in the police to inspect the workplace ([translated from Thai] 
NHRC 2008: 194, quoted in HRW 2010: 91).   
 
In this sense, collusion between Thai security forces and employers is not uncommon.  
As noted earlier, employers often deduct from workers’ wages for police protection fees, 
making it a matter of agreement between them and police as to when raids take place. A 
2010 report by Human Rights Watch contains a succession of tragic stories describing 
employers’ physical abuse of their workers, especially in the context of negotiations for 
compensation (see for example, pages 88-94). 
 Research on this topic portrays such a dire situation for Burmese migrants in Mae 
Sot that it is hard to imagine why they might stay and continue to work there at all. 
Results from the FIC study in 2011 show that 15 fifteen percent of undocumented 
migrants and 11 percent of those with documents reported experiencing harassment by 
authorities or employers in 2010. Compared to reports that compile page after page of 
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abuses against migrants, this statistic might seem low. Most migrants have not 
experienced direct harassment or physical abuse by authorities. Nevertheless, a more than 
one in ten ratio for harassment by authorities or employers is more than sufficient to 
ensure that migrants remain aware of the prevalent risk to their safety. The statistical 
information presented here does not refute the qualitative data of so many reports and 
studies, which, it is important to note, do not claim to be representative. Rather, I find 
these quantitative data enhance one’s understanding of the situation by enabling a 
contrast between abuse experienced and a more ubiquitous fear of that abuse. Indeed, in 
this dissertation’s qualitative research with more than 150 individuals, few reported 
physical abuse at the hands of authorities, employers, or others, but 64% articulated in 
unequivocal terms their fear of arrest, deportation, and violence.  
With much research focused on the abuse migrants experience at the hands of 
authorities, there is a gap of information available about social conflict and interpersonal 
violence among and between migrants. A series of UN and NGO reports in 2006 
attempted to address this gap in terms of the refugee camps, and there is some data about 
violence against women in migrant areas. According to a 2006 survey of close to 2,300 
refugees in three camps (Mae La, Ban Mai Nai Soi, and Ban Mae Surin), three quarters 
of camp residents identified problems related to alcohol consumption as a key protection 
concern, and 60 percent pointed to the threat of physical violence (IRC 2006). Between 
2003 and 2006, 350 protection incidents were reported to the UN refugee agency 
(UNHCR), showing an increase in reporting of domestic violence, rape, and physical 
assault (other than rape) (UNHCR 2006). In a 2010 “mid-term” assessment, IRC found 
that 15 percent of refugees experienced violent crime in the two years prior to the survey, 
12 percent experienced family disputes, six percent cited debt and loan issues, and four 
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percent mentioned gender-based violence (IRC 2010). Only two percent mentioned abuse 
by camp authorities (who are refugees themselves) or by Thai authorities. This reflects a 
similar situation outside the camp, as documented by the FIC study, which notes that ten 
percent of migrants (including registered and unregistered) mentioned experiencing 
physical assault in the previous 12 months by a variety of actors, including authorities but 
also by gangs, people within their communities, or family members (Saltsman 2011). 
Reporting is extremely low amidst fear and mistrust of officials (International 
Commission of Jurists 2012; IRC 2011).   
Research suggests widespread prevalence of gender-based violence and exclusion 
from basic social services for Burmese migrant women (IRC 2011; O’Kane 2006; Maung 
and Belton 2005). However, many women often do not seek treatment or report abuse out 
of fear of being blamed, mistrust of the Thai justice system, or because of cultural biases 
against accessing family planning services (Hobstetter et al. 2012; Leiter et al. 2006; 
MAP 2010). In addition to workplace abuses, research indicates widespread intimate 
partner violence in migrant communities on the border (Caouette et al. 2000; Maung and 
Belton 2005). Because of low reporting, and due to challenges in accessing isolated 
migrant worksites, there is no statistic for the number of migrants who experience such 
abuse.   
All this underscores the importance of looking at how migrants experience and 
interpret the violent places in which they are situated. By doing this, one starts to see how 
violence-inspired fear might push migrants to make interpretations about space and to 
give meaning to stories about incidents of brutality in ways that render such acts 
communicative in important ways (Morris 2006). One also sees the overlap between the 
structural violence of migrants’ living conditions as well as their precarious legal and 
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employment statuses. My goal in putting interpersonal violence into conversation with 
structural violence here is not to make a causal argument, but to show how the two are 
intertwined with one another in terms of how they shape migrants’ perceptions of the 
people and space around them. Relying on migrants’ accounts and narratives to highlight 
this connection between the local and personal, on the one hand, and the broad and 
systemic, on the other, addresses an important gap in the literature cited above. This is 
because it shows that interpersonal violence is neither an isolated phenomenon nor 
merely a product of cultural trajectories. 
 
4. Representations of perceptable violence: the power of fear 
 Qualitative analysis reveals that migrants sometimes wavered between talking 
about violence in great detail and sometimes hesitating to discuss it at all. While some of 
this variance was between participants, with some more forthcoming than others, it was 
more often the case that this difference arose depending on the topic. That is, there were 
certain forms of violence that seemed to leap out of people’s mouths—even (or maybe 
especially) when co-researchers had not asked specifically about violence—while other 
types of conflicts or incidents remained hushed. In this section, I focus in particular on 
the forms of violence that participants wanted to make more visible for co-researchers, 
and I ask what their communicativity means in this context. I find that dividing results 
between the rural and the urban sites helps convey some of the subtle differences in 
migrants’ experience between Phob Phra and Mae Sot.    
Urban sites 
In general for migrants in Thailand, a lack of legal status puts one at great risk for 
many different kinds of harm. In some cases, even being registered does not protect 
people from threats to their safety and wellbeing. Participants cited both the risk of 
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encounters with police and the prevalence of robbery and violent crime all around them. 
Direct encounters with authorities and individual as well as collective fear of violent 
gangs or police framed migrants’ perception of their world and their options. In Htone 
Taung, some participants were aware of violence near them, but this was usually 
perceived as violence outside their neighborhood. Htone Taung is seen as a relatively safe 
place, besides the need to remain vigilant about avoiding police. There, the fear is of the 
outside, including police, thieves, drug addicts, gangs, traffickers, Thai male teenagers 
roaming the streets, and others. Participants from Htone Taung were generally afraid of 
police and delinquent outsiders, as compared to Kyuwe Kyan where there is a palpable 
fear of people in the neighborhood or in adjacent areas. In Kyuwe Kyan, a lack of legal 
status inspired widespread fear of authorities, and residents there also perceived 
dangerous social problems related to drug consumption in their neighborhood.  
Raids on workplaces or houses, which, in turn, lead to extortion at police stations 
or deportations mean that even spaces migrants considered safe or personal spaces are 
subject to disruption and violation. One participant recalled that not long before the 
interview: 
The police tried to catch a guy who did drug trafficking. That guy ran into our 
dormitory and police checked the people in the dormitory and they found that all 
of us don’t have legal documents. So, police arrested all of us in the dormitory. 
(HT CW-1) 
 
Because of incidents like this, unregistered men and women participants explained that 
everywhere in Mae Sot is dangerous for them. They reflect that over the years they have 
become habituated to fleeing when they think the police might be around the corner. 
When police come to their neighborhood, “All of us are afraid,” one male participant in 
Htone Taung said. “Even though we have passports, we try to stay away when we hear in 
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advance that the police will come to our section” (HT FGDm-2). The excerpt above 
indicates that law enforcement practices sometimes ignore formal distinctions between 
legality and illegality, treating all migrants as lawbreakers. Such pressures force thinking 
about safe and unsafe spaces to inhabit.   
 These references to fear show that violence can have the effect of laying virtual 
boundaries all over Mae Sot. In addition, violence becomes more intimately involved in 
shaping the political subjectivity of migrants.  As the following excerpt illustrates, 
migrants take in stories of murder and crime and make meaning out of how police 
respond, interpreting their place vis-à-vis the state in a high-crime landscape:  
They do drug trafficking and kill people. Last summer, women and a child were 
killed. Last month, one man was killed in that dormitory. Because of these cases, 
police come to our quarter frequently. This is not our country so we can’t do 
whatever we want. Police don’t value Burmese people’s lives. (KK CL-2) 
 
In these words, one finds a sense of frustration with both the high level of murder 
and other types of crime in the area and the role of police who come to the neighborhood 
when such violent crimes take place, but who, according to this imam, do not respect 
Burmese people or value their lives. As this segment from an interview illustrates, 
multiple participants in and out of Kyuwe Kyan referred to this neighborhood as an 
extremely dangerous one. They brought up the regular occurrence of violence there.   
One sees how participants both articulate fear of multiple actors simultaneously as 
they explain how they have to shift their movements to avoid such problems. For women, 
this produced a particularly constraining environment. One of the participants who was 
robbed expressed the fear she felt after that incident, noting, “From that time on, I was 
afraid whenever I heard the sound of motorcycles. I dared not bring my mobile phone or 
money when I went out. But it is impossible to go out without them [and] so it happened 
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to me again” (HT FGDw-1). Women participants also recalled their strong sense of fear 
of police. This pertained to police raids as well as incidents when migrants run into 
checkpoints. As one woman in Htone Taung mentioned: 
R1: In the past when they were caught, they would be released by paying 100. 
Recently I went out for changing something and I was caught. I was asked to pay 
3,000 to 4,000 but was released with 1,000. So I am not happy to go out. If I need 
something I just try to find it around here. If it is important I go to the big market 
and sometimes I am not caught. We have to be afraid of going out like that. 
I1: So people in the community cannot go freely because they are afraid that they will 
be caught by the police? 
R1: Yes, the situation is like that. 
I1: So can women and young women go out of this community? 
R1: Those who have documents go out, those who do not have documents do not go 
out very often, only if there is some important issue, they go out. (HT F2Fw-2) 
 
Given the wages of participants in Mae Sot, the amounts mentioned in this excerpt can 
equal more than a month’s salary. While most participants mention having to pay the 
police bribes between 100 and 500 baht at standard checkpoints, several did mention such 
larger demands. A participant in Kyuwe Kyan mentioned that just the day before her two 
children were returning from work and when police stopped them, they each had to pay 
1,500 baht, more than ten days wages. Another participant, a woman in Kyuwe Kyan, 
mentioned, “I was imprisoned twice for 45 days. I was arrested by police when I went to 
sell watercress” (KK FGDw-2). Putting these words into context, one understands that 
migrants are caught between an immigration system structured to keep them flexible, the 
challenges of surviving as low-wage undocumented laborers, and local actors who 
simultaneously enforce the law and abuse their power.   
When asked to articulate particular areas that generated fear, during the 
community mapping exercise, participants tended to refer to the entry points and other 
places along the perimeter of the community. For example, a group of women in Htone 
Taung discussed recent incidents in their area: 
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R6: The robbery happened at the entrance road to Mae Sot Hospital. Necklace was 
robbed at that place. People heard that one girl was shouting for help but they 
couldn’t find the criminals. It happened yesterday. 
I: Where was it? 
R3: Here. That road is also called Oo Htote Road. That road is the worst. Oo Htote 
road and the hospital road are the same.  
R2: There is no light. My purse was robbed near Kaw Yone last one or two years 
ago. Money, wallet and mobile phone were robbed. It happened around 2pm. 
I: Where is Kaw Yone? Is it located on Oo Htote road? 
R4: It is located at the back of Mae Sot Hospital. This place is the front of Mae Sot 
Hospital, but that area is at the back of the hospital. Here is the road, which is 
located at the back of the hospital. I was robbed at that corner […] 
I: So can people go freely in this area? 
R1: It is impossible at night. But it is possible to use this road in the morning. Police 
do arrest though. All people are afraid of using this road. Parents don’t allow their 
children to go this place. Even they need to use this road, the parents allow them 
only when adults accompany them. 
R3: They’ve heard that rape cases have happened in the past. They are also afraid to 
be shot by criminals. (HT FGDw-1)  
 
While both men and women encounter the same constraints, the threat of sexual violence 
and pressures on women to manage the domestic arena mean they face an added risk 
when they are robbed or arrested. The mention of rape was a frequent occurrence in 
women participants’ stories of threats to their safety in surrounding areas. Participants 
mentioned whole areas that are off limits, demarcating hostile spaces according to the 
assumed presence of police or criminal outsiders. In one case, a participant in Htone 
Taung pointed to Kyuwe Kyan and explained that women in particular should not go 
there “because there are so many amphetamine users there” and the participant worried 
“that they might rape the women. Sometimes, they rob the guys or fight with them too” 
(HT F2Fw-5).  
Several discussed  murders and rapes that had taken place over the years—
including quite recently—in the neighborhood or nearby. The images conjured up in 
these narratives are disturbingly detailed and full of meaning. At least three participants 
discussed one case in particular: 
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Previously, the married girl was raped and killed at Myay Ni Road. We went and 
saw [their bodies]. She was a Karen girl. Her husband was also killed. They put 
the sticks into her vagina by hitting. As they are Burmese, what law will take care 
of them? They also have no relatives. If their relatives were here, they would open 
the case for them. We won’t feel anything bad if they did like this to a beautiful 
rich young girl with relatives. But, they did it to the couple that collected plastic 
for their livelihood. Her husband was disabled and she suffered mental illness 
sometimes.  (KK F2Fw-6). 
 
Other stories participants in both Htone Taung and Kyuwe Kyan told were in a similar 
level of detail. As this story does, the others also contained moral lessons to imply themes 
of justice and injustice, victimhood and power, violent life and death, isolation and 
alienation, legality and illegality, and right and wrong. The moral themes of justice and 
injustice and legality and illegality underscore migrants’ perceptions that they are on their 
own in Thailand and that they have no recourse to justice. Like the story above, the group 
of women in Kyuwe Kyan expressed that this sense of impunity is particularly acute 
when the case involves poorer migrants, such as waste pickers: 
R2: Some people don’t have shelters or food to eat. So, they collect plastic. They live 
and eat beside the road. They sleep in any kind of shelter they find. So, they are 
raped and killed when they meet with criminals. Boys are also robbed and killed.  
R3: They take money if they find money.  
R1: Then they also harm people.  
R2: Previously, a wife was raped and both husband and wife were killed.  
I: When did this happen? 
R2: It happened recently. That couple collected plastics. They were killed.  
R4: They died and they didn’t get anything.  
I: What do you mean they didn’t get anything? 
R3: I mean we haven’t heard anything about that case; nobody arrested the culprits. 
(KK FGDw-1) 
 
Stories of rape punctuate such statements as the epitome of violation and erasure 
of sovereignty in the absolute negation of consent. In this, women’s vulnerability comes 
to symbolize the hardship and marginality of migrants. Participants in Mae Sot evoke an 
image of an extraordinarily violent world for migrants there, especially those who are 
undocumented. Subject to arrest and extortion by police, they are also at risk of theft or 
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worse at the hands of perpetrators they often vaguely refer to as “criminals,” often Thai 
or Burmese gangs. And one thing participants make clear is their sense that they do not 
have access to justice within the Thai legal system. These conversations and narratives, 
which invoke an image of violence on almost mythical proportions, convey migrants’ 
sentiment that they are on their own in Thailand where they are subject to many 
predations. Without anybody to look out for them, they must take care of themselves.   
Rural sites 
The communicative power of violence that I refer to in the previous sub-section 
applies in the rural area of Phob Phra as well. Participants in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam 
and KM48 highlight in particular aggressive men from other ethnic groups who prey on 
young Burmese women. They also note the predations of corrupt police. The isolation of 
Phob Phra weighed heavily in migrant conversations. Fear and accounts of assault, 
particularly rape, take on a tone of legend passed through labor camps and shaping the 
way migrants’ see their work sites and the broader world around them.  
 As in every other community, residents of KM48 expressed fear of the police. 
They describe running away from police when raids take place or just when police come 
near their area. There is a police box (small station) in the middle of KM48 so the police 
are a regular presence here. As a monk in KM48 noted, it is not always necessary to fear 
the local police who have built a relationship with the migrants, especially the community 
leaders, over time. This relationship is often transactional, like with a protection racket. 
In some cases migrants must pay directly and in others, their landlords or employers 
make such payments and add the amount to the cost of rent or deduct from wages. The 
real problem with police, one community leader said, is with those who come from the 
outside, who are not local. In such cases, the monk explains, “If the authorities from the 
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other areas come and check here, then migrants have to run and hide. This is one of the 
big problems for the migrant workers who are here” (KM48 CL-3). In Pyaung Gyi 
Win/Rim Nam, a group of men discussed the dangers they perceive when police come to 
their area: 
I1: What do people here do when the police come? 
R4: All run away.  
R3: If they were coming now, we would have to run. 
R2: We had to run away even in the funeral service because the forest rangers come. 
When his [pointing to R3] father passed away, we had to run away during his 
funeral service.  
R4: If we do meet the police, we dare not talk with sign language or stand face to 
face with them. Sometimes, they shoot at us.  
R5: If we think we can escape, we can run. If not, we shouldn’t run and stand with 
our backs to them. If we do, they will shoot. 
I1: Have you experienced this? 
R4: Yes, one of my friends was arrested when we ran away together.  
I1: Do they shoot— 
R2: Mostly, they do not shoot. They kick, punch, and hit them when they catch them. 
R3: We have to keep our head down and sit when we are arrested.  
I2: If you run away, they kick or shoot you. If you do not run away, they do the same. 
So, why do you run away? 
R2: The reason to run is that if arrested, they will send us to Myawaddy and we may 
be sold to human traffickers or we at least have to give money on that side.  Police 
have contact with them— 
R3: If we were deported to 999 gate1 on the Myanmar side, we would have to pay at 
least 1,500 baht or 1,700 baht— 
R4: If we cannot pay, we will be sold to human traffickers— 
R5: In addition, when we come back to this place again it is difficult for us too. We 
have to give 100 baht to each checkpoint. (KM42 FGDm-2) 
 
This account conveys a clear image of the multi-layered fear migrants in this area have of 
police and other local authorities. It is not clear from this discussion if authorities actually 
beat or shot at these men, but what is significant here is the extent to which notions about 
                                                
1 The mention of 999 gate here refers to one of the main piers along the Moei River just outside of Mae Sot 
where Thai police deport Burmese migrants. Previously, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) 
managed the gate on the Burmese side, until they were absorbed into the Border Guard Force in 2010. 
Research has noted frequent abuses of deportees at this gate, with those who cannot pay sometimes 
subjected to forced labor or sold to traffickers (HRW 2010; HRW 2012).  
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such violent treatment at the hands of authorities and the powerless position of migrants 
has been interpellated as an awareness of status and life in Phob Phra. This pervasive 
narrative of vulnerability is also present as individuals consider possible recourse for 
traumatic experiences.  
Important also to note in the previous excerpt is the mention of trafficking, as it 
relates to the total abnegation of an individual’s agency through the loss of one’s freedom 
of movement and autonomy. It contrasts with the notion of smuggling, which, in referring 
to a “choice” made by migrants to travel illegally, contains an element of agency.2 KM48 
lies near to well known smuggling and trafficking routes where agents and brokers bring 
migrants from Myanmar or elsewhere on the border to major urban areas, especially 
Bangkok. Participants referenced the prevalence of both trafficking and smuggling, 
expressing fear of brokers who operate in the area. A highly gendered term, when the 
men in the previous excerpt mention the threat of trafficking upon being deported, they 
are stressing, in a sense, the possibility of humiliation, loss, and emasculation. For 
women, on the other hand, the discourse on trafficking often refers to forced sexuality, 
the subsequent loss of morality, violated bodies, and victimhood. As Adrijasevic (2007) 
notes, there is something violent about this representation of violence in the way it 
reproduces certain gendered hierarchies. A leader among migrants in KM48 village told 
interviewers a story of a girl who had been trafficked to the center of Thailand and then 
raped by brokers when she was trying to return to the border. He stated that he and others 
in the area try to… 
                                                
2 The notion of choice here is a complicated one and needs to be considered in a way that takes into 
consideration the set of constraints on individuals who, under various forms of duress, might be choosing 
the “least worst”option from among a series of unpleasant possibilities.  
330 
…stop [girls] not to go there by crossing that jungle to Bangkok. But they don’t 
care and some come back crying and we help them for medicine and they go back 
home. Sometimes we have to rent private cars to sent them back to Myawaddy. 
Sometimes Thai authorities then arrest the girls and make them to be like their 
wives. At that time we steal them back, hide them, and sent them to Myawaddy. 
(KM48 CL-2) 
 
Within the language describing the trauma of trafficking and rape for young girls, there is 
a disciplinary undertone to the speaker’s words in that he emphasizes the warning he 
issues to young women, their disregard as they leave the safety of the community for the 
hands of brokers, and the consequences in the form of sexual violence—potentially at the 
hands of multiple actors, including police. This reinforces the sense of gendered morality 
affixed to the notion of trafficking in which women who break the rules get raped and 
therefore are, at least in part, to blame for their own victimhood. With this interpretation 
in mind, the speaker’s words, which note the role he plays in rescuing the women—
stealing them like property—imply a sense of saving women not only from traffickers, 
but from their own ethical errors. At another point in the interview, this leader indicates 
that from what he sees, issues related to trafficking have decreased in recent years, as has 
the smuggling of amphetamines through that area. He attributes this to the departure of a 
particular gang that was engaged in both human and drug trafficking as well as an 
increase in avenues to gain legal status for migrants. Nevertheless, his words are effective 
in conveying a sense of the types of violence prevalent in his area, how these impact the 
men and women there, the informal ways in which he and others responded in an effort to 
save their fellow migrants, and how these mechanisms come with gendered implications.  
As the previous excerpt shows, participants frequently made an effort to articulate 
the involvement of authorities in trafficking and the sexual abuse of migrant women in 
order to highlight the inversion of ethics and their place before the law. In a discussion 
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about safety, some participants contrasted employers and police, illustrating how 
employers are sometimes patrons who protect migrants against the predations of the 
police who might wish to arrest or extort them. At such moments in the discussion, 
participants overlook the fact that employers do not register their workers, keeping them 
vulnerable to arrest and deportation. This is telling about the migrants’ perception of the 
police, the law, and their place vis-à-vis the state.   
When asked how he thought communities should respond in the event of sexual 
assault against women, a teacher in Rim Nam answered: 
I have seen a lot of cases like that. They have problems with reporting to the 
police since they do not have any legal documents. And then, they just come here 
two or three days after the rape, and say they were raped so we don’t really know 
how to help them. At that time, we had no idea how to handle her health. Yes, we 
can manage to send the case to the authorities but the girl was afraid to see them 
because she does not have any documents. This is happening everywhere. In the 
end we have to solve this with our traditional way, going to the village’s midwife. 
Maybe, these girls have to drink a kind of herbal liquid. We are not doing any 
legal action, but just protecting ourselves. We are so afraid to go closer to the 
authority’s area, let alone take action against them. Because we do not have any 
legal documents [silent]. (KM42 CL-1) 
 
Such words state clearly the complicated position of people who experience rape in this 
context as well as those migrants who attempt to provide assistance to them. The 
precarious state into which migrants entered when they crossed into Thailand, both in 
terms of government policies and the everyday work of local actors, leaves migrants like 
the speaker and the women in his story in a space of limited options that is defined by 
violence. This last excerpt also reflects the ways in which people make certain decisions 
about care based on an assessment of choices, which is structured by the violence of 
precarity. In the excerpt above, the teacher implies that the only way to respond to the 
rape of women in the community is to try to help them get an abortion through 
“traditional” means. 
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More than the police, however, it is primarily criminal gangs, drunk men from 
other ethnicities, and drug addicts who feature heavily as sources of danger in 
participants’ descriptions of fear and violence. Stories about these actors largely serve to 
constrain women in their movement and behavior. One community volunteer recounted 
her own experience witnessing her son being assaulted by “local drug users.” They “hit 
my son with their liquor bottle against his head” (KM48 CW-1). This incident reminded 
her that, “It’s not safe for women and children to go out at night at this area, especially 
behind the anamai [sub-district health office].” A community leader in KM48 reinforced 
this notion, saying, “Girls cannot go freely, especially at night, even within our village. If 
we went out, we would have problems. Even we men have problems. A lot of Thai, 
Burmese, and Myot drunkards.” When interviewers asked what the participant thought 
about migrants in this area going outside the parameters of the village, he answered, 
“Cannot! Even worse. We would have to face with robbery, cutting of heads and neck” 
(KM48 CL-1).   
While actual experiences with violence differed from compound to compound in 
KM48, in both the latter and Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam, participants circulated similar 
archetypes of bad and dangerous characters lurking outside the boundaries of a village or 
property. From this perspective, staying isolated and even locked in a house or compound 
appeared to many as an ideal response to avoid such a threat. No interviews or 
discussions suggested that narratives of fear and danger circulate purposively among 
migrants in this area, or that this constitutes anything like a deliberate tactic on the part of 
employers or leaders to control their workers. Yet, it remains the case that the production 
and reproduction of violent discourse in this way takes a complex context and boils it 
down to a few pairs of effective dichotomies with gendered implications. Inside a 
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landlord/employer’s compound and outside; safety and danger; community (Burmese) or 
foreign (Thai, Hmong, or other). Such binaries make it easier for people to understand 
their circumstances, what constraints lie around them and what tactics are best for 
protection. But at the same time, so much violence seems to also communicate to many 
migrants that their best hope to earn an income, keep it, and be safe is to be a good 
worker and stay in the labor camp.   
As in urban settings, both men and women are at risk of violence. But in both 
settings, I also find that stories serve an especially cautionary role for women. In Htone 
Taung and Kyuwe Kyan, the threat seems to be rape and murder. In Phob Phra, rape is 
also a threat, but particularly as a result of trafficking or the behavior of “others” from 
outside. While these narratives serve to emphasize vulnerability, in all four contexts, 
there is ambivalence as well, placing some responsibility on women to constrain 
themselves or face the consequences. The solution, then, at least in part, is for feminized 
workers (both women and emasculated men) to not stir up trouble. I include men in the 
category of feminized workers because unspoken in participants’ stories is the notion that 
harsh treatment towards men has the effect of harming their masculinity; for women who 
experience abuse, these narratives reify their vulnerability. In this sense, communicative 
violence is implicated in the interpellation of productive gender identities.  
 
5. Interpersonal violence, displacement, and gender identities 
 While the last section focused primarily on violence participants rendered visible 
during interviews and focus group discussions, this part deals with a more intimate level 
that was not discussed in the same terms. It was not the case that participants covered up 
the issue of domestic violence. Rather, the narratives of the previous section emerged 
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first and in great detail when co-researchers asked about challenges or problems in the 
community. It was only when co-researchers asked specifically about the prevalence of 
domestic violence that participants began to talk about such trends. This is not surprising 
for at least a couple reasons, one that is linguistic, and the other normative. In terms of 
language, as discussed in chapter three, the use of the more official or academic term in 
Burmese for violence “ajanpet mhu” by some co-researchers before they tried the more 
colloquial phrase “yaigt,” referring to “beating,” may have motivated participants to 
share incidents that stood out to them as grotesque and horrific. Though it appears telling 
that a pattern emerged in this study in which participants tended not to frame spousal 
abuse as a form of violence, this dissertation does not delve deep enough into the 
linguistic nature of the terms to interpret the meaning here.  
The second point is related to the first. Domestic violence is, by definition, 
intimate and private, and is therefore less likely to be spoken of. Scholarly research has 
covered well the tendency in most places to silence domestic forms of violence (e.g., Das 
2008). Co-researchers and other activists interviewed for this study repeatedly noted that 
this is the case on the border as well. That said, intimate violence appears as 
communicative in this context in its own way, more in the form of gendered moralities 
that both serve an explanatory role in making sense of displacement as well as a 
prescriptive function, guiding men and women in particular ways in order for them to get 
by in this challenging space.   
Reflecting this dynamic, qualitative analysis reveals a set of four salient themes 
that emerge from the interview and focus group discussion data about interpersonal 
violence. These are: (1) identifying links between precarity and violence at home; (2) 
discourse about gender identities as a way of explaining intimate partner violence; (3) 
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gendered morality as explanatory of displacement; and (4) discourse reflecting the 
everyday level of brutal violence. I find that across all four of these analytical categories 
are important moral messages that imply participants’ ideas about how the violence 
around them or in their households communicates certain tactics for how best to negotiate 
the difficult circumstances of displacement. That is, through accounts of and explanations 
for violence, migrants articulate certain gendered moral guides for how they can make do 
in this precarious context.   
(1) Identifying links between precarity and violence at home 
 
 Most common among participants’ interpretations of intimate partner violence 
were references to how precarious labor and living conditions constitute an environment 
in which interpersonal violence erupts more easily. In the words of a woman in Kyuwe 
Kyan, “If they have work, they are fine. But if they don’t have work, at that time there is 
a conflict between husband and wife and they beat each other” (KK F2Fw-1).   
 Framing intimate partner violence around migrants’ insecure circumstances adds 
a layer of understanding to how precarity impacts individuals and households. 
Participants in all four sites invoked images of couples arguing because of a lack of 
sufficient resources for the family’s survival. Such accounts are structured around certain 
gendered roles that generalize and caricaturize migrant identities, as the following 
example shows: 
Some husbands do not give enough money to their family. For instance, their 
household expense will cost 200 baht but they give their wives only 100 baht. So, 
their wives are unhappy and then they put the blame to their husbands. After that, 
problem grows bigger and bigger. If the wives can’t find the money to support 
their family, the situation is getting worse. They borrow money from the others 
without letting their husbands know. As a consequence, they have to pay a lot of 
debt. Even I do not let my husband know how much I borrow from other people. 
If I have 1,000 baht [in debt], I told him that I have 700 baht in debt. This is 
because I do not want to give him a burden to repay debt. […] Sometimes, 
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creditors arrive at their home when they get back from work. At that time, 
husbands know the real amount of debt. Then, problems happen. (HT F2Fw-3)    
 
To this participant, violence stems from an untenable situation at home. Implicit here, 
however, is the notion that husbands are the primary earners and that wives manage the 
finances. Both fall prey to a context in which wages do not amount to enough for the 
couple or the family to survive; the man does not earn enough and the woman cannot 
spread the income thin enough to cover expenses, incurring debt. Keeping the borrowing 
and the debt secret here reflects a reluctance to make financial problems known and also 
a desire to maintain the image of a competent partner. Thus, the burden to reproduce a 
perception of stability in an environment where stability is impossible falls onto women 
in this situation. To the extent that migrant households are single-earner, that this earner 
is a man, and that women often fulfill the role of managing the family’s finances, this 
explanation of how violence arises also reveals the pressure on such women. Reflecting 
different needs, choices, and likely different gender ideologies, in many cases participants 
describe situations where partners both find work, where there is not a similar notion that 
households must be male-earner only. However, even in such cases, participants explain 
that violence can happen when men place dual pressures on women to earn income 
alongside them and to play the primary role in household management and care.  
 Also ubiquitous in participants’ accounts of how economic and social conditions 
relate to intimate partner violence is men’s dependency on alcohol. Alcohol featured in 
interviews and focus group discussions as a primary trigger for violence at home. Often 
noted together with these accounts of drinking is the mention of how wasteful men spent 
hard-earned money on whiskey and beer instead of the family. In Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim 
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Nam, a 40-year-old woman explained why violence takes place in households in her 
camp: 
I will tell you why. They get 100 baht per day. If they drink one bottle, it costs 
sixty baht. If they drink a half bottle, it costs thirty and the cost for food is forty 
baht. So, both expenditures are seventy baht and nothing is left for the family. 
These are the common problems happening here. (KM42 F2Fw-2) 
 
Participants considered drinking to be a common response for men to the hardship they 
experience. They noticed that when the harvest season ends in Phob Phra and work dries 
up, drinking and abuse increase. “When there are many jobs here,” a community leader in 
KM48 said, “there is no problem. When there are no jobs, the problems start, men will 
drink. If husbands drink and there is no income and no savings, the wives start blaming 
the men” (KM48 CL-2). The narrative here of a drunk, abusive, and wasteful man is 
imbued with expectations of masculinity met and unmet. Men are failing in their role of 
earning income, but they are behaving in a masculine way by being aggressive. When 
community workers in Htone Taung agree that “most of the domestic violence is caused 
by business; if the women can make money like men, it can dispel the domestic violence” 
(HT CW-1), they are espousing an idea for an improved situation in which both adults in 
a household enter the workforce. In the border space, this means becoming flexible labor. 
Thus, at times, those individuals proposing solutions to intimate partner violence 
sometimes take as inevitable migrant precarity just as they often take as inherent the traits 
and roles of men and women. 
(2) Discourse about gender identities in accounts of intimate partner violence   
 
 As the previous section begins to suggest, migrants’ accounts about intimate 
partner violence and solutions to that violence are intimately tied to discourse about 
gendered notions of what it means to be a man and woman migrant. At the same time, 
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discourse about gendered identities is shaped by the context of structural violence in 
which migrants find themselves. Above, participants made reference to a seemingly fixed 
set of relationships between gender and certain roles or behavioral traits. Here, I show 
how participants’ narratives associate the challenges of life in border space, the demands 
on laborers to produce constantly for low wages, and moralized notions men and women. 
For a participant in Htone Taung: 
If everything is fine, the married life is prosperous. If there is a business problem, 
the conflict between the married couple happens. Wives totally depend on their 
husbands and when their husbands can’t fulfill the basic needs of the family, the 
problems are happening (HT F2Fw-1).  
 
The language of fulfillment of a family’s basic needs here derives from the participant’s 
assumption that women are dependent on men for income and that, therefore, men have a 
particular duty. In reality, laborers face a number of instances in which they might not 
receive pay. Workers are laid off, employers do not always pay employees, workers 
strike and forego pay, and the harvest and planting season ends. And yet, it is possible for 
others to interpret the end result as unfulfilled responsibilities.    
 Men participating in a focus group discussion in Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam 
considered a story about a man in another site who does not meet standards of 
masculinity. “He doesn’t live like a breadwinner,” they said, “He depends on his wife and 
does whatever his wife assigns him to do. He is always drunk. Therefore, she beat him” 
(KM42 FGDm-2). The common roles of aggression and violence are reversed here as the 
woman in the couple physically assaults her husband who is a drunk, who presumably 
does not earn enough income or any at all, and who is dependent on his wife, instead of 
the other way around. Being passive (to his wife) and his lack of income seem together to 
portray the man in this excerpt as feminine, a point underscored by the action of abuse 
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the wife committed against him. Other components to the “bad/weak/unreasonable” man 
include: 
Men’s focus group discussion: Htone Taung 
He gets married and he doesn’t do any job. He spends his wife’s income. He 
doesn’t do any household chores. He doesn’t take care of his children. His wife 
has to do household chores after she gets back from work. He also beats his wife 
after drinking alcohol. (HT FGDm-2) 
 
 Men’s focus group discussion: Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam 
The husband wastes all of the earnings by drinking alcohol. There is no saving in 
their families.  (KM42 FGDm-2) 
 
 In-depth interview (woman): Kyuwe Kyan 
They told their wives that doing household chores are the wives’ responsibilities 
and working to support the family is their responsibility.They assign them to fill 
the tank for taking a shower when they come back from work. Although they love 
their wives, they order their wives to do household chores with power. They are 
the breadwinners of the families and their wives have to fulfill the responsibilities 
of wives. (KK F2Fw-3) 
 
These excerpts convey both what these caricaturized men are lacking in terms of 
masculinity as well as what the ideal is. Important points here are that men should be 
good earners and respectful. If they cannot fulfill their role of earning, at least they need 
to help out around the house. Thus, good men are fair and willing to share duties. Taking 
a part in childcare and household chores does not affect their masculinity, as long as they 
are also earning sufficient income. In Kyuwe Kyan, a 22-year old woman contrasts the 
image of a bad/weak/unreasonable man with the idea of a dutiful and appropriate woman: 
“I think the women play an important role in reducing the conflicts. As wives, they have 
to do household chores and fulfill the responsibilities of wives” (KK F2Fw-3).   
The point here is that migrants often seem to frame violence between partners or 
the way to prevent that violence in a way that refers to some idea of fixed gender roles. 
But, while this may or may not be surprising, these notions of gender cannot be untangled 
from the social and economic reality in which migrants find themselves. Thus, I suggest 
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here that these accounts of genders as fixed to identities and responsibilities are sites 
where the insecurity, injustice, and inequality of the border context is displaced as 
migrants project a hardship they do not deserve onto themselves as men and women 
striving impossibly toward some goal of “tradition.”   
(3) Gendered morality in a context of displacement 
In addition to guiding migrants toward behavioral changes through reference to 
gendered identities and hierarchies, participants also used notions of gender as a 
metaphor to convey important principles about the individual and the collective in a 
context of displacement and liminality to make sense and explain their context. These 
moments took place in descriptions of dispute resolution as well as participants’ 
explanations for why gendered violence happens.   
The head of a migrant social welfare organization in Mae Sot elucidates the 
relationship between gender and a sense of tradition, loss, reassembly, and change in his 
analysis of migrant conditions and his explanation of why intimate partner violence is 
especially prevalent on the border. In terms of his understanding of how interpersonal 
violence intersects with why migrants come to Thailand, he explains: 
Why are people poor? For example, why can’t a [Burmese] family stay in their 
house while others can? Because we have no food to eat. What does the father do? 
Drink alcohol. Hitting, beating up others in the family. Mother has to go out to 
work. I will tell workers, “Why must you become slaves in another people's 
country? This is slavery. Doing the work for others. The work that they do not 
want to do. These things happened because there must be a criminal behind it. 
You guys must cross the border to come here because there are criminals. 
 
In terms of intimate partner violence, he then highlights five reasons. First, he points to 
the trend of family separation that comes with migration and displacement, men and 
women leaving their families behind, entering new relationships without mentioning their 
pasts, and then turning on each other when they become aware that they have violated 
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certain mores (“You are not virgin!?” “You are not virgin either and you are a father of 
how many children already?”). Second, the transient life style of Burmese migrants in 
Thailand leads to promiscuity and conflict. Women get in and out of relationships too 
easily:  
Some of them have family or relationships not even in their own village [in 
Myanmar] but just in another factory in Mae Sot. Stay with a man for one month 
[…] No parents around them to watch over. So they live as they like and then she 
moves to another factory. 
 
In this example, men get jealous and conflict between ex-partners, current partners, and 
the “promiscuous woman” ensues. The third point, related to the first two, deals with the 
contentious dynamics of second or third marriages and dysfunctional stepfamilies. A 
fourth reason underscores increased alcohol consumption and gambling as a source of 
domestic violence. Men return home drunk in the evening, having spent most of the 
family’s money on alcohol only to find that their wives blew the rest on the lottery. The 
result: conflict and occasional violence.  Finally, the head of this organization points to 
the pressure irregular employment places on the family: 
Construction workers and farmers, unlike factory workers, do not have work all 
the time. Then they do not have money and wives complain, “I want to have 
money. Other people go to morning market, Sunday market, Wednesday market 
but I cannot go. Why don't I have money?” Then the wife says, “Why don't you 
look for another job?” Husband said, “No I only want to work with my current 
employer.  Now there is no job for four, five days so just wait.” “No I can't wait,” 
said the wife, and then domestic violence happens.  
 
Within his short analysis of Burmese displacement and these five reasons for 
intimate partner violence, the speaker moves from a narrative of displacement linked to 
corrupt and abusive leaders—the criminals he mentions—to a loss of tradition and the 
destruction of a social fabric built on kin networks, to the pressures on the family 
generated by insecurity and the financial challenge in which many migrants find 
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themselves when working in Thailand. Throughout all these points, which are politically 
nuanced and include both structural as well as micro-level explanations for violence, the 
speaker emphasizes certain views of masculinity and femininity. The effect is to offer a 
gendered lens on displacement and migrants’ struggles for survival in border zones. In his 
analysis, the use of gender serves as a trope for talking about change, loss, and 
destruction. It thus lies at the heart of both explanations for current conditions and 
theories for how migrants must behave to survive those conditions. As authorities and 
migrants performatively assert certain gendered identities through this discourse, the 
intersection of gender with messages about tradition, community, and loss bears 
implications for how migrants make meaning out of their experiences and forge distinct 
subjectivities in this border space.   
(4) Discourse on everyday brutality 
 
 A final significant theme in the discourse on violence is the extent to which it 
sometimes seemed to fold into the everyday lives of participants; that is it did not stand 
out as an exceptional moment. This is not to say that participants were not significantly 
affected by violence—far from it. But, as participants explained, violence happens all 
around them to the extent that they are not surprised by it, have come to expect it, and 
have found ways to navigate it in the same way they manage other challenges of life. 
This is certainly the case with the structural violence of everyday encounters as it related 
to migrants’ living situation and access to basic services. Excerpts in previous sections 
reflect the extent to which migrants have come to anticipate acts of violence from 
authorities and often employers as well. Living in close quarters, some participants also 
seemed quite familiar with the regularity of domestic conflicts, and they, especially 
women, incorporated this aspect of their lives into their relationships with each other. As 
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I show in this section, participants’ discourse reflecting the everyday nature of this 
violence demonstrates their development of tactics to get by within a particular set of 
opportunities and constraints. 
In the Htone Taung neighborhood, a 38-year old woman noted that violence 
perpetrated by men against women in couples is common. When asked if she was aware 
of intimate partner violence, she answered: 
Yes, it happens. They beat their wives during the conflicts. But they have to save 
their children’s face so they reunite after quarreling. If they decide to divorce, 
they know their children will face trouble. There is some quarreling that happens 
in this community but within a few minutes, the husband and wife reunite. As 
husband and wife, they can’t resent and hate each other. (HT F2Fw-1) 
 
Such a response serves as an exemplar among the many different references to domestic 
violence. This is because the participant mentions intimate partner violence but within the 
same account, notes how spouses return together almost immediately out of consideration 
for their children. While the welfare of children is often on the minds of individuals stuck 
in an abusive relationship, migrants in this border space must contemplate the challenges 
of a separated family in an especially precarious environment, which often tends to 
narrow their set of choices. Women participants commented that they coach and support 
each other on how to respond to violence in their household. Some participants 
encouraged their fellow community members to leave abusive relationships, while others 
tailored their informal counseling to the survivor’s socio-economic status. For example, 
“We asked her ‘can you divorce him? If not, don’t leave your home.’ We told her like 
that because she could not divorce him” (KM48 F2Fw-6). Another participant explained 
that she tried to help some women stay together “because they can have food for only one 
day after they have worked for one day. If they don’t go to work and don’t get money, 
they will suffer more” (HT F2Fw-3). Only if the situation became too serious, involving 
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grievous bodily injury or a threat of death would some participants be willing to support 
the idea of separation.  
The response to that violence fits directly into their consideration of the options 
they have available to them. As a 40-year-old woman in Htone Taung put it, “Don’t fight. 
Don’t argue. Don’t find cause to hate one another. We need live together in someone 
else’s country” (HT F2Fw-7). In this space of violence, one of the safest options is to 
stick together, sometimes at the expense of an individual’s wellbeing. This, however, 
means women subverting to some extent their bodily sovereignty in exchange for 
household or communal order. 
Feeling unprotected by the formal justice system and aware of frequent 
occurrences of interpersonal violence in their labor camp, a group of women from 
Pyaung Gyi Win/Rim Nam illustrate the way that violence begets more violence in this 
space. When asked how other migrants respond to interpersonal violence around them, 
they engaged in a lively back and forth, mixing seriousness and humor: 
R1: We will just shout at each other not to do this or to do that. 
R2: If it is getting serious, we will make a call as we have many mobile phones here. 
We tell them [the offender] that we will report it to the border patrol police.3  
[Everybody talking at the same time] 
R1: I am getting tired of beating people around here. 
R2: Last time a man burned a house down because he was mad at his wife. We tied 
him up in front of her house. 
R1: He kept on calling me “mom” and I asked him to shut up. I don’t know how he 
untied himself. I really wanted to kill him. 
[everybody laughs] 
R3: We all beat him and threatened him to put him in the fire. 
                                                
3 When one of the participants mentions the border patrol police above, she is actually referring to the 
house of a Thai man who works with the border patrol police (Tor Chor Dor) and whose property lies 
adjacent to Pyaung Gyi Win. Participants identified him as a power broker who took care of security in the 
area from time to time.   
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R1: We kicked him out of the village. But one of his relative begged us and said he 
would take responsibility so we let him back in. Even if you beat them, only your 
hand will get sore…just like beating a dog, they never listen. (KM42 FGDw-1) 
 
This conversation relates to three key points. First, it depicts a violent scene in which 
bystanders to intimate partner violence reacted with their own violence by beating and 
tying up the offender. In most cases, participants note they will only respond if household 
violence disrupts community life. Second, the conversation reflects some link between 
acts of violence, the response to that violence, and participants’ perception of their labor 
camp as community. One woman, quoted above, explains that they expelled the offender 
from “the village;” and by village she is referring to the Pyaung Gyi Win compound 
where migrants live and work for the landowner. This raises the question of how such 
resonating acts of violence contribute to the constitution or perception of precarious 
worker space as a community place. Finally, this excerpt serves as an important example 
of agency in which migrants—especially women migrants—often portrayed as powerless 
demonstrate their will to act, and do so according to their own methods, albeit violent 
ones. All this suggests an imbrication of violence on multiple levels with the forms of 
sociality on which migrants rely to get by and make order. 
 
6. Mythico-histories and gendered memories of order  
 
  In the case of Burmese migrant labor camps and neighborhoods on the border, 
there is no one narrative about home or Thailand. Nevertheless, through the heterogeneity 
of experiences and recollections, certain salient themes emerge to communicate migrants’ 
conflicting gendered perceptions of community, displacement, and order. The focus on 
difference here, as opposed to homogeneity, underscores the diverse and constantly 
shifting context. 
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 During peer interviews, co-researchers did not ask participants to recall their lives 
or experiences in Myanmar. Nevertheless, it was not uncommon for participants to refer 
to Myanmar in a variety of ways, including to compare between their homes and life in 
Thailand, or to share personal observations or beliefs, as the following excerpt  from a 
woman in Htone Taung shows: 
R: Can’t I talk about my experience in my village? My experience about violence.  
I: You can.  
R: There was a couple, they were both single. They are cousins but they love each 
other so much and finally she got pregnant. The girl lives in Yangon but came for 
a visit to our village where the boy lives. Then they liked each other and met each 
other everyday in the rice fields and finally the girl got pregnant. The boy didn’t 
take any responsibility for the girl. The girl committed to God and delivered a 
baby boy looking exactly like his father. The girl sued the boy and was able to put 
him in jail […] If the boy married the girl, his brothers and sisters said they would 
cut him out of his inheritance. “Don’t marry her. Stay with us, all your brothers 
and sisters together.” He obeyed his eldest brother’s wish so he caused trouble to 
this girl. […] They are my relatives and I witnessed this violence with my eyes.  I 
heard if this kind of case happened here people just kill him, in Thailand. If you 
ruin a girl you will be killed. (HT F2Fw-8) 
 
This narrative, like many that participants told in the course of interviews or group 
discussions, is rich with imagery and allegory, and it serves two important functions. 
First, the participant stresses two aspects of a social system migrants often express they 
do not have in Thailand: kinship networks and inheritance. Many participants refer to 
sibling, parental, and extended familial relations as a primary component of governance, 
not only but especially in rural Myanmar. The speaker implies a mechanism of control 
and hierarchy whereby elders exert power over others and bear responsibility to ensure 
obedience and respect among all for the rules, customs, and laws of society. Some 
migrants note that the absence of kinship is linked to the possession of a freedom from 
tradition, which allows for people to relate to one another without the watchful eye of 
family or community. In many migrant narratives, they portray this freedom negatively; 
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as something that inevitably gets women—and sometimes men—into trouble. However, 
in the memory shared above, kinship networks did not stop an unmarried pair of cousins 
from becoming involved sexually with one another or the girl from getting pregnant. 
Rather the participant suggests that the obedience of the boy to his siblings caused a 
problem for the now pregnant girl.  Nevertheless, the function of this network as a firm 
but intimate level of order-making is abundantly clear.   
 A second function of the narrative is in the comparison between Myanmar and 
Thailand. The participant explains that the methods for dealing with this violence in 
Myanmar—family interventions and a lawsuit that puts the boy in jail—are different 
from the severe way the boy would have been dealt with in migrant communities in 
Thailand without access to the justice system that migrants had in Myanmar. Saying the 
boy would be killed in Thailand may be hyperbolic (most accounts of problem solving do 
not end up with murder, though some do end with a mob-like attack on the perpetrator), 
but it serves to underscore an element of lawlessness in the perception of migrants in 
Thailand. Thus, the image of informal capital punishment in Thailand reflects the 
communicative power of violence. In fact, the whole story is a metaphor for violence in 
multiple forms. The speaker points especially to the violence of abandonment as the 
supreme act of injustice and suffering in the story, though this act lies in contrast to 
another image of violence, that of a lawless killing of the perpetrator. The comparison 
here is important because it illustrates an ambivalence that is fundamental to the 
narratives of many participants in this study, between a perceived change to tradition that 
grants more independence to young women and a complete loss of rules that allows for 
vigilante justice and revenge. Indeed, other participants highlighted this contrast, one 
reflecting on a hypothetical victim of rape, “Although we want to help her, we can’t help 
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her here in Thailand. If she were in Myanmar, we could do something” (KM42 FGDm-
2).   
The speaker from the longer excerpt above leaves us with the image of an 
abandoned pregnant Burmese woman in both Myanmar and Thailand since she leaves 
open the possibility that such an act could occur in both places. This implies that the 
speaker considers how certain gender dynamics may not change between Myanmar and 
Thailand; men still run away and women can still be abandoned. However, the contrast 
between justice manifested as legal in Myanmar and as a revenge killing in Thailand tells 
us that the context in which abandonment takes place has shifted. Instead of abandonment 
as a result of familial power and justice in the courts, we find both the boy and the girl 
abandoned by order and law. While the speaker victimizes the girl in this story, she also 
sanctifies her decision to become a nun and “give herself to God”; this act of good in 
response to sin lies opposed to the act of violence committed by the boy in response to 
the same sin. Establishing this sense of moral and immoral reactions to improprieties, the 
speaker implies that justice is done for violence committed in both Thailand and 
Myanmar, via the courts in one case and a mob in the second.  
Moreover, the image of inheritance in this story is not only a thing that siblings 
can withhold from the younger brother, but a metaphor for home and ownership in a 
traditional sense that, as noted above, is starkly missing for Burmese migrants in 
Thailand. All this indicates a perceived displacement of the source of suffering and 
gender inequality from the realm of tradition to the space of the border and its dynamics 
of uncertainty and flexible labor. Thus, in this sense, the speaker uses the past and the 
present to build a narrative of memory that appears to reflect on current conditions 
through a lens of gendered morality (Malkki 1995). 
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 Comparing this participant’s memory with that of others, a pattern emerges 
around a series of binaries such as good versus bad, moral versus immoral, and order 
versus disorder. Below I take the themes that emerged in the story above and consider a 
set of excerpts from four participants, two women and two men, discussing order and 
justice in Myanmar and Thailand. I find that through comparison, the two male speakers 
have a different way from the female speakers of integrating gender into their points 
about governance and lawlessness.   
The first segment comes from a Burmese lawyer working on migrant rights in 
Mae Sot. He recalls a rape that took place in his hometown of Mawlamyine when he was 
still a student before leaving for Thailand.   
 Segment 1 
R: When I was there, I saw one rape case. As much as I remember. The woman was 
more than eighteen already. She was about twenty-one. So that girl was mute […] 
One day in April during Thingyan [New Year water festival] a drunk man who 
was an officer got into the house of the mute woman’s older brother who is also 
an officer. Went to visit. The officer went with his other friends, too, but he was 
the only one stayed afterward. When the rest went to across the road and were 
having fun, suddenly a screaming voice was heard and then people ran to see and 
saw that the officer was on the top of the girl. When his longyi and her clothes 
were tested, the result was rape.  
T: Can you say what kind of officer? 
R: To tell the truth he was the legal officer. He was the secretary of legal office staff.  
And at that time, I was a student of law […] I was working in that legal office too. 
Police came and arrested that little man. The little woman was sent to the hospital 
and they got evidence. After that, the man was sued in court and all evidence 
showed that it was rape. I saw what was going on—he was called to talk in front 
of the judge, other people had to give testimony. This case happened in the 
section I was living in and was dealt with in the legal office where I was working 
[…] After the court process, he was jailed for 3 years or 7 years…I don't 
remember…It is totally different compared to here. 
I: That's what I want to ask you actually— 
R: Yes, so the differences between here and there is: this is not our own land so it is 
easier for offenders to avoid [justice]. There [Myanmar] they cannot avoid. The 
house of the offender is known so even if he is not at home, he must come back. 
He cannot avoid it. There, we have section leaders who take close responsibility. 
Here we do not have such a thing. Not only section leaders but also Hseh Ain 
Moo. So control is more systematic. There, they have parents for both sides. Not 
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only parents but also brothers and sisters. So you are in the frame of rules. So, 
anyway, here there is freedom and that freedom allows people to commit crime. 
And I think the crime can be more. (BLC). 
 
While not a witness to the incident, this participant explains his proximity to the case. 
The offender was his senior colleague as was the brother of the victim. It is hard to 
imagine how this crime could not have torn through the legal office where the participant 
worked at the time, disrupting relationships and inspiring self-reflection. The participant 
mentions that he attended the trial and observed justice in operation, though he does not 
recall the length of the sentence for his colleague. Yet, the woman the legal officer raped 
remains in the background of this story. She is doubly mute, presented only as a woman 
unable to speak who is raped; her wellbeing and survival after the incident is unheard and 
invisible. The story is clearly less about her and more about what was done to her, the 
rape and the rapist taking center stage in the memory at the expense of the survivor. 
The story renders the act of rape communicative. An act of aggression during 
Thingyan, a holiday known for a kind of controlled disorder when “routine codes of 
deference to authority are suspended temporarily” (Philp and Mercer 2002: 1,594), the 
rape is metaphor for the crimes that happen in non-legal spaces. Like the act of 
abandonment in the first narrative, the rape in this story is the pivot upon which the story 
turns to make a comparison between Myanmar and Thailand. In response to such a crime 
in Myanmar, the victim goes to the hospital, medical staff and authorities are concerned 
with the evidence, which is later presented at court, and the offender faces the full weight 
of the law. Additionally, the speaker refers to the attachment of individuals to a place as 
well as the social and kin networks that function to make order in Myanmar, what he 
calls “the frame of rules.” In Myanmar, a rapist cannot escape because he is known—that 
is, he is not alien, and people recognize him in terms of where he works and lives and 
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who his relatives are. A rapist is caught first and foremost by his inability to escape his 
fixed place in society and community. However, in Thailand, rape may occur at any time, 
not only during the New Year holiday, because for migrants, the border space appears to 
be a space always outside the law. And in Thailand, when it comes to the Burmese 
population, offenders can get away, disappear over the border or elsewhere with nobody 
able to accurately identify or apprehend him. This is because it is possible to remain 
unknown. To be detached from one’s networks and unaccountable to one’s parents or 
relatives constitutes a kind of freedom, as the speaker suggests, but it is a negative 
freedom to get away with horrible crimes. As another participant put it, “in Burma people 
stay in their communities where authorities are assigned from the township to the section 
levels. So things are firmer. Here nothing is firm” (UOHMPP).  
Like the story of the two cousins at the beginning of this section, the speaker uses 
memory here—this time of a rape and how it was dealt with—to make contrast between 
life in Myanmar and migrants’ conditions in Thailand. And in a similar fashion, the 
speaker drives the point home through binary, a useful literary tool: order opposes 
disorder and familiarity contrasts with anonymity, the world of the alien in a foreign land. 
Such contrast reflects the use of memory to bolster the portrayal of the Thailand-
Myanmar border space as lawless and in need of order. Though he is recalling life in 
Myanmar, his story calls for greater governance on the border, and it does so not only 
through the use of references to law and social networks, but through a certain 
construction of gender as well. At the center of the binary is the nameless, voiceless 
victim who can be raped in either Thailand or Myanmar, just like she can be abandoned. 
In this sense, this story is told in a way that denies agency to women but subjects them to 
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the violence of dislocation and the ensuing disorder, reinforcing the role of “woman” as a 
symbol of both suffering and the need for order and community structures. 
A second quote comes from one of the co-researchers. Though it is less in the 
form of a story, it describes the practice of dispute resolution in the speaker’s home town 
in the suburbs of Yangon: 
 Segment 2 
I: So I wanted to ask you a little bit like…um…how did people deal with GBV 
problems in your neighborhood?  
R: In my section I saw disputes between couples. Then their neighbors would scold 
them. If they didn’t stop, the section leadership would come and talk to them; 
solve the problem for them. Sometimes they came and just said “Hey, will you 
guys stop or not?” then the conflict ended. The section leader has power. When 
they would arrive at the section office, both the wife and husband would be asked 
what happened. After they would hear, then they [leaders] would point to each of 
them and say, “You don't do this again. You don't do that again. If you do it again, 
next time it will be worse for you.” The couple would have to obey. They 
couldn’t talk back. Then they [leaders] would make them pay a fine and sign a 
promissory note and then [they would be] allowed to go.  
I: Is that method the same as the method you see used in Mae Sot migrant 
communities?  
R: Not the same because there it is our own country, our own people, so things are a 
little bit better. Here, it is not our country; it is not our village, not our people, not 
our environment so it is worse here in my view. Back there, people show care to 
each other more. Back there, when something happens and related authorities 
come, they have power. So just the presence of those authorities makes the 
situation calm. Here, [people] don’t care about anyone. “I will do what I want to 
do.” I mean there, people were afraid of each other. […] [Here], they can do 
whatever. I think it is because the Burmese people do not have access to law yet. 
Because in Myanmar, if a murder case happens, for example, the legal process 
will start and move on according to the law. If the same thing happened in 
Thailand among Thai people, the process would be the same. But if Burmese 
people are killed [in Thailand], there is no law for them. The worst thing is that 
Burmese women are abused by Burmese as well as Thai men. So, women are 
more vulnerable. If there are no rules, no action taken, it will just become like a 
kot m'shi de jam p'yang p'dang [whatever can happen if there is no frame]. For 
example a mat needs to have an edge. If the mat does not have an edge around it 
what will happen? So, law is a frame for our behavior. Law controls people’s 
heart and desires. This is my view. (MM) 
Like the first story, this co-researcher’s recollection of dispute resolution in Yangon 
emphasizes order, power, and community. He refers to section leaders as respected 
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individuals who can bring calm and peace to social conflict. His account does not convey 
an overly generous image of leaders as he mentions dispute resolution tactics that include 
intimidation. Though he explains that the methods he remembers are not the same as 
what he has seen in Mae Sot, in fact the technique of scolding parties to a conflict, 
making them sign promissory notes, and demanding compensation appears similar to 
what mediators and migrants expressed in the previous sections of this chapter. The 
difference, he states clearly, is the sense of ownership involved with this resolution 
process in Myanmar. He uses the word “care” twice in this segment, at first to refer to a 
network of social support, a strong sense of community, and fear. Then, three sentences 
later, the speaker highlights the opposite—individualism—among migrants in Thailand in 
an alien environment. Central to the difference between dispute resolution in Myanmar 
and in Thailand, suggests the participant, is the presence or absence of the law. Like the 
first story here, rule of law serves as a frame binding people together in a sense of order 
and community, the border to the mat that keeps the weave from fraying.  
Less explicit, but implied here is that the technique for solving problems on the 
local level in Myanmar is not perfect but it is necessary for the sense of order it brings to 
people. Such a recollection and comparison with conditions in Thailand serves to 
underscore the extent to which this co-researcher emphasizes order as a priority above all 
else, even at the expense of the quality of dispute resolution mechanisms. This implies 
the co-researcher’s belief that order and a strong presence of the law in a place is the key 
to building a sense of community and the ability to successfully address intimate partner 
violence there. However, the wellbeing of the couple in the story, including the safety of 
one or both of them, fades to the background as dispute resolution ceases to refer only to 
one strategy to deal with gendered violence and becomes primarily a reflection of order 
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or a lack thereof in Thailand. Gender comes back into the discussion toward the end of 
the excerpt, but it is only to lament the way in which the lack of order leaves women 
doubly vulnerable to Burmese and Thai men; they remain perpetual victims of 
lawlessness. 
A third set of recollections comes from a co-researcher who works for a migrant 
worker’s association. She describes how she remembers people in her village in Waw 
township, Bago district, dealing with gendered violence.   
 Segment 3 
R: Traditionally, in my village, and this also applies to many places in Burma, but I 
will talk about my village only. In the village, relating to GBV, this kind of thing 
is not something people take seriously. Even when we go up to the village head, 
the village head never takes it seriously. When fighting happened between 
husband and wife, people normally put blame on the women and say that is 
because his wife is groaning (pwa si, pwa si) [mimicking the sound of whining] 
so it is understandable that her husband would hit her. Yes that kind of thing. If 
women are harassed, verbally or physically, again people blame the women 
saying that is because she does not behave well so it of course can happen to her. 
[…] Next one is a big problem. For example, the woman just stays home and 
sleeps in the night. The man who likes her comes and takes her against her will 
and if she screams at that time to get help, people will again blame her. When 
women get all the blame by people around them for anything like that, we cannot 
say they will report to the village head because, in fact, they do not even dare to 
inform their own relatives. […] 
T: You said earlier when GBV cases occurred, people went to the village head, what 
would the village head do?  
R: How the village head solves the problem is ngwe mya t'ya naing [more money 
wins in the law]. If one side gives the village head a bribe that case will disappear 
by itself. Those who make a report are weak so they do not dare to report often. 
She goes to report for the first time, second time, and if the village head does not 
do anything for her, she gives up like that. If the offender goes and gives money 
to the village [head] then that case is finished. (ZMTBLC) 
 
The co-researcher’s memory of dispute resolution in her hometown differs greatly from 
the previous narrative. While the previous excerpt above also includes some critique of 
the method, the speaker ultimately places his faith in the Burmese system of community 
justice and law. This third segment, on the other hand, is cynical, showing a complete 
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lack of faith in the village level justice system. Her words reflect a mistrust of order on 
the local level in her village, and she believes her critiques may be generalized to all of 
Myanmar/Burma.   
Not only are village heads easily bought, she says, they are biased as well. As the 
vast majority of village tract and village administrators in Myanmar are men with few 
documented exceptions (KWO 2010; MDR and Kempel 2012), this co-researcher 
perceives that they tend to side with male parties when adjudicating conflicts in a couple 
or between men and women. The speaker extends her critique to the broader village 
population, referring generally to “people” and not just the village chief or head. She 
describes an environment where women are regularly blamed for the abuse they 
experience both inside and outside the family. This includes acts of rape perpetrated by 
men in the community. The image this co-researcher conjures of rape in her village—
which appears here as a hypothetical—is not so different from what the speaker in 
segment 1 recalled from his time in Mawlamyine. But instead of using the story of the 
rape to make commentary on the law in a way that bypasses the voice of the woman in 
the story, this third narrative uses the example of rape to comment on the pressures 
women face in their villages and the way they are likely to silence themselves as a result, 
instead of seeking help or redress.   
This points to an important difference between the first and second excerpts and 
the third segment above, which is that this co-researcher uses a gendered lens to articulate 
her critique of local governance in Myanmar, while the previous narratives leave gender 
in the background. In so doing, she reaches a different conclusion than the others. Given 
her observation that village administrators are corrupt and chauvinistic, she expresses no 
confidence in the system of order-making on the local level; to her it represents an unfair 
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and unjust system. Perhaps because of this, she does not construct a binary between this 
system and the conditions for migrants in Thailand.  
 The fourth and final set of memories in this section comes from another co-
researcher in reference to the same question about dispute resolution and gendered 
violence in her hometown of Loikaw, Karenni state.   
 Segment 4 (NO) 
I: Ok so, one of the things that I am interested in—if you have memories about this 
from the time you were living in Loikaw—about how people were dealing with 
gender based violence? 
R: [laughs] Ah, mostly people don't really think that this is a problem, so they think 
that this is the internal affair of the family so they don't really interrupt that, and 
then they just blame to the couple, so I will say they don't really solve those kinds 
of problems, they just let it be. 
I: I mean would you say there's no intervention at all? 
R: No--but if they really are killing each other or throwing things—threatening to 
their lives, then people will interrupt—they will just shout or grab the people, 
that's it—“stop the violence!”  
I: Alright alright....umm, what about other types of GBV— 
R: Like sexual—in my personal opinion, I think that sexual abuse is happening but 
they don’t really express the experience…cos I think many people experience 
these kinds of abuse by their close relatives in the family or in their…cousin or 
like uncle, like that…so for them they don't really dare to speak up because they 
will think that they will destroy the family or relative's dignity so they just keep 
quiet and if...maybe strangers do the sexual abuse to the another stranger, so it can 
be—some cases pop up to the court, yeah. 
I: A lot of other people talked about mediation by like uh Yakwa Lugyi [laughs]. But 
from what you’ve heard or seen in Loikaw, you don’t—it’s not so common? 
R:  But for the mediation for like...because we—I grew up in Loikaw, so maybe a 
little bit different from the rural area. In the rural area, they have so many ah...like 
culture...that...especially in our Karenni culture, if you were raped, many people 
would blame you...because you...like...the way you wear or behave is not really 
good—that’s why you was raped, something like that. And then normally, 
especially in the villages, the village leader will try to call both persons, the 
perpetrator and the survivor together and then agree on like the kind of mediation 
and then finally both have to pay compensation for the village because they 
thought that this is...how can I say...in Burmese we call sey kyor deh—you tried to 
damage the village’s dignity so you have to pay for that, you have to clean that.  
 
In this participant’s set of recollections, the work of section leaders or village 
administrators in Loikaw, Myanmar, to resolve disputes related to gendered violence is 
357 
rare compared to the more common tendency to silence such abuses. Explaining this, the 
speaker brings greater awareness to the many obstacles survivors of abuse must 
overcome just to report an incident. This contrasts with the first two narratives in which 
reporting abuse is taken as a given; something that happens automatically. Like the third 
segment, this excerpt focuses on both an insufficient system to address gendered violence 
and a broader criticism of the public’s stigmatization of women for the abuses they 
experience. The speaker stresses that in her town, it is more important to protect the 
collective unit of the family over the individual needs or rights of any member, 
particularly the women. Similarly, she notes that village heads are more likely to focus on 
the wellbeing of the village’s image over that of a victim of abuse or a couple in conflict. 
For this reason, she remembers, authorities demand sey kyor deh (to clean) to restore the 
village’s dignity. Focusing on the broader stigma affixed to survivors of gendered 
violence and flawed techniques used for dispute resolution, this co-researcher does not 
stress a comparison between an orderly life in Myanmar and the lawlessness of Thailand.  
This is not to say she considers governance in Thailand to be fair for Burmese migrants. 
Rather, it suggests a use of memory to focus more on the challenges of securing justice, 
dignity, and safety for women who have experienced abuse. Also, the work of memory 
here reifies the concept of culture as a negative force on women (see also chapter seven). 
 Among these four quotes dealing with dispute resolution and gendered violence, 
some more closely resemble stories conjured through memory than others. The first 
segment follows a narrative structure with sequenced events that convey meaning 
(Riessman 2008: 3), while the other three waver between memories of a social system 
punctuated with illustrative hypothetical information or dialogue on the one hand, and 
specific recollections, on the other. Nevertheless, an account of a social system or mode 
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of ordering recalled from observations made earlier in one’s life is still a form of memory 
that is important to consider. Whether recalling a specific story or engaging in dialogue, 
all of these participants build a picture of their hometown and the mechanisms there for 
addressing conflict and violence, particularly gendered violence against women.   
While it is important not to take these images and extrapolate from them to form 
broad statements of culture and life in Myanmar or of a homogenous “migrant 
viewpoint,” such memories must be analyzed for what they are: constructions of the past 
made from perceptions of the present to selectively form moral statements. The first two 
speak more to the notion that societies need laws, firm governance, and biopolitical 
control to maintain peace and order. It is only through such a system that people can 
prevent or adequately respond to violence against women. The second two segments 
differ as they yoke order to gender discrimination, offering a statement that stability and 
order are contingent on equal access to rights and services for women and men.   
Although these accounts do not tell us what life is like for the majority of 
Burmese people, they inform us how some Burmese migrants perceive their homeland, 
which is significant in its own right. Further, they reveal the process of discursive 
selection each speaker goes through to piece together a narrative or a description, 
choosing certain subjects to highlight or words to use and ignoring or rejecting others. 
Malkki (1995: 245) reminds us that such acts of subversion and privileging of voice and 
narrative is a fundamental part of producing and telling mythico-histories.   
The making of cosmological, mythico-historical order necessitates the destruction 
and subversion, encompassment and ingestion, mutation and revaluation of 
previously existing or antagonistic orders…Thus, neither disparate, antagonistic 
orders nor dissenting “others” are ever passive in this process. In so far as these 
orders are spun in an oppositional context, in struggle, making history inevitably 
implies the unmaking of somebody else’s history. Such processes areagonistic. 
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In this way, the second two excerpts above serve as contrast for the first two, spotlighting 
the ways the first speakers omitted gender and the agency of the female survivors of 
abuse. Thus, Burmese migrants rely on their present lived experiences in border space to 
selectively construct a homeland of Myanmar/Burma, which in turn helps make sense of 
their life in Thailand. It is in the selection of what to recall and what to leave out that one 
finds conflicting ideas about order, collectivity, and the gendered self in displacement. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 Though the interwoven themes of gender and production have received much 
scholarly attention over the years, in this chapter I have subjected them to a rather 
indirect analysis. That is, this chapter has centered on how the relations of precarious 
work, challenges of displacement, and practices of gender intersect in a mutually 
constitutive fashion in the homes and collective spaces for Burmese migrants as opposed 
to the factory floor or the field. Migrants’ narratives about violence outside their 
workplaces provide an important angle for considering how the dynamics of production 
and dispossession permeate all aspects of social life for migrants.  
From this perspective, it is possible to see that gender takes on a productive force 
through the telling and retelling of stories of violence. At the same time, these stories 
produce certain notions of gender that are contingent with the experience of displacement 
and refracted through the power of collective memory. This is true both for forms of 
violence that take on a high level of visibility as spectralized accounts, as well as those 
that migrants utter in language shrouded by moral opprobrium and guidance. The 
difference between visible and unspoken violence is important in that it reflects those 
narratives that migrants select to convey the hostility of their experience in Thailand and 
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those that are not to be mentioned in detail, but that contribute to certain gendered tropes.   
Through an analysis of both the spectacularized and the barely spoken, I have 
shown in this chapter how discourse on violence serves as an ordering mechanism for 
migrants. Stories of aggressive police and sexual assaults provide a fear of mistreatment 
that reminds migrants, especially women, that it is better to remain safely in factory 
dormitories, worker compounds, or homes than to be out and on one’s own. Through the 
symbolic weight given to violence against women, stories reinforce the need for gendered 
orders within migrant collectivities as they underscore a degree of exclusion, injustice, 
and lawlessness that define the border space. Women who restrict their movement and 
remain safe from rape are, in effect, protecting the whole community since their violation 
at the hands of an outsider would be an annihilation of the sovereignty of the whole 
collective. It is in this sense that at the same time gender is useful for explaining and 
making sense of a violent social space, it is also the case that such explanatory narratives 
reproduce certain ideas of femininity and masculinity in a context of precarious labor.   
Looking at gender and production in this way is important because it reveals some 
of the nuanced aspects of the injustices migrants experience within the dynamics of 
capital accumulation. The challenging work and living conditions in which migrants live 
manifests itself not only in low or nonexistent wages, physical abuse, arrest, or 
deportation, but also in the way that migrants can, at times, project the violence of such 
experiences that are so endemic to border zones like Mae Sot and Phob Phra onto the 
identities and relationships of women and men. At the same time, the discursive narrative 
analysis of this chapter sheds light on some of the gendered subtleties of migrant political 
subjectivity, which inform how people interpret and respond to the myriad technologies 
of governance deployed in border economic zones.    
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Chapter 7—Interpreting intervention: bio-welfare and migrant agency in the 
response to gender-based violence 
 
1. Introduction  
 
On the first day of the “Core Concepts of Gender Based Violence” workshop1—
part of a training package aimed at educating and empowering Burmese women in Mae 
Sot—the lights go down and participants move their chairs closer to a portable screen for 
a short film. When the facilitators—a Burmese and a Thai woman—switch on the 
projector, images of women’s faces appear moving across the screen bounded within an 
equal sign. The participants see that they are watching a foreign film that does not take 
place on the border or in the region. Actress Eva Mendez is shown looking intently at a 
group of black women and, in the background, her voice says, “Power and control are the 
reason rape happens in the first place.” Another voice narrates as global statistics about 
violence against women flash across the screen.2  
“At least one in three women have been beaten,” the voice continues, “coerced 
into sex, or otherwise abused in their lifetime.” Different snapshots of women of color in 
Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East are synchronized with the words “beaten,” 
“coerced into sex,” and “abused” which pulse into view. At this point, former US 
Ambassador at large for global women’s issues Melanne Verveer appears, and calls 
violence against women “regrettably a global epidemic.” The rest of the film shows how 
                                                
1 This is a training offered by the International Rescue Committee that usually pairs with modules on 
helping skills. Facilitators distinguish between sex and gender, and they discuss power, the roots of gender 
based violence, the needs of those who experience violence, and basic helping skills. This training was 
offered to co-researchers working on the collaborative action research project as a first set of modules that 
was followed by detailed discussions on how to implement the methods the group had decided to use for 
the study.  
2 The film is in English. Though most participants spoke English, there were also interpreters helping 
convey the meaning of the film in Burmese.   
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the International Rescue Committee responds to this malady in Sierra Leone through 
“social empowerment,” activities aimed at personalized care for survivors as well as 
changing men’s attitudes and instilling in them a sense of responsibility.   
When the film is over and facilitators ask for feedback and reflections, 
participants share four key themes that they noticed: the importance of empowerment, the 
link between violence and the abuse of power, the need to struggle for equal rights, and 
the prevalence of gender-based violence in many countries. As a co-facilitator for the 
following training module focused on research methods, I sit in the back of the room and 
wonder what other aspects of the film these training participants absorbed, perhaps 
subconsciously. What about the racialized associations between gender violence and 
“Third World” women of color? How about the use of medical language to discuss this 
violence? And, finally, did participants take note of the emphasis on individual care and 
the absence of a broader feminist discourse of change? These questions suggest that there 
are myriad discursive relations of power that are unarticulated but which nonetheless 
circulate in the training room and have an impact that is sometimes tangible and 
sometimes not. In this example, such messages transmit via the media of this film, but 
they also disseminate via other forms of media as well as language, suggestive affects, or 
subliminal structures of feeling. Power in this sense takes on the form of what Avery 
Gorden (2008: xvi) calls a “haunting” quality; that is, the process by which “a repressed 
or unresolved social violence is making itself known.” It is the “ideological substance” of 
intervention discourse (Lindorfer 2009: 355). 
  Questions about the interaction of border-located knowledges and those situated 
in or generated by transnational institutions are important to ask for what they tell us 
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about migrants’ agency amidst the performative reproduction of unequal power relations. 
As chapter three asserted, the circulation of situated knowledge about displacement and 
gendered violence on the Thailand-Myanmar border through the practice of humanitarian 
assessment and intervention reflects the power to privilege certain identities and voices 
while subjugating others. In this chapter, I take the conversation a step further to look at 
how humanitarian work contributes to the construction of specific border subjectivities, 
that is, influences people’s senses of self and collectivity, and choices about their 
opportunities and constraints. Specifically, I ask how migrants interpret and make 
meaning out of these humanitarian interventions, and ultimately what the social impact or 
cost of these interventions might be. To what extent do humanitarian interventions 
support or fragment critical aspects of community, or social, economic, and political 
networks and women’s rights movements fighting for equality?  
Such questions are crucial when considering how migrants make sense of their 
experience of displacement. These contexts are often not only spaces where you see the 
power of capital’s creative destruction, but they are also the targets of international 
agencies concerned with the welfare of refugees. My role was a participant-observer in 
this circulation of discourse, knowledge, and logics related to migrants and the nature of 
violence in their neighborhoods and labor camps. Throughout the period of the 
assessment, I was often filled with a sense of unease, wondering what types of relations 
or identities we were peddling unwittingly. Indeed, it was sitting with this discomfort that 
guided me to analytically interrogate “how that which appears absent can indeed be a 
seething presence” (Gordon 2008: 16). Though this is an effort that is likely to yield more 
questions than answers, if, as Gordon suggests, this can contribute to “a more complex 
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understanding of the generative structures and moving parts of historically embedded 
social formations” (p. 19), it may be a worthwhile endeavor.   
 In this chapter, I start by looking at the political nature of the circulation of global 
discourses about women’s rights and their translation and application in these local 
contexts. I then situate this discussion within a brief review of how activists established 
local Burmese women’s organizations in Mae Sot with differing goals, methodologies, 
and affiliations. These two sections help frame this chapter’s analysis, which is built on 
qualitative data from key informant interviews I did with activists working for local 
Burmese and international NGOs and the peer interviews co-researchers conducted with 
participants in the collaborative assessment. I structure the analysis in two parts, putting 
the narratives of NGO representatives about how they aim to effect social change toward 
gender justice into dialogue with migrants’ views of NGO discourse as well as their own 
tactics for dealing with violence. In my interpretation, I find important elements in the 
analysis that shed light on how the demands of export production systems (such as the 
garment industry) relate to and interact with the language of local and international 
groups staging interventions to protect the wellbeing of migrants. This approach 
spotlights some of the ways migrants not only respond to the discursive frameworks of 
transnational civil society, but also appropriate or manipulate particular elements as they 
develop their own tactics to safeguard their survival and their wellbeing as individuals 
and collectivities. 
 
2. Transnational rights discourse, gender, and the complexity of translation 
  
As activists everywhere make decisions about the use of international human 
rights language, they must navigate the discourse’s contentious terrain (Finnegan, 
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Saltsman, and White 2010). At the center of scholarly critiques are not so much the actual 
words that make up the body of human rights laws (which span the political, civil, social, 
economic, and cultural), but the emphasis on an individualized code of ethics and its 
assumption as universal, a move scholars critique as simultaneously political and de-
politicizing (Hemmet 2011; Moyn 2010; Mutua 2001).3 To Hardt and Negri (2000: 35-
36), this dynamic is not benign; rather the “moral instruments” of humanitarian and 
human rights work represent “powerful pacific weapons” for the spreading of empire. 
Critics point to a human rights and humanitarian industry that increasingly focuses on 
crisis and not structural oppression, the rights of the individual and not the collective, and 
on suffering and the restoration of a kind of basic universal humanity (bio-welfare) 
instead of the political (Fassin 2012; Finnegan, Saltsman, and White 2010). Cornwall and 
Nyamu-Musembi (2004) show that state reforms to better incorporate a foundation of 
human rights have been selective, privileging market-oriented changes over those that 
address gender and social justice.   
2.1 Women’s rights without feminism? Individual welfare as gender justice 
Engagement with rights discourse is a key dilemma for feminist organizers 
working to advocate for gender justice. Cornwall and Molyneux (2006: 1180)) highlight 
four particular challenges to feminist engagement with the project of universal human 
rights: (1) reconciling diverse feminist approaches which stem from multiple systems of 
laws and social and religious practices and norms with the liberalist notion of universal 
rights and systems; (2) the dissonance between the elite language and policy space of 
                                                
3 This paradoxical notion reflects the critique that human rights discourse is political in the sense that it is 
often aligned with the foreign policy strategies of the “West” at the same time some of the dominant 
international human rights groups or voices de-emphasize the importance of collective political struggle, in 
the form of labor movements, for example. 
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rights and the realities of those women for whom rights is at most an abstract concept; (3) 
the institutionalization of rights within the work of the state which incorporates doctrines 
of women’s rights but can then also appropriate such language for its own agendas, 
which might leave many more women marginalized and still subject to patriarchal 
systems of subjugation; and (4) the proliferation of only certain rights for women under 
the banner of empowerment but which in reality focus on the inclusion of women and not 
their entitlement to equality.   
While much work has been done in the last four decades to bring women’s rights 
to the fore of debates on development and human rights, the results—even when 
resembling victories for movements—have not always furthered feminist agendas, 
especially from an intersectionality perspective (Crenshaw 1991). Murdock (2003) refers 
to a  “move around feminism” in the gender and development discourse to describe this 
contradiction. As dozens of development and humanitarian aid agencies adopted a 
“rights-based” approach, explicitly incorporating the language of women’s rights, many 
have eschewed identification with feminism (Cornwall and Molyneux 2006; see also 
Hyndman and de Alwis 2003). This turn away from, or around, feminism has also 
manifested itself in a shift in the uses and meanings of “women’s empowerment,” a term 
popularized in the 1980s and 1990s with roots in feminist radical organizing, subaltern 
struggles against class-race-gender intersecting domination, and Freire’s (2000) idea of 
conscientization (conscientização), or critical consciousness-raising.4 Batliwala (2007) 
                                                
4 The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) identifies five components to “women’s empowerment”: 
“women’s self-worth; their right to have and to determine choices; their right to have access to 
opportunities and resources; their right to have the power to control their own lives, both within and 
outside the home; and their ability to influence the direction of social change to create a more just 
social and economic order, nationally and internationally”(UN Population Information Network ND). 
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laments the depoliticization of this concept as the emphasis in governmental and non-
governmental development work was increasingly on the growth of women’s economic 
participation—e.g., saving and lending. Sen and Mukherjee (2014: 190) criticize the 
Millenium Development Goals for focusing too narrowly on access to education in its 
articulation of women’s empowerment, missing the other key interdependent dimensions 
such as “sexual, reproductive, economic including unpaid care, political, legal—and 
multiple freedoms including…from threats of violence.” They advocate for a return to a 
politically-charged rights-based approach for gender justice.  
 Thus, currently, rather than dismantling patriarchal structures, one finds an 
increasing emphasis on the “smart economics” of investing in women; that is, 
development projects that target women as ideal recipients of aid (Buvinic and King 
2007; Wilson 2011).5 Pittman (2014) underscores how this constitutes backtracking on 
earlier development goals related to gender equality, a result of a stronger voice for 
conservatism in the form of religious and market-oriented forces in today’s policy spaces. 
In this sense, more conservative voices seem to present their own latent goals that 
underlie their manifest discourse (Merton 1957). This selective engagement with 
women’s rights leads to the promotion of a particular package of values centered on 
independence, self-reliance, and the right to contribute economically to society (Wilson 
2011). Elias (2010) explains that this focus reproduces the unequal burden of social 
reproduction on women by glossing over their role in hierarchies of capital. 
 This emphasis on an individualistic morality seeps into discourse about gender 
violence as well. Susskind (2008) explains this as a lack of intersectionality in the work 
                                                
5 For an example of this type of approach see Kristof and WuDunn (2009). 
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of international NGOs who are often so focused on individual encounters with violence 
that they do not see or prioritize the myriad other injustices their target population may be 
facing; injustices that might be collective and linked to class, race, or ethnicity. As 
Ticktin (2011) asserts, humanitarianism is vigilant about restoring humanity and saving 
lives, but not about challenging the social, economic, or political systems that threaten 
those lives. Gendered violence becomes less about gender and more about violence 
against suffering bodies, with the “woman as victim” trope. Explaining this further, 
Ticktin (2011: 256) writes, “‘Epidemics’ of rape are not placed in the context of gendered 
regimes of property for instance, or of inheritance; they are not approached as possible 
effects of structural adjustment or imperialist policies which play out in gendered ways.” 
The tendency to medicalize and individualize violence against women dovetails with 
particular global responses focused on women’s bio-welfare as suffering subjects, 
reflecting a move from their invisible position as poor women to hypervisible victims of 
rape and other gendered violence (Crosby and Lykes 2011). This supports a politics of 
the moral as paramount and as justification for intervention (Fassin 2011; Moyn 2010). 
2.2 Humanitarianism and hierarchies of difference  
 At the core of this logic of rights-based moral intervention are important 
assumptions about need and difference between those who allocate and those who receive 
assistance (Ticktin 2011; Harrell-Bond 2002). Those in need of protection are imagined 
as “precarious” or vulnerable beings (Butler 2004). Critical scholarship agrees that none 
are portrayed as more at risk than women in contexts of displacement and conflict (Dogra 
2011; Ticktin 2011; Wilson 2011). Ong (2011) describes the tendency for Western NGOs 
to conceive of their mission in abolitionist terms as they set out to free migrant women 
from slave-like conditions. While not disputing the urgency of many displacement and 
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migration contexts, there is, nevertheless, an overtly racialized tone to this conception of 
“Third World” women as the target of intervention; suffering bodies waiting for 
“empowerment” so they can exercise their agency (Abu-Lughod 2013; Razack 1995; 
Syed and Ali 2011; Ticktin 2014; Wilson 2011). Such an approach bears strong 
resemblance to colonial discourses of the vocation to save through civilizing regimes of 
order (Scully 2011; Stoler 2010; Syed and Ali 2011). Mutua (2001) writes of key 
metaphors of saviors, victims, and savages embedded in human rights discourse. It 
should be noted that the humanitarian industry is well aware of some of these dilemmas 
and that they have instituted many reforms in discourse and practice (Kennedy 2012).6 
This has led to an emphasis on agency and empowerment instead of victimhood. 
Nevertheless, as I have shown above, this still reproduces certain hierarchical discourses 
because instead of interrogating the circulation of power they offer universalizing 
constructs, which adhere to some individuals and not others (Hodgson 2011a). While 
some argue that this may only be a first step for NGOs working for gender justice who 
get caught in a process of triage, identifying the most urgent need first, this nevertheless 
renders irrelevant any co-existing situated activism that might seek to challenge broader 
structural inequality in these locales (Ong 2011; Wilson 2011). In this sense, movements 
of political struggle for justice operating in the “Global South” are often not in line with 
the rights-based humanitarian focus on saving lives.   
                                                
6 Certainly, the humanitarian industry of the 1990s is not the same as it is today, even as many 
fundamentals noted above remain. UN agencies, governments, and NGOs have called for greater 
accountability as well as the reframing of the relationship between human rights and humanitarianism, on 
the one hand, and situated populations, on the other, who adhere to alternative moral and ideological 
frameworks (Polastro 2014; Young and Maxwell 2013). The industry has also responded to critiques of its 
victimization of “Third World”populations; hence the rise of a discourse of agency and participation. This 
in part has led to the advancement of the Sphere principles, which among other objectives, aim to integrate 
ideas of local empowerment into humanitarian work (Kennedy 2012).  
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2.3 Womens’ rights and the uses of culture 
Within the work of women’s protection, empowerment, and humanitarian 
intervention, there is a set of binaries that structure the discourse of rights and that is 
crucial to highlight. These binaries are between rights and culture on the one hand and 
between repression and liberation on the other (Avishai et al. 2013). A notion of culture 
as fixed temporally and spatially features heavily in this discourse about women’s rights 
and gender-based violence, primarily as a negative force (Hodgson 2011a). Part of this 
has to do with the link drawn between a concept of culture and forms of gender-based 
violence in the language of international law (Merry 2006; Susskind 2008).7 International 
agencies provide a definition of gender-based violence that includes “harmful traditional 
practices” (IASC 2005; OHCHR ND; WHO 2012), a reference to “particular forms of 
violence against women and girls which are defended on the basis of tradition, culture, 
religion or superstition by some community members” (GAD Network). These include 
“early and forced marriage, female genital cutting…female feticide/sex selection, ‘honor’ 
killings, widow immolation or burning…caste-based discrimination and violence, [and] 
Western women’s eating disorders and cosmetic plastic surgery” (Merry 2009: 127). 
While this language attacks culture in its manifestation as a weapon used by those 
defending abusive practices, it also supports the framing of culture as a static obstacle to 
the liberation of “Third World” women.  
                                                
7 Article 2(f) of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) explains that state parties must “take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify 
or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women.”Article 5(a) requires state parties “to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men 
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles 
for men and women.”In addition the CEDAW Committee General Recommendation Three describes 
prejudice against women “owing to socio-cultural factors”and urges “all States parties effectively to adopt 
education and public information programs, which will help eliminate prejudices and current practices.” 
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It is also in this sense that culture as a negative force elicits the humanitarian 
intervention of NGOs or states and their militaries to usher in liberation, though this is 
also often an excuse for economic or geopolitical agendas (Abu-Lughod 2013). 
“Humanitarian organizations,” write Abramowitz and Moran (2012: 123), “carry into” 
their work “preconceived notions about the meaning of culture as a determinant of human 
behaviors” which require “certain forms of intervention.” Within this paradigm, culture is 
indirectly a cause for women’s suffering, a complex and yet reified set of beliefs that can 
be overcome by the introduction of rights. Rights, then, “are weapons that push against 
intractable culture” to relieve this suffering and liberate women who will be free to 
realize their own potential as social actors (Levitt and Merry 2011: 81).8  
 Reliance on this particular socially constructed notion of culture leads to 
particular representations of gender and gender justice. Relationally, within the practice 
of program implementation, Razack (1995: 50) describes asylum proceedings in Canada 
as problematic in the sense that, based on her study, interviewers tended to favor those 
women asylum seekers who “presented themselves as victims of dysfunctional, 
exceptionally patriarchal cultures and states.” Others describe aid strategies which target 
women as “ideal” and “trustworthy” recipients of development assistance because of both 
their deficit of power as women in “traditional” societies and their “natural” instinct to 
care for their families (Escobar 1995; Wilson 2011). Though working in the name of 
women’s empowerment through livelihood strategies, there is a risk that aid agencies will 
                                                
8 Many scholars focus on the issue of female genital cutting (also referred to as Female Genital Mutilation) 
as a paradigmatic example of this tension between rights and culture (Abusharaf 2009; Hodgson 2011b; 
Merry 2009). Without defending the practice, Hodgson’s analysis (2011b) shows how the zealot-like focus 
in the “West” on the issue of female genital cutting in Africa as a cultural crime against women detracts 
from the work of Maasai women in Tanzania who prioritized struggles against poverty and the political 
marginality of women in their communities.   
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reproduce hierarchical notions of men as prodigal and women as efficient and caring. 
These ideas are rooted in unequal power relations as they heap domestic responsibilities 
on women. As Wilson (2011: 318) puts it: 
These well documented gender disparities in the use of income and resources 
stem from specific patriarchal structures, institutions and ideologies, notably the 
gendered divisions of labour and responsibility, and the various constructions of 
‘good’ mothers/daughters/daughters-in-law as those who ‘make sacrifices’ for 
their families. 
 
The image of vulnerable women in need of help to realize their agency conveys and 
reproduces “traditional” structures of domination that deny women all forms of power. In 
this sense, gendered assumptions yoked to concepts of culture such as these are ever 
present but all too often invisible to the very actors who implement the policies and 
practices. This is part of how gender is produced and also produces subjectivities on an 
everyday basis in ways that are linked to racialized worldviews (Butler 1990). It also 
relates to a broader process of structural violence in Farmer’s (2004) framing of the term 
in that it implies a process of erasure wherein colonial legacies and economic exploitation 
are invisible behind more prominent cultural explanations (see also chapter four).  
2.4 Gendered assumptions and the ambivalence of stigma 
As the examples above suggest, the construction and performative reproduction of 
certain notions of culture and gender bear implications for the lives of women and men in 
contexts of poverty and displacement— the objects of these discourses and interventions. 
Razack’s (1995) example of asylum seekers’ interactions with interviewers reflects this 
impact, as they receive status based on their ability to reflect state actors’ gendered and 
racialized assumptions. Other scholars point to the way the assumptions of aid workers 
influence their decisions about the trustworthiness and need of refugees who rely on 
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services in camp contexts and urban areas (Harrell-Bond 2002; Voutira and Harrell-Bond 
1995; Olivius 2014).   
Beyond the material consequences of these belief-sets, it is important to ask how 
such conceptions impact service users’ sense of themselves and of the bureaucracies that 
allocate assistance. That is, how do the people who are the targets of aid organizations’ 
assistance programs interpret the concepts of gender and culture that are directed at them 
and that are implicitly or explicitly part of the intervention; concepts that might convey a 
sense of backwardness and/or victimhood? This question suggests the need to distinguish 
between the manifest functions of organizations and movements—primary, explicit 
agendas—and the unintended consequences of their unspoken or subconscious interests, 
what Merton called latent functions (Crothers 1998; Merton 1936). 
The work of scholars on ambivalence and stigma is relevant here as it reflects a 
focus on the internal conflicts of individuals who see themselves through the eyes of a 
society that has labeled them as deviant. Stigma refers to the discrepancy between one’s 
self image and a devalued image of oneself projected by social categories (Blaine 2000; 
Goffman 1963). Stigmatization refers to the construction of categories and their linkage 
to stereotypes (Link and Phelan 2001). Goffman stressed the extent to which social 
stigma creates great uncertainty in the lives of individuals who fall within those devalued 
social categories. This uncertainty or inner conflict relates to Merton and Barber’s (1976: 
6) concept of ambivalence as a dilemma of “incompatible normative expectations” linked 
to one’s role or status in society. This includes the anomic sense of social values or 
aspirations up to which one is not living, and the internal conflict imposed by stigma (R 
Coser 1966).  
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Within the field of psychology, links have been drawn between stigma and a 
number of personal and social problems from mental and physical health issues, to high 
infant mortality rates, to problems accessing housing and jobs (Allison 1998; Clark et al. 
1999; Major and O’Brien 2005). This also includes diminished academic performance 
and notions of individual and collective moral inferiority (Hirschl et al. 2011; Spencer et 
al. 1999; Steele and Aronson 1995).  As Reutter and colleagues (2009) argue, individual 
interpretations of stigma attributed to them are diverse, multilayered, and subjective. In a 
sense, these inquiries risk contributing to the focus on bio-welfare over fixed structural 
realities. This places the onus of change onto the individual who is problematized to, for 
example, internalize and/or reject the multiple manifestations and effects of inequality. 
Humanitarian work has an immense power in identifying certain people as stigmatized 
and not others because this implies, on a certain level, the acceptance and 
operationalization of static social structures via constructs that adhere to the person.9  
But at the same time, research on the effects of stigma mirrors the individual 
mental and physical manifestations or symptoms associated with discrimination and 
prejudice. Put into the framework of this chapter, I reflect on stigma and ambivalence in 
terms of how transnational knowledge production and circulation mark individuals living 
in situated communities. While both are social scientific concepts that historically have 
underscored the deviance of individuals, they also point to the racialized and gendered 
ideas and power relations humanitarian intervention reproduces discursively against 
which individuals and collectivities may struggle. In some ways this argument echoes 
literature that analyzes the effects of colonialism. Such works, like Fanon’s (1967), 
                                                
9 Personal correspondence with MB Lykes (21 January 2015). 
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consider how the violence of colonial representation, which reifies historically situated 
and complex social forms, can result in forms of internalization and psychological trauma 
for the subaltern. Others focus on the transnationality of racialized and gendered 
hierarchies, which resonate back and forth between multiple locales, influencing local 
perception and also dominant narratives (Magubane 2004). Targets of aid, like subjects of 
colonialism, defy, resist, appropriate, and adapt the reifying representations constructed 
around and about them.   
2.5 Grassroots activism and human rights as a tool for structural change 
 Just as human rights and humanitarian discourses can have a colonizing effect in 
the “Global South,” they can also serve as important tools for solidarity building, 
mobilization, and advocacy for structural change. In this, the potential for human rights 
discourse to resist or subvert social violence resonates with the argument of some 
scholars, like Hardt and Negri (2000), who identify the potential for struggle within the 
technologies of domination. The particular flexibility of human rights language as a 
transnational discourse is crucial to consider because its use and attractiveness to 
grassroots activists working for structural change can be part of how those in precarious 
circumstances assert alternative pathways to wellbeing and justice, and also because of its 
universalization and recognition worldwide.   
Concerned with how local actors relate to the international women’s rights 
movement and effect change within this movement, Sally Merry (2006) offers the term 
“vernacularization,” which describes the process whereby activists, government officials, 
and the heads of NGOs are all involved in constantly adapting and translating 
transnational ideas into local vernaculars that are relevant to situated concerns, norms, 
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and relational systems.10 The work of translation and adaptation is a messy, ad hoc, and 
complex process that, says Merry, engages local cultural systems. Merry, as well as other 
anthropologists writing on this topic, remind readers that culture is far too dynamic and 
multilayered to be regarded restrictively as either the static force of oppression many 
regard it as or the guardian of local norms (Hodgson 2011a; Levitt and Merry 2011; 
Merry 2006). Indeed, just as certain actors defend or condemn violent practices against 
women as part of cultural traditions that need to be preserved or eradicated, there are 
activists who rely on cultural concepts in their fight for social justice, including women’s 
rights as it can be an effective and resonant social change strategy for building public 
support (Pittman 2009). The blending of transnational rights’ discourse with cultural 
knowledge systems suggests neither a prompt rejection nor acceptance of either situated 
norms or the universalist discourse of transnational human rights institutions. Activists in 
local contexts are “conveyers, converters, adaptors, transformers, and generators,” write 
Rajaram and Zararia (2009: 479), when it comes to the work of turning transnational 
rights into local vernaculars. This means reframing the language or the principles in a 
way that speaks to situated priorities, experiences, and values (Goodale 2007; Levitt and 
Merry 2011; Speed 2007). 
Levitt and Merry (2009) cite the concept of “framing” from social movement 
literature (e.g., Ryan 1991; Tarrow 2011) to explain decisions regarding whether to use 
human rights language. While in some cases, organizations rely on the discourse of 
human rights to appeal to “Global North” donors who privilege such narratives, others 
                                                
10 I use the term “movement”in the singular here with reservations because there are multiple disparate 
intersecting movements circulating globally for women’s rights. My reference here to an “international 
women’s rights movement”is specifically in regards to the organizing work that has been done in the 
relatively top-down policy space of CEDAW and other supra-national legal instruments. 
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use the language to unite disparate social movements opposed to “global hegemony” (de 
Sousa Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito 2005). Perelman and White (2011) work with 
activists who conceive of human rights work as “political practice” that can open up 
“generative spaces” for new discourse and debate that challenges the effects of neoliberal 
globalization by strengthening the social welfare structures in their countries. For these 
activists, the choice to rely on economic and social rights language stems in part from the 
norms of “inclusion, equality, participation, and security” which pervade the international 
covenants (Houtzager and White 2011: 175).   
 Thus, even as I suggest that the dominant narratives of the transnational human 
rights movement risk leaving the targets of their interventions feeling stigmatized, I 
emphasize here the widespread trend of claiming ownership over rights’ discourse to 
offer alternative strategies for change. As Levitt and Merry (2011: 100) write, human 
rights are “themselves cultural repertoires that are open to adaptation and use by people 
with a wide variety of cultural backgrounds.” And, I would add, a wide variety of 
political aims.  
 As the subsequent sections of this chapter show, analysis of gender justice 
discourse on the Thailand-Myanmar border confirms Merry’s assertion that the dialogue 
between a global rights framework and situated mobilization is not a uniform process. 
For example, it is possible for local activists to challenge dominant narratives that portray 
Burmese women as victims waiting for the international community to empower them at 
the same time they circulate and reproduce some of the fundamental underlying 
hierarchies of the human rights and humanitarian industries. Ultimately domination, 
resistance, and alterity are intertwined in the collaborative work of women’s protection 
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on the Thailand-Myanmar border. By looking at the interaction between local struggles 
for gender justice and transnational narratives of hierarchy it becomes possible to explore 
the intersection between the performative reproduction of power relations and the 
possibility of alternative modes of social organization. In the next section I turn to the 
specific context of Mae Sot and the work of select women’s rights organizations.   
 
3. Women’s rights organizing in Mae Sot: merging the transnational and the local 
 
While feminist organizing around rights and nationalism in Myanmar goes back 
at least to the early twentieth century,11 most of the women’s rights organizations 
working in Mae Sot today started only in the mid to late 1990s, around the same time 
NGOs—both local and international—began to concentrate in Mae Sot. The few “Global 
North” scholars who have written on women’s rights groups on the Thailand-Myanmar 
border focused on the close connection between local women’s organizing and global 
women’s rights activism, framing this as a transformative moment for the Burmese 
women’s rights movement in exile; as the impetus for Burmese women’s gender 
conscientization (Belak 2002; Harriden 2012; Norsworthy and Ouyporn 2004; O’Kane 
2006; Snyder 2011). This includes a narrative that displacement is ambivalent for 
                                                
11 Chie Ikeya (2012) provides an in-depth discussion of the role of women in the leftist and nationalist 
struggles that took place in colonial Burma in the 1920s and 1930s. This includes groups like the Burmese 
Women’s Association, which advocated for the institutional expansion of women’s rights. BWA and other 
groups, such as the Young Women’s Buddhist Association and the Wunthanu Konmaryi Athin (Patriotic 
Women’s Association), were heavily involved in student boycotts and other nationalist activities. As Ikeya 
points out, even as some of these groups offered feminist critiques of the status quo, they also embraced a 
role as “supporters”and moral guides for the wider movement and not as leaders. Finally, it is also notable 
that within Burmese women’s organizing during this period, there was a complex relationship with the 
growing “internationalist”feminist movements. Important “South-South”linkages informed Burmese 
feminist work, while at the same time the support for an imperial notion of Burmese women’s 
“emancipation”through colonial intervention among many European and American women members of 
international feminist organizations, such as the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal 
Citizenship (IAW) and the International Council of Women (ICW) created some tensions.  
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Burmese women who “faced new challenges as refugees and migrants with limited legal, 
social, economic and political rights,” but who “were also exposed to new ideas about 
human rights and gender equality through the media and their interaction with 
international organizations” (Harriden 2012: 271).  
The labeling of this moment as ambivalent is important to highlight as a dynamic 
in the relationship between transnational organizing and the lives of Burmese women 
because it suggests conflict; that is, conflict between the idea that displacement is a 
horrible experience and the notion that only due to displacement have certain forms of 
mobilization and struggle become possible. A diversity of scholars suggest that it is on 
this level of internal and collective conflict that one finds the dynamics of and potential 
for social change and transformation (Butler 1997; Coser 1962; Merton and Barber 
1976). But, presenting ambivalence between individuals and extant, fixed, social 
structures (the functionalist Mertonian use) differs from seeing ambivalence in the 
relationship between subordination and subjectivity as individuals struggle with the 
privileging of certain aspects of their identity and the suppression of others amidst 
racialized and gendered relations of power (as Butler conceives of the term). Harriden’s 
presentation of ambivalence above risks making transnational women’s rights work the 
focal point instead of the complex histories of Burmese women that extend far beyond 
the temporal and spatial parameters of the border and exile. As such it reflects the power 
to label certain people as stigmatized and ambivalent and not others, a dynamic at the 
center of this chapter’s analysis. Analysis of women’s organizing in Mae Sot, then, must 
be considered as a partial view situated within the discursive power relations between 
“Global North” and “Global South” movements.   
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Thus, analysis here is less concerned with establishing some “official” account of 
feminist organizing in Mae Sot and more interested in teasing forth some of the ways that 
discourse about and in this movement reflect tension in the circulation and reproduction 
of implicit hierarchies. Within the civil society bubble of this town’s more than 120 local 
and international NGOs, according to recent lists, there are 15 that work primarily on 
women’s rights and women’s protection.12 There are an additional six groups with 
broader objectives, but that do, among other activities, provide services to women who 
have experienced forms of gender-based violence. This section explores four key factors 
that led to a convergence between global feminist discourses and local women’s 
organizing in the Thailand-Myanmar borderlands. Embedded in the outline of these 
factors are excerpts from interviews I conducted with two participants from well-known 
women’s rights groups working in Mae Sot: Social Action for Women and the Burmese 
Women’s Union. These narratives help structure this section by providing examples of 
these individuals’ personal development as activists. 
First, Burmese women and men activists fleeing the 1988-89 government 
crackdowns in what was then Rangoon gathered in Mae Sot along with other locations in 
Thailand, augmenting existing social movements and resistance in exile. This was 
especially the case after the fall of Manerplaw in 1995, the capital of the Karen National 
Union’s Kawthoolei state where many resistance organizations had been based.  
In 1988, I fled [Rangoon] and stayed with ABSDF and worked together in the 
jungle. I served in the area of health, research, and information. I served in the 
jungle for about 10 years. In those days, I went to ethnic areas such as Shan, Pa-
O, Karen and Karenni, Tenasserim Division. There I saw underdeveloped ethnic 
                                                
12 This includes a list put together in 2009 by the Foundation for Women, a Thai NGO and in 2011 by the 
International Rescue Committee (list on file with the author). The list does not include refugee camp-based 
organizations without offices in Mae Sot.  
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places. I also saw them suffering from civil war. I also saw women and children 
abused. (AM-SAW) 
 
Among many of those seeking refuge from the 1988 protests in Rangoon (now Yangon) 
were women activists who were eager to continue the struggle for justice and democracy, 
but who also saw an opportunity to challenge the relatively patriarchal structure of 
resistance (O’Kane 2006). O’Kane explains that although many of her respondents 
recalled a fairly egalitarian student protest movement in the late 1980s in Rangoon, they 
noted a shift when the same students fled to the highlands to wage armed resistance 
against the government. Suddenly fellow male cadres expected women who had played 
leadership roles in various parts of the movement to cook, clean, or work as medics. The 
role of soldier was not an option for most. 
For the whole ABSDF, we had two women in leadership roles. Only two women 
for the whole group. The rest [of the women] were medics and teachers…[or] 
communication officers. (BWU) 
 
 Second, activists fleeing government persecution in the late 1980s were 
increasingly joined by those displaced by economic destruction in Myanmar, as discussed 
in chapter two. This brought a diverse population of Burmese migrants from many parts 
of Myanmar to and through Mae Sot. From the beginning of their displacement, migrants 
faced the sorts of violence and exploitation noted in chapter four, creating urgent demand 
for the organization and mobilization of support networks.   
When I arrived here [Mae Sot] in 2000 I found that many women were in trouble 
in this border area. In meeting with Doctor Cynthia,13 she said many babies were 
left in her clinic. Women who experience abuse also came to seek help. Unwanted 
sex workers also came to seek rescue. Doctor Cynthia said she could provide only 
health services. She asked if [we] could do something? (SAW) 
 
                                                
13 Dr. Cynthia Maung to the head of the Mae Tao Clinic, which was founded in 1989 in Mae Sot. 
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This, along with a drastic rise in abuses faced by those in southeastern Myanmar (as 
explained in chapter two), led to a number of ad hoc formations among the Burmese 
population in Mae Sot for worker’s rights and solidarity, healthcare, and general 
protection.   
Third, the Burmese refugee crisis became an international issue in 1997-8,14 
although starting in the mid-1980s there were a handful of aid organizations along the 
Thailand-Myanmar border to provide assistance to the displaced. Aid money flowed into 
Mae Sot during the early to mid 2000s, much of which was directed toward refugee 
camps in Thailand which became the best-funded in the world, but also to populations of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in southeastern Myanmar. Most of this money came 
from the governments of the United States and the European Union (including the UK), 
and to a lesser extent Japan and Australia. Significant funds and “technical assistance” 
flowed into Mae Sot starting in 2006 when USAID became the primary donor for 
projects assisting “Burmese displaced in Thailand.”15 From 2006 through 2014, they have 
provided approximately 35 million dollars through projects run by international and local 
NGOs.16 This source of aid in Mae Sot deserves to be highlighted in particular because 
this constituted such a major influence in the town’s civil society, not only in terms of 
                                                
14 This was a product of the Thai government’s decision to request the assistance of the international 
community in registering, monitoring, and supporting the welfare of the growing number of refugees in 
their territory. In 1998, UNHCR became involved in refugee status determination proceedings and opened 
field offices. A number of international humanitarian NGOs followed suit.  
15 This pertains to funding to Burmese migrants outside the nine official refugee camps. The camps receive 
substantially more funding per year than projects targeting migrants received in a decade.   
16 This is an estimate of the allocation of funds for two major projects funded by USAID: “Support to 
Health, Institution Building, Education and Leadership in Policy Dialogue”(SHIELD) and “Project for 
Local Empowerment”(PLE). The former project was an approximately 50 million dollar project over 
nearly six years, while the latter was funded with 40 million dollars for four years. Much of this money was 
directed towards humanitarian aid for internally displaced people, some toward camp-based assistance, and 
a substantial amount for projects in Thailand in multiple locations along the border.   
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funding but also because this large sum of money reflected a source of power to push 
organizations and projects in certain directions; that is, toward professionalization and 
partnership with the Thai government. Funding went primarily to groups working on 
health and education, with additional sums financing projects categorized as advocacy, 
legal assistance, and women’s protection.17 
Mae Sot is now both a target and a host for its large civil society presence, which 
divides roughly along the lines of international humanitarian and UN agencies (10%), 
Thai NGOs and foundations (5 %), and unregistered Burmese organizations (85%). Most 
of the international agencies work in the camps or with IDPs while Burmese groups are 
divided by those that operate in Myanmar, those concentrating on migrant issues in Mae 
Sot, and some that position themselves on both sides of the border. Among the 123 
organizations in the town, 70 percent are primarily service groups and 30 percent have 
primarily an advocacy focus, though there are many organizations that do some of both. 
Most of the groups engaged in advocacy are working on issues in Myanmar, likely in 
large part due to the fact that they are mostly unregistered in Thailand. Three of the Thai 
organizations are advocacy focused.   
Finally, the 1990s witnessed the further development of a global women’s rights 
movement, buttressed by action-oriented conferences, such as the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. International laws were also established that 
helped enshrine women’s rights as human rights like the Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women in 1993. The 1990s marked a proliferation in women’s 
                                                
17 Though this dissertation cannot make this assertion, it is quite possible that this shock to Mae Sot’s civil 
society generated fault lines, especially between those groups who received substantial USAID funds and 
“technical assistance,”expanding their workforce and scope, drastically in some cases, and those who did 
not—either because they chose not to apply on principle or because USAID did not award them funds. 
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rights organizing on a global level (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The confluence of activism, 
attention, and aid has meant that since the 1990s, the growth of Mae Sot’s women’s 
rights sector was contemporaneous and interdependent with virtually unceasing waves of 
involvement from transnational agencies. During this decade and into the 2000s, a 
Burmese women’s rights movement in exile burgeoned in a way that capitalized on these 
intersecting factors, heavily influenced by multiple discourses linked to transnational 
feminism, women’s rights, resistance, and humanitarianism (O’Kane 2006). Burmese 
groups formed to both continue the political work of revolution and to order, educate, 
heal, and protect the thousands of workers gathering in Thailand’s border provinces.   
The more than 20 groups who run activities on gender justice do work that is 
familiar to the development and humanitarian sector, including weekly or monthly 
women’s empowerment workshops or dialogues, “capacity building” for relevant Thai 
government agencies and NGOs on proper care for survivors of abuse, community-wide 
awareness raising about women’s rights, and the management of safe houses and shelters 
(Freccero and Seelinger 2013). Seven of these groups (including two Thai NGOs) have a 
strong advocacy focus, though all provide services to women as well. NL from BWU 
recalls that she attended trainings on empowerment, counseling, gender, women’s rights, 
and domestic violence, eventually becoming a trainer herself. An article by Katherine 
Norsworthy and Ouyporn Khuankaew (2004) deals with a six-year project run by the 
International Women’s Partnership for Peace and Justice to facilitate workshops for 
Burmese women on the Thailand-Myanmar border starting in 1997.18 The authors explain 
                                                
18 This is very likely the same set of trainings mentioned by BWU in that at another point in the interview, 
NL states, “We had P’Ouayporn who normally teach about gender to come and be a facilitator. Do you 
know her? P’Ouayporn from IWP.”   
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their workshop’s methodological framework as stemming directly from feminist 
psychology and the Freirian concept of conscientization. The goals of these workshops 
were to facilitate collaborative analysis, “develop culturally relevant solutions and action 
plans for social change,” and “help participants prepare to take the liberatory workshop 
methodology back to their home communities” (Norsworthy and Ouyporn 2004: 265-
266). Specific strategies in these workshops included highlighting personal strengths, 
deep listening to one another, and an analysis of gender and violence against Burmese 
women. Participants determined that such violence results from a “complex web of 
interconnected systems that work together,” including “societal values and belief 
systems,” “religion,” “education,” “media and business,” “legal and law enforcement 
systems,” “government,” “Thai system” (i.e., Thai attitudes and behavior towards 
Burmese women), and “colonialism” (ibid: 273-276).  
While most of these groups run their own activities, the border is a relatively 
small area and it is not uncommon for multiple organizations to conduct projects in the 
same neighborhoods. These organizations have, over the years, also coordinated in 
various referral networks, such as an effort in the early 2000s to establish an “Automatic 
Response Mechanism” (ARM) to respond to the sexual violence of Burmese migrant 
women, a child protection network, and recently, a GBV referral group, focused on a 
broader array of violence than the ARM. Some of this networking stems from local 
organizing efforts, and others are pushed by international NGOs and/or donors. The result 
is a series of monthly coordination meetings, joint trainings, and flowcharts outlining 
collaboration. NGO staff must also juggle these efforts with what is often a busy schedule 
of visitors, including researchers, monitors, and existing or potential donors.   
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Local organizations vary significantly in size, structure, budget, and the scope of 
their work. While some groups are made up of only a couple staff members who have 
other sources of income and who serve primarily as a contact point for their 
constituencies when they encounter problems, others are top-down organizations with 
more than a dozen personnel, several hundred-thousand dollar budgets, multiple 
departments, and thousands of service-users per year. Most Burmese groups, even larger 
ones, are unregistered. Some rely primarily on international funding, such as private 
foundations, governments, or individuals (the latter is especially common with shelters 
and orphanages). Organizations like People’s Volunteer Association, mentioned in 
chapter five, are membership-funded, while some organizations set up certain revenue-
producing projects to draw in funding for their political or organizing work. There are 
also some groups who receive financial support from Thai foundations, though this study 
did not conduct a formal survey of NGOs’ funding streams. Some organizations operate 
only in Mae Sot, sometimes out of the house of the director, and others are multi-site 
entities with branches in Mae Sot, refugee camps, other Thai cities, or across the border 
in Myanmar (in Yangon or towns in or near the country’s southeastern highlands). The 
latter are typically those groups working with the IDP population.    
 
4. Theories of change in Women’s NGOs in Mae Sot 
  
 Within the crowded civil society space of the border are multiple ideas about how 
to affect social change. In order to consider the connections between the discourse of 
some of the activists from local organizations and global messages about gender justice, I 
analyze “theories of change,” a familiar term in the monitoring and evaluation field used 
to describe organizations’ or individuals’ conceptual frameworks for how they can 
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achieve social change (Vogel 2012; for examples or descriptions in the context of gender 
based violence and women’s empowerment, see DFID 2012; Pittman 2014). The 
emphasis on theory is important here because it illustrates the presence of certain 
hypotheses, which are in turn based on epistemological and ontological positions, and 
which underpin the direction of organizational resources (Just Associates 2011).   
As chapter three notes, this study includes key informant interviews with 
representatives from 11 local organizations. Four of these are specifically women’s rights 
organizations, another five are not but have specific women’s rights programs or 
departments, and two groups note that they work on issues related to gender violence 
from time to time. I review how representatives from these groups whom I interviewed 
envisage effecting positive change toward gender justice, particularly in terms of 
reducing violence and empowering women. As the section shows, there is rarely one 
single theory about change within an organization, especially as, at times, activists voice 
several goals or visions towards which they work. I try to show the presence of these 
multilayered and intersectional concepts when they arise in order to illustrate the extent 
to which activists’ narratives interact with broader discourse circulating on the border, 
especially that of humanitarian intervention, neoliberal governance, and export industries.  
 Through thematic qualitative analysis of transcripts, I identify 11 strategies to 
affect change from participants’ in-depth interviews reflecting their personal ideas, and 
sometimes those of their organizations. The interpretive process led me to group these 
into three categories: (1) Transform problematic institutions; (2) Change norms; and (3) 
Strengthen/reform the individual (see Table 8 below). In some instances, participants 
mentioned ideas from two or more of these categories in the same utterance or they 
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voiced ideas that transgressed the lines of the categories offered. For example, the notion 
of engaging with masculinities to prevent gender violence primarily reflects a critique on 
societal norms but can also pertain to ways that individuals need to reform themselves 
(individual men, in this case). This type of permeability serves as a reminder that these 
themes are in no way firm or mutually exclusive, but nevertheless prove useful as 
interpretive guides.   
Table 8: Theory of change analytical categories 
Transforming institutions Change norms Strengthen individual 
Order making Dealing with culture Building confidence 
Pursuing strong legal responses Engaging masculinities Awareness raising/ knowing rights 
Worker solidarity Change gender roles Economic independence 
Political participation   
Advocate for women’s rights   
   
 
One of the central features of most writing about theory of change is that the theories are  
depicted as linear progressions from a problem to a solution; even in the most complex 
analyses this appears to be the case. Different theories may start from the same problem, 
take different paths, and then converge on a shared solution. With this in mind, I include 
Figure 5 below, in which I extrapolated a pathway from problem to solution, based on 
participants’ comments. Thus, while the “intervention” line corresponds to specific codes 
from the data, all other rows come from my own interpretation. Nevertheless, this 
diagram shows how the strategies mentioned in Table 8 are factors of change in this kind 
of linear model.   
 However, as this and the next section show, much is left out by focusing on 
change in this way. I argue that haunting these notions of change are a variety of 
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2012 
Figure 5: Pathways of change for gender justice 
 
narratives that lie in the margins—factors that cannot be quantified—but which 
nonetheless have an influence on social relations (Gordon 2008). These did not always 
emerge in key informant interviews, but sometimes only in migrants’ perceptions of 
humanitarian intervention. The level of analysis focusing on theories of change helped 
me to tease out some of these spectral narratives and assumptions that inform the 
direction and the impact of humanitarian intervention in Mae Sot.  
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4.1 Reforming oppressive structures 
 All but two participants’ among the 11 NGO representatives cited the need for 
broader institutional change in some form or another as a way to achieve gender justice. 
Though quite a general category, this largely refers to emphasis on reforms to governance 
and the implementation of policy in ways that would eliminate discrimination and 
violence against women and create space for their equal participation. During interviews, 
such messages were directed both at Burmese and Thai society. For some activists, their 
idea of change was more about achieving gender equality through greater inclusion of 
women at higher levels of the government and civil society. Others viewed gender justice 
for migrants as bound up in political, civil, or worker’s rights. Together, these ideas 
suggest a view of gender justice as part of a broader struggle for social change. 
4.1.1 Rule of Law 
 One of the most common ways activists framed the need for structural change 
was in their call for greater rule of law when it comes to the protection of migrants. As 
the founder of a women’s rights group focused on health explained,  
The husbands are not afraid and they keep treating women badly. If the law 
protected women more it would be better. If the law that protects the women is 
similar to the human trafficking law, it will be good. In the community, although 
they are advocating about “don't harm the woman,” but the men are still doing it. 
The effort is not working well. I think the only one way that women can be 
protected is the law. (F) 
 
Critical of NGO activities that only raise awareness, F places emphasis on a strengthened 
rule of law as the way to make change. Speaking to Thailand’s Anti-Human Trafficking 
Act and perhaps the less-often enforced Domestic Violence Act, her words suggest that 
greater enforcement of these laws would make a significant impact among the migrant 
households where she works. Implicit here is her analysis of the problem, which, in part, 
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attributes high rates of gender violence to the extra-legal space in which Burmese 
migrants find themselves on the border. Several other women’s rights activists echoed 
this statement and called for the full weight of the law to punish perpetrators of gender 
violence instead of having to rely on the informal mediation tactics mentioned in chapter 
five. Working toward the same goal, a Burmese lawyer explains how his organization’s 
strategy to achieve reform is to strive for test cases that create legal precedent for 
guaranteeing rights for migrant women; “If one case is successful, the rest of the cases 
will be easy,” he explained, optimistically. 
4.1.2 Order making 
 There were also a number of activists who focused on the importance of order-
making, whether legal or informal (such as the technologies of governance discussed in 
chapter five). The sense here is that more order among migrants in labor camps and urban 
neighborhoods would result in a decrease in violence. However, with so many negative 
encounters with Thai law enforcement (as well as the Burmese government), some 
activists placed more emphasis on informal networks or the ability of civil society to help 
make and maintain order. This took a variety of forms, including advocacy for 
“network[s] with other village or other communit[ies] or maybe a higher level,” which 
would enable greater coordination for better responses to gender violence (NO). This also 
referred to “making the existing community system more organized. Like Htone Taung 
which has both Thai and Burmese leaders, having rules set for the people. Giving support 
to the weaker people. Doing things according to the law” (MM).  Thus, even when 
advocating for informal order-making tactics that are essentially outside the law, as 
discussed in earlier chapters, the purpose of these is to ensure a law-abiding space, 
though as chapter five shows these regimes of discipline are not necessarily characterized 
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by gender equality. A significant aspect of this set of ideas is an expansion of civil 
society. If NGOs and their services are pervasive, then when “cases occur, the 
community leader reports to us or sends us a message” (AM) and they know “SAW is 
here, please contact us, SAW can provide these services” (MM). This perspective 
resonates with the discussion in previous chapters, in which discourse about technologies 
of governance reflects some of the ways migrants manage to negotiate a context of 
displacement defined by exceptional legal space in which they are susceptible to multiple 
overlapping forms of structural violence. 
4.1.3 International human rights 
 Activists also framed their calls for change in the language of international rights. 
For the most part, this was in order to advocate for the protection and empowerment of 
women migrants. For organizations that had a labor rights focus, their staff tended to 
offer more of an intersectional perspective in which women’s rights and worker’s rights 
were linked. Two activists working together explained their method of teaching labor 
rights, human rights, and gender during a three-day training for men and women factory 
and farm workers. The gender module dealt with the social construction of gender as a 
category embedded in cultural and normative beliefs. The longer-term goal for this 
training, as one of them put it, is, “to establish a worker’s organization;” a unified 
movement of laborers with the strength of a union to contest their exploitation. When I 
pushed them to explain the specific objectives of the part of their training that dealt with 
gender, they answered, “not to have gender discrimination…so to let them know that 
women’s rights are also human rights…[and] for workers to be able to demand their full 
rights from work” (SH & CM). It is clear that this group emphasizes greater knowledge 
about rights and gender as core to their broader goal of mobilizing a labor movement 
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among migrant workers, though notably absent is a focus on transforming gender 
relations and/or sexualities.  
 On fewer occasions, references to rights meant advocating for institutional 
changes in Myanmar that would bring the country’s laws in line with the principles of 
international political, civil, social, and economic covenants. For example, one head of a 
women’s rights organization explained how she looked at case studies around the world: 
Myanmar will have to try hard…When I attended the workshop on Human Rights 
and Constitutions, I saw a lot of things that I want to copy from constitutions to 
advocate for women’s rights. We can see that in other countries, especially 
European countries such as Norway and Denmark, women are prioritized. 
Women can enjoy their rights. Women who deliver babies, they have rights to 
take leave and even if she wants to work, the husband is allowed to get paternity 
[leave]. Those rights are written in the constitution of other countries. In 
Myanmar on the other hand, people do not even enjoy basic human rights (AM). 
 
From this excerpt, AM is unambiguously calling for constitutional changes that can bring 
Myanmar more in line with “Western” countries, particularly those European states with 
substantial social welfare systems in place. Also included in this type of framework are 
calls for the greater involvement of women in Myanmar’s civil society and opposition 
political movements: 
For us, we see that women must participate in leadership roles.  Must obtain 
decision-making positions. We work so that women’s voices can be heard. So 
women’s voices cannot be left out any longer, because whether they recognized 
WLB or not, they must invite them for any high-level meeting. Because this 
women’s group [WLB] is founded by all revolutionary women’s organizations. 
So we tried to push for this, when the organizations have meetings or whatever, 
they must have WLB’s participation. They cannot leave us out. (NL) 
 
Though NL appears to speak in a way that universalizes the category of “Burmese 
women,”19 this is a significant part of the advocacy platform for groups like BWU and all 
                                                
19 WLB is a coalition of 13 women’s organizations, including a number of ethnic groups, but it is 
noteworthy that there are no Muslim women’s groups in this coalition. One cannot assume a universal 
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the other members of WLB. They regularly refer to UN Security Council Resolutions 
1325 and 1889, which relate to women’s representation in peace building and the 
resolution of armed conflict. Focusing on this view of change, common activities include 
population mobilization (through demonstrations, rallies, and protests), legal advocacy, 
network building with other organizations, and efforts to supervise or guide informal 
Burmese community leaders in their handling of gender violence cases.  
Despite the fact that some groups seem more interested in institutional change in 
Myanmar and others in Thailand regarding the rights of women migrants, the common 
thread in these pathways to gender justice is their targeting of problematic social and 
political institutions. This type of focus is more likely to include an intersectional 
perspective and does not make frequent reference to the role of individuals, either as 
perpetrators or as victims. When excerpts do mention individuals, they are neither the 
cause nor the solution to the violence. Rather, they are social actors governed by broader 
forces. Though none of the excerpts above explicitly root their approach in transnational 
discourse, one can clearly see links to the international women’s rights movement in 
participants’ framing of their goals in language that mentions UN Security Council 
Resolutions or the constitutions of other countries. One also sees parallels to some of the 
modules in Norsworthy and Ouyporn’s trainings (2004) which consider the links between 
violence, government, and the rule of law, among other factors. This contrasts with 
excerpts that appear more rooted in immediate needs, such as order or service provision.   
                                                                                                                                            
women’s platform, as evidenced in this case by the currently polarized social environment in Myanmar in 
which the Muslim population finds itself targeted and discriminated against on multiple levels. This is not 
to say there can be no advocacy for women’s rights as a category, but rather that the differences and 
hierarchies among the female population of Myanmar according to race, religion, and class must be part of 
those advocacy discussions.  
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4.2 Changing norms 
 Moving to the second column in Figure 5, many activists made reference to the 
need to change the social and behavioral norms they see as linked to gender-based 
violence. Like much of the transnational discourse centered on the individual as a cause 
and solution to violence, participants discussed work that encourages migrants to see 
themselves and their relationships differently. This included a push for men and women 
to reframe their ideas of masculinity, femininity, marriage, fatherhood, and motherhood. 
The theory of change behind this notion is that if migrants can change their conceptions 
of traditional gender roles and identities, there will be a significant decrease in intimate 
partner violence in their households. Yet as the analysis shows, participants define and 
deploy culture and tradition in different ways. 
This theory of change is behind many of the NGO programs in Mae Sot and 
elsewhere along the border, especially those targeting not only women, but men as well. 
One of the objectives for workshops is to engage men with the aim of breaking down the 
power and control endemic in dominant notions of masculinity. While there are different 
training methods to accomplish this goal, a common strategy is to bring men and women 
together and discuss the difference between sex and gender, discrimination, and the 
importance of an equitable division of labor in the family and workplace. No participant 
discussed a more in-depth approach than this, or follow-up, though one organization has 
organized men’s groups for these types of workshops. One activist expounded, “Men 
must do more. We must encourage men who have the will to work for women’s 
rights…Only when men understand, men can control each other” (AM). Another activist 
expressed the need for ongoing work “to educate or work together with men to change 
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their behavior in many different ways so that way maybe a few years later, they might 
not—like [may]be the conflict between the family [members] can be decreased” (NO). 
Activists point out that the topic of sex and gender is extremely contentious every time 
they try to include men in the training. “They can never accept it,” one activist said, “Any 
training on domestic violence or gender—some men are very masculine” (NL). Despite 
few gauging this approach as successful, those working with local NGOs on the border—
men and women alike—tend to agree that they need to keep pushing men to change their 
behavior.  
Many NGO activities in and around Mae Sot also seek to model good behavior to 
migrants. This includes projects with names like “Happy Families” (Sim et al. 2014), 
which consist of a series of workshops, trainings, dramatizations, and other collective 
activities to convey good parenting and relationship skills. In the case of the Happy 
Families project, these activities come with multiple rounds of interviews to monitor 
participants’ progress and evaluate the project’s impact. As one staff member from a 
worker’s rights association put it, “We have to show a lot of good examples. Then they 
will say ‘aww…they are doing this and living like this and so they are happy.’ We give 
them the knowledge this way” (ZMT). 
The assumption here is that normative gender roles for Burmese people are 
oppressive to women and these roles are fundamentally static, unmoving. One activist 
explained that in Myanmar, a “traditional” gender dynamic does not lead to violence. 
However, when migrant women and men are displaced, new pressures create tension in 
this tradition “because men and women are working equally,” as he put it. MM continues: 
In Burma, men are working so men are powerful. Here, on the other hand, when 
men come back from work and ask their wife to cook rice, the wife says, “I also 
397 
just got back from work. We both work, so let’s cook together.” Because of that, 
violence happens. Knowledge is different there. Violence against women happens 
more often here as we mostly see that men get back from work and drink alcohol 
while women get back from work and do cooking. 
 
A view of culture as an obstacle to women’s rights and gender justice is implicit here in 
this comment that also illustrates the challenges and pressures migration and precarious 
work places on families. Some activists described the need to persuade women not to 
accept a subordinate role in their marital life. As one activist said, “It was because she 
had a belief according to our culture that these are women’s jobs” that she refused to let 
her husband help her (NL). At this moment during the interview, the participant and 
another woman sitting next to her began to list some of the sayings that have been used at 
different times in Myanmar to assert unequal gender roles (such as those found in the 
Lokanīti, mentioned in chapter five), including “tha ko th’kin, lin ko p’ya” (treat your son 
as your master and treat your husband as your god).20   
To one staff member of a larger international NGO, problematic cultural 
dynamics called for the repetition of their message: “I think if we can do the prevention 
activity a lot and continuously until they can like kind of understand and absorb that, so I 
think they can control their desire and their feeling, so they can respect to each other” 
(NO). Echoing this, an activist with a local NGO used a metaphor to make her point: 
For example, there is a curry pot. If we cook curry in it a few times, the pot will 
get stained. We will have to clean it until all the stains are gone. If this pot has 
been used for a long time, we will now need a new technique to clean this pot. 
Same is true [for migrants]. The traditional belief comes along with them such as 
their own country’s law or their own culture and norms and they are practicing 
this in their daily life. (ZMT)   
 
                                                
20 Translated by Sweet, April 2014. 
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ZMT’s message here is that patterns and norms which lead to and support discrimination 
and violence against women are deeply embedded and require not only repeated 
“scrubbing,” but some new technique to push people to shift their behavior and their 
beliefs.   
 “We have to change the mindset,” as MM put it, “We have to change what they 
already know so that they will be more humane. Then raise awareness or conduct training 
so that they do not discriminate between men and women.” But, importantly, as he 
explained this, MM does not suggest throwing out culture as a vestige of something 
primitive. Rather, he offers a saying to counter phrases like the one above: “lin ta htan 
maung ta ywet” (The husband carries [on his shoulder] and the wife carries [on her 
head]).  
Some NGO representatives looked to Burmese society to find examples when 
trying to get migrants to reconsider their interpretation of cultural and religious 
principles. One local NGO head explained a tactic he uses when counseling men: 
Burmese people are saying that women are low, they should not be allowed to get 
into the Buddhist holy places, get into the temples. If so, in our Myanmar political 
world, is there any man who is more outstanding than Daw Aung San Suu Kyi? 
Say it, anyone, say it if you know such a man. After that, I begin to talk about 
rights.21  
 
Others pointed to their context of displacement as a source of change. For NL, whose 
words elsewhere do suggest she believes strongly in the potential of behavioral change 
workshops, notes that the experience of dispossession pushes women to confront 
                                                
21 While this does not reflect a formal workshop strategy and more of a one-on-one counseling tactic, it 
was not uncommon for Aung San Suu Kyi to come up as a symbol for women in power, though such 
references gloss over the class, ethnicity/race, and religious dimensions of this example; that is, the fact that 
Aung San Suu Kyi is among the elite. Indeed, one of the main critiques of analyses that assert the 
“‘traditional’high status of Burmese women”is the tendency to rely solely on elite Burman women as a 
model to extrapolate to the whole diverse female population (Ikeya 2005).  
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oppressive norms and take leadership positions in acts of resistance: 
Women, whether they are in Yangon or Mae Sot, if they are put together in a big 
group, we find that they become brave. In the past, demonstrations were led only 
by men. Now it is not like that. Women are becoming braver. Now we see the 
uprising of farmers. In Burma, the land is taken away from farmers so farmers are 
demonstrating and the leaders are women. The reason is that women’s lives are 
directly affected by their land being stolen. So depending on the situation, when 
women get too much pressure, they are ready to stand. But here, the difference is 
this is not our country. If individuals are abused for example in the Phop Phra 
area, [nobody] dares to say anything. They feel they are in other people's country 
and they do not have documents. Here, they worry more. (NL) 
 
This excerpt reinforces the notion that the experience of displacement is ambivalent when 
it comes to women’s rights and gender violence, in part because of the multiple layers of 
violence linked to dispossession that these women must navigate. While earlier quotes 
suggest that the pressures of work in the export processing sector and the living 
conditions of the border create tensions in households as they disrupt social and cultural 
norms, NL offers a different perspective. Both, however, point to these norms as 
problematic.  
The emphasis in many of these excerpts on knowledge, control, and change is 
striking. At the same time this resonates with the strategies of many international NGOs 
working on gender justice (e.g., de Mel et al. 2013; Fulu 2013), it also evokes an image 
of deviant men and subjugated women that is important to note, especially because these 
same men and women are both precarious workers and actors of resistance in the 
factories and farmlands of the Thailand-Myanmar border. That is, such interventions 
amount to a level of pressure on individuals to change themselves while these same 
individuals are so pressed in the precarious conditions in which they live and work. 
Without being linked to the intersecting levels of oppression and resistance that both men 
and women experience on the border, behavioral change activities risk reproducing 
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racialized and colonial discourses. Moreover, as presented here, the approach of 
“working with men” is less about deconstructing masculinity, or even demonstrating the 
complex and fluid nature of masculinity, and more about discipline and governance. I 
continue to follow this theme of norms, knowledge, and governmentality in the section 
below. 
4.3 Strengthening individuals  
 The third category emphasizes the role of the individual woman as part of a social 
category and her capacity or agency. Staff of local NGOs stressed that the empowerment 
of individual women was central to their broader goals of achieving gender justice. For 
some, this was their primary strategy, while for others, this was a more minor component 
of a multi-pronged approach. As Table 8 above shows, analysis identified three main 
dimensions to this strategy: confidence building, awareness raising (about rights, 
reproductive health, family planning), and economic independence. The first two 
strategies were more prevalent than the third, and, as I show, continue the theme of 
placing the responsibility on individuals to end violence. 
In terms of confidence building, activists emphasized their role in reshaping 
women’s diminished self-perception. For AM, this was something she learned while a 
medic with ABSDF inside Myanmar in the 1980s and 1990s. “When I was in the Karenni 
area,” she told me, “I met Karenni girls who had been raped by Burmese soldiers, I talked 
with them and I tried to heal them psychologically.” When I asked how she did this, she 
explained: 
As I was simply a medic, at first I only gave them medical treatment. At the 
beginning they did not want to talk about the incident…In order to get their trust, 
we had to listen to their feelings. Listening to them is the first step, then next think 
about what they can do. In the beginning as they were emotionally affected, they 
wanted to commit suicide. So in order to keep them from doing this, I had to 
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listen to what they talked about and then I told them, “you cannot give up. You 
can not give up your life for this reason.” It took a while, like one month or two 
months. After she trusted us, she would tell us more about what happened and 
then we had to help them to feel less pain. At last we persuaded them to come and 
help us in providing medical service. They were not medical staff but they could 
be helpers. For example, when we went to dress a wound for a patient who lost 
his leg we took them with us to help us. That is how we tried to change their 
minds. We wanted them to feel they were helpful. (SAW) 
 
Here, AM draws attention to more of a service-oriented model for change, as opposed to 
one focused on political awakening.  Given the nature of her experiences, the urgency of 
the situation, and the level of abuse with which she was dealing, it is hard to imagine any 
other tactic. Nevertheless, it was not uncommon on the border for activists to underscore 
their organization’s role as non-political and centered on empowerment through service 
or moral and affective guidance.  
For other activists, the work of building individual self-awareness was very much 
a political activity of awakening to their power, though sometimes more explicitly 
focused on affect and self-esteem: 
Women must see themselves first. To find out what they can do, what they are 
capable of. First of all recognize and accept themselves. Right? The ability to 
cook is also work. Right? You may be able to read or not, but as long as you 
know how to do something such as sewing, you can reap the paddy. This is work. 
If you are capable to do these things, that is your quality, you have to value it. 
First of all, they need to have the heart that recognizes its own abilities. That is 
how we empower them. Only after that, we go forward step by step to get them to 
reflect on themselves. Some of them graduated from university but don’t know 
how to speak, cannot make a speech in front of people. Feeling shy. That is why 
we have them practice talking. Then [we] have them value what they can do. We 
begin doing it that way time over time. One time is not enough so we meet them 
again and again and practice that with them over and over. From our observation, 
they begin to have confidence; they dare to speak. They dare to go to the market. 
In the beginning, they did not even get out of the factory. That kind of 
thing…Then the factory owner also threatens them. “Do not go out or the police 
will arrest you.” So they did not dare to go out. Now when we do exchanges, they 
come. They come to borrow books. They begin to have confidence to come and 
go. When we see them come and go like this, we can tell that they are gaining 
self-confidence (NL).  
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 In this excerpt, NL highlights a confidence built first and foremost on the recognition of 
women’s own agency as individuals; realizing that without any training or capacity 
building, women are already empowered with unique abilities and qualities. Importantly, 
NL roots this power in the concept of work, getting women to recognize that they are 
productive members of society with strengths and abilities that they can contribute. Her 
target here is a distinction made between work as productivity and social reproduction as 
subordinate (tied to nature), an assumption that NL is clearly trying to upend. By getting 
women to see the productive value in their everyday work as caregivers, NL puts social 
reproduction and work into the same category, breaking down the barrier between 
notions of masculine and feminine binary categories. At the same time, by mentioning 
sewing, NL is referring to women’s primary occupation in Mae Sot’s garment industry. 
In striving to get women to see this work as illustrative of their productive capacity and, 
thus, their power, NL is speaking to both the dilemmas of oppressive gender structures 
and the exploitative and dehumanizing nature of migrant work in Mae Sot.   
In this way, for NL, individual confidence sits at the heart of a notion of 
empowerment that is political. To her, through confidence building and awareness 
raising, migrant women gain new “ways of thinking” which, in the end, can help them to 
change themselves. Thus for NL, who was cited in the previous section, her work is a 
struggle linking personal transformation and broad-level change; gendered 
conscientization and high-level advocacy to carve out more space for women in Burmese 
society and government.   
 A dominant strategy to achieve the kind of confidence-building NL describes 
above is the establishment of women’s spaces for safe dialogue. A number of 
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organizations in Mae Sot and Phob Phra have initiated “women talk” or “women’s 
exchange” sessions, which take place on a bi-weekly or monthly basis and which 
encourage women to share their everyday challenges and struggles, to build confidence 
about themselves, and to find solidarity in other women in their community or workplace. 
All the organizations that implement this type of activity also use the dialogue space as 
an educational forum in which they impart various lessons to the migrant women who 
attend.  
 At the center of these educational missions is the principle of “awareness raising,” 
an activity known throughout the world of aid work. It is in this context that most 
activists interviewed for this study brought up a human rights discourse. As AM 
indicates, Mae Sot is flooded with the discourse of rights and morals:   
Here [in Mae Sot], they [women] know more about what social welfare they can 
enjoy. They get more general knowledge here. Four, five years ago, they did not 
know any of this, but later, workers know about their rights, especially with more 
trainings and awareness raising [activities] happening. Now, they can access radio 
awareness raising, Blue FM radio for example, pamphlets, workshops, 
discussions, educational opportunities are more frequent, so here, they have more 
knowledge. (AM) 
  
Due to the efforts of local civil society—and often with the funding of international 
donors—AM suggests that migrants can access messages about their rights pretty much 
everywhere and pretty much all the time.   
While the discussion of rights can be in reference to broader structural change, as 
noted above, activists also use rights to refer to individual entitlements and 
responsibilities; that is, as part of a lesson to build ethical citizens. NO illustrates part of 
this angle as she remarks, “So for empowering women, they really need to understand 
that...they have—they have equal rights and then they can say no if they don’t want, 
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something like that, you know.” NL adds that awareness of rights cannot come alone: 
We are thinking rights and responsibilities must go together…We must know our 
rights and we must be responsible. “This is my right so I can drink as a man.” We 
are not talking about such things. We want to say we have rights, but at the same 
time we have the responsibility to maintain our rights. Enjoying our rights at the 
cost of others is not what we want to be [advocating]. We must have self-
discipline and morality. We share this with women, too. 
 
In this sense, there is some burden on women to advocate for themselves and to handle 
their knowledge of rights responsibly. Within this last excerpt, there is perhaps an 
underlying reinforcement of an image of women as demure; they should not interpret 
their new awareness of rights to mean that they can be wild and “drink as a man” even if 
they have the right to. Thus, together with the pathway of individual empowerment 
through the construction of rights-based knowledge are suggestions for how women can 
be ethical citizens of their migrant communities; moral beings within a gender 
stereotyped framework of morality.22 
 A final component of this theory of change relates to advocacy for women’s 
economic independence. Staff of local NGOs occasionally discussed their mission to help 
women secure their financial independence from their husbands. This was in reference to 
“survivors, many women” who “might need the income generation project…to have 
some kind of work and then [they] are able to take care of the family” after getting out of 
abusive relationships (NO). Beyond the context of caring for survivors, NL sees 
economic dependence as one of the key challenges for Burmese women: “Some women 
have the mentality to depend on others. Some men tell their wives, ‘I feed you so just 
obey me.’ Mostly we see cases like that…Women who have many children…have to 
                                                
22 I use “citizen”here not strictly in terms of membership to a nation-state, but referring to group 
membership, as in “cultural citizenship”(Ong 1996), or the multitude of categories of governance and 
subject that derive from migrants’experiences in displacement (as noted in chapter five). 
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depend more…They cannot get themselves out.” Her organization and a handful of 
others have vocational training activities. At least two teach women to sew so they can 
acquire better jobs in factories; a third organization owns a sewing machine for women to 
use and sell garments at a piece rate. Another organization has a plot of land outside Mae 
Sot where women from their shelter go to grow corn and other produce for sale at local 
markets.   
As is often the case with such initiatives, a broader analysis that embeds these 
types of practices within the dynamics of production that are prevalent on the border 
might point to ways that securing economic independence for women in oppressive 
relationships can avoid reproducing the exploitative modes of production that affect so 
many migrants. In general, there is an ambiguity about the pathway to change discussed 
here. At times, activists apply an intersectional lens to their approach and link resistance 
to the unfair treatment of workers with challenges to normative gender frameworks. But 
at other times, these same activists offer a model for change that, at least in part, asserts a 
moral gaze onto women migrant bodies, pushing them to govern and care for themselves 
in a context in which there is virtually no formal social support network in place and 
something of a fragmented but multitudinous set of informal networks. In addition, the 
excerpts presented here to illustrate theories of change in Mae Sot offer a particular linear 
and static concept of norms and change. “Culture,” “tradition,” and “rights” appear as 
value-laden terms and I find that they are located on something of a spectrum or a linear 
chronology which guides us from a past of women’s subjugation in Myanmar, to a 
present of struggle for rights and change, and finally to a future with gender equality and 
without violence against women. Yet, this, I argue, misses whole chapters of Burmese 
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history, which describe decades of activism for the rights and welfare of Burmese women 
(see for example, Ikeya 2012; Ma Ma Lay 1991 [tr. Aung-Thwin]; Maber 2014; Thin Lei 
Win 2014). Perhaps greater consideration or emphasis of these histories as part of the 
complex web of what it means to be a Burmese woman and to struggle for Burmese 
women’s rights would enable a more multi-sided view of culture and tradition as 
potential resources for struggle and not only as the root of oppression.23 Examples of this 
include movements to reinstate the Bhikkhuni, the female ordination of Theravada 
Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka and Thailand (Hindstrom 2014); the literary construction of 
female monastic communities in Myanmar as a refuge from dominant patriarchy (Ho 
2011; Ma Ma Lay 1991 [tr. Aung-Thwin]); and spirit worship in Myanmar as 
transgressive of “normative scripts of heteropatriarchy and the dominance of abusive 
centralized authority” (Ho 2009: 277, see also Brac de la Pierre 2007). 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the ideas mentioned demonstrate activists making 
calculated decisions about how best to advise migrants to survive in response to the torn 
social fabric of displacement; the uprooted, stretched, and sometimes damaged networks 
on which migrants rely; and the social violence of these border economic zones. In this 
context, maybe a more neoliberal emphasis on moral governmentality is an immediate 
solution to a violent situation, even as it might, on some level, reaffirm oppressive 
hierarchies. In addition, this framework appears to be more fundable to “Global North” 
donors pushing implicitly for neoliberal models; an issue linked to “institutional 
isomorphism,” where organizations strategically replicate the organizational structures, 
                                                
23 A useful question for subsequent research here would be whether the presence or absence of awareness 
of this history is more linked to the organizers/informant’s lived experience, more generally to trace the 
mechanisms for learning about these issues.  
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practices, and ideologies of powerful institutions because this sets the standard 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Pittman 2009). To the extent that any of this this is the case, 
as this section has shown, these activists do not make such strategic choices in a vacuum, 
but adopt and translate the transnational discourse of rights to fit their message, a useful 
tool—like culture and religion—to convey moral guidance. Moreover, activists do not 
deal with global discourses in the same way because, as Salzinger (2003: 163) reminds 
us, their notion of struggle for gender justice is a product of their “location within 
structures of gender, nation, and corporation, and the perspectives that emerge from that 
placement.” 
But if self-discipline is a logical strategy, how does this added pressure on the 
individual intersect with workers’ daily personal and collective struggles to make ends 
meet? To deepen my analysis of how messages of change in this context—composites of 
local ideas and an adapted notion of transnational discourse—have an impact on the 
border, it is essential to include an analysis of migrants’ interpretations of these various 
NGO initiatives.  
 
5. Interpreting intervention: bio-welfare and migrant agency in the shadow of 
humanitarianism   
 
 While the many pathways to change mentioned previous section are aimed at 
empowering women and achieving a level of gender justice, it is clear that they also bring 
with them implicit or explicit moral assumptions about the subjects of humanitarian 
intervention. These less visible ethical and situated discourses constitute power relations 
that are, to use Gordon’s (2008) phrasing, “ghostly” in nature in that they edge in on 
dominant accounts of displacement, violence, and the pathways to end that violence by 
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attaching to them universalizing constructs that reproduce gendered and racialized 
hierarchies. Focusing on discourses that are not typically part of the humanitarian 
conversation both reminds us of what is not being said and shows how their “seething” 
presence can have an impact on the outcome of interventions. They are part of the array 
of power relations that course through the borderlands and that constitute a form of 
governance for migrants, albeit one focused on bio-welfare. This section compares the 
theories of change, discussed above, with participants’ tactics in the four communities to 
eliminate violence to explore overlaps, divergences, and the social impacts of global 
discourses on individual and collective efforts to navigate displacement.  
5.1 Discipline and deviance: interpreting humanitarian and rights-based interventions 
 Among the more than 150 participants from the sites of data collection in Phob 
Phra and Mae Sot, there were, not surprisingly, a wide variety of attitudes regarding the 
ongoing interventions of local and international NGOs.24 In particular, migrants had 
distorted reflections of what exactly NGOs were trying to accomplish. While some 
participants’ narratives replicated specific civil society logics and agendas, migrant 
workers also, not surprisingly, put such concepts through their own interpretive filters. 
Specifically, participants tended to frame NGO interventions and the violence in their 
communities as a security issue or through the prism of deviance and discipline. 
                                                
24 Although co-researchers did not inquire how participants view these organizations, they did ask a set of 
questions about migrants’ideas for how best to respond to gender violence and secure the well-being of 
migrants in general, and women in particular. The extent to which migrants included mention of civil 
society in their responses to such questions, often as a perceived source of protection or positive change, 
was surprising, even as such answers were multilayered and, at times, included subtle critiques. It should be 
noted, however, that this may be an indication of some bias in this study to the extent that the assessment in 
migrant sites was conducted for a consortium of NGOs and co-researchers were themselves staff from local 
organizations. That said, throughout this entire dissertation, I regard the dozens of narratives I analyze to be 
situated and partial, reflections of the moment and of relations. Nonetheless, I do negotiate this potential 
limitation in that I do not draw conclusions from this data about whether interventions in migrant areas are 
positive or negative. Rather, as this section illustrates, I am more concerned with the underlying meanings 
embedded in migrants’responses.  
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5.1.1 Deviance and the discipline of intervention 
 Migrant participants in all four sites expressed a desire for some form of civil 
society intervention related to VAW. The most common form of intervention requested 
had moral and educational components. Residents of both rural and urban areas noted 
that violence in their communities might be reduced with regular trainings from NGOs 
focused on a variety of strategies, such as targeting men’s beliefs and behaviors. This 
emphasis echoes the theory of change related to reforming problematic norms mentioned 
in the previous section. However, as the conversation continued, participants focused 
increasingly on how trainings could address the faults of community members as 
individuals. In the words of a community “mobilizer” working with several international 
NGOs, organizations should come to Htone Taung to train ten migrant families per 
month “one hour per day after working hours. By doing this, [participants] will 
understand how to save money and problems between husbands and wives will reduce” 
(HT CW-1R1). In a women’s focus group discussion in Htone Taung, participants 
dialogued about different strategies to address intimate partner violence: 
I: How can we reduce the problems? 
R: It can’t be solved among family members because they may not listen to each 
other. It would be great if the organization came to conduct the training that 
focuses on how married couples can take care of each other. If the men attend this 
kind of training two or three times, they will understand how to live properly in 
married life. 
R3: This kind of training should be provided regularly. Both sides will understand 
more if we tell them like that more and more. Women will also speak politely to 
their husbands. So, the problem will reduce. (HT FGDw-2) 
 
Here, participants suggest that addressing domestic violence needs to come from the 
outside, in terms of explaining the source of problems and imparting moral lessons for 
how couples can get along peacefully together. But participants place responsibility onto 
themselves for actually changing their behavior, and appear to presume that 
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understanding and education from NGOs is enough to bring about that change. The 
assumption appears to be that if men can understand these lessons and that if women can, 
as a result of the training, speak more politely to their partners, there will be less conflict. 
Other participants, like a migrant woman in KM48, proposed “married life education for 
the people in this area to reduce the problems that occur between husband and wife” 
(KM48 F2Fw-1). 
 This excerpt raises serious questions: Do these residents of Htone Taung actually 
believe that they do not know how to “live properly in married life” and that they 
therefore need an outside organization to provide instruction? Furthermore, does this 
excerpt suggest that these participants attribute the violence in their neighborhood to their 
own personal failings as spouses and partners? The language these women use to discuss 
needs for the betterment of their community indicate a level of deviance out of which 
migrants need to be pulled by NGOs offering trainings. Where do such notions come 
from? Is it possible that participants are repeating the messages transmitted to them by 
the many different interventions on the border or just via the assumption among outsiders 
that they are the solution-makers? 
  Within this framework, participants look to NGOs as a sort of moral beacon, a 
source of knowledge, and a safeguard of bio-welfare. In the eyes of some participants, 
this means meeting “the needs of the community” as they look to NGOs who “provide 
contraceptive pills, measure blood pressure, check body weight, measure heart rates 
and…also provide medicines for hypertension and other heart diseases” (KK CW-1R6). 
Stressing the moral aspect, a community leader in Htone Taung stated a need for 
“educational meetings for young girls” because “they came here for work and they are 
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away from their parents so they need to know about prevention” (HT CL-2). In this 
sense, some see the behavioral change initiatives of NGOs as a substitute for the frayed 
or stretched kin networks of many migrants on the border, particularly those young men 
and women away from their sources of moral guidance and discipline. This suggests a 
similar attitude to that mentioned in the last chapter, which mentions the way some 
participants consider violence a product of collapsed social mores.   
 However, with NGOs squarely positioned in this value-laden role, some migrants 
were occasionally reluctant to get help from certain organizations, perceiving the latter’s 
moral framework as restrictive or even dangerous. This was particularly the case when 
women wished to get support from organizations to leave their abusive partners. As one 
participant from Htone Taung recalled, “I did not report to the organization because some 
of them just try to negotiate between the couple to reunite them.” She continued, 
mentioning a memory of an earlier incident with her husband where she did report to one 
NGO head “and he referred me to the religious organization. After that, they tried to 
negotiate…and sent me back home. They always did that when I reported to them so I 
solved the problem by myself finally” (HT F2Fw-3). Participants in Htone Taung and 
Kyuwe Kyan were the most likely to encounter this issue, perhaps because these are 
neighborhoods where NGOs founded on religious principles are more common (or at 
least NGOs that use religious principles to solve problems, e.g., PVA, mentioned in 
chapter five). 
Within these accounts, the guidance of NGOs to live ethical lives contrasts with 
the tendencies of Burmese migrants, apparently immoral due to the conditions of 
displacement. As previous chapters have shown, migrants are aware of the violence 
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surrounding them; as a communicative force, it is part of how participants appear to make 
meaning out of life in the border space. But this dynamic reflects something else; a 
turning inward to point the finger at weak social mores. Putting this trend into sharp 
contrast is the fact that at other points during their interviews or discussions, several 
participants provided analyses of interpersonal violence as a trend linked to the structural 
inequality of the border context, and not in the personal or collective failings of migrants 
as a group that sticks out as stigmatized. I noted some of these perceptions in chapter six, 
but I revisit the issue briefly here. This includes participants who note that when “there is 
a business problem, the conflict between the married couple happens” or that “if 
husbands have jobs, there will be no problem, but without jobs for ten or fifteen days” 
conflict arises (HT F2Fw-1; KM48 CL-2). At such moments, participants identify the 
intense pressure they are under amidst the challenge to make ends meet as one potential 
source of violence in families. Even as this is a partial explanation, and one that does not 
include the myriad other factors linked to war, displacement, and the institutionalized 
violence migrants face, it still suggests a more complex set of factors than what 
participants imply as they stress the need for NGOs to act as educators and 
disciplinarians. 
Though I do not have a conclusive answer for this contradiction, I suggest here 
that this contrast may reveal a process in which migrants are consciously or sub-
consciously framing their conception of strategies to address violence and improve 
wellbeing in ways that mirror the less visible “ideological substance” of humanitarian 
intervention as an outsider-led set of practices (Lindorfer 2009). These include the 
emphasis on individual moralities and qualities as opposed to collective entitlements or 
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structural critiques. As well, it appears migrants are picking up on the reified notions of 
culture that resonate between the global and local discourses of humanitarian 
intervention. In participants’ calls for NGO activities to discipline and structure their 
behavior, they express a level of ambivalence between embracing a narrative describing 
the stigma of deviance responsible for the pattern of violence among migrants on the one 
hand, and the assertion that they can handle problems themselves, on the other. In this, 
what effectively amounts to a kind of devaluation, I find one of the unintended 
consequences of humanitarian intervention. Even if migrants choose to present 
themselves and their communities this way just when they are talking to NGOs (such as 
those conducting the assessment), this still illustrates what migrants assume organization 
staff expect or want to hear (Razack 1995). By maintaining such an unwavering gaze on 
migrants’ bio-welfare and individual morality, perhaps NGOs have unwittingly 
reproduced some of the most subtle and least visible aspects of the social violence 
prevalent in this context of displacement. 
5.1.2 Security and governance  
 A second significant theme in participants’ responses relates to the role NGOs 
play in migrants’ sense of and need for security. In considering how to best address 
violence in and around the community, migrants often noted the need for strengthened 
local level order enforcement mechanisms. For example, a woman interviewed in Kyuwe 
Kyan said, “We need security guards to handle violence” (KK F2Fw-1). A group of 
women in Pyaung Gyi Win discussed the need for “a committee that can help us…the 
kind that can govern and take care of us” (KM42 FGDw-1R1). This reflects a call for 
local groups to keep order, resolve conflict, and perhaps more. In most cases, these calls 
for order were requests for NGOs to step in and play an increased role in governance. A 
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migrant in Kyuwe Kyan felt that NGOs should “select suitable persons as headmen” (KK 
F2Fw-5). For some, this sentiment was linked to the ideas of discipline expressed above 
as group leaders would help “tell us about how we should act and live” (KM48 F2Fw-2). 
For others, the desire for increased governance from NGOs was to ensure women’s 
safety: 
R1: We need a safe place and a committee for everyone to go to when they are 
facing any kind of trouble. But there is no place like that. People are facing 
problems everyday here. Like the place you said Pyaung Gyi Win, there are a lot 
of women working as sex workers. They have no general knowledge about HIV 
or AIDS and their customers are mostly just workers and some bosses. We need 
to have a safe place for them and also to educate them. Because for us guys we 
have places to have fun, such as playing soccer with friends or drinking alcohol in 
the evening but for women they don’t have anywhere to go. That is why I think 
we need safe places for girls; for counseling, playgrounds, and a safe place to hide 
from their husbands, at least, for about a week when her husband drove her away. 
I am just saying what I think. (KM42 CL-1) 
 
Such an idea, which contains overtones of discipline, refers to the need for security for 
women, but also alludes to the unequal domination of space in this labor camp. Women 
in Pyaung Gyi Win may feel they do not have a right to the collective space of the camp 
and, as this group leader suggests, many women may feel that there is nowhere to go 
when they experience abuse inside or outside the home. A woman in KM48 reiterates this 
notion, calling for NGOs to “arrange a safe place for women at other places or in other 
villages” (KM48 F2Fw-11). Similar to this last point, it was not uncommon for 
participants to share the desire for not only trainings but also for the embedding of an 
organization in the community itself. In the words of a community worker in Pyaung Gyi 
Win/Rim Nam: 
I want to suggest one thing. There is a women’s affairs organization at 35 km. 
This organization helps deal with the problems women face with their bosses or 
by reporting cases to CPPCR [Committee for the Protection and Promotion of 
Child Rights]. This organization also works together with village leaders in 
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solving the problems. It is better to have a women’s affairs organization in here. 
So, they can solve the problem with this organization. (KM42 CW-1) 
 
These calls for a greater NGO presence in migrant communities were predominately in 
Phob Phra sites where, even if organizations have a presence seven kilometers away, the 
isolation of farm labor camps means such groups might as well not exist. With the types 
of challenges migrants in Pyaung Gyi Win and KM48 experience on a regular basis—
challenges that are compounded for the women there—it is not surprising that migrants 
call for both greater governance and more regular support for women’s safe spaces. 
Because of the exceptional status these migrants have within the Thai legal system, this 
need is directed toward NGOs and informal technologies of governance as opposed to 
official government representatives.   
 Considered together with the previous section, migrants offer intersecting 
interpretations of the humanitarian interventions that take place in their neighborhoods 
and labor camps. These NGOs are both sources of security and discipline, safety and 
moral guidance. On the one hand, this is similar to what activist informants explain as the 
objectives of their work within the broader goal of effecting gender justice. But on the 
other hand, the individualized focus (as opposed to structural) and the perception and 
internalization of deviance constitute traces of the racialized neoliberal aspects of some 
humanitarian discourses. It is in this way that local activists and staff of international 
NGOs may unwittingly find themselves reproducing a logic of governmentality as they 
allocate resources, conduct advocacy, “educate” men, and strive to help migrant women 
realize and capitalize on their agency in a way that tells migrants that the root of and the 
solution to this challenge lies with them.    
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5.2 Safety tactics, maintaining peace, and solidarity 
 If migrants’ comments indicate that NGOs appear to reproduce some notion of 
bio-welfare and moral discipline in their interventions, an important question to ask is 
whether this is a dynamic reproduced on the community level in neighborhoods and labor 
camps. That is, by looking at participants’ strategies for responding to the conflict and 
violence around them—particularly gender violence—I believe that it is possible to 
further our understanding of how migrants interpret and react to the forces of discursive, 
relational, and institutional power of the border space. In this section, I bring this chapter 
to a close with a look at the tactics migrants use to address the issue of intimate partner 
violence which take place around them. As I show, these are largely ad hoc tactics, but, 
on some level, they contrast with the moral messages of intervention and offer some 
indications for how alternative efforts to make change might take place.25    
 I stop short of referring in this section to the notion of “self-protection,” a term 
which has gained some currency as an analytical framework, especially in the context of 
humanitarian intervention, as some scholars emphasize this as a way of studying 
grassroots strategies for the safeguarding of collective or individual safety (Baines and 
Paddon 2012; Bonwick 2006; KHRG 2010; South et al. 2010). Common moves cited in 
these studies include running away, hiding, lying to authorities, or armed defense. While 
the term is useful in humanitarian policy dialogue because it directs stakeholders’ focus 
to the “importance of local knowledge systems and networks” in the development of 
plans to keep vulnerable populations safe during conflicts and other crises, it also 
                                                
25 I hesitate to frame these actions as fitting any sort of dichotomy between reproductive (of dominant 
discursive framing) and resistant because, as I have noted elsewhere in the dissertation, this constitutes the 
imposition of a deductive rather than an inductive approach to the interpretation of practice. Thus I 
characterize alternative subjectivities and social forms that may be resistant or reproductive, or otherwise 
particular. 
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supplants the complexity of experience and practice with a narrow and deductive lens 
(Baines and Paddon 2012: 232).   
One unpublished paper on self-protection in Mae Sot does, however, provide an 
interesting reference point for this section. On the topic of “personal security strategies,” 
Soe Lin Aung (2011) notes that migrants in the broader Mae Sot area take into 
consideration their social networks, the placement of checkpoints, the likelihood of police 
raids, and space-time parameters (e.g., which route to take at night versus the day,). His 
qualitative research finds that migrants engage in self-protection strategies that include: 
Limiting movement outside one’s home or workplace; moving in groups…; 
choosing carefully when to leave one’s home or workplace; moving to fields and 
forests when authorities raid factories and other workplaces; building and using 
informal warning systems to protect against crackdowns, raids, and the dangers to 
migrants’ persons that result; use [of] supplemental earnings as a means for 
limiting dependence on abusive partners; [and] changing jobs or moving locations 
when a particular employer or working arrangement proves abusive and/or 
dangerous (Soe Lin Aung 2011: 22). 
 
Participants in this study mention some of the same tactics to guarantee their safety. 
Migrants describe exchanging knowledge with one another and remaining attentive to 
where police or other threats might be lurking. As well, some women describe hiding 
money from abusive husbands or diminishing tension by keeping secret dire financial 
situations (a temporary strategy, at best). However, rather than framing these as acts of 
self-protection, I rely on categories that arose inductively from the data. Thematic 
analysis identified 12 distinct tactics that fall within two categories on which participants 
rely in Phob Phra and Mae Sot: (1) peace-making and (2) expanding a space of safety and 
security. An important sub-theme for the second category is the way that migrants’ 
everyday work of making their neighborhood or camp a safe one is an important 
solidarity-building experience as well.   
418 
5.2.1 Peace-making 
 Several practices that migrants rely on to prevent or respond to violence are aimed 
at maintaining peace and order. This is not surprising, given the emphasis of the many 
different technologies of governance discussed in chapter five. In addition to these 
practices of local and cross-border power-brokers, ordinary individuals living in migrant 
neighborhoods or labor camps described tactics to resolve disputes, respond to violence, 
and prevent tension from boiling over into conflict where the primary emphasis was on 
maintaining order. Emphasis was rarely on achieving justice.   
 For example, participants described practicing the same type of mediation/conflict 
resolution tactic mentioned by governance actors. A community volunteer in Kyuwe 
Kyan recalled, “If there is a conflict between husband and wife, I call both of them and 
let them sit with me for a moment. If it is needed, I feed them. When they calm down, I 
help them to get along”  (KK CW-1R5).26 Other participants explained that the best way 
they can help neighbors suffering violence is to make a referral to one of the many NGOs 
or informal governance groups on the border, who often, as chapter five showed, carry 
out some type of conflict management or suppression strategy. Some migrants described 
the tendency to directly intervene when they become aware of an ongoing conflict. This 
was even the case with intimate partner violence, though there were also many 
participants who stressed they did not dare get involved in a dispute between husband and 
wife. In one interview in Htone Taung, a woman made clear that this was a group 
practice: 
                                                
26 As noted elsewhere, it was not uncommon to see the expression of hospitality linked to processes of 
mediating or otherwise handling cases. Local Burmese groups or individuals with little or no source of 
funds for such work often mentioned providing food, drink, and shelter to those who come to them to solve 
conflicts.  
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R1: As we are married women, we have concern for other married women as 
well. If the women are about to be beaten, we have a sympathetic soul for her and 
all the women come out and protect her.  
I1: How do you help? 
R1: We say, “Please stop, if you beat her strongly, she will be injured.” Groups of 
men try to calm down the husband and a group of women try to calm down the 
wife. (HT F2Fw-2) 
 
Aside from the immediate safety of the parties involved in the fight, this type of practice 
is also clearly geared toward keeping the neighborhood calm as opposed to seeking 
retribution or justice for the perpetration of abuse. Nevertheless, at the same time, it also 
reveals an important moment of solidarity among the group of migrants in this 
neighborhood in general, and specifically between women who act together and men who 
play their own role in dealing with the aggressive man.  
As a way of preventing conflict, a woman in Pyaung Gyi Win stresses the 
importance of elders in the camp who “tell the young people not to go out at night when 
it is not safe outside and this is not our country so we have to be very careful.” This 
participant noted that this message can come from any leader or elder, “not only people 
from the family, but respectful people also can tell the youth not to go to inappropriate 
places at inappropriate times. They tell them, ‘It is better to protect yourselves in advance 
before bad things happen’” (KM42 F2Fw-4). This reflects a level of moral guidance in 
this labor camp, where, even as transient spaces, some migrants make efforts to establish 
these sorts of norms and structures. In this sense, while such a tactic emphasizes 
individual morality, the network in place to impart this lesson illustrates a collective 
support structure pieced together in a context of displacement.   
With all of the practices I link here to the maintenance of order, there is an 
ambiguity with regards to how they might impact migrants’ political subjectivity in this 
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border space. As elsewhere, the undertones of individual morality are strong, even when 
practices may be primarily about enforcing norms; migrants are guided away from 
creating conflict or encountering danger, even when the cost might be encouraging their 
neighbor to remain in an abusive relationship. The tactic leans more toward an idea of 
struggling toward personal change over justice. Though similar in the emphasis on 
individual behavior, this approach runs contrary to the rights-based messages of 
humanitarian organizations, which focus more on rescuing vulnerable women, removing 
them from violent homes, achieving justice for the abuse they experience, and working 
toward their self-realization and empowerment. Yet at the same time, the emphasis in the 
tactics mentioned here is on collective strength and social ties, an asset that is highly 
valuable for individuals struggling to get by in a context of displacement.  
5.2.2 Expanding space of safety and security 
 As participants in this study explained, staying safe in the dangerous settings of 
Mae Sot and Phob Phra is an ongoing effort that required innovation, expansive 
networks, and creativity. Migrants avoid checkpoints, come up with alternative remedies 
for illness when it is too difficult to access healthcare, hide in fields when word of a raid 
comes, earn income in different workplaces in case one gets shut down, pay brokers to 
smuggle them across mountains, and pay fees to informal organizations to help keep 
order and liaise with the Thai government. For the most part, these types of practices are 
reactive as migrants find strategies to circumvent obstacles and threats to their safety. At 
the same time, they are based on years or generations of experience both in Myanmar and 
in Thailand. Such experience has helped migrants survive via subversion of rules and 
official practices, which enforce constraints on citizen or migrant bodies.  
However, when it comes to maintaining security within the confines of one’s 
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home or one’s community—when the potential perpetrator is a fellow migrant struggling 
with displacement and an exploitative, violent environment—the risk is, in some ways, 
compounded. This is because the offender comes from within the same group to whom 
the victim might look to for solidarity in order to survive the hostile context. Thus, 
migrants’ responses seem to indicate an effort to carve a community space that can 
provide some notion of safety for migrant women in their own neighborhoods and labor 
camps. Community volunteers often, though not always, play a role in helping to secure 
this space. 
In both Phob Phra and Mae Sot sites, women participants described their efforts to 
counsel, encourage, and support their fellow women migrants. A community worker in 
Htone Taung explained her work with women in her neighborhood who have faced 
abuse: “To feel better,” she said, “it is very important that the victims should talk to us 
frankly or to their close friends from their area about their cases” (HT CW-1R5). A 
woman in Pyaung Gyi Win shared a story about her friend: 
One of my friends went to Bangkok. She was married with a man. Then, he left 
her. She was already pregnant. She didn’t tell anyone about the pregnancy or that 
she was married. She disclosed only when she was four to five months pregnant. 
To be able to comfort her mind we told her “don’t commit suicide by drinking all 
these medicines. There are many women like you, even though we didn’t suffer 
from this exactly. Make your mind to be strong by yourself…It is very usual and 
this kind of thing happens all around the world.” Like that we consoled her. 
(KM42 F2Fw-4) 
 
 When incidents take place within the community or household, women who live nearby 
describe providing various types of assistance, including these sorts of informal 
counseling or encouragement. This includes offering a kind of temporary shelter. 
Participants in three of the four sites mentioned this tactic, including a group of women in 
KM48: 
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I1: Are there any temporary shelters for the women who are violated/ abused? 
R1: They ask help from their friends and stay with them for a while.  
I1: Can you tell a little bit more on that? 
R1: They hide the places where the culprits or rapists can’t reach. 
I1: I mean when the women are abused, are there any places for them to stay for a 
while? 
R1: No… But, we just help her by hiding in our house. 
R5: We save her so she doesn’t have to go to the other places. (KM48 FGDw-1) 
 
An important point to note here is that these participants mention that allowing women 
who have experienced abuse to stay with them is a crucial protection tactic because 
otherwise, these women might endanger themselves by leaving the town or labor camp. 
In this sense, such a move is suited to the dangers of the border context. Migrants in Phob 
Phra expressed the need to be especially creative because many of the services, such as 
shelters or health clinics, are more than 30 kilometers away and on the other side of at 
least one checkpoint. In such situations, their homes become temporary sources of refuge 
for those women in their community who need it. It is worth mentioning, however, that 
this is a complicated tactic in that two participants (one in Kyuwe Kyan and one in Htone 
Taung) described the potential threat they face from angry husbands when they offer 
shelter to victims of abuse. One woman in Kyuwe Kyan described incidents when “the 
owner of a house sends [victims] back home because they don’t want to get involved in 
the problem” (KK F2Fw-5).   
 Nevertheless, such practices are part of reciprocal networks that form some 
semblance of security for migrant women. In addition, participants, particularly women, 
described the importance of relying on each other to travel in groups inside and outside 
their neighborhood to ensure that no harm comes to them: “If we need to go outside, we 
bring friends,” as one woman in KM48 put it (KM48 FGDw-1). Women in these sites 
also reported exchanging knowledge with each other about which streets to take at which 
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times of the day as they encountered experiences with or rumors of thefts and assaults. 
While these are all quite informal tactics, they may have the effect of increasing a sense 
of sisterhood or solidarity between these residents, knowing that as difficult as the 
situation might get, they can still rely on each other for some occasional help.  
 Some of these tactics resemble the activities of NGOs mentioned in section four 
of this chapter. In particular they resonate with the work of encouragement and solidarity-
building; helping women who have experienced abuse to feel they are not alone, that they 
have support, and that they can reclaim agency that their abuser attempted to deny them. 
However, they do not reflect the moralization or stigmatization of victims and 
perpetrators noted elsewhere. Nor do they reflect dependence on the outsider as 
helper/savior, which Lindorfer (2009) asserts has a disempowering effect on local 
struggles. 
So, do the practices outlined in this section bear more or less potential than the 
interventions of civil society to secure the wellbeing of Burmese migrants on the border? 
It may or may not be the case that the tactics briefly outlined here offer the possibility of 
significant change in the lives of migrants or in the dynamics of production. That is not 
for this dissertation to conclude. Nor can we answer whether the work of NGOs and the 
circulation of humanitarian and human rights discourses are making progress for gender 
justice on the ground in the everyday lives of migrant men and women. But what is clear 
is that the moral undertones of such interventions resonate with the moral needs of many 
participants. And yet, at the same time, the practices that appear most welcome or 
common are not those that isolate the individual as a moral being detached from 
structural determinants but, like the examples provided above, those that divert the 
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individuating influence of the production systems on the border by asserting a kind of 
subaltern solidarity, albeit one that is not always liberatory. By individuating influence 
here, I mean the combination of factors associated with farm and factory work that 
eliminate free time through long working hours, emphasize competition and individual 
welfare, and instill uncertainty which leads to high rates of turnover and thus transient, 
unfamiliar, and detached, communities. On this level, the maneuvers to promote 
collective safety and solidarity constitute tactics as Michel de Certeau used the term, 
referring to those practices that manipulate relations of domination for alternative 
purposes. As such, they do not offer revolution, but a far subtler power. They bear 
potential to disrupt the performative and iterative reproduction of discursive and practical 
constraints on migrants’ lives and identities and to offer something born of these 
conditions, but alternative.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
 In a dissertation concerned with the agency of migrants and their production of 
alterative political subjectivities in structurally violent border economic zones, this 
chapter has identified the ambiguous role of humanitarian and human rights NGOs. On 
the one hand, with migrants denied basic rights to health, security, and life, these 
organizations work tirelessly to meet tremendous needs on many levels. On the other 
hand, these same groups constitute an additional layer of governance regulating Burmese 
migrants. Supplementing the influence of local law enforcement, employers, community 
leaders, and cross-border political networks are humanitarian NGOs that intentionally 
work to order migrants in ways they think will improve their lives. As I have shown in 
this chapter, evaluating whether these groups effect positive change is not easy because it 
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is necessary to look on multiple levels, some less detectable than others. My effort here 
has been to look beneath the more obvious relationship between transnational 
humanitarian intervention and local lives, less to point the finger at NGOs and more to 
understand how analyzing their work can contribute to responding to this dissertation’s 
questions about subjectivity and border spaces.  
  I have attempted to make visible some relations of social violence that often 
remain hidden. Through an analysis that is centered on three levels of discourse, I suggest 
here that it is possible to identify the paths of suppressed knowledge circulating and 
mutating between disparate locations. These three levels—international human rights and 
humanitarian discourses, local NGOs operating on the Thailand-Myanmar border, and 
Burmese migrants who are the target of these NGOs’ activities—are interconnected via 
circuits of information, logics/agendas, and money. As such, there is no question that 
influence and knowledge resonate among these levels; indeed, it is the explicit goal of the 
first level to affect the second and the goal of both the first and the second to affect the 
third. As well, local social movements strive to change transnational positions and 
discourses through a variety of forums. But, concrete objectives aside, just how invisible 
messages transmit across borders and languages—how they refract amidst the multitude 
of other force relations that constitute a social field is a different matter. I have suggested 
here that a study on the level of what Avery Gordon (2008) calls the “ghostly nature” of 
“haunting” can help to begin to untangle this complex set of discursive relationships in a 
way that might render greater understanding of material realities.   
 Applying this type of discursive and inductive analysis to the qualitative data of 
this study underscores the many ways in which contemporary humanitarian interventions 
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and transnational organizing for women’s rights are often entangled with gendered and 
racialized representations redolent of imperial linkages and certain neoliberal ideologies. 
With a particular focus on gender and gender justice, I have drawn attention to the slant 
within the human rights and humanitarian industries away from broad feminist critiques 
and toward an individualized and moralized narrative of bio-welfare. And I offer the 
notion of stigmatization and ambivalence as a way to frame the directionality and some 
of the effects of those gendered and racialized representations.  
 Through this multi-layered analysis, I have shown that narratives of individual 
morality and responsibility—goals of ethical citizenship—resonate within local NGOs’ 
conceptualization of gender justice and change, and among the population of Burmese 
migrants. But this resonance is not “clean” or linear. It is messy and complex in that 
migrants and migrant activists on the border encounter many disparate but intersecting 
forms of discursive and material power that assert certain knowledges, hierarchies, and 
technologies of governance while subverting others. It is rarely clear that participants are 
“speaking” to one set of logics or another, or to any at all. Nevertheless, it is not possible 
to ignore the constant seething presence of certain constellations of gendered ethics, 
which seem to lurk just under the surface or beyond detection. To the extent these ethical 
frameworks materialize in migrants’ perceptions or daily practices, it is crucial to surface 
these ghostly relations and discourses and to determine how those groups wishing to do 
well can confront their own perpetuation of socially violent representations.  
 427 
Chapter 8—Conclusion 
 
 
1. Erasure 
 
When I started this dissertation research, there were 86 homes and over 400 
residents in the Kyuwe Kyan settlement. As I conclude, only ten houses remain. During 
the June 2014 raids on undocumented migrants throughout Thailand (mentioned in 
chapter four), the Thai landlord of Kyuwe Kyan, reacting to pressure from local 
authorities, gave his residents 24 hours to get off his property. Despite an intervention by 
the Thai-Muslim council of Mae Sot to stay their removal, on June 12th at 4:30 am, Tak 
immigration officials and soldiers from the Thai army swept into the settlement and 
picked up dozens of people while the rest fled into nearby fields. This was not the first 
time Mae Sot authorities had raided the settlement. Only a year before, Thai security 
forces arrested a number of residents, threatening to deport them all. But while the 
authorities in the previous raid relented and allowed migrants to return home, albeit in a 
state of uncertainty, in June 2014 the new military government was eager to show a firm 
response to illegal migration. People in Kyuwe Kyan were made to disassemble their 
homes, clearing the lot. Of the 89 migrants arrested, immigration officials separated 
families according to those with children in school and those without. They allowed 12 
adults and their 34 school-going children to remain, but deported 43 people, including 
those kids not in school the same day (MRPWG 2014). Precluded from rebuilding, the 
rest of the population who had fled during the raid —about 300 people—found 
themselves homeless.   
Today the fields behind the buffalo enclosure look empty save for a few dispersed 
houses. With each disassembly and re-assembly the homes look less stable, more hastily 
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put together, as if residents know that they need not bother constructing something that 
will last. It is just as possible that the place will remain nearly empty as it is that 
eventually more people will rebuild or that newcomers will arrive in the way that Kyuwe 
Kyan and other informal settlements fluctuate and shift between people’s movements and 
the actions of security officials and landlords. But regardless, it is a place scarred by 
erasure; a place and a people that represented a “threat” for authorities, and even for 
many other Burmese in Mae Sot. Looking at Kyuwe Kyan now, one cannot tell that it 
was full of homes a few months ago aside from the scattering of materials and household 
objects in the grass. Perhaps it will easily fade from the town’s collective memory. Even 
if it gets rebuilt, the ease with which Kyuwe Kyan disappeared and with which it is 
possible to forget about the people who lived there, the social ties that might have made 
this a community to some, and the experiences they faced together, all reflect the 
violence of this erasure.  
Incidents like the raid are reminders of not only the instability of houses that are 
easy to take apart, but also the precarity of the social relations that helped people get 
through their daily lives together, resolve conflicts, and maintain some level of peace and 
order. However, like homes unbuilt and rebuilt and people who have separated into other 
sites, it is likely the elements of social networks and social ties discussed in the preceding 
pages have not totally disappeared but have adapted and shifted again, under the duress 
of repeated displacement. This is part of what makes the subjectivities discussed in this 
dissertation unique to dispossession and borderlands.  
The erasure also places the village clean-up and my observations described at the 
beginning of this dissertation into stark relief with the reality of people’s lives. In some 
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ways, like much of what this dissertation discusses, such events demand affective 
reactions like outrage, compassion, or solidarity before an academic response can be 
formulated. Nevertheless, reflection pushes me to ask what the imperatives of a written 
work are when so many of its subjects continue to face abuse and when the space they 
inhabited during the course of this research has been eradicated. In one sense, the 
violence of the act speaks to the urgency of work on migration and displacement in 
places like Mae Sot and the Thailand-Myanmar border. But it also raises an 
uncomfortable question with which I must reconcile: What does the work we do mean in 
the face of a raid that wiped out an entire community? What can NGOs like the one 
conducting the clean-up learn from this violence and from what might suggest a kind of 
futility to their work? Relating to this work, as I bring this dissertation to a close, the 
dispossession of Kyuwe Kyan’s residents places the intellectual exercise of writing into 
perspective and pushes me to ask reflexively what the implications of this work’s 
findings might be. I divide this last chapter into four brief sections that discuss what this 
study’s findings can tell us about  migrants’ lives and state and market practices in 
Southeast Asia at a time of change as well as research in borderlands and contexts of 
displacement. 
 
2. Migration in a changing context: territory and borders 
 
 As this dissertation is concerned with the multiplication of borders through the 
performative reproduction of migrant precarity, it is important to consider some of the 
ways that these hierarchies might relate to social and political change on a broader level 
in Thailand and Myanmar. As noted throughout, while I regard the lines of difference and 
homogeneity imposed on migrants to be, in many ways, a product of the Thailand-
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Myanmar borderlands and its history of socio-spatial hierarchization, I also find that the 
articulations of boundaries are increasingly enacted on migrant bodies in ways that 
correspond to the demands of industry. This means that the structural violence discussed 
in this dissertation is not limited to territory of the Thailand-Myanmar boundary; the 
dynamics of migrant disposability are reproduced every time migrants encounter social 
actors who see them as alien “others” for whom inhumane treatment or conditions are 
normal, appropriate, or inevitable. In this sense, migrants carry borderland spaces of 
exception on their backs wherever they happen to be in Thailand, whether inside or 
outside specially designated spaces such as Export Processing Zones (EPZs) or refugee 
camps.  
   However, part of what this dissertation’s findings suggest is that the 
multiplication of borders involves a set of practices that is intertwined with but also 
beyond market and state regimes of discipline. If gendered migrant subjectivities involve 
the biopower and violence of state actors and factory managers, they are also made up of 
transnational and situated political and social networks, which assert their own ordering 
practices and discourses, as this study shows through its analysis of the resolution of 
social conflict and intimate partner violence. The rise of informal leaders, their tactics for 
handling disputes between Burmese workers, and the narratives of home, tradition, 
custom, and gender that arise from these processes play a significant role, both to help 
migrants make meaning of their experiences and as a form of governance. One of the 
significant findings of this dissertation is that there is no single technology of discipline 
in spaces of exception, or for exceptional populations. Rather, collective and individual 
life that has been rendered precarious finds order in a diversity of fractured, partial, or 
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mutated sources, some of which support the aims of production networks and some of 
which assert alternative modes of social organization; that is, some of which can be 
attributed to the state or the market, and some of which come from elsewhere—whether it 
be a retired neighborhood police officer or a group affiliated with an ethno-nationalistic 
insurgent group.   
Yet, as this dissertation shows, it does a disservice—or worse—to call these 
alternative forms signs of resistance and stop there. This is because while such situated 
mechanisms for maintaining social order can foster a kind of solidarity in the face of 
pressure to individualize and accept unjust conditions, they also often appear to 
reproduce their own kind of biopolitical management of workers. The gendered discourse 
of such disciplinary practices often affirms dominant ideas of femininity and masculinity 
that displace the challenges and pressures of life in precarious conditions to the roles of 
men and women in migrant worker households. Explanations for the violence of 
everyday life, both structural and interpersonal, link to ideas about how men and women 
should be behaving. And the strategies to manage conflicts, including intimate partner 
violence, often seem to involve an invocation of “traditional” and “customary” gender 
identities to avoid trouble and combat the ways precarious life corrodes social mores. 
Even the memories of conflict resolution in Myanmar tell us something about how 
gender, violence, governance, and culture are contested concepts integral in various ways 
to surviving displacement. The ways in which these practices and discourses produce 
gender show us the complexity of what one might otherwise call “resistance,” by 
reminding us to ask, “resistance for whom and to what?”  
With this in mind, subsequent research might ask how the parallel structures of 
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discourse and identity-making manifest themselves beyond the territorial borderlands.  
Do all migrant spaces have a similarly lawless reputation—that is, are they considered 
beyond the law to the extent that people there rely on parallel mechanisms of order-
making? Is there a similar heterogeneity in ordering regimes? Do transnational networks 
of power extend everywhere in Thailand where migrants work and live? And even if they 
do not, can one still argue that gendered subjectivities of flexible laborers are always just 
as contingent on a laborer’s agency as it is on state and market biopolitical forces?   
These questions are highly pertinent in considering how the relationship between 
migrants’ lived experiences and the reproduction of their subordination is likely to play a 
role in the future of labor practices in Southeast Asia. In fact, as noted at the end of 
chapter 2, migrants and the low-cost labor-intensive work they do are central to the 
development plans of the region. However, besides the potential of building Mae Sot into 
a node on a regional transportation and production network, investors around the world 
are interested in Burmese workers in Thailand as they regard Myanmar as a potential 
gold mine in terms of both “untapped” or underutilized labor resources and consumer 
markets (Boot 2014; Fujimatsu and Moodie 2015). Billions of dollars of foreign direct 
investment have poured into Myanmar in the last three years. The country has received 
increasing amounts since first initiating political changes in 2011, and expects to receive 
over five billion dollars in 2015 (World Bank n.d.; Mooney 2014). Part of the inflow of 
funds has gone toward infrastructural development and the construction of SEZs (Special 
Economic Zones), including extremely ambitious projects in Thiwala and Dawei, which 
include thousands of acres designated for industry, highway construction, and a deep-sea 
port. Investment in infrastructure to establish these zones throughout Myanmar is based 
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on the assumption that the millions of young Burmese in that country and the millions of 
migrant workers in Thailand and elsewhere will be eager to fill up factories closer to 
home. This has Thai industries nervous about the potential impending labor shortage; one 
source of motivation for the government to make it easier for migrants to stay longer.   
The question seems to be which economy will get to benefit from low-cost 
Burmese labor. In this sense, the value placed on a migrant identity in Thailand is not 
moored to sites of production in Thailand, but seems to adhere to the population itself. 
Thus, as Southeast Asia increasingly takes on a powerful regional economic identity, 
embodied in the single-market ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the Asian 
Development Bank’s economic corridor schemes, and the Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific, I would argue that it is not only the territory that will appear variegated in its 
manifestation of sovereignty and market disciplines, but rather whole populations who 
are considered in terms of their labor-value, maybe more than their nationality, with some 
as low-wage, others as middle class consumers, and others as technical experts. As 
Aihwa Ong suggests (2006), this is a dynamic already playing out on some level in 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This arrangement is central to what will grow the 
AEC—home to ten percent of the world’s population—at a rate set to outpace the 
economies of the US, EU, and Japan by 2020 (Hodal 2015). 
  With investors skeptical that these sites may not draw sufficient labor to be 
profitable, and with Thai firms anxious about their supply of cheap labor, it is clear that 
the disciplinary regimes of exceptional spaces are key to the region’s development 
agendas. What technologies of governance are we likely to see as centers of production 
shift? What role will migrant’s social and political networks play in furthering or 
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inhibiting efforts to make these spaces profitable? And what kind of gendered 
subjectivities will these forces combine to produce and reproduce? Such questions point 
the way for future research on migration, borders, and labor in Southeast Asia.  
 
3. Subjectivities on the move 
 
In addition to thinking about how these broader-level shifts relate to the dynamics 
of migrant spaces and collectivities, this dissertation raises a number of questions about 
how violence and precarity interact with agency in the lives of migrants navigating 
displacement. I show that in migrants’ narratives about violent life outside and inside the 
home are gendered ideas about why abuse takes place and how women and men should 
live their lives. While scholars have looked at the way perpetrators can use acts of sexual 
violence to strip individuals of their humanity, I show that for those participants in this 
study who are surrounded by but may not always directly experience such acts, the result 
is not an erasure of their humanity but rather its gendered reconstitution in a space of 
dispossession. The narratives are useful mechanisms for migrants to help explain the 
nature of life in Mae Sot and Phob Phra. Precarious life is violent and there are specific 
ways men and women can look to their masculinity and femininity to avoid trouble. That 
is, precarity, violence, and gender are mutually constitutive. This suggests that the 
particular gendered subjectivities with which migrants grapple in spaces of dispossession 
can constitute resources for navigating its visible and invisible brutality, even as they 
sometimes also signify sources of restriction. On a more general level, this set of findings 
calls for a scholarship on displacement and migration that conceives of movement as 
contingent not only on tangible costs and benefits, but on more nuanced calculations 
based on gendered perceptions of how to get by.  
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This is not to say that gendered strategies for explaining violence and making 
order are necessarily forms of constraint on men and women. They can also manifest 
themselves as tactics for security as well as the organization of collective efforts and the 
expression of certain solidarities. I illustrate this point in two different places. First, in co-
researchers’ recollections of how they developed as activists in Mae Sot or elsewhere on 
the border, one sees how individuals’ particular responses to the violence they 
experienced and/or witnessed in the process of being uprooted from home in Myanmar, 
or amidst the conditions of life in displacement, led to particular social change agendas 
and particular efforts to organize people around them in the name of social and gender 
justice. And second, the tactics of migrants to respond to gender violence in their labor 
camps and settlements that involve forms of neighborly reciprocity, as opposed to 
authoritative leadership, are important moments for the articulation of agency and the 
formation of social ties, including in ways that are sometimes subversive of extant power 
structures. I show, however, that at the same time, these sites for the articulation of 
relationships and identities that embody expressions of resistance must also be considered 
for the way they may privilege certain knowledges over others and reproduce power-
laden sets of ethics. 
By pointing to the double-edged nature of these border subjectivities, I show 
reflexively the ambiguity in the “critical border thinking” that helps surface discourses, 
affect, gestures, and practices which appropriate and redefine the terms of dispossession. 
Continuing from here, further research is needed to consider what these kinds of 
gendered exertions of agency in spaces of dispossession could mean for women’s rights 
organizing in Thailand as well as in Myanmar. Rather than assuming that gender justice 
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work on the Thailand-Myanmar border offers a more global struggle for women’s rights 
than the movements taking place now and in the past in Myanmar, subsequent studies 
might look to the way that the particular solidarities and networks formed in Mae Sot, 
which often extend across religious and ethnic lines, bear potential to bring ethnic and 
ideological diversity to struggles in Myanmar, a place in the process of fracturing under 
the strain of religious and ethnic tensions.   
With acts of violence occurring all over Myanmar as mobs identifying as 
Buddhist nationalists attack Burmese Muslims, there has been a rise in religiously and 
socially conservative activism. This includes the 969 anti-Islam movement that calls for 
boycotts of Muslim businesses, and that is believed to be behind the incitement of riots 
that led to the destruction of Muslim properties and homes (Marshall 2013). As was the 
case in certain nationalist movements in colonial Burma, this religiously conservative and 
racialized discourse contains a gendered dimension as well in that it places responsibility 
on women to embody religious and racial purity (Ikeya 2012). Such moves are 
contemporaneous with broader political changes that include some increased openness 
for civil society, such as advocacy for greater inclusion of women in peace talks between 
the government of Myanmar and ethnic armed groups, as well as a campaign under way 
to add national legislation to specifically address domestic violence, and violence against 
women more broadly (Thin Lei Win 2014). All this indicates a crucial moment for 
gender justice activism in Myanmar (Maber 2014). With this dissertation’s findings in 
mind, it would be useful for subsequent research to ask how the modes of social 
organization and personal perceptions of gender and gender justice in Mae Sot might 
intersect with and influence these various movements in Myanmar. Will the salience of 
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conservative narratives of religion, culture, and gender that are prominent in Mae Sot as 
forms of order-making fuel Myanmar’s divisive politics? And how will the critique of 
culture by many women’s rights activists in Mae Sot relate to gender justice campaigns in 
Myanmar that rely on cultural symbols and metaphors as part of activist framing? 
Furthermore, perhaps, the experience of learning how to protect one another in a space 
where individuals cannot rely on the rule of law for support—both during experiences 
with internal displacement in Myanmar as well as on the Thai side of the border—will 
prove useful as parts of Myanmar continue to struggle with governance in ways that leave 
men and women vulnerable to violence. Such questions would be important in 
considering how border subjectivities interact with broader political and social forces in 
migrants’ places of origin. 
 
4. Turning analysis into action  
 Although this dissertation is rooted in a collaborative action research project that 
resulted in a series of activities and networks that continue to operate in Mae Sot and 
Phob Phra, the urgency of the context and the sense of insufficiency that comes in the 
aftermath of incidents of mass violence such as the raid mentioned above engender 
reflection of what else can be done. On the one hand, findings from this study do reflect 
that migrants’ everyday lives could be improved with certain changes to Thai policy, 
such as the establishment of a more permanent and stable legal status for migrants, 
obtainable more easily at no expense (or a reasonable expense) by migrants (as opposed 
to their employers); the extension of social protections to migrants in a way that improves 
access to healthcare and education; and stricter enforcement of pay and labor conditions; 
to name a few.   
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But on the other hand, with this dissertation’s focus on the more nuanced level of 
discourse, gendered subjectivation, and knowledge production, results underscore the 
importance of subtler and more localized changes as well. As the social actors in the 
context with the explicit aim of bettering migrants’ lives through concepts of 
“empowerment,” “participation,” and improving their access to basic human rights, I look 
to humanitarian and human rights agencies—both local and international—as responsible 
for certain reforms. Though it will not stop raids and deportations, this study’s findings 
suggest a number of practices among NGOs and CBOs that could help make their work 
more supportive of the struggles in migrant collectivities for a safer and more just 
existence. This includes agencies being more in tune with the multiple lines of difference 
that intersect labor camps and impose hierarchies that are not invisible. Outsiders looking 
to effect positive change might strive for greater awareness of ongoing practices in 
migrant spaces that enhance security and solidarity. It is crucial to distinguish between 
these, which are often less visible, and those initiatives that work more to maintain order 
by imposing other hierarchies. There may be ways for outsiders to support the subtle 
forms of solidarity-making and care in migrant sites, or perhaps the greater need is to 
understand when not to get involved in recognition of the fact that situated tactics to 
subvert or circumvent unjust systems sometimes need to be left alone rather than 
professionalized.     
In regards to the work of many humanitarian organizations striving to empower 
women, this dissertation stresses the importance of a broader gender analysis that takes 
into consideration not only family dynamics, but also the nature of life in displacement, 
and the political and economic structures of power that are built on gender injustice. This 
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broader analysis would include the ways in which people tend to project the dilemmas of 
displacement onto social and cultural forms in ways that reflect and affirm patriarchal 
structures. It would also relate to the fluidity of culture and gender categories; that is, 
how, rather than adhering to static structures, migrants are, in fact, engaged in the work 
of producing and reproducing cultural forms and gendered subjectivities as they find 
ways to navigate the violence of displacement. Among humanitarian agencies, a dynamic 
and constructivist perspective like this could help ensure that project goals are in more 
solidarity with participants and not overly concerned with upholding neoliberal gender 
values.  
Finally, this study’s findings point to the importance of interrogating the diverse 
and sometimes invisible hierarchies that are pervasive in humanitarian and development 
work. This implies the need for greater reflexivity in the work of NGOs who could go 
beyond the analysis of whether or not they are “harming” their service users to examine 
how the power and privilege of their institution and staff influence the production of 
knowledge and hierarchies, even during efforts to ensure “empowerment” and 
“participation.” Though these comments essentially call for humanitarian agencies to 
slow down their work, embrace a more nuanced analysis of the context, and localize their 
goals in order to fit situated needs over donor demands, such recommendations are not all 
that new and echo some of the critiques to which humanitarian actors have been 
attempting to respond for some time.  
 
5. Knowledge production and the imperatives of research in contexts of 
displacement 
 
 As the previous section makes clear, I consider as crucial reflexivity and praxis in 
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research on displacement and violence. At the core of my analysis of migrants’ practice 
and discourse in Mae Sot and Phob Phra is the question of how discourse translates into 
material realities and consequences. This includes asking how the knowledges and 
agendas of the collaborative action research project that informed this dissertation 
circulate as a form of power that interacts alongside other relations to reproduce and/or 
challenge inequalities. My analysis, and that of the co-researcher group, was part of the 
construction of knowledge about migrants’ lives, which not only risked essentialization, 
but in fact led to tangible projects and interventions designed to affect people’s lives. The 
contours of such activities were informed by our collaborative assessment of the 
particular dimensions of need. A reflexive approach has helped to point me in the 
direction of the subtle or not so subtle ways that the knowledge and privilege that directly 
and indirectly informed the research might have seeped into participants’ daily lives and 
self-conceptions. As noted elsewhere, contexts of dispossession are often sites of not only 
flexible labor and precarity, but also biopolitical interest, whether in terms of 
humanitarian intervention, the focus of researchers, government agencies, or other 
sources of neoliberal and bureaucratic authority. If this dissertation makes a 
methodological contribution, it is to insist that a reflexive approach is key to research on 
displacement because it enables an analysis of contingent social forces that resonate 
between the local and global and that, in some cases, operate in subtle ways.  
  This means that praxis is necessary, not only when focusing primarily on the 
impacts research or the institutions supporting research have, but on any work in sites of 
dispossession and violence. This approach signifies an insistence on focusing on 
difference, the production of hierarchy, and the perspectives that come from the 
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interstices between what appear to be seamless categories. To do this is to interrogate 
scholarly approaches; to assess the extent to which they overlook particular voices or 
knowledges in the way inquiry and analysis are structured. This is important not only 
because it may provide for a more nuanced study of process, discourse, and practice. It 
also offers researchers from the “Global North” a way to engage the power they bring to 
the context, interrogate it for the way it contributes to the production and reproduction of 
certain hierarchies, and identify how it reflects the broader flow of discourse between 
global and local spaces. Such a perspective enables researchers to be more mindful of 
their relationship to the social violence inflicted upon dispossessed peoples.  
But a call for reflexivity in researching displacement is about more than trying not 
to further inflict forms of invisible violence onto participants. It is also a way to navigate  
a course of what Lykes (2013: 776) calls “informed empathy and passionate solidarity.” 
Emphasis on thinking with and not just about participants relates to this, and is what 
enables one to more fully be an activist-scholar that “accompanies” participants’ journeys 
as they find their way amidst the immense violence of dispossession and precarity. 
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